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ABSTRACT 
NAZI DOMESTIC PROPAGANDA AND POPULAR RESPONSE9 1943-45 
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Ph. D 
by 
Gerald Anthony Kirwin 
Department of Politics 
This thesis is a study of the effects of totalitarian propaganda 
in a period of unrelenting crisis. Its importance as a totali- 
tarian state and the vast amount of documentary material 
available make Nationai Socialist Germany of 1943-45 an"ideal 
subject for such a study. As long as Germany was confronted 
with a generally favourable military situation, as was the case 
in the years 1939-42, the work of Nazi propagandists was a 
comparatively easy one. The Stalingrad debacle in the winter of 
1942-3, however, marked a turn not only in Germany's'military 
fortune, but also in domestic morale and response to propaganda. 
Nazi propagandists, now deprived of the favourable context, faced 
their first real test and were compelled to create a substitute 
for the increasingly unwelcome real world. It is shown that the 
German people's recognition of the growing rift between this 
propaganda-ersatz, "world" and the reality of the military 
situation resulted in a fall in Nazi propaganda's reputation 
for truth and trustworthiness, as well as an increasing 
dependence on alternative, eve I n. forbidden, unofficial information 
sources (e. g. rumours, foreign radio stations, the accounts of 
soldiers at the front). 
The thesis deals with those factors determining propaganda 
policy, the popular response to this propaganda and the reaction 
of the propagandists to this response. Within-the context of 
this two-way process of interaction between propagandists and 
propaganda audience particular attention is paid to six themes. 
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(a) What was the comparative importance of fear and consolation 
as components of Nazi propaganda policy? How successful were 
propagandists in strengthening the German people's will to 
resist the enemy by pointing out the dire consequences of defeat, 
and, at the same time, in providing adequate "positive" 
arguments to convince their audience of the feasibility of 
"final victory"? 
(b) How effective was constant repetition of the propaganda 
message? 
(c) How "total" was, in fact, Nazi propaganda? Was the 
propaganda audience identical with the German people? 
(d) What was the effect of military events and bombing on the 
popular attitude to both Nazi propaganda and the unofficial 
information sources, mentioned above? 
(e) How crucial were class and regional factors in determining 
morale and response to propaganda? 
M What effects didmilitary setback and bombing have on 
popular attitudes to the future and the growing likelihood of 
defeat? Did the German people accept the basic propaganda 
argument that defeat would constitute their own destructionZ 
The study is principally concerned with the Nazi press and 
radio, as well as some aspects of Party propaganda. Chapters 
2-7 each contain a basic research subject for an examination of 
one or more of the questions listed above. The subjects chosen 
are the Battle of Stalingrad, the subsequent "Total War" 
campaign, the anti-Bolshevik and anti-Semitic propaganda 
campaigns in the first half of 1943, the Allied bombing offensive 
against the Reich, retaliation (Vergeltung) propaganda, and, 
finally, the catastrophic. chain of events in the final nine 
months of the Second World War. Chapter 8 presents some general 
conclusions. 
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PREFACE 
This thesis relies very heavily on German documentary sources. 
Translating documents is a rather disheartening task and never 
completely satisfactory. Especially in the case of National 
Socialist Germany, it is so difficult to retain that underlying 
mood and bombastic style that chdracterised so many Nazi 
writings and utterances. The question of how freely one should 
translate poses a considerable problem. In every case, I have 
endeavoured, to keep to the original German as far as possible, 
even if this, at times, means a stylistically clumsy English., 
Of course, words such', as Volksgenosse and Vergeltung are virtually 
impossible to translate satisfactorily, and I trust that the 
recurrence of a few German words will not vex the reader. 
Considerable use has been made of the Daily Digest of Foreign 
Broadcasts of the BBC Monitoring Service. These transcripts 
which had to be drawn up in considerable hurry contain several 
grammatical and stylistic imperfections. When quoted in the text, 
no attempt has been made to correct them., 
In the long period of research and writing up this text many 
people have provided me with invaluable help and advice. For 
their kind cooperation I would first like to thank the staffs 
of the Wiener Library. and the Imperial War Museum in London, 
as well as the archivists and Beamten of the Bundesarchiv, 
Koblenz, the Hessisches Hauptstaatsarchiv, Wiesbaden and the 
Geheimes Staatsarchiv, Munich. I am particularly grateful to 
Dr. Mommsen, President of the Bundesarchiv, who provided me 
with advice and support during my stay in Koblenz. My sincere 
thanks go to the Anglo-German Group of Historians who, by 
granting me a scholarship, made my research in Germany possible. 
Warm thanks are also due to Geoffery Warnerl now Professor of 
History at the University of L eicester, who was my first 
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supervisor, for starting me off and putting me on the right 
course. Finally, I would like to mention my supervisor, 
Professor Peter Campbell, to whom I am most indebted. During 
the last few years he has provided me with constant encouragement 
and support. 
(v) 
ABBREVIATIONS 
Ab. - Abschnitt (district) 
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BA - Bundesarchiv, Koblenz 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION: THE SCOPE AND SOURCES OF THE STUDY 
A. THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
The word "propaganda" still has an unsavoury taste for most 
people. It is usually associated with an all-powerful, 
irresistible instrument which, in the hands of a few determined 
and unscrupulous men, is able to act at will on the unsuspecting 
individual. Particularly in a dictatorship, whether right or 
left-wing, the population is seen as a pitiful passive mass - 
a mindless entity - at the mercy of the controllers of public 
opinion. Nazi propaganda is considered to be aprime example of 
how effective the most devilish form of totalitarian propaganda 
can be and how an entire people can be enslaved "of their own 
free will" by a power-crazy dictator. It was only in the Second 
World War that political scientists, sociologists, and 
psychologists were made fully conscious of the limitations of 
propaganda as well as the folly in assuming an automatic 
receptivity on the part of a population to a propaganda message. 
In "informed circles" the phenomenon "propaganda" was less the 
monster in 1945 than it had been only six years before. 
Hitler himself shared the belief in the irresistibility 
of a skilfully organisedv all-prevailing and all-pervading 
propaganda system and acted on it. Indeed, he interpreted the 
"success" of Allied atrocity propaganda in the First World War 
as an important factor in determining German defeat. The setting 
up of the Ministry of Propaganda and Popular Enlightenment in 
the very, first days of the Third Reich - at a time when there 
were still many democratic vestiges to be dealt with - 
demonstrates the supreme importance the Nazi leader attached 
to the "spiritual leadership" of his people. Hitler's ideas 
- 
as to what constituted "good" propaganda rested on his far 
from exalted view of the masses. He wrote in Mein Kampfl: 
"The receptive powers of the masses are very 
restricted, and their understanding is feeble. 
On the other hand, they quickly forget. Such 
being the case, all effective propaganda must 
be confined to a few bare essentials and those 
must be expressed as far as possible in stereo- 
typed formulas. These slogans should be persist- 
ently repeated until the last individual has come 
to grasp the idea that has been put forward. If 
this principle be forgotten and if an attempt be 
made to be abstract and general, the propaganda 
will turn out ineffective; for the public will not 
be able to digest or retain what is offered to them 
in this way. Therefore, the greater the scope of 
the message that has to be presented, the more 
necessary it is for the propaganda to discover that 
plan of action which is pychologically the most 
efficient. " 
1 
An effective propaganda was "systematically one-sided", only 
presenting "that aspect of the truth which is favourable to 
its own side". 
2 
Moreover, there was no room for rational 
argument or compromise: 
"Whoever wishes to win over the masses must know 
the key that will open the door to their hearts. 
It is not objectivity, which is a feckless attitudev 
but a determined will, backed up by forcet when 
necessary. " 
3 
Hitler never budged from these basic principles. They 
constituted the operational basis of Nazi propaganda practice. 
- 
The first essential aim of Goebbels as Minister of Propaganda 
was to broaden the basis of support and loyalty for the new 
Nazi state. The 44% of the votes won by the Nazis in March 1933 
had vividly demonstrated the inner division of the German Volk. 
A true Volksgemeinschaft demanded a convincing consensus of 
support and it was for. this that Nazi propagandists worked and 
strove in the first years of the Third Reich. Then the "I or 
2V who stubbornly refused to learn the lessons of the past 
could be dismissed as outsiders who did not deserve to belong 
to the People's Community; they became "state enemies" and 
"traitors". The fundamental purpose of National Socialist 
propagandists in the years 1933-9 was to gain such an adequate 
measure of popular backing that they could convince themselvesy 
the German people and other states that there was absolutely no 
division or difference between German and National Socialist. 
In other words, there was no longer such a thing as a non-Nazi 
German. It would appear - at any rate on the surface - that 
they succeeded. Both the Summer Olympics in Berlin in 1936 
and the celebrations to mark Hitler's 50. th birthday in 1939 
provided the German people and the world with a persuasive 
spectre of German unity. Of course, this may well have been a 
very superficial phenomenon but in those pre-war days there was 
virtually no way of judging how deeply National Socialism was 
rooted in the hearts of the German people. Certainly foreign 
statemen let themselves be taken in and were more often than 
not convinced of a truth and reality underlying Nazi propaganda 
spectacles. This would perhaps help to explain the fact that 
in the heyday of appeasement the considerable minority inside 
Germany attempting to resist the sweeping tide which threatened 
to engulf them hardly found a worthy place in the considerations 
of British diplomats and politicians. Shortly before Munich 
the German "resistance" was hindered rather than encouraged 
- 
by the "appeasers" in London. 
In September 1939 the Nazi leadership and propagandists 
believed that not only the military but also the morale 
prerequisites for war had been supplied and that they could 
embark on armed combat without expecting trouble from "within". 
In fact, the German victories of 1939-42 served to strengthen 
the, -. outward cohesion of the German people. The spectacular 
military successes of 1940, in particular, swept along many 
people who had hitherto remained sceptical and had resisted 
the encroachment of the regime on their lives and beliefs. 
But as yet there was no way of kriowing whether this enthusiasm 
was proof of the existence of an identity of the German people 
with the Nazi Weltanschauung or merely an expression of 
nationaipride in German military triumph. Certainly Nazi 
leaders pref erred to believe it was the former. Perhaps the 
state propagandists were tempted to see it as the successful 
culmination of all their efforts since 1933. They had quite an 
easy time of it in these first three years of the war. It was 
none too difficult a task to maintain unity and morale and to 
keep the people in good spirits. They could afford to take a 
back seat. Events spoke for themselves and were the very best 
propaganda. The mass media could often afford to restrict 
their role to that of ringside commentator, endeavouring to 
make the best possible use ofýalready favourable news. 
Nevertheless, spoilt by military victories, the German people 
came to take them for granted. The human being seems incapable 
of attaining a state of complete satisfaction. Once the prime 
question of existence and fear of the future is out of the way, 
then he turns his attention to smaller discomforts previously 
forgotten or ignored. Even in the Germany of 1940 compa- 
ratively small things smacking of discomfort or temporary set- 
back were sufficient to depress moraie quite considerably -a 
ý, t, II 
- 
ireduction in food rations, difficulties in coal supply, light 
RAF raids and subsequent loss of sleep, inflation and wage 
"freeze". First, news of the launching of the attack on the 
Soviet Union in June 1941 and, above all, the winter retreat 
of 1941-2 led to considerable uncertainty and a marked fall in 
morale. Even the resumption of the German offensive and the 
advance into the Caucasus the following summer were unable to 
restore the same degree of confidence that had characterised 
German civilian morale in the days after the fall of France 
back in 1940. This did not mean that the German people had 
become defeatist or now feared defeat. It was the anxiety lest 
the war go on for years that lay behind the more sober appraisal 
of events. In the summer of 1940 the overwhelming majority of 
the German people had expected victory and peace to be a few 
days off. Thereafter every further prolongation of the conflict 
and of the accompanying uncertainties and discomforts had a 
most depressing effect on the popular mood. It is, however, 
interesting to. note that it was not a military event that caused 
the lowest recorded point in morale-in the period up to the 
autumn of 1942 but the cut in food rations announced in March 
1942.4 
The Battle of Stalingrad marked the turn of the tide not 
only in the military field but also in domestic morale. It 
ushered in a period of unrelenting ýsetback- and it is this 
period that has been chosen for a study in propaganda behaviour 
and effect in a totalitarian state at a time of almost un- 
interrupted crisis and threat to its existence. Suddenly in 
the winter of 1942-3 both the German propagandists and the 
German people were presented with a war of quite different 
quality and dimension. Henceforward, military events would not 
only be a cause of temporary discomfort but would pose a threat 
to the very survival of the nation and the fate of the individual. 
- 
ihe unmitigated background of defeat, the picture of unrelieved 
deterioration, provides this period with its unityý' Not only 
was the German Wehrmacht thrown back onto the defensive but so 
also were Goebbels and his propagandists. Although the funda- 
mental task of the latter remained the same as heretofore - to 
convince the German people of the certainty of final victory - 
they were deprived of a favourable reality, of the very 
foundations on which they had previously built. Events no 
longer supplied the same solid basis for the credibility of the 
propaganda message. In fact, Nazi propagandists now faced their 
great test. The time for an artistically created and well 
thought-out propaganda had come. The degree to which the German 
people could recognise the consequent cleavage and inherent 
contradiction between the real world and the interpretative 
picture of Nazi propaganda would to a great extent determine the 
success or failure of the entire propaganda effort. It is 
therefore with this recognition of a basic change in the entire 
war-time situation that the period of study begins. 
The basic subject of examination is propaganda behaviour, 
popular response'to propaganda, and the reaction of the pro- 
pagandists to this response. But since, ideally, Nazi 
propaganda aimed at securing a constantly high level of morale 
and low morale might thus be viewed as proof of general 
propaganda failure, attention must be paid to the wider aspects 
of morale and not just to the response to any one particular 
propaganda theme or campaign. Within the framework of this two- 
-way process of interaction between propaganda and response/ 
morale, particular attention will be given to these eight aspects 
and factors: 
1. the comparative importance of fear and consolation, 
2. the effect of repetition of the propaganda message, 
3. " thd-availability of the propaganda audience, 
4. the attitude of the German people to official propaganda, 
5. the significance of other sources of information, 
6. class and social fantnrq- 
- 
7. regional differencep, and, finallyp 
8. attitudes to a possible defeat situation. 
1. The Comparative Importance of Fear and Consolation 
In a time of prolonged crisis, such as Germany underwent in the 
years 1943-5, it is possible to divide practically the entire 
propaganda output into a propaganda of fear and a propaganda of 
consolation. Both are complementary. After bringing his audience 
into a nervous and anxious state, the propagandist has to provide 
the arguments for an alleviation of the unbearable tension he has 
aroused. In the wartime Germany of 1943-5 this meant that it was 
not enough to warn the population of the perils of defeat but that 
credible arguments had to be supplied as to how the ultimate 
danger might be avoided, the threat removed and the war won. The 
more the military crisis worsened and the propagandists' room to 
manoeuvre was reduced the more interesting Nazi propaganda 
became, a propaganda, it must be remembered, that could not as 
much as hint at the prospect of likely defeat. 
2. The Effect of Repetition of the Propaganda Message 
As has been explained above, Hitler never wavered in his belief 
that an effective propaganda had to restrict itself to the 
repetition - albeit with variation - of a few clear-cut arguments 
which even fools could understand. The more often the same thing 
was said, the greater the effect on the recipient would be. This 
was to become the basic operating principle of Nazi propaganda 
in the twelve years of the Third Reich. The question will have 
to be examined whether the truth of this assertion was, in fact, 
confirmed in German experience in the second half of the Second 
World War, a time when the role of Nazi domestic propaganda was 
assuming a new importance. 
3. The Availability of the Propaganda Audience 
The basic prerequisite for the effectiveness of Nazi propaganda 
was, of course, the availability and the size of the propaganda 
- 
audience. We are, perhapsq all too ready to assume the automatic 
presence of a vast audience for receipt of a propaganda message 
in a totalitarian state. An attempt must be made to find out to 
what degree the German people actually constituted an audience 
and let themselves be "manipulated". This means not merely a 
study of listening and reading habits but also a consideration 
of the extent to which the German people was reached by radio and 
the press. In short, how far was the propaganda audience 
identical with the German Volk? 
4. The Attitude of the German People to Official Propaganda 
What effect, if any, did the deteriorating military situation 
and the intensification in enemy air raids, as well as the 
propaganda response to these developments, have on people's 
attitude to (i. e. belief in the credibility of)'National 
Socialist propaganda, a propaganda that once had promised swift 
victory? 
5. The Significance of Other Sources of Information 
The question to be examined here is how far Nazi propaganda 
really enjoyed a monopoly position in the formation of public 
opinion in war-time Germany. It is to be expected that dissat- 
isfaction with official propaganda would be reflected in a 
tendency to lend an ear to "private" information sources - the 
enemy radio, rumours, pamphlets, the accounts of soldiers and 
other "experts". Considerable attention will be given to these 
news sources that lay outside official control, for the extent 
to which they were used and believed also throws light on the 
overall influence and effectiveness of Nazi propaganda itself. 
Class and Social Factors 
Mention has been made above of the outward picture of accord 
and national unity back in the summer of 1940. Nazi 
propagandists portrayed this as the visible expression of a 
deeply rooted Volksgemeinschaft and as tangible proof that the 
- 
days of social and political division and "class struggle" were 
gone. for ever. How deep this sense of identity with the 
national community really went and how strong the fabric of the 
German Volksgemeinschaft really was will become apparent in this 
study of the crisis years 1943-5. Did military setback mean 
that the German people, in anticipation of what was to come, 
found their way back to earlier or more immediate loyalties? 
In Russia and Germany in the First World War, for instancep the 
initial demonstration of unity gave way to ihter-class strife and 
enmity in the later part of the conflict when victory no longer 
appeared possible. With the possibility of there being some 
degree of resurgence or strengthening of class feeling in the 
Germany OfI943-4it will certainly be worth while to look at the 
role of class as a factor determining attitude and response to 
the Nazi propaganda message. 
7. Regional Differences 
The political unity of the German Reich was a comparatively 
recent phenomenon. Regional traditions, ties and identities 
were all still strong in 1943 and could justifiably be expected 
to exert a very important influence on the response to 
propaganda principally manufactured in Berlin. As far as 
reflections on the present and future were concerned, the danger 
P erceived naturally varied from region to region. 
8. Attitudes to a Possible Defeat Situation 
Closely linked with points 6 and 7 is the preoccupation with a 
possible future defeat which would be expected to assume a 
growing importance as Germany's military position worsened. Of 
course, any seriously-held belief in the possibility of an 
acceptable way of life in a defeated Germany -a non-Nazi Ger- 
many - would automatically negate all Nazi propaganda goals. 
The final success of Nazi propagandists depended on their being 
able to persuade the German people that there was really no 
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alternative but to hold out and that defeat would mean the end 
of the German state and the destruction of the entire German 
people. This assumption -a propaganda "truth" - was the very 
foundation on which National Socialist propagandists had to 
build. It also meant convincing the German people of the 
inseparability of Germany and National Socialism. Immediately 
people came to direct their thoughts and hopes at "another" 
Germany of the future with a quite different political set-up 
and saw a chance for themselves in this Germany, then the most 
strenuous efforts of-the propagandists would be predestined to 
fail. National Socialism would then be associated in the popular 
mind with a dying regime, a regime that was dispensable. Thus, 
views concerning possible defeat and post-war Germany which 
were current in the last two years of the Third Reich will form 
a central theme in this study. 
This study, however, is not intended to provide a complete 
factual account of all aspects of National Socialist propaganda 
and effect in the years 1943-5. The sheer vastness of the mater- 
ial available precludes this - that is, if the work is to be 
kept to a reasonable length. Firstly, the account mainly 
concentrates on an examination of the behaviour of and the 
response to the German press and radio, as well as some important 
aspects of Party propaganda; very little attention, for exampley 
is given to the Nazi cinema, although this indubitably 
constituted one of the most effective propaganda channels of 
the time. Secondly, although the various themes appear in a 
basically chronological framework, a certain amount of over- 
lapping in time and material is unavoidable; the chapters on 
bombing and retaliation, for instance, scan the whole period 
under examination. Thirdly, the intricacies of National 
Socialist propaganda organisation lie outside the scope of this 
study and are only mentioned or alluded to in as far as it is 
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deemed necessary for a full appreciation of propaganda 
behaviour at a particular time. Finally, several crucial 
military and political events and developments are given very 
little or only cursory treatment, e. g. the Allied invasion of 
Italy, the, fall of the Duce, D Day, the war in the Far East, the= 
attempted putsch by German officers on 20 July 1944. 
Chapters 2-7 each contain a basic research theme and 
constitute a kind of case-study for an examination of one or 
more of the factors listed above. 
Chapter 2 Stalingrad and the New Situation 
This chapter serves principally to acquaint the reader with the 
new situation in which both the German people and the German 
propagandists suddenly found themselves in the winter of 1942-3. 
The problems and difficulties arising in this first really 
serious confrontation with military defeat could be expected to 
become constant features And determinants of propaganda response 
and morale in the subsequent two-year period. 
Chapter 3- "Total War" 
In the aftermath of the Stalingrad debaclev an attempt was made 
at putting the whole German economy on a war footing by mobil- 
ising large sections of the population for war work and by 
closing down inessential businesses. This naturally had a 
noticeable effect on the life of most Germans, particularly the 
middle class which was hit most. An ideal opportunity thus 
presents itself for deducing the importance of class and class 
consciousness as a factor in determining popular response. 
Similarly, this reaction would permit the drawing of conclusions 
regarding the reality of the much vaunted Volksgemeinschaft. 
Chapter 4- Anti-Bolshevism and Anti-Semitism 
Both anti-Bolshevism and anti-Semitism were essentially ideo- 
logical themes which lay at the very core of National Socialist 
- 12 - 
teaching. In the months after Stalingrad they were used to 
prepare the population for harsher times ahead. By instilling 
fear and hatred of Germany's enemies, Nazi propagandists strove 
to convince their audience that there was absolutely no 
alternative but to grin and bear all misfortune. At the same 
times acceptance of the Nazi image of the Soviets and the Jews 
was essential for an acceptance of the idea of National 
Socialism as the only possible German Weltanschauung.. The 
degree to which the German people would oblige their 
propagandists in this respect would determine the overall 
success of Nazi crisis propaganda. 
Chapter 5 The Bombing of the German civilian Population 
By its very nature, the Allied bombing of Germany provides an 
ideal subject for a study of the interaction of propaganda 
message and response. The RAF raids meant that an increasing 
number of Germans came into direct contact with the full weight 
of Allied might for the first time. For the inhabitants of the 
blitzed towns the war now truly became a matter of survival. 
This unwelcome manifestation of enemy superiority in the air 
naturally restricted the room for propaganda manoeuvre. The 
attempts of Nazi propagandists at countering the effects of 
this awesome reality as well as the outcome of these attempts 
form the basic theme of the chapter. Perhaps the most crucial 
and decisive question that will have to be examined is whether 
Nazi propaganda succeeded in turning the pent-up antagonism 
and aggressive feelings unleashed by-heavy bombing in a direct- 
ion favourable to the leadership - i. e. towards the enemy - 
thereby fortifying the resistance will of the suffering German 
population. 
Chapter 6- Retaliation 1943-5 
The promise of all-out retribution against Britain at some 
- 13 - 
time in the future constituted a deliberate attempt at diverting 
attention away from the hardships of the gloomy present by a 
propaganda of hope that did not require any immediate confirmation 
in fact. Its success of course depended on the readiness of the 
German 'people to let themselves be taken in - even drugged - by 
promises of new weapons that would force a second and final turn 
of the tide, this time in Germany's favour. What was the effect 
of a propaganda of optimism and promises, promises that could 
never be adequately fulfilled? The confident tones of Vergeltung 
propaganda formed a complement to the purely negative propaganda 
of fear endemic in the anti-Semitic and anti-Soviet themes. 
7. Chapter 7- The last Months (October 1944-Mdy 1945) 
After September 1944 the enemy was not only imperilling the 
safety of the Germans from the., sky. He had set foot in the Reich 
itself. The ultimate danger, military invasionp provides the 
background to this chapter. The enemy advance inside Germany 
at first slow - gathered momentum in the new year and by April 
1945 the Greater German Reich had been reduced to a very slender 
belt of unoccupied territory. The effects which this supreme 
threat to the existence of the Reich had on propaganda behaviour 
and popular response form the basic theme of this chapter* The 
increasingly desperate straits of propagandists who were deter- 
mined to carry on as long as possible at a time when the very 
edifice they depended on was falling down around them provide 
the fascinating material for a study of the ultimate crisis of 
a totalitarian propaganda machine. In this very final confront- 
ation between nightmare reality and the "make-believe" 
propaganda contrast world, how great was the readiness of the 
people to accept the latter? Could a totalitarian propaganda, in 
fact, hope to succeed, if only temporarily, in offsetting the 
visible manifestations of enemy might which all seemed to point 
to German defeat? 
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B. PROPAGANDA AND MORALE 
In order to appreciate the full importance of the interaction 
of propaganda message and popular response, it is first 
necessary to look at Goebbels' own. views on propaganda, his 
audience and the phenomenon he was endeavouring to control so 
keenly - morale. Like his master, the Propaganda Minister had 
no idealistic view of the masses. After a wartime visit to his 
mother, whom he maintained "to me always represents the voice 
of the people", he remarked that "the rank and file are usually 
much more primitive than we imagine". 
"Propaganda must therefore always be essentially 
simple and repetitive. In the long run results 
in influencing public opinion will be achieved 
only by the man who is able to reduce problems 
to the simplest terms and who has the courage to 
keep forever repeating them in this simplified 
form, despite the objections of the intellectuals. " 
5 
The masses were also slow in learning: 
"Only when the intelligent person saysp 'For 
God's sake stop it, I can't bear to hear it 
any more', the moment has come for the little 
lumber-jack of Bad Aibling to say "Wellq I 
never! That's the first time that I have heard 
about that. Let's find out right away what it's 
1,6 all about' . 
Goebbels certainly possessed to an extraordinary degree the 
gift of simplifying even the most complex matters. 
7 
In a 
stark revelation of his working principles to one of his 
subordinates, he stressed that it was not the task of a 
propagandist to be objective: 
"I try to draw the attention of the Volk to the 
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essential news material at hand. The average 
citizen cannot find his way among the jumble 
of daily political reports. He cannot disting- 
uish the false from the correct, the important 
from the petty, the purposive from the factual 
reports. Much less can he recognise with 
certainty what is important and also correct 
for the Volk. Here lies the task of the 
propagandist .... I must therefore simplify 
reality, omit'something here, add something 
there. There develops an artistic picture 
which can deviate considerably from the objec- 
tive truth. As is the case with an artist's 
perception, it's only important that the polit- 
ical line is genuine and true in my eyes and it 
is useful for our Volksgemeinschaft .... True is 
therefore what is useful to my Volk. Please do 
not misunderstand me. This principle ought to 
be no charter for the distortion of facts or 
the violation of truth. It signifies rather: 
to be truthful as necessary but to omit what 
you consider to be necessary for your Volk. ,8 
In war-time, moreover2 the instructional aspect of news was more 
important than the purely informative. It was Goebbel's opinion: 
"Not every item of news should be published; 
rather should those who control news policies 
endeavour to make every item of news serve a 
certain purpose. " 
9 
From these working principles of Nazi propaganda it might 
seem that Goebbels viewed his audience as essentially passive, 
i. e. its morale should be merely the end-product of his efforts 
at mass-persuasion. This, perhaps, was the ideal. But there can 
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be no doubt that the minister regarded the various Stimmun&s- 
berichte (reports on morale), which were compiled in wartime 
Germany, as a means of learning how best his message could reach 
the population. They were considered fundamentally as an aid 
in determining propaganda tactics, but not the inherent goal of 
the propaganda. However, when German propagandists were forced 
on to the defensive in the second half of the war, the goal it- 
self was frequently determined by morale considerations. Owing 
to the virtually constant need to turn a negative into a posi- 
tive moodp short-term aims were increasingly allowed to override 
long-term ones. With the goal being more and more one of sheer 
self-preservation, it could no longer be a question of deepening 
National Socialism in the hearts of the German people but simply 
of maintaining the status quo. This was to prove difficult 
enough. W. A. Boelcke sees Goebbels' interest in the morale 
reports as"a'prerequisite of his propaganda "success": 
"Without a knowledge of the popular mood, he would 
never have been able to parry any deterioration 
byacorresponding propaganda measure or, what is 
more, to have strengthened trust in the leader- 
ship.... If a propagandist is to be successful, 
he must first inform himself of the opinions, 
ideas, hopes and feelings of those he is seeking 
to influence. Only then is it possible for the 
propaganda to address them or, should the need 
arise, to mislead or delude them. Goebbels had 
his finger on the pulse of the nation's mood. " 
Finally, Boelcke . sees Hitler's goals and popular morale as the 
two determinants of Goebbels' propaganda policy-10 
There can be no doubt that the Propaganda Minister was part- 
icularly sensitive to, and conscious of the potential consequences 
to morale of all kinds of actions and developments, Nor did he 
lip 
- 17 - 
hesitate to involve himself in the most technical or apparently 
most trivial matters when a negative public response had occurred 
or was expected to occur. His propaganda policies were naturally 
also geared to maximising the positive and minimising the 
negative effect of situational developments on morale. The war- 
time American propaganda analysts were quite aware of this 
sensitivity of the Nazi propaganda machine in reacting to the 
situation it was trying to control and summarised the typical 
progression of techniques employed by Goebbels in dealing with 
perceived morale problems: 
W On first observing negative attitudes among the population, 
Goebbels would provide arguments against them without, at the 
same timep specifying what they were. 
(ii) If this proved inadequate, the negative attitude would be 
revealed in morale-building propaganda but, at the same timep 
minimised by a) describing it in euphemistic terms, thus per- 
mitting a discussion. without, however, admitting its full 
seriousness, or b) by associating it with a minority which could 
thereby be isolated or descredited. 
(iii) Often Goebbels would give the correct attitude Germans 
should take and from this it was easy to conclude what the 
incorrect attitude was. 
(iv) If all the techniques described in (i) - (iii) proved 
insufficient and were followed by an open admission of the 
negative attitude, it meant that Goebbels was acting on inform- 
ation that the undesired view had persisted! or. even spread. Its 
very mention showed that there was no risk of the propagandist 
spreading knowledge of it yet further. 
(v) With still more serious morale problems, denunciations of 
those holding the "dangerous" views followed, denunciations often 
tinged with threats. Here propaganda was becoming the herald of 
direct repression. 
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(vi) Lastly, with the public announcement of the penalties 
inflicted on those guilty of the wrong attitudes or wrong 
activities (e. g. rumour-mongering, listening to enemy radio 
stations, defeatism), it was clear that an even graver situation 
had arisen. 
11 
It thus becomes evident that in the same way as Nazi 
propaganda set out on its task of forming public opinion, it was, 
in turn, itself often a response to that which it was trying to 
control. This was even more the case in a time of crisis when 
morale considerations, on which every leadership is in the last 
resort dependent, came more to the fore. Neverthelessp Goebbels 
would have been loath to admit this dependence on public opinion. 
The Stimmungsberichte ought to be the confirmation of his 
success. Since the population was regarded as hardly capable of 
having an independent opinion, a reported negative response to 
propaganda was frequently traced back to the influence of 
subversive elements or enemy propaganda. Similarlyp rumoursp 
instead of being put down to an unsatisfied need for informationo 
were wrongly interpreted as expressions of political opposition. 
12 
To Goebbels, of course, the truth could often be very unpleasant 
and as the scales of war turned more and more against Germany he 
displayed a diminishing readiness to face facts that were un- 
pleasant. In the last months of the war, the control mechanism 
for his propaganda was also weakened, since he preferred to 
believe the obsequious reports of his own propaganda offices 
rather than the more caýndid accounts of the Security Service. 
Perhaps even more fateful, he often placed an extraordinary 
amount of trust in his own intuition and the letters of 
flatterers. 13 * 
The phenomenon "morale" forms a constant background in any 
study of propaganda behaviour and popular response. But what 
is "morale"? This question has baffled many students of the 
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Second World, War. T. Harrisson has demonstrated so clearly how 
in Great Britain during the war a "Morale Committee", set up by 
the government to ascertain drifts in popular mood, was faced 
with the vexing problem of not really knowing what it was 
supposed to be measuring. 
14 "Morale" i's a very nebulous concept 
indeed. The Nazi leadership tried to overcome the problem of 
definition by differentiating between Stimmung (m9od) and 
Haltung (bearing or behaviour). The former represents the more 
immediate and superficial reaction to events and the latter a 
basic attitude based on education, tradition and experience. 
15 
It would, for instance, be possible to have a bad mood and view 
the future pessimistically, yet, at the same timep to behave as 
one had always done, i. e. to work for German victory. In 1943Y 
when owing to Allied bombing the question of "morale" assumed 
a new importance, Goebbels explained the difference as follows: 
"Under bearing we do not understand the noisy 
jingoism when the nation or certain parts of 
the people are subjugated to particularly heavy 
stresses. It cannot be demanded or expected 
that a town, which has just suffered a massive 
attack by enemy bombers, should display the 
rosiest of moods because of that very fact. 
To depict such a deep-reaching event in the 
colours of a patriotic outburst of enthusiasm 
must be reserved to the queer world of imagin- 
ation of pub-strategists .... After such a disaster 
it is not important that the population should 
be in a good mood but that it should preserve 
its bearing. " 16 
The drawing of this contrast between, Stimmungand Haltung 
was to become an increasingly important ingredient in the 
official interpretation of domestic morale with the changed 
military situation after Stalingrad and with intensified 
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enemy raiding. This distinction, however, became rather too 
automatic and sterotyped and at times degenerated into one of 
sheer convenience. The Stimmung could be used as a framework 
for a frank 9--yle of reporting. The compensation lay in 
ascribing it only limited importance and by declaring Haltung 
alone decisive for morale. In short, this meant that candour 
in descriptions of the Stimmung had to be qualified by an 
affirmation of the impeccable Haltung. But such an arbitrary 
distinction was hardly a valid one and it would be very mis- 
17* 
leading to assume a complete independence of the two phenomena. 
As the Stimmungsberichte . thems ýlves at times admitted, a "low" 
in the Stimmung did not always remain without effect on the 
Haltung. 
Within this context a satisfactory definition of "propaganda 
successit would seem difficult. Can a success only be recorded 
when the response to the propaganda message takes the form of 
the recommended action, manifested in a person's behaviour? Or 
is it a propaganda success merely to remove an individual's 
doubts and fears, without at the same time ensuring an increased 
contribution to the war effort, i. e. simply to improve his 
Stimmung? But it would be wrong to become trapped, as were the 
Nazis themselves, in a terminology designed primarily as an 
aid in understanding the complex phenomenon of morale. In the 
following chapters it is the response of the German people which 
is evident in a cri-fical appraisal of morale reports that is 
mainly used to observe and record propaganda success or failure. 
C. THE PROBLEM OF THE "MORALE" SOURCES 
As this study relies so heavily on contemporary observations 
of German domestic morale-and response to propaganda, it is 
important to deal with the reliability of the sources used. 
These are of German and "foreign" origin. It should be stressed 
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that all the morale sources listed below - however much they 
vary in accuracy - describe only the perceived state of morale, 
i. e. not necessarily how it really was. 
1. Sicherheitsdienst (SD) 
It 
, 
was the responsibility of SD-Inlands which in September 1939 
became Department IIIC4 of the new Reichssicherheitshauptamt, 
18 
under its chief Otto Ohlendorf to report on the morale of the 
German people. Through a net of around 10jO00 agentsp 
19 it was 
able to give a qualitative account of the opinions, fears and 
hopes of the civilian population at any one time. 
"The reports are limited, however, in that the 
Germans did not avail themselves of modern 
scientific techniques for the study of popular 
thought and feeling. Quantitative controýsq 
sampling methods, and research design were 
completely lacking in the collection and inter- 
pretation of the material for those reports. 
Hence the German intelligence reports cannot be 
used to obtain estimates of the degree and 
extent of weak and strong points in morale with 
any precision. They show the problems of main- 
taining war morale in a totalitarian state and 
give illustrations of the qualitative aspects 
of these problems, but they do not indicate in 
any quantitative manner the relative extent or 
depth of the various elements of morale. " 
20* 
The SD's agents (Vertrauensmdnner)s recruited from party and non- 
party circles, 
21* 
were required to pass on all they saw or heard. 
Their field of operations was public transports shopss newspaper 
kiosks, hairdressers, as well as the circle of their family, 
friends and work colleagues. 
22 Every individual observation 
made was part of a huge mosaic whichs when put together, became 
a picture of the people's mood. Objectivity was demanded. 
23* 
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The reports submitted by SD offices should "describe the mood 
of the population frankly without any colouring or propaganda 
window dressing, i. e. factually, clearly, reliably and 
24 responsibly, and as it was, not as it could or ought to be" . 
None the less, from a comparison of the local SD reports with 
their final compilation in the Meldungen aus dem Reich and the 
later SD Berichte zu Inlandsfragen, which gave a survey of 
morale developments in the whole Reich, it would seem that a 
certain watering down of the originally reported observations 
occurred. There'were limits to Ohlendorf's fanaticism for the 
truth. Even he was loath to admit the failure of National 
Socialism as an ideology' and as a political system. It would be 
safe to assume that the final picture that developed in these 
national surveys was often somewhat more positive than the 
facts warranted. 
25 
Despite these qualifications the SD 
, 
stimmungsberichte still 
proved too outspoken for the Nazi leaderships which could hardly 
be expected to accept the fact of the failure of its handiwork. 
The more critical Germany's military position became and the 
more these reports mirrored the consequent crisis in civilian 
morale, the greater did official opposition become. Goebbelsy 
to whom the very idea of a body of opinion independent and 
uninfluenced by his own propaganda was anathemat was particularly 
incensed by reports of the critical reception to his call for 
"total war" in the Berlin Sportpalast on 18th February 1943.26 
Henceforth he was to become the foremost proponent of a drastic 
reduction in the number of those receiving the reports. In the 
wrong hands they could become the spreaders of defeatism. 
27 
The SD had in addition to face the full fury of the opposition 
of the Party organisation which was especially outraged by 
frequent reports of the NSDAP's loss in prestige and popularity 
among the masses. Party officials also had the uncomfortable 
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feeling of being watched and sensed competition. A change in 
the form of the reports in the summer of 1943, when the 
Meldungen aus dem. Reich were replaced by the rather less 
comprehensive SD Berichte zu Inlandsfragen, did not appease the 
opposition for long. 
28* 
The real crisis came in the summer of 
1944, when Bormann forbade all members of the NSDAP and Ley all 
members of the Deutsche Arbeitsfront to cooperate with the SD. 
29 
The result was the demise of the national'morale surveys. Never- 
theless, the SD managed to continue its work and compiled reports 
at a local level right up to the end of the war and even beyond. 
30, 
From a warning of Ohlendorf to his subordinates in October 1944 
it does not seem that SD reporting had, in fact, become much less 
frank and outspoken than before. He admonished'the organisation 
for being too anecdotal and for overvaluing individual remarks or 
occurrences, thereby losing sight of the whole. SD officials 
must remember that they were National Socialists and that they 
were obliged to view developments from a National Socialist 
standpoint. 
31 
That Bormann still found time, howeverp to complain 
of an SD report at the very end of the war 
32 
would seem to suggest 
that Ohlendorf's colleagues had learnt little of the art of-tact. 
The very fact that these SD Stimmungsberichte caused so 
much bad blood speaks in their favour when used as a source 
material. Despite their understandable caution when dealing with 
such highly-charged themes as the attitude of the German people 
to the Party and to the political leadership, the SD morale 
reports remain by far the most convincing German source about 
the real state of morale. 
2. National Socialist Party 
Each Kreis of the NSDAP was required on the basis of information 
received from the smaller Ortsgruppen to furnish its respective 
Gauleitung with fortnightly - or, should the situation demand, 
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with weekly - reports. At Gau level they were put together in 
a general monthly survey which was dispatched to the 
Parteikanzlei in Munich. These reports were mainly concerned 
with those sectors of life in which the Party was active, e. g. 
the success of a local'propaganda campaign and the influence of 
the churches on German youth vis a vis that of the Party. At 
the same time, however, they commented on the local mood and 
response to the propaganda of the mass media. 
33- 
But this source material has to be viewed with a particularly 
critical eye. The Party's work was reported in a most favourable 
light and, if shortcomings were admitted, extenuating cir- 
cumstances were almost always given. A. L. Unger in his examin- 
ation of this material remarks: 
"Local party functionaries evidently regarded it 
as their task not merely to report popular re- 
action, but also to pass on their own opinions 
and judgments, although they often phrased their 
comments in such a way as to imply that they 
reflected the views of the public. , 
34 
On the very first day of war, Hitler had made every Party 
official down to the. lowest level of Blockleiter responsible for 
the morale in his area, and it naturally followed that their 
accounts were often very coloured, concealing anything that 
could be traced back to their own shortcomings. This propensity 
to gloss over any unfavourable development became more and more 
evident as Germanyls military situation deteriorated. The fact 
that in two reports for Aachen-Land for December 1942 and 
January 1943 not a single mention was made of Stalingrad dem- 
onstrates how local Party chiefs sought to evade uncomfortable 
35 
subjects. It is also safe to assume a certain watering down 
of negative observations as these reports were passed on to the 
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top level of the Party hierarchy. It was quite easy for a 
Gauleiter to select more favourable items and to ignore the 
negative ones when compiling a summary of the reports sent to 
him from subordinates. Finally, the circle of Party officialdom 
was much too restricted to build up sufficiently extensive 
contacts with the population. The citizen would also naturally 
be wary of expressing'hiý true opinions - if these were other 
36 
than optimistic - to a representative of the Party. 
This source, however, has at times proved very useful in 
support of other material and for times when SD material is 
somewhat sparse, as is the case after the summer of 1944. 
Although there is indeed no adequate corrective, these reports 
do show up regional contrasts pretty well. Moreoverp Party 
reports could afford to be rather more critical when dealing 
with the public response to the mass media which were not under 
the direct control of the Party. 
3. Reich Propaganda Ministry (RPM) 
The 43 regional ReichspropagandaRmter (RPX) throughout Germany 
with their 11332 officials 
37. informed Goebbels at regular inter- 
vals on the population's reaction to propaganda. With the ending 
of the SD Berichte zu Inlandsfragen in summer 1944p the 
Tatigkeitsberichte of the RPýI, based on these local reportsy 
become an indispensable source. Unfortunatdy, there is one 
great drawback. Their compilers were Party power holders and 
thus cut off from informal contact with the masses. As 
, 
Gaupropagandaleiter they came under the dominance of the local 
Gauleiter who was much nearer than their other chief, the 
Propaganda Minister in Berlin. A harmonious relationship with 
their Gauleiter was a prerequisite for their work and they could 
hardly be expected to report in a way that might prove damaging 
to the reputation of the Gau or its chief. 
38 
Caution was, of 
coursep also necessary when criticising the handiwork of the 
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powerful minister, Goebbels. 
In spite of these qualifications, they do mirror the 
worsening morale situation and the attempts of Nazi propaganda 
to counter it. It should be noted that Goebbels increasingly 
based his decisions on this material to the exclusion of the 
39 SD reports. This narrowing of his horizon was an expression 
of his own fear. As Germany's position became hopeless, he 
probably wished to avoid unnecessary demoralisation and n. 0 
longer'wished to look beyond a distortedly mirrored reality. 
Other State Offices 
Use has also been made of the quarterly reports drawn up by 
the local Oberlandesgerichtsprdsidenten and Generalstaats- 
anwdlte for the Ministry of Justice in Berlin. Although they 
were principally concerned with judicial matters, observations 
were also made regarding the mood of the local population as it 
appeared from trials and the testimony of witnesses. These 
highly subjective reports vary from being wholly sycophantic to 
the Party and the public authorities to being models of frankness 
The fact that they were drawn up at three-monthly intervals 
permits a general view of long-term trends and the factors 
governing them. They are frequently of particular value in 
providing an introduction to the more detailed SD and Party 
reports, which cover much shorter periods. This is also true 
of the monthly reports of the Reichsregierungsprasidenten which 
almost without fail contain comments on the state of local moralE 
These, however, remain only for the Land Bavaria. 
5. Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW) 
At the end of the war the general respect of the German people 
for the armed forces 
40* found official recognition when soldiers 
were used to bolster morale in a Mundpropagandaaktion (prop- 
aganda by word-of mouth) as well as for gathering information 
on civilian morale. In July 1944 a trial operation was 
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conducted in Vienna. Goebbels, who seems at first to have known 
nothing of the action, appears to have been pleased with the 
results and soon gave it his full backing. In the following 
mont1m he was to enjoy decisive control through his RPA, which 
had a determining voice in the choice of reliable soldiers, and, 
in addition, supplied their working material. The conviction of 
having found a more "reliable" reporting system may well have 
contributed.. to his acquiescence in the ending of the SD Berichte 
zu Inlandsfragen. Furthermore, these reports were sent to the RPX, 
so that the basis for the Tdtigkeitsberichte of his own ministry 
was widened. 
41 
The soldier reporters, of course, lacked the long experience 
of SD and Party workers and their hastily prepared reports seem 
in their description of individual observations to have lost 
sight of the course of developments as a whole. 
42 Neverthelessq 
when used, in conjunction with other sources they do help to fill 
the gap left by the SD Berichte zu Inlandsfragen. 
6. U. S. Content Analysis Reports 
During the war the United States Foreign Broadcast Intelligence 
Service and later the Office of War Information drew up weekly 
analyses of German propaganda. These reports attempted on the 
basis of the content of Nazi propaganda and by means of 
qualitative content analysis procedures 
43 
to make inferences as 
to German policy intentions, expectations and the'state of German 
domestic morale at any one time. The validity of these prop- 
aganda analysis procedures rests on the assumption of the 
"purposeful and deliberative" nature of a propaganda communica- 
tion. 
44 
A. L. George, who was engaged in this work during the 
Second World War, could claim: 
"In the two month sample period (March-April 1943), 
85% of the 119 inferences for which some verific- 
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ation decision was made were scored as having 
been correct on the basis of available historical 
evidence. " 
45 
In the specific field of home morale 100% of the inferenceswere 
scored as positive. 
46 In the use made of-the material in this 
study it has often proved quite striking how these accounts, 
drawn up in a faraway enemy land, repeat the very same observat- 
ions and conclusions as official German stimmungsberichte. 
7. Other Sources 
The observations made by neutral travellers and journalists in 
the German Reich which appeared in the Swiss and German press 
are at times of considerable interest, although they are, of 
course, very subjective in nature. It should finally be pointed 
out that the whole interaction process between propaganda and 
morale meant that the propaganda directives and the propaganda 
content were themselves often a testimony of current morale 
trends and the response of the German people to previous 
propaganda lines. 
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CHAPTER 2 
'STALINGRAD AND THE NEW SITUATION 
On February 2,1943, the guns fell silent in Stalingrad. The 
Greater German Reich entered a three day period of official 
mourning. To the Allies the news came as a much needed 
confirmation that victory was possible, indeed probable, even if 
many heavy battles still lay ahead. The myth of German invin- 
cibility had been destroyed for ever. Despite the Reich Propaganda 
Ministry's attempt to interpret the disaster as a glorious saga 
which would go down in the pages of German history, the'real 
significance of the surrender of the Sixth Army was not lost on 
the German people. A people who had shown great impatience even 
during "the good times" of almost unbroken German victory was now 
faced by'the apparently impossible - the spectre of the virtual 
annhilation of an entire German army. All the hopes that had 
been built up by the German advances in the summer of 1942 were 
suddenly dashed. Admittedlyt Stalingrad lay far from the 
frontiers of the Reich and Germany itself was not in mortal danger, 
yet the long awaited last battle which would secure final victory 
now seemed further off than ever before. 
A. THE TIMES OF SILENCE 
On 23 November 1942, four days after the launching of the Soviet 
winter offensive, the world heard the news that the German Sixth 
Army had been surrounded. Only the governments of the Axis 
remained silent, hoping for a turn for the better. Any hint as 
to the real situation in and around Stalingrad was expressly 
forbidden, and in the following weeks Stalingrad virtually dis- 
appeared from the German press and radio, apart from a special 
radio hook-up on Christmas Eve. In fact, the propaganda treatment 
of events on the Eastern Front as a whole became extremely vague 
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and unclear. No maps of the Front were printed and only 
successful resistance to localised Russian thrusts was reported. 
A much more melancholic and serious tone came to characterise 
propaganda output. The propaganda's sensitivity to military 
developments is illustrated in a directive given the press on 5 
January', in which it was stated that articles "over climatic 
conditions in the arctic zones and the ostensibly great dangers 
of this climate" were undesirable. 
1 
Such a sudden and total silence could hardly but arouse the 
curiosity of the Gerýman people, especially as they had been told 
only a short time before that Stalingrad's capture was merely a 
matter of-time. The very fact of its absence from the news 
turned attention on Stalingrad more than everbefore. 
"The only anxiety exists in regard to the-troops 
fighting in the Stalingrad area, all the more as 
Stalingrad was no longer mentioned in the last 
Military Communiqu4s. It is rumoured in many 
parts of the Reich that about 80,000 to 100POOO 
soldiers are completely encircled in the Stalingrad 
area, and this has givenrise-to fears that 
Stalingrad could become a second Verdun* ,2 
Such -astonishingly accurate newsýcould only have come from the 
accounts of soldiers on leave or from the enemy radio. The 
official silence had thus achieved very little. The population 
was determined to find out the truth one way or another. In 
fact, by such an ill-conceived policyv the leadership ran the 
risk of losing all control and influence over the formation of 
public opinion. The German people were turning elsewhere for 
information and forming their own independent picture of events. 
If this tendency were left unchecked, the work of many years of 
Nazi propaganda would most certainly be destroyed, for its 
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ýuccess naturally depended on the population's total dependence 
on it. 
Goebbels had most to lose from the enforced silence. Both 
in Germany and abroad he was quite wrongly held responsible for 
all aspects of news policy and all material emanating from the 
Nazi mass media. In fact, he was far from being free to do as 
he wished on the propaganda front and he was bound to the decisions 
of the, Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, which jealously defended its 
right of military censorship and of compiling the military 
communiqu4 (OKW-Bericht). It is all too easy to overlook this 
fact. In the case of the handling of the Battle of Stalingradv 
the news black out can be traced back to a decision of the FUhrer 
himself. 3 
Faced with the reality of Soviet success, a radical revision 
of all estimations of the enemy followed. On 17th December 1942 
the SD reported: 
"The persistent heavy Russian employment of men 
and materiel, which is shown particularly in the 
high number of tanks reported destroyed, has 
strengthened the opinion among the population 
that Soviet Russia still has inexhaustible reserves 
which are being supplemented by American supplies. 
Because of this, it is often not believed that 
Soviet-Russia has almost reached the end of her 
military strength, especially as the view prevails 
that the Russian industrial war production in the 
Urals is in full swing. " 
4 
Since the nightmare of inexhaustible Russian supplies and 
materiel starkly contradicted the former propaganda portrayal 
of a "colossus-with feet of clay", it was quite natural that the 
Germans should have become completely uncertain in their judge- 
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ment of the enemy, particularly in their assessment of his 
military strength. 
5 
Even the propaganda argument pointing out 
the advantage given to Germany by the high Russian losses only 
boomeranged in the end, as the conclusion was then drawn that 
the Soviets must have an immense potential strength at their 
disposal. It showed, moreover, that their industry remained 
intact. 6 
The German people entered the new year with a sense of fore- 
boding. Their war had become cloudierv much less certain. In 
the belief that the fronts were securev their grievances had 
been directed hitherto at hardships at home. Now, all of a 
sudden, all their previous anxieties were dwarfed by the new and 
threatening danger lurking in the east. In the festive speeches 
of Nazi leaders, as well as the Fiffirer's order to the Armed 
Forces, at the turn of the year, it was the lack of clues and 
pointers as to the future development of the war which struck 
the German population, a population wanting to know how and when 
this war could be won. The question "how" was more and more to 
replace the question "when". The'immediate prospects looked 
very bleak indeed. Not to mention the situation in Stalingradt 
which, despite the official silence, had already become common 
knowledge, it was now also doubted whether the Wehrmacht could 
withstand the enemy onslaught in Africa, and with the loss of 
North Africa an attack on Italy was feared. 1943 also brought 
the certainty of a resumption of British air raids, much heavier 
than those of the year before. Nor did the changed tone of the 
radio and press go unnoticed. Both had lost their boundless 
optimism and carefully avoided making any predictions for 1943. 
Only the harshness of war was stressed. That it would be a long 
and hard war was now clear to all. 
7 
The pessimism occasioned by 
the rumours of a Stalingrad disaster was now extended to the 
judgement of the military situation in the east as a whole. 
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The worst was feared. Rumours of encirclement found an all 
too ready ear. Many reckoned with the Russians cutting off 
the German units in the Caucasus and in the Leningrad area. 
8 
Many people now turned elsewhere for encouragement and, 
helped by the propaganda, found some ground for hope in the U- 
boats which were now reaching the height of their success in the 
Battle of the Atlantic. 
"More and more the view prevails among the 
population that the sea war must decide the 
outcome of the war. "9 
But such good news, although very welcomep could provide no 
adequate compensation. What is morep there was the very real 
fear that any good that might be done would sooner or later be 
neutralised by the immense American ship-building capacity. 
10 
Indeed, the United States remained the unknown factor. There was 
an uncomfortable feeling that the West was being allowed to build 
up its strength and positions quite undisturbed, while the Reich 
was exhausting itself on the endless plains of Russia. 
" 
In this critical situation, the official news reporting was 
seen as hopelessly inadequate. Its lack of clarity, together 
with its indirect announcement of unfavourable developmentsy led 
to a certain "reading between the lines". Neverthelessf it was 
impossible to make a clear picture of events without resorting 
to other sources of information. 
"The majority of the population form their picture 
of the situation in the east from their own 
reflections and conclusions. Whilst paying 
attention to the news of the press and radio,. 
they attempt at the same time to fill in the 
gaps of the official reporting (lack of place- 
names and indications as to the whereabouts of 
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the front-line). " 
Although an increase in listening to forbidden overseas stations 
was recorded, 
"The strongest influence at the moment comes from 
letters from the Front and from the reports of 
front-line soldiers on leave. " 
12 
There could be no better evidence of the failure of propaganda 
policy - or more aptly propaganda silence - than this admission 
that the unofficial information sources were having a greater 
influence in the forming of public opinion than the official 
Nazi mass-media. 
B. THE FALL OF STALINGRAD 
When there was no longer the slightest hope of rescuing the 
Sixth Army, German propaganda began preparing the German people 
for the bad news to come. The first official indication that 
Stalingrad was surrounded, an indirect one at that, was made in 
the OKW-Bericht of 16 January: 
"In the Stalingrad area our troops, who have been 
engaged for weeks in a heroic defensive struggle 
against an enemy attacking from all sides, yester- 
day again beat off strong attacks by enemy infantry 
and armoured formations with great Bolshevik losses. 
The command and troops again provided a shining 
example of the heroic German military spirit. " 
13 
The press was now permitted to give prominence to the Stalingrad 
sector without, at the same time, diverging from the formulations 
of the OKW-Bericht. 
14 
Some attempt was made to point out the 
positive side of the long and bloody battle now nearing its end. 
In his weekly radio survey of military events, Lieutenant-General 
Dittmar could. claim that, owing to the tenacity, of the 
Stalingrad fighters, a catastrophe had been avoided: 
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".... be the outcome of this unequal struggle as 
it may, the operational value of this heroic 
resistance is already evident today. It is no 
exaggeration to say that the firm stand of 
Paulus' army through the weeks has had the most 
decisive influence upon the development of 
operations on the southern sector of the Eastern 
Front. " 
If Stalingrad had been given up, 
"The lines of corrmunication leading to the west 
and south-west via Stalingrad would have been 
opened to the Soviets. The superiority of 
their forces pressing in the same direction 
would have been overwhelming. 115 
It was not, however, the strategic value of the sacrifice that 
the propaganda chose to stress, but instead the exemplary 
heroism of the Stalingrad fighters themselves, a heroism which, 
it was hoped, would unite the German people in accepting the new 
burdens placed upon them. In a secret conference with his 
propagandists on 27 January, Goebbels fervently expressed the 
view: 
"This unique event in German. history - for Germn 
soldiers have never before been in such a hope- 
less fight - must be used for a pychological 
strengthening of our people. " 
The-press was to remember that "every word over the heroic 
struggle will go down in history". In particular$ the OKW- 
Bericht should be so formulated that "it will stir the soul in 
16 
the centuries to come". A historic saga was in the makingA In 9 
a speech on the tenth anniversary of the Na7,, i assumption of power 
in Germany, Gbring maintained: 
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"One day this will be regarded as the greatest 
and most heroic battle that was ever fought 
in our history.... Such a battle is being waged 
there today, that every German, even in-a 
thousand years time, will pronounce the word, 
'Stalingrad', with holy awe and will remember 
that it was there that Germany set the seal 
for final victory. For a people who can fight 
like that must win. " 
He, moreoever, expressed the conviction that it was the Soviets 
"last fling". 17 
The news of the surrender of Paulus' army was made known 
three days later by means of a Special Announcemento hitherto 
only the bringer of good tidings. The assignment of the press 
was. clear: 
"The heroic battle of Stalingrad will now become 
the great epic song in German history. The 
German press is now placed before its greatest 
journalistic task ..... In the undying bravery of 
the men of Stalingrad is displayed the spirit 
and strength of the German people more strongly 
than ever before, which will secure them the 
victory they are now more fanatically deter- 
mined than ever to obtain. " 
18 
Any unwelcome details likely to disturb this grandiose picture 
of valour and heroism were left out. No mention, for example, 
was made of the capture of Field-Marshal Paulus. 
19 
The myth was 
rigorously protected. The sense of mystery and awe should not 
be lost through too frequent use. The very word, "Stalingrad", 
was to be saved for great occasions. 
20 
The official admission that the situation in Stalingrad was 
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hopeless occasioned extraordinary depression, even among those 
who had known the truth for weeks. There was a continued 
tendency to extend this pessimism to other fronts. Now, with 
the evacuation of Tripoli, many believed the loss of North 
. 21 Africa to be inevitable. Nothing was able to bring the people 
out of their pessimism. Even the U-boat successes, to which an 
increasing importance had been ascribed in the weeks before, now 
aroused little interest: 
"With the Special Announcement (Sondermeldung) 
on the success of the U-boats, a general 
disappointment was noticeable when the England- 
Fanfare sounded. # 
22 
The growing manifestation of Soviet strength now appeared as a 
veritable nightmare and the Stalingrad debacle showed only too 
clearly its consequences. It was quite natural that with the 
defeat of the Sixth Army: 
"The fear is increasing among many sections of 
the population as to whether we can see this 
mighty struggle through. " 
23 
Few could share Gbring's "conviction" that the Soviets were 
sending their last reserves into battle, as "the Russians have 
already given us too many surprises for us to hope that this 
24 
will really be ýheir last effort" . 
In spite of the fact that the propaganda had been preparing 
the German population for bad news for days, the final 
announcement on 3 February still came as a shock. Many had still 
hoped against hope. 
"Although the fate awaiting the Sixth Army had 
had to be reckoned with for weeks, people had 
nevertheless still hoped right up to the very 
last moment for a turn for the better. " 
25 
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Perhaps, it is not necessarily contradictory when people, at 
the same time as doubting everything the propaganda tells them, 
never give up all hope that it might be right after all. 
The explanations as to the sens. e of the sacrifice and its 
interpretation in the form of a heroic saga did not stop the 
German population asking the question why it had all been 
necessary. 
"The inevitable development and the necessity 
of the huge sacrifice is being. discussed among 
all sections of the population. 1 In particular, 
the population asks why the threat to Stalingrad 
was not recognised in time. Surelyt the air 
reconnaisance must have noticed the deployment 
of the Russian army against Stalingrad. The 
question is also being asked why the city was 
not evacuated when there was still enough time. 
It is, above all, pointed out that the opponent's 
strength must have been underestimated, as other- 
wise the risk in trying to hold Stalingrad after 
it had been surrounded would never have been taken. 
The people cannot understand why the relief of 
Stalingrad was not possible. At'present, they 
do not appreciate the strategic importance of 
the battle that has taken place there, because 
they lack detailed knowledge of overall develop- 
ments on the southern sector of the Eastern Front. 
It is to some extent doubted whether the defenders 
of Stalingrad did really succeed in tying up 
strong enemy forces right up to the very end. , 
26 
There could be no better, testimony of the bitterness occasioned 
by the disaster, a bitterness felt all the more deeply as it was 
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thought that it all might have been avoided. In contrast to 
the propaganda, many ascribed little practical value to the 
stand of the Sixth Army. In short, it had been an unnecessary 
massacre. The glowing portrayal of the sufferings which the 
Stalingrad soldiers had been forced to undergo, instead of 
contributing to a new historical myth, simply backfired and only 
managed to depress the families of the fallen and missing still 
further. 27 What interested them most was not the role of 
Stalingrad in German history but the much more pressing question 
whether their sons and husbands were still alive and had, after 
all, been taken prisoner. Although German propaganda never as 
much as hinted at the possibility of there being survivors, many 
continued to hold on to the belief that one day many German 
troops would return to the homeland from Soviet imprisonment. 
28 
The whole propaganda treatment of this serious defeat was 
characterised by a very dangerous lack of reality and a failure 
to appreciate the most basic human feelings. Von Studnitzp an 
official in the Press and Information office of the Foreign 
Ministry, was fully aware of the danger and on 2 February noted 
in his diary: 
"This secrecy as regards the details about 
Stalingrad will inevitably drive the population 
into the arms of foreign propaganda sources. 
What the relatives of some quarter of a million 
German soldiers want to know is what has happened 
to their sons, their fathers and their brothers. 
Not everyone will be able to resist the tempt- 
ation to try and get news by listening to enemy 
broadcasts. Those at the top seem to have 
overlooked the fact that publication of the 
figures given by the Russians would have allayed 
anxiety. In the eyes of the simple masses, 
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'taken prisoner' is very different from 
'killed', no matter how many times they 
are told the Russians murder all prisoners 
taken. " 29 
These fears were soon borne out by facts. Many tried to 
satisfy their news hunger in a matter of such direct concern 
to the family by tuning in to forbidden stations. The SD reports 
leave no doubt as to the considerable increase in "black- 
listening" at this time. 
30 And what might have initially been 
the result of a momentary weakness might later - and here lay 
the danger - prove habit-forming. In fact, by its silence 
regarding a question which was uppermost in the minds of so 
many Germans, Nazi propaganda was only managing to create new 
and, perhaps, even greater problems for itself. 
What importance did the German people then ascribe to 
Stalingrad for the course of the war as a whole? 
"They are generally convinced that Stalingrad 
constitutes a turning point of the war. Whilst 
the more militant elements perceive Stalingrad 
as a moral obligation to employ all their 
energy on the home and fighting fronts, hoping 
thereby to secure victory, the weaker ones 
, 31 tend to see it as the beginning of the end. 
The January report of the Regierungsprdsident of Munich was 
even more blunt: 
"The mood is very depressed among all parts 
of the population. The number of Volksgenossen 
who believe that a German defeat is quite poss- 
ible or who already consider the war as already 
lost is increasing. " 32 
Even in official circles, morale was far from being satisfactory: 
- 41 - 
"Many, who occupy responsible posts which 
give them a greater insight into the 
position in one particular sector, speak 
freely of difficulties and, by making 
anxious remarks, infect others with their 
pessimism. *It is reported from different 
parts of the Reich that Volksgenossen, who 
have been in Berlin on business during the 
last few days, have, -in some cases, noticed 
a pronouncedly dejected mood among the 
authorities and state offices there. " 
33 
The belief that this war might indeed be lost was a real danger 
sign which, left unchecked, would most certainly prove fatal 
to the entire propaganda effort. Even more perilous from the 
point of view of Nazi propagandists was the growing pre- 
occupation with the probable consequences of defeat. The SD 
pointed out this trend in a report of 28 January: 
"Afraid that an unfavourable end to the war 
has moved into the range of possibility, 
the Volksgenossen are now seriously contem- 
plating the results of a defeat. The over- 
whelming Mjority is convinced that the loss 
of the war would mean total ruint although 
here and there it is stated that it would be 
'only half so bad'. If, on the other hand, 
this alarming awareness strengthens the will 
to hold out, it also leads to considerations 
of a possible way out should it come to the 
worst and to talk of the last bullet which 
remains ready if everything is at an end. , 
34 
Without hope of ultimate success in the common effort, 
propaganda could naturally achieve but little. Most dangerous 
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was the idea, which was gaining ground, that the German nation 
could survive a defeat and the end of National Socialism. Not 
everyone seems to have accepted the official view that Germany 
and National Socialism were now one and the same, that the fate 
of the one determined the fate of the other. In Bavaria, for 
example, many were certain that there existed an alternative 
to Nazism and there was even some talk of a South German State 
of under French protection" . 
35 
Church-goers in the GmUnd area 
were reported as expressing the firm conviction 
"that a German defeat would not have such un- 
favourable consequences for Bavaria since the 
enemy's hate is directed exclusively at 
Prussian Germany and not against Bavaria. " 
36 
It was to be expected that Stalingrad should become the 
starting point for an attack on the whole propaganda organisationg 
which, so it was thought', had been guilty of misleading the 
German people, especially in regard to Soviet strength. But much 
more serious was the reported criticism of both the political 
and military leadership. An implicit confidence on the part of 
a population in its leaders is, of, course, a prerequisite for the 
Unity of a nation at war and therefore for-its morale. And in 
the aftermath of Stalingrad, such, fundamental criticism was 
reported not only from out-and-out opponents but also from those 
hitherto favourably disposed to National Socialism. 
37 That Hitler 
had promised to hold Stalingrad at all costs was now recalled 
with wounding bitterness. It was stated quite openly that 
Halder had warned the Fiffirer of the imminent threat of an enemy 
attack aimed at cutting off Stalingrad and the Caucasus. Gau 
Westfalen-SUd reported: 
"In a train the Fiffirer was described as the 
mass-murderer of Stalingrad, without anyone 
immediately arresting the culprit or at least 
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giving him a good thrashing. Similarly, 
statements are reported which ascribe 
responsibility for the war and the horror 
it has caused to the FUhrer and the Party. 
Other remarks, which must have originated 
from officer circles, can also be heardv 
namely that last winter Brauchitsch had to 
go, but this time the Fiffirer is alone 
responsible. So who will have to go now? 
Unfortunately, such base talk is not immed- 
iately encountering any strong reply, a sign 
how bourgeois and weak-kneed a large part of 
the Party membership is.,, 
38 
Faced with this very bad "mood", the compilers of the 
morale reports sought a compensation factor. Thus, the 
extremely pessimistic report quoted above ends by stressing the 
unshaken "bearing" (Haltung) of*the civilian propulation. In 
the dark months that followed this distinction between Haltung 
and Stimmung1was to become increasingly routine. However bad 
the "mood" might be, the "inner strength" of the German population 
remained unimpeachable. But the SD was, in fact, following the 
lead given by Goebbels himself who, as will be shown in a later 
chapter, was to find such a distinction useful since it provided 
him with greater flexibility when portraying civilian morale. 
C. THE PROPAGANDA DILEMMA, 
With the "turn of fate" Nazi propaganda faced its great crisis. 
It has beenishown above that, with the bad news arriving from 
the Eastern Front, the Nazi leaders chose to keep silent. It 
was the easiest solution even if it meant no more than a 
postponement of the inevitable and amounted to an open invitation 
to the German people to seek the news elsewhere they sought. 
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Sooner or later they would have to be told the bitter facts. 
In fact, it is difficult to appreciate what the regime was 
hoping to achieve by holding on to this silence for so long. 
It must have known that an information vacuum would be created 
which the German people would do their best to fill. Suddenly, 
the number one issue in people's minds, Stalingradt had 
vanished into obscurity and it was quite inevitable that a great 
number of those civilians who felt directly affected should make 
every effort to get their hands on any news about what was 
really happening out in the east. Time was soon to show how 
little official propaganda had to gain from such a negative policy. 
"People indeed realise that military reporting 
should not give the leadership of the enemy 
army any information they could use in coming 
operations. Recently, however, they have 
often been dissatisfied, because, even in cases 
where no such danger existed, adverse news was 
reported only in a very veiled way. The 
population is far from being prone to falling 
into deep pessimism on receiving unfavourable 
news and sees its intelligence being underrated 
and in these veiled reports a source of 
uncontrollable rumours. " 
39 
This lack of confidence in official propaganda became so 
pronounced that Hans Fritzsche, appointed political controller 
of German broadcasting in November 1942, felt obliged to defend 
the reliability of the, Grondeutscher Rundfunk on 23 January: 
"We have not only clearly named the places where 
fighting took place; nay, with all the German 
Armed Forces which are fighting, there are 
hundreds of reporters, who, soldiers th&mselves, 
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report on details apart from the general 
situation and on the men waging the fight. 
No war reporting can possibly be more candid 
and reliable. Moreover, unlike every one of 
our enemies, we have no reason for under- 
estimating the fierceness of the struggle and 
the extent of the danger threatening us, for 
glossing it over or belittling it; for it was 
against us, the Germans, that this war had been 
prepared for a long time by a few men on. the 
other side, who were merely the puppets of the 
two manifestations of International Jewry - 
Plutocracy and Bolshevism. We have never had 
reason or opportunity to minimise the extent 
of the tasks and the dangers of this war, , 
40 
Together with the army of the German Reich, German 
propaganda was now pushed onto the defensive. The greater 
significance and difficulty of its fundamental task to maintain 
morale at a critical time meant both a greater sensitivity to 
as well as a growing dependence on the reaction of the population 
to the propaganda message -a reaction, of course largely 
determined by its' morale. The interaction of propaganda content 
and propaganda response was to become a constant feature in the 
period between the German defeat in the Battle of Stalingrad and 
the final collapse of the Third Reich. Before the old year 1942 
was out, a serious attempt was made to bring the tone of the 
propaganda into line with the seriousness of the military 
situation and the mood of the population. It was now necessary 
to prepare the German people for the harder times that lay ahead. 
The boundless optimism that had marked almost all Nazi propaganda 
in the first three years of the war was no longer appropriate. 
Although the propaganda content did not become any more truthful, 
as the silence over Stalingrad shows, the news itself was 
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presented in a more factual, sober manner which must have led 
many to think that the mass media had become more candid and 
frank. Without this really being the case, the German reader 
and listener was given the impression that news reporting had 
become more informative. It should be added, moreover, that in 
the military reporting German units no longer automatically won 
every engagement. But a pessimistic candour regarding details 
could also be used to conceal much more fateful developments, and 
in the first two weeks of the new year German propaganda 
continued to ignore developments in the Stalingrad area. The 
significance as well as the intention of this new tone was not 
lost on the German civilian population. According to an SD 
report of 25 January: 
"The overwhelming majority are proving them- 
selves strong enough for a blunt style of 
reporting. Most people reckon on further 
reports of hard blows in the coming weeks. 
They base this belief on the fact that the 
news services have never chosen such serious 
expressions and have never described the sit- 
uation in such clear terms as at the present 
moment. " 
It then went on to stress the fact 
"that the population would rather hear the 
truth, despite all the dejection caused by 
unfavourable reports, than be uncertain of 
what is happening or to hear the news pre- 
sented more favourably than the facts warrant. , 
41 
Although the change was thus generally welcomed, the 
reputation of German propaganda, which had always claimed to 
have told the truth, was to a certain extent being undermined 
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and compromised at the same time. The sudden change made very 
many people aware of the propaganda purpose and intensified the 
feeling of being manipulated. The move could almost be 
interpreted as an admission that hitherto the propaganda had 
been deliberately misleading them. Naturally, the first question 
now asked was why this change in style and tone had first come 
at that moment. Had not German propaganda always boasted of 
being factual and frank? 
"One remembers many announcements of the 
previous year, which had been less cautious 
and had been made in a very optimistic tone, 
certain of victory. , 
42 
In short, the propagandists-' recognition of the changed 
situation had come rather late. 
Once the announcement of the end in Stalingrad had been 
made, the tone of Nazi propaganda became even more harsh and 
pessimistic, perhaps even more pessimistic than the facts at 
this time really warranted. But this pessimism was now to become 
much more than it had been up to then - an official response to 
the negative reaction of the German people to their mass media. 
It was now used as a--tool of propaganda policy itself. Pessimism 
became the means of persuading the German nation of the necessity 
of a more total war effort, of making them accept the harsh 
measures that now lay in store. In their enthusiasm for the new 
official pessimism, many propagandists made the same mistake they 
had made in the old days of official optimism - of going too far. 
The danger of overdoing it was pointed out in a Party report at 
the end of January. 
"If one wishes to make the people hard, then 
one must not deprive them of all hope, for 
by doing so one is taking away their faith. 
Moreover, one must not give the relatives and 
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friends too clear a picture of the terrible 
torments the Stalingrad fighters had to bear, 
because this only succeeds in engendering a 
feeling of horror and despair. " 
43 
The dilemma of a centrally directed propaganda at a time 
of military setback is here clearly demonstrated. When the 
information media choose to ignore the seriousness of the 
situation and remain confident and over-optimistic, they are 
reproached for trying to conceal the truth. When their pro- 
nouncements suddenly become more factual and realistic, they 
destroy hopes and confirm existing fears. With the change in 
policy, the "propaganda" nature of all official information 
becomes apparent to everyone, and the consequent consciousness 
of being the object of manipulation lessens the effectiveness of 
the propaganda message. The pessimists among the populationg 
long suspicious of their mass media, became even more suspicious 
and concluded that the general situation wasp in fact, much more 
serious than it was currently being portrayed - perhaps hopeless. 
And, as the military position became increasingly unfavourable 
to the Reich, German propaganda became increasingly trapped in 
this vicious circle. Whatever propaganda policy might be, the 
German people became more and more aware of the existence of a 
propaganda policy and that they were meant to be its victims- 
The result was a growing impatience and dissatisfaction with the 
propaganda, which was now often regarded'as just thato 
it propaganda". with the same undertones as in democratic lands. 
The SD Linz, for instance, qualified its description of the 
overall "success" of Goebbels' New Year's Eve speech with the 
following words: 
"The effect of his statements of course suffered 
in the sense that people see in Goebbels too 
much of the propagandist, whose statements, 
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although indeed extremely skilfully put 
together and. rhetorically perfect, never- 
theless lack that inner warmth which 
accompanies the FUhrer's words. " 
44 
Particularly among the more educated part of the populationg the 
view was expressed that, however beautifully Goebbels could 
speak, it was nonetheless only "propaganda". Moreover, the fact 
that Goebbels should make-two speeches in one week, in addition 
to having his weekly Das Reich articles read twice over the air, 
was seen as evidence of his "excessive craving for admi-. ration" 
(GeltungsbedUrfnis). 45 
The changed military situation remained, of coursep the most 
crucial factor in making the population view all that they were 
told with an ultra-sceptical eye: 
"At this time when the emotional burden is so 
great, the population tends to regard all 
propaganda broadcasts particularly critically. " 
46 
This very pronounced tendency is clearly illustrated in the 
reception to the once popular political surveys of Hans 
Fritzsche. 
"Especially at this time, the population is 
less ready to hear polemical discussions about 
the enemy. They are, for example, little 
interested in the anxieties caused in England 
by the absence of extra Christmas rations and 
are quite indifferent as to whether there are 
47 
ten or fifteen million unemployed in the U. S. A. 
What had in good days made the Germans gloat now only irritated 
them. At a time when the last defenders of Stalingrad were 
making their last standp there was little interest in propaganda 
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attacks on the enemy leadership. 
"Almost everything that could be said over 
the character and conduct of our enemies 
and over the mendacious leadership clique 
in England and the U. S. A. has already been 
said during the last few years. All that 
is still written and said about them is 
considered by most of the population to be 
nothing new and of secondary importance when 
compared with the main questions at present. " 
48 
Particularly disliked were articles and talks which dismissed 
the enemy successes as unimportant and Germany's opponents as 
"disunited, weak and ridiculous" . 
49 
Germany's military set- 
backs spoke a much stronger language than the propaganda gloss. 
"Among the population no one believes that 
Churchill and Roosevelt are so stupid and 
divided as they appear in the press. The 
population believes without exception that 
the meeting Zýn Casablanca7/ was not fruitless 
as the commentaries maintained. 
" 50. 
D. CONCLUSION 
With Stalingrad Germany entered a period of almost unmitigated 
setback. With one blow the eyes of all Germans had been opened 
to the seriousness and the realities of the war. 
51 For Goebbels 
the fundamental question now was whether he could offset the 
inevitably negative effect on the nation's morale of so grim a 
situation. The glamour and splendour of the great German 
victories of 1939-42 had dimmed and he now had to struggle hard 
to maintain that degree of popular support the government needed. 
The results of his attempt to counter the Stalingrad debacle 
did not look very promising for the future. Disguising its real 
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significance by building up a heroic "myth" deceived few. For 
a people long spoilt by a chain of virtually uninterrupted 
victories, nothing could now remove the sour taste of defeat. 
Defeat remained defeat! The propagandists were themselves to 
realize that absolutely no capital was to be made out of 
Stalingrad. The very word conjured up memories, not of exemplary 
valiant self-sacrifice, but of defeat and ignominious surrender. 
The "eternal myth" was therefore allowed to die. Soon the very 
mention of there once having been a Battle of Stalingrad was 
expressly forbidden. 
52* 
In fact, by tackling the news from the Eastern Front in the 
way it did, the leadership only managed to create a much more 
serious problem for itself. By its initial silence, it threw 
the civilian population on to alternative sources of information 
which, moreover, they could do practically nothing to control. 
The increase in "black-listening" was dramatic. The subsequently 
more realistic style of German propagandap as well as the swift 
ahange in propaganda policy at the beginning of February, in 
which an admission of the seriousness of the military situation 
was no longer anathema, only substantiated information previously 
heard from unofficial sources. Although many appreciated this 
new "frankness", for others the sudden swing in the propaganda 
pendulum compromised the trustworthiness of official propaganda 
and helped to boost the prestige of enemy radio. Most dangerous 
of all, an increasing number began trying to form their own 
independent picture of events. 
The basic question in the months to come was whether the 
Reichspropagandaministerium would be able to win back lost 
ground and to improve its somewhat battered image. Would Nazi 
propaganda succeed in eliminating the threat posed by its un- 
welcome competitors? Moreover, could a totalitarian propaganda 
be successful in a period of prolonged setback? 
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CHAPTER 3 
"TOTAL WAR" 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Goebbels was one of the few German leaders to recognize the 
changed nature of the war. Victory could no longer be regarded 
as a matter of certainty, a question of time - it could now only 
be achieved by the total sacrifice of every German man and 
woman at home to the war effort. At a policy conference in his 
ministry at the beginning of the new year, he took issue with 
those who held the view that Germany could never lose the war. 
Of course she could lose the war if she did not mobilise all her 
potential strength and resources in one gigantic common effort. 
The setbacks in the East gave Goebbels the chance to put through 
his plans for a really total war. On 24 Januaryy before the end 
in Stalingrad, the mobilisation of all men between 16 and 65 and 
women without children between 17 and 45 for war work was 
decreed. Stalingrad now became the example for those at home. 
No longer could there be an excuse for continuing with an almost 
peace-time existence whilst the soldiers at the front were 
fighting a life and death struggle. Nevertheless Goebbels did 
not get what he wanted, absolute powers to coordinate the 
totalisation of the war on the Home Front, and he had to be 
content with a merely supervisory role. Instead, the coveted 
prize went to a triumvirate consisting of Lammers 9 Keitel and 
Bormann. 2 
As the totalisation was an action directly influencing the 
everyday life and even financial interests of the population, an 
extreme sensitivity in the reception of the propaganda and the 
measures it was backing would naturally be expected. Here was 
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not just another propaganda theme or a propaganda portrayal of 
events on a faraway battlefieldv but something concrete, visible. 
The "total war" would be followed with an extremely watchful eye. 
In fact, the eye of every German left at home would be able to 
ascertain whether the propaganda really mirrored the reality. 
A constant comparison between what one saw in the street, in 
the factory, at the office, and what one heard on the radio and 
read in the press was here possible and inevitable. This was the 
vital factor determining acceptance of the new measuresq for 
every Volksgenosse would regard himself as qualified to judge, 
on the basis of his own observations, whether "total war" was 
or was not a fact. This, of course, made the task of the 
propagandist doubly difficult and drastically limited his 
freedom of manoeuvre. 
Only ten years before, a large majority of the German 
working class had voted Social Democrat or Communist. It might 
well be that many would see in the new measures an opportunity 
to give vent to their animosity against the more well-offt Who 
had hitherto been spared the rigours of the war effort. Such a 
consequence, would expose National Socialist theory of a 
. national community without 
inter-class strife and friction as 
without substance, indeed a fraud. So Goebbelsp apparently 
ihout realising it at the time, was about to test the reality wi 
of the kernel of National Socialism, the existence of a true 
Volksgemeinschaft. From the first moment, it was clear that 
everyone would make it his business to ascertain that all 
citizens were equally affected and that the burden was fairly 
shared by everybody, independent'of family and class. Would, 
for example, the hitherto privileged daughter or wife of the 
Oberstudiendirekto7r be treated leniently and given a pleasant 
job in an office? In this chapter the question to what extent 
the German worker had remained true to his belief in the class- 
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war cannot be overlooked. This factor would most certainly 
play a substantial role in determining his reaction to "total 
war" propaganda. Goebbels would have to proceed with the 
uttermost skill if he wished to attain his goal. One false 
step could unleash an avalanche of bitter recriminations, 
undermining the very fabric of the "social state". 
B. THE COURSE OF THE CAMPAIGN 
There can be little doubt that the measures were particularly 
welcomed by the working class, that is by those already fully 
engaged in the war effort. On the other hand, there was ILttle 
enthusiasm to the announcement by those most directly affected, 
3 
the middle and upper classes, Thus from the very beginning there 
was a potentially dangerous polarisation of the classes. The 
promise of equal treatment of their social "betters" wasp 
however, viewed with suspicion by the working class, since it 
simply seemed too good to be true. 
"According to the reports at hand, the scepticism 
is fairly great. It is believed that the 'better 
class' people - among whom in a small town the 
wives of the BUrgermeister and the solicitor are 
included - will somehow attempt to dodge the 
measures. The doctors will certainly be pestered 
by women requesting certificates to confirm that 
they are unfit to work. At. the most, the 
women who are being considered for mobilisation 
will report to the Red Cross, which could 
hardly be regarded as fully valid war service. 
A large part of the population regards a really 
total enforcement'of the measures as a'criterion 
for testing the existence of a real people's 
community (Volksgemeinschaft) and for judging 
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the leadership's determination to dis- 
tribute the burden fairly and equally. " 
Some working-class people were even reported as "already 
having taken down the addresses of the so-called 'better class' 
women in their area so as to see whether and in what way these 
5 
women would be mobilised for work" .A report of the 
Regierungsprdsident of Munich echoes the widespread class 
suspicion within the Volksgemeinschaft: 
"The question whether distinctions will be 
made according to class and whether the 
wives of civil servants and other employees 
of the state and the party will be given 
the same treatment is being watched with a 
particularly sharp eye. 16 
It is thus not surprising that an SD report of 4 February warned: 
"a too mild implementation of the measures 
would affect the trust of the people /-17n 
the leadership 7quite considerably. ,7 
Goebbels attempted to allay these anxieties in a speech marking 
the tenth anniversary of the Nazi accession to power: 
"The total war effort demands abandonment of 
all comfortable bourgeois habits, and a 
complete devotion to its tasks fills the 
whole of our people; it will not be tolerated 
that even a single person should try to shirk 
We shall proceed with the hardest punishment 
against saboteurs of our conduct of the war, 
but there is hardly need to stigmitise them. 
publicly since their number is so small that 
it carries no weight with the people.,, 
8 
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Goebbels realised the importance of the visual aspect, what he 
called the Optik, of the "total war". A series of measures was 
principally designed to convince the working class that the 
government had no intention of protecting the better-off, even 
if the nature of the restrictions was to pose no threat at all 
to the financial interests of the upper classes. Horse-riding, 
for instance, was forbidden in the GrUnewald and Berlin 
Tiergarten 9 and a number of luxury restaurants were closed. 
10 
The sensitivity of the propaganda machine is illustrated in a 
directive to the press forbidding any mention of long evening 
dress exhibits at the Berlin fashion show. 
11 
The willingness of 
Nazi propaganda to consider mass opinion is shown in the treatment 
of sport. On 20 January, SD Stuttgart recommended: 
"Outside broadcasts of spqrt ought not to be 
broadcast too oft&n, as the workers are here 
very sensitive and frequently attack winter 
sports in a quite'incomprehensible way. " 
12 
Winter sports were generally regarded as a pastime of the idle 
rich and, as if in answer to this popular attitude, the German 
press was told a few days later not to take any notice of such 
sports as golf and tennis. 
13 
Here, Goebbels really seemed to be 
pandering to the wishes of the masses. It is interesting to note 
that throughout the dark months that lay ahead German mass media 
continued to give considerable attention to such a popular sport 
as soccer. 
Goebbels certainly gave the impression, at least at first, 
that he was seriously contemplating exploiting class feelings to 
gain support of the new measures by using them as a whip for 
bringing the reluctant middle and upper"classes into line. Von 
Hassel was convinced that this was the case and was appalled by 
the minister's "filthy rhetoric against the upper class". 
14 
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This aristocratic. opponent of the regime later claimed to have 
detected a more profound and far-reaching purpose than the more 
ephemeral one dictated by the needs of "total war". The following 
November he confided in his diary: 
"The higher-ups, through Goebbels' megaphone, 
are deliberately inciting hatred against the 
upper class as a skilful and effective means 
of diverting the hatred that would ordinarily 
be directed against the party. " 
15 
This was certainly a misleading oversimplification and misinter- 
pretation of long-term propaganda aims and perhaps mirrors the 
deep contempt felt by many old Prussian families for the Nazi 
it upstarts". But it does show how easily the use of class 
feelings as a propaganda lever in promoting "total war" could 
get out of hand, be misunderstood and misfire. The propaganda 
Minister naturally denied wishing to arouse class animosities. 
It isp however, true that he did find some very kind words for 
the lower classes. In a speech to Berlin armament workers at 
the beginning of February, he stated: 
"Particularly in such times as at present, 
the broad masses of our people - the workers 
and farmers - form the foundation of our state. " 
He expressed the view that it was high time that everybody, 
without exception, was drawn into the total war effort. 
"On the Home Front no one can any longer 
be allowed to remain inactive or to take 
it easy. " 
16 
This association with the less well-to-do was not without its 
inherent hazards. It might be falsely interpreted as a cue, 
officially blessed, to give vent to those long pent-up anti- 
capitalistic feelings. And here lay the danger. Goebbels could 
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not afford to alienate those on whom the regime principally 
depended to finance its war effort. This was an extremely 
delicate instrument to play and, as will be demonstrated later, 
Goebbels seems at first to have given the matter far too little 
thought. 
The first obstacle which would have to be removed before 
the propaganda and the programme it was supporting could succeed 
was the doubt in its seriousness. The population was becoming 
impatient. They wanted to see "total war", not just to read 
about it in the newspapers. They wanted to know that the 
measures were in fact being implemented. 
17 It was to set the 
public's mind at rest as well as to show the rest of the leader- 
ship that "total war" was an absolute necessity that Goebbels 
made his notorious address in the Berlin Sportpalast on 18 
February. The measures were portrayed as the leadership's 
response to the popular will: 
"The broad working masses of our people do 
not blame the Goverment for acting too 
ruthlessly but rather for being too 
considerate. " 
He promised that the few women trying to flout the measures 
would not be a llowed to get away with it: 
"Doctor's certificates will not be accepted 
in place of the called-up worker. Also 
an 'alibi-job' a woman might get with her 
'husband, her brother-in-law, or a friend, 
in order to continue to shirk work 
unsupervised, will be answered by us with 
competent counter-measures. The few who 
hatch such plans will only finish themselves 
off in the eyes of the public. We forget 
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nothing; after the war we will remember. 
The people will treat them with the 
greatest contempt. " 
This speech, although delivered in an aggressive form, is an 
excellent illustration of the defensive nature of much of the 
"total war" propaganda. The working class, for whom the war had 
long been a "total" one, was encouraged in its hopes of really 
radical change. At the same time, the middle class which had-, 
most to lose was appeased with the words: 
"I take the strongest exception to the 
allegation that our measures in any way 
aim at the closing down of businesses of 
the middle classes or a monopolisation of 
our economic system. After the war, the 
middle classes will at, once be reconstituted 
on the largest possible scale, economically 
and socially. The present measures are 
exclusively emergency measures designed to 
meet war purposes and war requirements. They 
do not aim at a structural alteration of the 
economic system, but are only focused on the 
objective of total victory. " 
This address ended with the notorious ten questions with which 
the minister whipped up his audience into an uncontrQ11able 
frenzy of overnment policy and unconditional obedience to the 
demands of "total war". Those- present in the Sportpalastv who 
were meant to represent a true cross-section of the German people, 
were asked if they were prepared to follow Hitler through thick 
and thin until the time of "final victory", to work much harderp 
if necessary 16 hours a day, and to support the most radical 
measures against shirkers and wa. r-profiteers. The emotions 
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unleashed by this series of questiorrand answen reached a pitch 
with the final question, "Do you want the total war? ". 
18 
For 
anyone present who was still capable of detaching himself from 
his rýaving environment, the whole Sportpalast must have 
appeared a veritable madhouse. 
In general, the speech seems to have been effective in the 
sense that it managed, if only temporarilyt to reduce anxiety 
lest this be just another propaganda campaign. Goebbels hal, 
shown quite clearly how serious the situation had become and 
a strengthening of confidence and trust in the leadership was 
recorded by the SD. The-reaction to the ten questions, however, 
was a very mixed one: 
"The last part of the speech met with a very 
mixed response. Although the impact-of the 
10 questions is stressed, Volksgenossen and 
Parteigenossen from all social groups never- 
theless expressed the view that the listeners 
and readers were made all too conscious of the 
propagandist purpose of these questions and 
answers. It 
19 
The reports of the NSDAP give a similar picture. Although the 
speech was said to have found a generally positive reception, 
"The 10 questions to the audience at the end 
of the speech are criticised by almost all 
Gaul'bitungen. " 
In Gau Westfalen-Nord, for example, 
"The questions are described in certain circles 
as superfluous, as theatre, designed to impress 
other nations. " 
In the Catholic Kreis, Paderborn-Bilren, the response was even 
I 
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more negative: 
"That was the last cry of the Nazis. One 
must now reckon with the loss of the war. 
During-his speech Dr. Goebbels had found 
it necessary to scream in order to hide his 
nervousness. , 
20 
The Oberlandesgerichtsprdsident of Bamberg also reported that 
the closing part of the address had been "rejected by almost 
everyone". 
21 
This shows quite clearly that existing attitudes 
towards National Socialism were a crucial factor in determining 
propaganda success. Devout Catholics had been shocked by the 
closing down of their schools as well as the secret euthanasia 
programme and were strongly influenced by these measures when 
judging something quite different - the propaganda of 
"total 
warov. Besidesp the purpose behind Goebbels' moving words had 
been all too evident, and propaganda success naturally depended 
in large measure on its not being viewed as propaganda. 
Goebbels found it expedient again and again to return to 
the same issue, g1ving the very same promises and reassurances. 
He was doubtless aware that the classes most directly affected 
had not as yet discovered any great patriotic enthusiasm for the 
new government measures., At the end of February he changed his 
line of approach somewhat. Instead of trying to coerce the 
support of middle and upper-class women by threats of penalties 
for disobedience, he now attempted to win them over by gentle 
persuasion. They were assured that the factories were no longer 
the dark, dirty and degrading places they had been a quarter of 
a century before. They were light, clean, orderly and friendly 
places. In addition, the burden of work would be shared fairly 
and equally. 
22 
The Minister of Propaganda was at pains to portray the 
- 62 - 
to total war" measures as a pure expression of the new "German 
Socialism", of the newly found unity of leadership and people. 
Any reluctance to support the new laws might be effectively 
countered by showing that they were firmly anchored in popular 
demand. Few people would wish to stand alone. In fact, the 
compulsion of the mass might prove more efficacious than the 
regulations themselves in securing support. In his speech of 
30 January Goebbels had exclaimed: 
"A cry for the most total waging of war is 
reaching the leadership in countless letters 
from every strata of the population. Millions 
0f unexploited or not entirely exploited 
energies stand prepared to be included in 
the gigantic war scheme of our civilian life. 
To mobilise them is the compulsion of the 
times. " 23 
The government in Berlin was depicted as a "popular" govern- 
ment in constant touch with the mass of the population. On 12 
February Goebbels wrote in Das Reich: 
"The measures taken so far are not too severe 
for our people; rather they are not severe 
enough .... We have-never, not, -even in the 
war, been surrounded by a Chinese Wall. We 
have always lived and worked in the midst of 
the people. Our desk stood.. and stands so to 
speak on the Wilhelmplatz and everyone has 
the right to look over our shoulder and give 
good advice. We knew and know exactly what 
the people want, what they think and feel, 
what they are able and willing to give and 
do, and what call is needed to spur them to 
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the utmost effort .... But we must over and 
over a'gain point out that all Government 
measures would disappear like water in sand 
if they were not immediately taken up and 
converted into deeds by the people. We 
cannot and do not want to place a policeman 
24 behind every citizen to watch him. " , 
Goebbels subordinated all other propaganda considerations to 
the needs of the "total war" campaign. All-other themes were 
either played down or, as in the case of anti-Bolshevik 
propaganda (which is the theme of the next chapter), used in 
such a way as to implement the effect of the campaign. At the 
very beginning, the setbacks in the East and the resulting 
military threat to the Reich provided a very "welcome" back- 
ground. In factv Goebbels. often deliberately. pqinted the 
situation darker than the facts really warranted in order to 
attain the desired effect. The press was even instructed on 22 
February that "favourable news over the situation on the Eastern 
Front should in no case by published" . 
25 This policy was not too 
difficult a one to follow in the days immediately following the 
end in Stalingrad. But the fronts soon became stabilised and 
the German Army even managed to score some local successes. 
Moreover, at the beginning of March, some of the territory lost 
only shortly before was recaptured. But, although hoping the 
Red Army would eventually be rolled back, Goebbels was not 
prepared to-sit back and see the general improvement in the 
military situation jeopardize the implementation of the new 
measures by arousing a spirit of uncontrollable euphoria. 
Instead of victory fanfares being sounded, the treatment of the 
military situation continued to be characterised by a note of 
official pessimism. "Good. " news was put aside or subordinated 
to the s upreme task of mobilising the nation. On 15 March, for 
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instance, the German press was told: 
"The capture of Kharkov is to be given no 
special journalistic treatment. Commentaries 
andthe headings for the OKW-Berichte should 
rather continue to stress the sustained hard- 
ness of the fighting on the Eastern Front 
and the need for a further determined effort 
on the Home Front. j, 
26 
Many people were quick in perceiving the purpose behind this 
propaganda strategy, even before thexecapture of Kharkov. 
According to an SD report of 22 February: 
"Here and there it is remarked that Goebbels 
has painted the situation blacker than it 
really is in order to make his total-war 
measures more effective. , 
27 
Forced onto the defensive, Goebbels was forced to deny doing 
any such thing although, in fact, he went on doing exactly the 
same thing in the weeks that followed. In an article in Das 
Reich on 12 March he asserted: 
"It would be fundamentally wrong and a proof 
of superficial self-deception if one were 
to assume that we have intentionally painted 
the situation in the East during the last 
few weeks blacker than it actually was: 
that we have in other words been practising 
a sort of practical pessimism in order - as 
our enemies assert - to sell our 'total war' 
to the people more easily. It is not 
necessary to raise ghosts to frighten our 
people. " 
After providing this demonstration of propaganda reaction to 
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popular response, he went on to warn: 
"We are not yet over the hill. We are still 
facing it. An enormous stretch, including 
the most difficult part, has still to be 
conquered .... Whatever the promises of spring 
and the lure of summer, we must only think 
of the winter which is to follow and which 
we must conquer without considerable loss 
28 
We do not know where enemy resources end. 
C. THE RESPONSE TO THE CAMPAIGN - THE IMPORTANCE OF THE 
CLASS FACTOR 
Many responded to this propaganda in exactly the way least 
desired by Goebbels - by giving vent to their class feelings. 
Well-dressed ladies were insulted in the street and in the Berlin 
underground. One such case is described by Von Hassel: 
"The wife of Minister Thomsen steps out of the 
subway. A man in'uniform, heavy with braid 
she thinks it was a police officer - storms 
up to her, snatches an ordinary, much worn 
kid-glove off her hand, and bellows: 'Haven't 
you heard Goebbels has forbidden the wearing 
of kid-gloves? ' A peroxide blonde passing by 
chimed in 'Quite right! ' Incidentallyv Goebbels 
had not said anything against kid-gloves; he 
said that in such times as these one couldn't 
handle them /shirkers 7with kid gloves. But 
the stirring up of animosities and hatreds is 
getting worse and what makes it worse is that 
it originates in 'high places'. " 
29 
What was more, the newcomers to the factories were often mocked 
and made to feel anything but welcome. 
30 Goebbels' "total war" 
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propaganda had succeeded in bringing to the surface those 
class-antagonisms which to a large extent had lain dormant 
since 1933. The fabric of the new "social state" now appeared 
very thin indeed. An SD report of 25'February went as far as 
to remark: 
"Envy, suspicion and prejudice have perhaps 
never been so evident as they are today. " 
31 
This was precisely what Goebbels had wished to prevent and he 
saw in this orgy of class hatred a real danger to the unity of 
the nation at war. In a propaganda conference of 12 March: 
"The Minister showed his concern over reports 
describing the molesting of well-dressed 
ladies by certain people who had completely 
misunderstood the demands of waging total 
war. The sharpest measures must be taken 
against any attempt of the mob to throw its 
weight around. , 
32 
The press was now called upon to make it quite clear to its 
readers that 
"it is no infringement of war discipline 
when, for example, a woman dresses nicely 
and makes herself look pretty with the 
things she possesses. Not outward ' 
appearance, but bearing and achievement 
are alone important. " 
33 
The seriousness which the Propaganda Minister attached to this 
becomes quite clear in the very direct words he used in his 
Das Reich article of 26 March: 
"Nobody should believe that he is rendering 
particular service to the total war effort 
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if in a tram or in an underground carriage 
he bursts into vulgar abuse against a 
woman who happens to be nicely and neatly 
dressed.... In so far, indeed, as the war 
entails a certain amount of levelling, this 
is not by reason of a principle - let alone 
envy or class instinct - but by a compelling 
practical necessity .... Where life in wartime 
still leaves room for the expansion of 
individual personality, it is open to anyone 
to make use of the opportunity. Total War 
is a very serious affair. And we should do 
the greatest harm to it and ourselvest toot 
if we were to tolerate its degradation into 
the scene of mass instincts let loose. " 
34 
Those here addressed do not seem to have been very impressedp 
because exactly one week later Goebbels found it necessary to 
resort to the last weapon in his armoury - the threat: 
"That a few hotheads should try to exploit 
the favourable opportunity of giving rein 
to their undigested class instincts is 
thoroughly unsatisfactory, but will be 
ov ercome by exercising some patience and 
35 
necessary, - severity. ", 
Thus, by the end of Marchý members of the working class had taken 
the place of middle-class malingerers as the target of official 
criticism. 
It has been emphasized above that it was the middle 
classes that had to bear the brunt of the burden. As the class 
most affected by the shutting of small shops and businesses and 
by the mobilisation decrees, it was also the class that showed 
- 68 - 
the least enthusiasm for participating in the common effort. 
Many saw in "total war" a threat to their livelihood, a process 
of rapid proletarianisation of society. Those who had only a 
short time before been the most stalwart supporters of National 
Socialism now felt betrayed. This mood was echoed in an SD 
report of 8 March: 
"Since the beginning of the action of closing 
down businesses, statements that National 
Socialism is getting like Bolshevism in its 
methods have been increasingly'reported. In 
those middle-class circles directly' hit by 
the closing-down of certain branches of the 
economy, the destruction of the middle class 
in favour of a state-capitalistic concentration 
of the economy is being predicted. From this 
only a small leading group would profit. , 
36 
All this was the very opposite to the expectations with which 
this class had greeted the Nazis only ten years before. 
Goebbels did his very best to soothe these doubts of the 
regime's hitherto most faithful followers. But despite his 
reassurances in his Sportpalast speech of 18th February that no 
systematic political purpose lay behind the measures, such fears 
only grew in the months that followed. The propagandists did 
all they could to halt this grave-development. On 7 March, for 
example, an article in the Hamburger Fremdenblatt warned that it 
would be "completely wrong to view the decreed rationalisation 
of the economy as a final or even desirable situation". It 
would, moreover, be a great error to think that the days of the 
entrepreneur were over. Although he was a servant of the state 
and could not be allowed to do as he wished, he was nevertheless 
an indispensable element of the economic system. 
37 
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But all these soothing words did little to allay middle- 
class anxieties. As late as May, Gau Thdringen pointed to the 
very widespread mood of disappointment and bitterness: 
"In spite of the propaganda carried out by 
the Party to the effect that the closing- 
down action is merely a war measure, the 
idea that the middle class. is to be 
systematically wiped out is gaining more 
and more ground, , 
38 
The effect of the propaganda backing the closing-down 
action as well as other business restrictions was severely 
undermined by. the very unequal implementation in the various 
Gaus. The local party boss, disinclined to curry unpopularity 
and frequently himself-a member of the class that was to bear 
the brunt of the burden, interpreted the decrees as he saw fit. 
This was a source of constant concern to Goebbels, who could 
exert very little influence over the independent will of the 
Gauleiters. On 13 March he wrote in his diary: 
"It simply won't do that total war is 
interpreted in one Gau laxly and in another 
Gau strictly. This has already led to the 
situation that in certain Gaus the dyeingand 
waving of women's hair is forbidden whilst 
in others it is permitted, with the result 
that the better-off ladies go from one Gau 
to another in order to have their hair done. 
That is, of coursev not the sense of total 
war. 11 
39 
Many were asking what had happened to the great "storm" of which 
Goebbels had spoken only shortly before. Even small differences 
in the interpretation of the measures in the different Gaus 
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sufficed to confirm suspicions that the entire "total war" 
programme had been drastically watered down. There was also 
the sneaking suspicion that Party members were not being hit to 
the same extent as other citizens. Finally, what one saw with 
onets own eyes provided the most damning evidence: 
"People were saying that little has changed, 
even from the outside and the enthusiasm 
which at first gripped the population has 
subsided and has again given way to 
indifference and scepticism. " 
40 
Soon Goebbels was to see that there was little to be gained 
by denying that there had been formidable difficulties. The 
contradiction between the reality and the too perfect picture 
painted by the propaganda had become so stark that the Minister 
was compelled to find some scapegoat. He tried to put some of 
the blame on the lower ranks of the state bureaucracy. In an 
outburst of calculated candour on 2 April he ridiculed the 
numerous questionnaires which "continue to be issued, filled-inp 
stamped and even buried in great filing cabinets, from which 
they never see the light of day again". He then went on to 
strike a more personal note in his attack: 
"Somebody proves-with. disarming thoroughness 
that Copernicus should be written with aW 
and gives the impression of having won a 
battle in the struggle of continents. Another 
devotes industry worthy of a better cause to 
the stringing together of the first syllables 
of technical expressions, creating new 
monstrosities of words and befouling our 
beautiful German language. " 
41 
The function of this criticism was immediately recognized by 
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American content analysts: 
"In order to escape the public's growing 
resentment against the state apparatusy 
Nazi propaganda now tends to place the blame 
for the personal inconvenience of the war on 
the lower bureaucracy, speaking as if the 
latter were not part of the state apparatus. " 
42 
Ever since Hitler had criticised German civil servants in his 
Reichstag speech of 26 April 1942, the German Beamter had had 
the uncomfortable feeling of being under attack from above as 
well as from below. Now it appeared Goebbels-was preparing to 
reopen the attack. According to an SD report compiled three days 
after the publication of the article: 
"The civil service (Beamtenschaft) is worried 
about the contempt being shown for it by 
the population which is becoming more and 
more marked, and it feels insufficiently 
43 
protected against this by the leadership. 
This attack really amounted to a cheap attempt to capitalise 
on the animosity felt by citizens of all states against the state 
bureaucracy. But it was just as sensitive as plant to handle as 
inter-class strife, and could prove just as perilous. Such 
criticism from official quarters meant undermining the working 
morale of a group on whom the regime had to rely and who had 
hitherto behaved quite loyally. It is therefore-hardly 
surprising that a halt was soon called to this attack on the 
class of German Beamten. Such an admission that the state 
authorities were inefficient and ineffective was in itself very 
damning and would most certainly never have succeeded in 
enhancing the reputation of the political leadership. Had the 
attacks continued, the opposite would doubtless have been the 
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case. 
Naturally the "total war" needed time to take effect but 
at the end of the year 1943 the German people felt themselves 
entitled to draw their own conclusions as to whether the 
measures had, in fact, been an overall success. An SD report, 
drawn up on 13 DecetAer, which examined the response to the 
measures in the preceding months, was not at all flattering to 
the regime and most damning in its description of public 
judgement of the results of the once so loudly proclaimed "total 
warit, 
"It is being asserted that the proclamation 
of total war has not, in practice, been 
followed up with the energetic and drastic 
measures expected by most Volksgenossen. The 
call to total war has in part remained just 
a slogan. Many of the possibilities of a 
truly total effort have remained unexploited. " 
The German people had quite definite ideas as to what a "total 
war" should really be like: 
"According to popular opinion, a total war 
effort must have the following objectives: 
I. the greatest possible increase in arms 
production capacity 
2. the constant replenishing and strengthening 
of front-line units with fresh able-bodied 
soldiers 
3. the defence of the Home-Front from air- 
raids 
4. the securing of the supply of food and 
other essential consumer goods to the 
population. 
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Apart from these there must not be any 
other tasks or objectives, because they 
would only weaken the potentiality of total 
war. It was in this sense that the 
statements of Reichsminister Dr. Goebbels 
in the Sportpalast at the beginning of 
the year had been understood. 
Those Volksgenossen in war service, however, 
frequently observe how certain parts of 
the population have not been mobilised for 
total war and how there are still today 
numerous establishments whose work is only 
of marginal importance or even completely 
unimportant for the conduct of the war. 
The Volksgenossen believe these to be the 
reasons for the setbacks that we have 
suffered on all fronts. " ' 
The many exemptions from military servicet particularly the fact 
that many healthy young men were left at home for "essential 
work", was said to be the cause of bitter reproach and criticism. 
One worker was reported as remarking: 
"At the front our soldiers are fighting an 
enemy superior in numbers, and potential 
reserves are hanging around doing little 
at home simply because the firms want to 
maintain a nucleus of personnel to enable 
them to lay the necessary basis for making 
their post-war profits. This is fundamen- 
, 
tally wrong. " 
The deep'suspicion that Party leaders and state-employees would 
somehow be spared the rigours of the measures prescribed and 
given-preferential treatment had in no way abated and, in fact, 
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appeared confirmed by the course of events. 
"The view is often being expressed that the 
authorities, public corporations and many 
corporate institutions, as well as the NSDAP 
and some of its organisations, have been 
combed very superficially indeed. The 
disappointment is occasionally expressed in 
the assertion that whoever has a position 
with the authorities or the NSDAP need not 
fear being called up, even if he has been 
officially declared fit for military service. " 
Nor had the actual implementation, of the measures been able to 
remove the nagging doubts that social and political position 
would prove more powerful than the principle of fairness and 
equality. 
"On the basis of their own observations, the 
Volksgenossen have the impression that the 
number of those who have not been called up is 
incredibly high. But it would not be fair. to 
condemn the shirking of these Volksgenossinnen 
too hard as long as many of the leaders, who 
are naturally-obliged to give an example to 
others, ostensibly used their influence to 
protect their wives and daughters from the 
claws of the Labour Exchange (Arbeitsamt). Il 
The lower classes were also disappointed by the incomplete 
implementation of the decision to close down businesses 
unnecessary for the war effort. 
"What is more, the population believes that 
the action to close down businesses has 
brought no satisfactory results. In general, 
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only a few businesses - mainly perfumeries, 
confectioners and jewellers - have been 
shut. The population cannot find any great 
public benefit in the result of the closing- 
down action and consider it a failure. This 
attitude is accompanied by a certain sympathy 
for the 'little guy' who is normally the first 
to suffer whilst the 'big folks' remain 
unmolested and always know how to protect 
themselves. Above all, people point to the 
purpose of the total war measures - to save 
manpower - and remark that little has, in 
this respect, been attained by shutting down 
smaller businesses. " 
Finally,, a certain respect was expressed for the more thorough- 
going methods of the Bolsheviks: 
"Among almost all parts of the population the 
opinion is being uttered that the Soviets are 
superior to us when it comes to a thorough 
implementation of total war. The Soviets have 
realized how. to develop really total methods 
,, 44 in a quite exemplary way, 
In short, the German people saw far too little evidence of a 
really radical transformation in wartime life. No one was more 
conscious of the general failure of the campaign than Goebbels 
himself who most certainly shared the sentiments disdus'ged in 
the report quoted above. He had had to stand by quite powerless 
and see how the policies he himself had formulated and proclaimed 
were softened up and diluted by a bureaucracy he had no way of 
controlling. He put the main blame for the flop, however, on the 
intrigues of Bormann. Von Oven recorded the scathing judgement 
of Goebbels on the success of "total war" in a diary entry of 
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July 1944: 
"Not a single practical measure was 
implemented. Everything got bogged down 
in the sand of ministerial bureaucracy. 
No department was prepared to subject it- 
self to voluntary restrictions and the 
gentlemen of the triumvirate were not the 
kind of men who could insist on getting 
their way.,, 
45 
Hence, all that remained of the "great storm" proclaimed with 
such elan at the beginning of 1943 was a very damp squib. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The propaganda campaign backing "total war" fell far short of 
the desired effect. Despite some individual successes of a 
rather temporary nature, Nazi propaganda was unable to convince 
the average German citizen who considered himself to be in a 
good position to judge whether the measures proclaimed werep 
firstly, being-ýenforced and, secondly, sufficient to pave the 
way to victory. This was particularly true of the working-class 
who observed, ry eye. 
.. 
pverything with a highly watchful and wa 
But it must be stressed that the propagandists hardly had a 
chance when the "total war" measures fell far short of Goebbels' 
hopes and expectations and were constantly being watered down. 
They could do precious little when up against those elements in 
the Party who simply did not want to recognise the gravity of 
the situation. So it is scarcely surprising that the propaganda 
backing "total war" was not very effective when the "total war" 
itself was far from being total. Goebbels waý hardly to blame 
for this, for he had desired the most radical changes. He was 
without the necessary authority to prevent the measures from 
being watered down at the national level by the triumvirate and 
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at the local level by the obstruction of the Gauleiters, who 
did not wish to forego any of the popularity they might enjoy 
or to harm their own financial interests by supporting an attack 
on the class which they themselves represented. Sectional 
interests within the Party still posed too formidable an obstacle 
for the strong will of the Reichspropagandaminister. This 
absence of enthusiasm, let alone good will, by leading represent- 
atives of the NSDAP was the most important factor in checking a 
propaganda campaign designed to promote the ideal. Thus, such a 
contradiction between propaganda claims and the reality arose 
that even the most willing citizen could not fail to notice. 
The second factor minimising the propagandats success is 
not far divorced from the first one: the measures were aimed at 
those people who, forming the basis of NSDAP supportv naturally 
hoped to be the main beneficiaries of National Socialism - the 
lower middle class. No amount of propaganda could persuade those 
affected that the closing down of their businesses would not 
have any far-reaching effect on their future livelihood. All the 
reassurances made by the government only served to make these 
once so loyal supporters of the "New Germany" ask themselves 
whether the war had really been necessary and - what is more - 
what the results of a military defeat might be. And a class 
seeing itself faced with economic ruin would be irritated rather 
than encouraged by all the kind words of the propagandists, who 
never ceased to emphasize that victory was the prerequisite for 
the restoration of the middle-class. 
In addition, the sudden manifestation from below of those 
animosities associated with the idea of Klassenkampf must have 
considerably added to the fears of the petit bourgeois and 
created the impression that the Nazis were now aiming at the 
bolshevisation of Germany. But this unfortunate situation was 
difficult to avoid for, as has been explained, the total war 
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measures affected people according to class and it was the 
better-off part of the population that up to this time had barely 
been touched by war. Hence, a dangerous polarisation of classes 
existed from the very beginning. The class factor was in- 
extricably bound up with the reaction to the new war measures. 
From the very, first-moment Goebbels had been forced to perform a 
balancing trick. At the same time as wishing to show the middle 
and upper classes the need for their cooperationv he did not 
wish to stress those privileges they had hitherto enjoyedq 
thereby unleashing an avalanche of recriminations and class 
hatred. The less well-off had observed their "social betters" 
very closely and had waited to see how serious the "socialism" 
in National Socialism was. Goebbels must have known at the start 
that his propaganda would stir up this class consciousness, which 
he was certainly not naive enough to believe had vanished without 
leaving a trace since the Nazis seized power. Perhaps he had 
even hoped to harness it in order to frighten less enthusiastic 
members of the upper and middle classes into acquiescence to the 
new measures. But here he'was only deceiving himself. The 
Propaganda Minister had seriously underestimaýed the strength 
of these class feelings which would not allow themselves to be 
neatly fitted into his propaganda repertoire, there to do his 
bidding. Very soon he drew back in fright. on seeing what a 
powerful monster he had evoked and concentrated his efforts on 
repairing the damage done. But it was too late. Many a middle 
and upper-class German citizen must have shared the belief of 
the simple worker that this reermergence of the class-war was 
just what Goebbels had intended. This comes out clearly in the 
observations made by v. Hassel in November 1943, quoted above. 
In short, it had been all too easy to reawaken old class 
feelings but impossible for the propaganda then to control them, 
even less to call them to a halt. Thus class was a very 
formidable factor in determining reaction to both the measures 
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and the propaganda backing them. The latter could never hope 
to succeed in persuading a class to recognise the necessity of 
acting against its own interests. 
Propaganda could, in fact, do precious little to remove the 
existing doubts, scepticism and class prejudice. The first 
consideration would always'remain the'question how far the 
measures would affect the financial existence and everyday life 
of the individual. Those most directly hit were therefore the 
least enthusiastic. No amount of propaganda could persuade them 
that factory work was really quite pleasant, and the mere 
repetition of this theme only served to underline the ineffective- 
ness of Nazi propaganda in overcoming existing attitudes and 
prejudices. 
The idea of a really "total" war was naturally welcome to 
those already fully engaged in the war effort - the traditional 
working class. Here, however, existing attitudes towards the 
Party and the government were a much more important factor than 
all the promises made via the mass media in determining propaganda 
response. The picture painted by the radio and press seemed too 
good to be true. This class regarded the party bosses, the 
Bonzen, with intense distrust and assumed that they would pull 
enough strings to be able to go on . avoiding the rigours of war. 
Rumours that Party officials were being exempted from front-line 
duty were rife. 
46 The unequal enforcement of the measures in the 
various Gaus must have done much. to confirm suspicions that the 
Bonzen did not wish to relinquish any of their peace-time 
comforts. The mere rumour of privileges enjoyed by these 
political leaders or of exemptions from military service was 
sufficient to undermine the trust in the sincerity of the state 
leadership. And the rumour did not have to be true. Mere 
suspicion was enough. Any apparent confirmation of the existing 
attitude was immediately seized and used as evidence. Propaganda 
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proved to be a very ineffective instrument for removing the 
resulting doubts. What people themselves saw was the only 
acceptable proof and they saw too little. A constant visual 
confirmation was demanded that "total war" was a fact, not just 
another propaganda theme, and the propaganda itself was judged in 
terms of to what extent this visual confirmation, in fact, existed. 
Here was no purely ideological theme. Action, not words, 
was demanded. Too pointed a propaganda theme would only succeed 
in arousing the suspicion that here was yet another in a long 
series of propaganda campaigns, and at the time of Stalingrad 
the average citizen had learnt a lot in the art of reading between 
the lines and discovering the typical manipulative techniques of 
the propaganda machine. Few would now fail to recognise the real 
reason for the picturesque portrayal of a modern factory, for 
instance. 'As soon as the propaganda purpose, was discovered, the 
reader or listener was put on his guard and the propaganda 
message was unable to attain the intended goal. This would 
account for the far from favourable effect of Goebbels' ten 
questions. Many of those listening were indeed in the first 
moment swept along by the emotions deliberately aroused, but once 
the audience was away from the suggestive atmosphere and again 
immersed in the drudgery of everyday wartime life the propaganda 
purpose would become quite clear. So one has here to distinguish 
between the immediate and the long-term effects. An initial 
enthusiasm might even work to the disadvantage of the pro- 
pagandists, for with the inevitable confrontation with the sober 
reality the individual might feel himself duped. The morale 
reports confirm this impression and point, for example, to the 
very ephemeral effect of party rallies and speeches, even those 
of the FUhrer himself. 
In conclusion, it may be said that in the case of the 
"totalwar" campaign factors outside the influence and control 
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of Nazi propaganda were decisive in determining opinion - the 
degree to which the measures were enforced, the closing-down 
policy, class consciousness and roles, attitudes to the 
authorities and to the Nazi Party. Here the contradiction 
between what one heard and read and what one witnessed with one's 
own eyes was simply too great. It would therefore seem that 
propaganda is only able to induce the desired belief or opinion 
in a situation in which the facts perceived correspond to the 
claims of the propaganda message. In fact, propaganda itself can 
play only a subsidiary role in securing acceptance of government 
measures. It can contribute by providing skilful interpretation 
and the assurance that they will be implemented equally and 
fairly , by gentle persuasion and in the last resort by open 
threats. But propaganda is doomed when the situation it is 
portraying does not exist and everyone can see that it does not 
exist. Its strength depends on its being the sole reporter, the 
sole-interpreter in a field without competitors. In describing 
events on a faraway front - in the Far East, for instance - it is 
much freer than in a situation much nearer home in which every 
individual considers himself an expert, fit to judge success or 
failure and to draw his own conclusions independently of the 
official media. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ANTI-BOLSHEVISM AND ANTI-SEMITISM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the aftermath of Stalingrad, Goebbels believed that the best 
means of arousing a spirit of determination to weather all storms 
and carry on at all costs was to return to the very rudiments 
of National Socialist teaching - anti-Bolshevism and anti- 
Semitism. The German civilian and soldier should be given a 
sense of purpose, the feeling of fighting a good and just cause, 
and should, moreover, learn to hate his enemies. Before the final 
capitulation of Stalingrad, virtually all Nazi propaganda was 
being given an anti-Bolshevist slant. In fact, anti-Bolshevism 
was now to become the motor of the total-war campaign. It enabled 
the German propagandist not only to demonstrate the necessity of 
the measures being taken but also to depict in the most vivid 
colours the terrible peril facing the Reich and the supreme need 
to hang on and continue the struggle to the bitter end. By 
pointing out the danger to "Europe an civilisation" and the entire 
western way of life, it was also intended to sow discord in the 
enemy camp. The conservative and traditionally-thinking British 
were considered to be particularly susceptible to this kind of 
propaganda. 
In the early summer of 1943, anti-Bolshevism gave way to 
the even more strident tones of radical anti-Semitic propaganda. 
The same arguments that had been heard since the early days of 
the party were brought to the fore in a true orgy of hate. From 
the point of view of Nazi propagandav anti-Semitism seemed much 
more promising than anti-Red diatribes. Whereas in stressing 
the brutality and terror of the Soviet system there was a 
considerable risk of compelling more pessimistic German subjects 
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to seek consolation elsewhere and to place their hopes on 
Anglo-American humanity, anti-Semitism provided German propagand- 
ists with a unified and all-comprising target of attack. It was 
possible to show the danger threatening in the west as well as 
in the east, for according to a maxim of National Socialist 
theory the Jew was the force behind'both Bolshevism and 
Plutocracy. If the German people were becoming weary of the 
hardship and deprivations of war, then they knew who was to blame 
for everything - that race which, so it was said time and time 
again, had sworn to destroy the German nation! 
Both these themes were essentially ideological in substance 
and lacked any real visible form of confirmation. To a great 
extent, their political aspect was abstract and a matter of blind 
belief in the Nazi credo. Only in as far as Bolshevism was 
represented by a military power with which Germany was locked in 
combat was the danger visible. Both campaigns came in the after- 
math of severe military defeats - the capitulation of Paulus, 
Sixth Army in Stalingrad and the surrender of Rommel's Afrika 
Korps respectively. They also came at a time of widespread war- 
weariness which obliged Nazi propagandists to stress enemy war 
guilt and the fact that the German government had neither wanted 
nor planned a war. It is certain that the Nazis wished to 
prevent the understandable feelings of frustration and resentment 
which arose after almost four years of war being directed at 
themselves and instead to convert them into hostility towards 
the foe. It was thus hoped that a strong dose of anti-Bolshevism 
and anti-Semitism would prove to be an effective antidote to the 
increasing war-weariness and disappointment with the course of 
the war which was being recorded at this time. 
Both campaigns represented a deliberate attempt to right a 
potentially dangerous deterioration of morale by a return to a 
repetitive and intensive hammering of the few fundamentals of 
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Nazi teaching, presented in a form that everyone could understand. 
In this chapter it will be of particular interest to judge 
whether such methods were fit to secure acceptance of the pro- 
paganda message and the overall success of the campaigns. 
B. ANTI-BOLSHEVISM 
The anti-Bolshevik theme dominated the entire Nazi propaganda 
output in the first months of 1943. From the very beginning, it 
was clear that this was no easy theme to tackle. By stressing 
the threat of Communism to the western way of life, German 
propaganda was running the risk of demonstrating Soviet military 
strength rather too effectively. Although the overall military 
threat presented by Soviet Russia became the very essence of all 
arguments concerning the Red peril, Nazi propaganda would have 
to take great care not to destroy the delicate balance by arous- 
ing a spirit of hopelessness, the fear that nothing could be done 
ag , ainst sudh'a'mighty foe. Anti-Bolshevik propaganda was 
designed to eliminate defeatism, not to encourage it. 
(i) TheProb1emsPosedbye 
Anti- Bo 1 shevik Campai. &R 
A study of the campaign will perhaps permit conclusions to 
be drawn as to how far the German people were prepared to fight 
Communism and the Red Army - which were not necessarily the 
same - and to what extent they thought successful resistance and 
with it a favourabie termination'of the war were possible. This 
investigation may answer four questions. 
First, how successful was German propaganda as a whole? Anti- 
Bolshevism had always belonged to the fundamental tenets of 
National Socialism. With the exception of the years of the 
Soviet-German pact, 1939-41, the Nazis had never ceased hammering 
into people's minds that Russia was the arch-enemy of the German 
Reich. After June 1941 Germany was portrayed as the crusader 
against Bolshevism and thus the champion of western civilisation 
- 85 - 
against "uneuropean" ideas. It was not only fighting in the 
name of its own people but on behalf Of every "good European". 
In this. chapter it will be of interest to find out whether 
Germanýpropaganda had recovered from the severe setback of the 
winter 1942-3 and whether it had succeeded in overcoming or at 
least checking the growing lack of trust 'in its credibility, 
recorded at the time of Stalingrad. Those sources of informationi 
outside the control sphere of the authorities would play a vital 
role here, since they could be expected to constitute a decisive 
intervening-factor between propaganda aim and effect. Moreoverg 
the significance of the Germans' own picture of the Soviet 
political system as well as the Russian people as an intervening 
factor must also be examined. 
Second, how important was the volume of propaganda in determining 
the effect of propaganda? Was Goebbels justified in assuming 
that "only the most intense and frequent repetition of our 
Za-nti- 
Bolshevilý'/_ theses can have-a lasting success"? 
1 
Third, ' how,; ý*responsive were the German people to the propaganda 
that defeat would mean the destruction of Germany? How far were 
the German people willing to come to terms with the likeli- 
hood of defeat and to what extent were they convinced of the 
possibility of an acceptable form of life in a Germany under 
foreign occupation? 'Linked with this is a consideration of 
attitude to the Party and the willingness to relinquish National 
Socialism as the price of-peace and survival. 
Fourth, how far had the German workers remained faithful to 
Marxist beliefs? Had ten years of Nazi rule destroyed all 
remnants of the old class-thinkingv as well as-the once widespreaý 
admiration of the German working class for the Soviet social 
and political model? Did Nazi propaganda convince German workers 
that the victory of'Socialist Russia would also constitute the 
destruction of the German proletariat? 
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(ii) TheCourseoftheCa2paI Fa 11 
In explaining the purpose of the campaign to his sub- 
ordinates in the Propaganda Ministry, Goebbels listed the 
following "misconceptions", against which the battle was to be 
fought, namely that 
. 
1. Bolshevism had become more liberal and humane, a view 
supposedly held in intellectual circles; 
2. the English and Americans would see-to it that Germany was 
not bolshevised; 
3. that Bolshevism did not endanger the life of the ordinary 
working man who would simply have to go on working as he had 
always done; and 
4. the Bolsheviks would merely get rid of the Nazis and would 
not harm the simple German citizen. 
2 
All these ideas were inherently defeatist in nature and would 
have to be nipped in the bud. The widespread longing for peace 
must have also played a substantial role in Goebbels' decision 
to give the German people a strong dose of the Bolshevik bogey. 
The propaganda campaign was thus much more than the motor of 
11total war". It was the determined attempt to counter adverse 
developments in morale before it was too late. That Goebbels 
was none too sure of his audience and, in particular, of how 
deep National Socialism was anchored in the German working-class 
population, becomes clear in his express instructions that all 
reminders of the old international Marxist slogans were to be 
avoided: 
"In our description of the Bolshevik system, 
we do not speak of the struggle, of the 
proletariat but only of terror, murder, the 
mass deportation of workers, etc-Similarly, 
we do not wish to speak of the Red Army but 
always only of the Bolsheviks and Soviets .,, 
3 
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On February 18, Goebbels used the Berlin Sportpalast as his 
platform for launching the really intensive part of the campaign. 
His invited audience, as well as those at home who had tuned in 
to the live radio broadcast, were told: 
"The onslaught of the Steppe against our venerable 
continent broke loose this winter with a vehemence 
which surpasses all human and historical concept- 
ions. The German Armed Forces, together with 
their Allies, constitute the only conceivable 
protecting rampart against it. " 
4 
The tremendous importance attached to this campaign meant that 
all other issues, apart from "total war"9 were allotted a sub- 
ordinate place. Already on 12 February, the representatives of 
the media had been informed: 
"As the greatest and crucial propaganda thesisf 
our fight against Bolshevism must dominate all 
instruments of propaganda. This demands that 
smaller and routine questions of everyday life 
be given much less attention .... From now onf 
every radio talk, every report, every speech 
and every slogan must end with the stereotyped 
message that the struggle against Bolshevism is 
our most important task, ,5 
The success of anti-Bolshevik propaganda was to a great 
extent dependent on acceptance of the seriousness of the military 
situation on the Eastern Front. At the beginning of 1943, the 
danger had been apparent to all. But, as mentioned in the 
previous chapter, in March 1943, after the front had once again 
been stabilised, the German Wehrmacht was able to recapture some 
of the territory lost only shortly before, including Kharkovo 
the fourth largest city of the USSR. These successes were all 
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too readily interpreted by some as an indication that the 
military crisis had been completely surmounted. A third summer 
offensive was now being considered not only possible but 
probable. 
6 
Such optimism was not officially encouraged, as the 
absence or failure of the expected offensive would then lead 
inevitably to a propaganda debacle more far-reaching and 
disastrous in its consequences than that of Stalingrad. Goebbels 
noted with a certain disdain in his diary on 19 March: 
"It is uncanny how there are certain people who 
go to pieces with the first misfortune, but who 
with the first success see everything only from 
the rosy side. I consider it best if the German 
people behave in a completely realistic way and 
do not allow themselves to be over-influenced by 
the events of the day, be they favourable or 
unfavourable. ,7 
Hence, the rather more favourable military developments in the 
East did not fit into his propaganda concept. The radio and 
press were told to play down these localised battle successes. 
In his diary entry of 5 March Goebbels admits using such 
manipulative tactics: 
"We can record some extraordinary offensive 
successes. However, we are not giving them 
the great attention they deserve, as we do not 
8 
want to upset our anti-Bolshevik propaganda. " 
Throughout the early months of 1943 the campaign ran relentlessly 
and formed the basis of the entire propaganda effort. 
(iii) TheRes j2 onsetotheCamRai&a 
A marked lack in popular interest characterised the response 
to the campaign. The propaganda itself was either ignored 
entirely or heard extremely reluctantly, mainly because the 
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arguments being used were already familiar to everyone and were 
the very same as those that had been used for years. An SD 
report of 18 February pointed out: 
"The population does not wish to have Bolshevism 
and no longer needs to have the danger pointed 
out to them. " 
9 
The Re ierungsprdsident of Augsburg testified to the failure of 
the campaign in his April report: 
"The appeal of the rousing propaganda under the 
slogan, 'Victory or Bolshevism'p hast so it is 
reported, not been very great. " 
10 
The desire to arouse a real spirit of confidence and determination 
to hold out had been at the root of all propaganda endeavours, 
but after the campaign had been running for a good two months, 
the general mood was characterised less by enthusiasm than by 
the sheer lack of it. From Augsburg "an increased pessimism 
regarding how the war is going to end" was also reported, as 
well as "a slackening in general enthusiasm and in willingness to 
show the flag fin- special Nazi celebration dayst etc. 7 and in 
attending /FartY7 meetings". 
11 The campaign would therefore 
appear to have had no effect at all on behaviour and to have 
done very little in halting the downward trend in morale. Instead, 
apathy was spreading and was even beginning to infect Party 
circles. Fewer were now wearing their'Party membership badges 
and the Heil Hitler was frequently being given in a very half- 
hearted fashion. The papers found it necessary to remind their 
readers: 
"The greeting Heil Hitler has nothing in common 
with a sound which is barely articulated between 
the lips, nothing with a loosely executed lifting 
of the right armp at best reaching the level of 
the chest. " 
12 
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The "pessimists" were reported as having gained the upper hand 
in all discussions on the future course of the war and the more 
optimistic Volksgenossen had a hard time making themselves heard. 
When the latter tried to counter the arguments of less confident 
citizens by a simple expression of faith in the certainty of 
final victory, they only ran the risk of being regarded as 
ridiculous and incorrigible fools. 
13 
By painting the perils of Bolshevism in such vivid colours, 
it was clearly intended to destroy all those hopes in the 
possibility of a post-war German state without the Nazis. 
Germany and National Socialism were portrayed as synonymous. 
They were, inseparable from one another, the survival of one 
depending on the survival of the other. By accepting this 
fundamental truth, it was hoped that every German would redouble 
his efforts to avoid the personal destruction that would result 
from proving too weak in the face of such a threat. Thusq the 
very necessity of waging the war lay at the basis of this 
campaign. Moreover the success of anti-Bolshevik propaganda would 
depend on the success in extinguishing those "illusions" of a 
post-war non-Nazi political system, observed at the time of 
Stalingrad. In this regard, the propaganda campaign was a flop. 
Numerous morale reports at this time indicate a growing, not a 
decliningg preoccupation with an eventual defeat, as well as a 
tendency to see chances for oneself in an occupied Germany - 
despite all the utterances of the anti-Bolshevik propaganda. 
The population of MUnsterlandq for instanceg "met any mention 
of the Bolshevist danger with the answer that it would not be 
so bad, since Mnsterland would be part of the English 
occupation zone". 
14 
Furthermore, at the time when anti- 
Bolshevik propaganda was in full swing, the Meldungen aus dem 
Reich,, although describing the overall success of the propaganda 
in rather vague termsq pay considerable attention to a "minority" 
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of Volksgenossen who look forward without fear to a future 
non-Nazi Germany. 
"It is reported from western and southern parts 
of the Reich that parts of the population 
there representing every class, but especially 
Catholic and business groups - and in the 
Alpengauen (Austria) monarchists - argue that 
these areas would belong to the Anglo-American 
sphere. " 
(15 February 1943) 
15 
"The tendency, already reported, to place hopes 
on a division of Germany into a Soviet and an 
Anglo-American sphere of influence should the 
war be lost is, according to the reports at hand 
from the southern parts of the Reich, spreading. 
In the Alpengauen even people not belonging to 
monarchist circles are speaking of a new empire 
under Anglo-American protection. " 
(8 March 1943) 
16 
"The Catholic West and the Ostmark (Austria) 
will belong to the Anglo-American area of 
influence. " 
(12 April 1943) 
17 
This "minority" seems to have-been big enough to have merited 
thecomtant attention of the Nazi propagandist and to have 
unnerved the political leadership. These reports show quite 
clearly that a considerable part of the population of west and 
south Germany as well as former Austria found the anti- 
Bolshevik diatribes quite irrelevant when considering future 
developments. They could envisage an acceptable alternative to 
a Nazi and Bolshevik Germany. It is interesting to note that 
no such hopes were mentioned in reports from the eastern parts 
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of Germany. Here, it was obvious that defeat would mean Russian 
occupation. Other means would have to be found to make such a 
prospect more palatable. This will be discussed later on in 
this chapter. 
Just as interesting as these regional differences is a 
consideration of class as a factor determining response and 
particularly the question whether the campaign managed to instil 
a fear of Communism in those who had been ardent followers of 
the two socialist parties in the days of Weimar. In April the 
SD was still reporting the prevalence of the view that the "Reds 
are not so bad" and that only the Nazis would suffer, 
18 ideas 
which Goebbels had hoped to extirpate with his anti-Bolshevik 
propaganda drive. How little had actually been achieved in this 
respect is further borne out in a report of the 
Oberlandesgerichtsprasident of Naumberg at the end of June: 
"More disquieting than the fading of confidence 
in victory, which had previously prevailed every- 
where, is the view, spreading among the 
industrial working class, that Communism is 
not really so bad as it has always been depicted 
and that the working population (the industrial 
proletariat) need not fear any fundamental change 
in their living conditions. " 
19 
Goebbels certainly erred in assuming that the opinion, "the 
Bolsheviks are not so bad",, was one held principally by 
20 "intellectuals" 
. This was far from being the case. The 
Regierungsprdsident of Regensburg associated such views more with 
farmers and workers. 
21 
An SD report of 15 February was even more 
explicit: 
"The statement is often heard among the working 
class that for them life would not be so much 
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worse under Bolshevism than it is now. 
Older workers who had formerly supported the 
red parties state that under the Kaiser, 
during the Weimar Republic and the Third Reich 
they had had to work hard. And under Bolshevik 
rule, too, they had nothing worse to fear than 
much work and little pay. 1,22 
It must be remembered that the Nazi Party had been trying to 
win the German workers for years. The much publicised Kraft 
durch Freude voyages of the pre-war years certainly do not seem 
to have left behind any lasting impression. The anti-Bolshevik 
propaganda campaign does not seem to have left any greater 
impression, because otherwise a Party report would never have 
claimed at the end of May that only "about a half" of the 
population of the Steiermark still believed in a favourable end 
to the war. 
23 
Goebbels was soon to realise that there was little point in 
carrying on the campaign and perhaps a certain admission of 
failure may be detected in his instruction to the press to close 
the campaign at the end of March: 
"The press may now drop the anti-Soviet theme. 
Enough has been written and the longer it 
continues to be dealt with, the greater the 
danger becomes that the /-newspaper 7headings, 
in particular, will lack any psychological 
effect. The matter is generally somewhat 
difficult psychologically, as the desired 
1124 effect cannot always be guaranteed. 
(iv) TheFactorsIntervenina 
between Propa. Eanda Mes sa. E2 and 
h, a. aponse 
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The anti-Bolshevik propaganda campaign certainly fell far 
short of the desired success and left behind little or no lasting 
impression. In explaining this very negative result, it will be 
necessary to examine those factors which had intervened between 
propaganda message and response. A distinction must be made here 
between attitude to official propaganda and to the accessible 
unofficial sources of information which had proven to be so 
important in forming public opinion the winter before. Since 
Soviet brutality played such a central role in the campaign, 
considerable attention will also have to be paid to the popular 
image of the Russian enemy and the question how far it'corresponded 
to propaganda portrayals. Two important factors can be discerned. 
First, 'there are the weaknesses of official Nazi propaganda. 
In Chapter 2 it was shown how Nazi propaganda's prestige fell 
after the encirclement of Stalingrad, and crucial to the examination 
of response to anti-Bolshevik propaganda in the early months of 
1943 is the question whether the official German mass media had 
succeeded in overcoming this crisis of confidence. The damage 
inflicted to the image of Nazi propaganda during the previous 
winter naturally handicapped the campaign from the very beginning. 
People felt bitter at having been manipulated, led astray and even 
cheated. Thus, in the weeks following the capitulation of the 
Sixth Army, the German population could be expected to follow 
state propaganda with a particularly cautious and watchful eye. 
Perhaps, Goebbels was expecting too much from his new propaganda 
drive. This widespread feeling of being manipulated, fatal for 
any propaganda message, was difficult to remove or even weaken 
with such a tendentious theme as anti-Bolshevism. Here, the 
intention was clear to everyone and, as already underlined in the 
last two chapters, what was seen as "propaganda" was rejected out- 
right. Indeed, public attitude does not seem to have changed at 
all in the first days of the campaign. An SD report of 20 
- 95 - 
February, for example, explained the declining popularity of 
the daily radio magazine, Zeitspiegel ("Mirror of the Times"), 
by pointing out that people felt it was being "used too much for 
propaganda", whereas before it had limited itself to informing 
listeners of matters of topical interest. 
25 
In short, listeners 
had learnt to be more critical and wary. The official silence 
of the media over Stalingrad had acted as an eye-opener and many 
were determined not to let themselves be misled a second time. 
Past experience became the basis for forming attitude to the 
trustworthiness of all official propaganda, anti-Bolshevism not 
excepted. The monotonous uniformity of the German press was 
hardly appropriate to halt this loss of image and, if anything, 
could only deepen it and add to the uncomfortable feeling of 
being the victim of a deliberate attempt at manipulation. 
According to the SD: 
"It is not only the recurrence of the same factual 
content in every newspaper and the all-pervading 
interpretation of every event as seen through 
the eyes of the National Socialist leadership, 
-but the extensive similarity of the material 
itself in the commentary and in the style used 
by every German newspaper to address every 
Volksgenosse .... The uniformity of the pressv which 
is indirectly influenced by the DNB (German News 
Agency), is further reinforced by the immediate 
and extensive steering measures on the part of 
the leadership of the political, press, with the 
result that time and time again the reader hits 
on the idea that the newspapers can only publish 
what Berlin permits and prescribes, " 
26 
The widespread boredom with propaganda content is echoed in a 
SD report of 29 March: 
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"A number of people are quoted in the reports 
who believe that the press is no longer able 
to capture the interest of the reader to any 
great extent, either by its external presentat- 
ion or lay-out or by its content. Day after day, 
the papers are merely skimmed through by many 
Volksgenossen because they are rather monotonous 
in appearance and repeat the same old themesp 
such as the Bolshevik danger, the post-war plans 
of our enemies, the disunity within the enemy 
camp, etc., without adding any really new arguments 
and with virtually the same words. This has led 
to a certain oversaturation, since poeple feel 
sufficiently well-informed over these questions 
which have been dealt with time and time again. " 
27 
Another factor determining the success chances of a 
propaganda theme would naturally be its ability to answer those 
questions foremost in people's minds, thereby showing the way to 
victory. Mood at this time was marked by a growing longing for 
peace, but, at the same time, the population was becoming more 
and more uncertain as to how a favourable peace could be achieved, 
Did the propaganda convince them that the efforts and sacrifices 
they were being called upon to make would one day be rewarded? 
The acceptance of the possibility of German victory was the 
prerequisite for accepting all other arguments of Nazi propaganda. 
It was all too well to warn of the awesome consequences of defeat 
but the German people wanted to know how such a defeat could still 
be avoided. This was regarded as a question of existence which 
would decide the fate of every individual citizen, his property 
and future. The intensified treatment of the theme, "the war 
was forced upon us", at this time, according to which the Fiffirer 
had left no stone unturned to save the peace, leaves no doubt 
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that an increasing number of Germans were asking the dangerous 
question as to the sense of the war and whether it had all been 
really necessary. American content-analysis experts concluded 
in April: 
"The popular attitudes which this propaganda 
is to influence are apparently so widespread 
that the Nazis need not fear putting ideas in 
unreflective minds by overt refutations. " 
28 
The fact that the mass media had stopped giving too many 
predictions for the near future was generally welcomed, but 
people were unhappy about being given no clues whatsoever as to 
future developments and at being left to their own devices in 
trying to surmise the path to final victory. Goebbels touched 
on this delicate point in his diary: 
"Morale i's changing constantly. All sorts of 
things are criticised, but what depresses most 
is the fact that they /Ehie German people7 no 
longer have any general picture of what is 
happening. No one can picture just how the war 
is to end and how we are to win the victory-" 
29 
It is true that great hopes were being placed on the coming 
German summer offensive in the East. But even if substantial 
military successes-were attained as in the previous two summersq 
the winter would surely follow - and therein lay the great 
element of uncertainty. How could a final decision. ever be 
reached with this eternal swing of the pendulum between summer 
victory and winter defeat? Meanwhile, the western powers would 
be free to build up their strength quite undisturbed and 
confidently await the most favourable moment to strike. 
30 
Here, Nazi propaganda was caught up in a terrible 
bredicament. It could not predict future developments without 
running the risk of compromising itself later. It had lost so 
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much credit the winter before by doing precisely that. On the 
other hand, a very pronounced propaganda of fear - and that is 
what anti-Bolshevism really amounted to - was totally inadequate 
to convince the German people of the necessity of carrying on. 
Even the basic reality -. the military situation itself - was 
soon no longer favourable for a propaganda of fear. The 
stabilisation of the Eastern Front and the subsequent three-month 
lull took the heart out of the campaign. The propaganda drive 
was deprived of its solid basis. Perhaps, the peril had always 
appeared somewhat unreal. Few people could envisage an Eastern 
Front on Germanyts frontier, let alone a Russian advance into 
the Reich. It was true that the Russians had captured a small 
part of East Prussia in 1914-5, but the front of 1943 was still 
over a thousand kilometres from Berlin. Von Studnitz points out 
this phenomenon in his diary: 
"As soon as things at the front become quietp 
the East reverts to being that vague conceptp 
exemplified by Goethe's words, 'peoples somewhere 
, 31 beyond Turkey who are always fighting each other'. 
Finally, the playing down of the military successes in the 
Kharkov area was soon recognised as yet another propaganda trick, 
and the suspicion grew that the anti-Bolshevik propaganda 
campaign depended on a deliberate pessimism (Zweckpessimismus) 
at growing variance with the facts of the situation. 
32 And, 
once again, people are less susceptible to propaganda which is 
seen to be "propaganda". Moreover, in the spring of 19431 other 
dangers were facing the German nation, which seemed even more 
pressing and threatening than the "remote" Eastern Front - the 
Allied advance in North Africa and, above all, the enemy air 
blitz on the cities of the German Ruhr. Abstract anti-Bolshevik 
propaganda was no longer viewed as being in line with the reality 
of the situation and this undoubtably played a part in Goebbels 
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calling a halt to the campaign. 
The second factor affecting the response to the official 
propaganda was the availability of unofficial sources of 
information. The morale reports at this time leave little doubt 
that the influence of such sources increased considerably in the 
months following Stalingrad, and this development is of supreme 
importance in any assessment of the effects of the anti-Bolshevik 
propaganda campaign. It even appeared that for many people 
these unofficial news sources were becoming more important in 
the forming of opinions than the official media themselves. It 
would, however, be wrong to assume an automatic relation between 
value estimation of the reliability of official propaganda and 
the willingness to lend an ear to unofficial information sources 
in every case. It is important to remember that even at this 
crucial stage of the war a large part of the German population 
remained almost untouched by mass media, as an SD report of 18 
March was at pains to stress. This was said to be particularly 
true in rural areas where newspapers were scarcely read and the 
farming population either did not possess a *radio set or, if 
they did, had no time to listen. Consequently country people, 
in particular, were susceptible to information and opinions 
passed on by person-to-person contact. 
"Rumours, field-post letters and the remarks 
of individuals are for many almost the sole 
source of information. " 
33 
In spite of this important qualification, there can be little 
doubt that the attempt to inform oneself from other sources was 
a conscious and deliberate one and rested on a value estimation 
of official propaganda. This was especially true of illegal 
"black listening", as every "culprit" would naturally be aware 
of the risk he was running. Many people were convinced that 
their own mass media were withholding vital facts from them 
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which could be learnt from enemy radio stations. A Party report 
of May 1943 remarked: 
"It is very often the case that those Volksgenossen 
who have been informed by enemy propaganda or 
who trust the rumours circulating have a much 
better impression of the real situation than 
those relying solely on the official statements 
of the various ministries. " 
34 
Any enhancement in the reputation of enemy radio was, of course, 
accompanied by a decline in the reputation of the German 
information media for reliability and accuracy. An SD report 
of15 March 1943 leaves no doubt that "black listening" was on 
the increase and that this was very much tied up with the 
tarnished image of Nazi propaganda. 
"The population is saying that at present enemy 
stations are being heard-to a greater extent 
than ever before. No one, indeed, wishes to 
admit to having heard enemy stations himself 
or can name anyone who does so. Many 
Volksgenossen explained, however, that enemy 
stations satisfy the news hunger of the pop- 
ulation better than German stations, because 
they broadcast less propaganda and polemics 
and more concrete news. " 
35 
During the period under study, the most burning question 
for a large and growing part of the population concerned the fate 
of relatives reported "missing" in Russia. Were they still 
alive? Nazi propaganda did not encourage people to think that 
they were. Although the matter was never directly mentioned, 
there is little doubt that it was expected that every citizen 
would conclude from the anti-Bolshevik propaganda that the life 
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of no German prisoner-of-war would be spared by the cruel 
Soviet foe. "Missing" should be interpreted as meaning "dead" 0 
36 
To ask the families concerned to accept this was asking too much. 
They wanted to know that their relatives were alive and belief 
in Soviet brutality and acceptance of anti-Soviet propaganda was 
tantamount to believing they were dead. Disbelief in the claims 
of Nazi propaganda was not enough - they had to be proven wrong. 
And this would only be possible by turning to other information 
sources. This terrible uncertainty in a matter of such direct 
concern to so many German families turned out to be an important 
bonus for Soviet propagandists, as a great part of their 
audience not only wished to believe them but had to believe them. 
Moscow Radio knew how best to exploit this anxiety and went about 
providing its listeners with the information they wanted to hear. 
It gave the names of German prisoners captured in broadcasts 
neatly trimmed with propaganda and many Germans listened 
regularly, knowing full well they were putting their own lives 
at stake. 
37 
As a result, the natural conclusion was drawn that 
death was not preferable to Soviet imprisonment, a conclusion 
at variance with official thinking. Well-meaning listeners 
often passed on the news heard on the Moscow wavelength. The 
wife of a soldier reported missing in Stalingrad, for instance, 
heard the voice of her husband on Radio Moscow one evening. 
Next morning, her letter-box was full of anonymous letters 
informing her of the good news that her husband was alive and 
well. 
38 
A further case was reported from Frankfurt-on-Main: 
"A woman has received over 100 anonymous letters 
informing her that, according to a report broad- 
cast on the Soviet radio, her son has been taken 
prisoner. A short time ago, it was normal to 
notice about 5 letters in such a case. , 
39 
Despite this somewhat crude working with statistics, this report 
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shows quite clearly how massive the increase was in the number of 
"black listeners". Many were even prepared to justify listening 
to Radio Moscow as long as their own government went on withholding 
information concerning the whereabouts of their missing friends 
and relatives. 
40 
The SD remarked rather pitifully that "a sharp 
41 
criticism of this punishable deed is hard to find" . 
It is therefore hardly surprising that of all the foreign 
stations Radio Moscow exerted the most "dangerous" influence at 
this time, although it must be added that the BBC continued to be 
heard a lot. 
42 
The growing dependency on these "illegal" radio 
stations did not remain without effect on Nazi propaganda. Its 
reputation fell still further: 
"Listening to enemy radio stations has led to a 
great breach in German propaganda's reputation 
for truth and honesty which is being increasingly 
questioned. , 
43 
The danger was immediately recognized and counter-measures taken. 
Party speakers were given the job of pointing out at meetings how 
ridiculous and unreliable Soviet propaganda was -a none too easy 
task after Stalingrad. 
44 
Acceptance of anti-Bolshevik theses would, of course, also be 
determined by the image of the Russian foe.. Were the peoples of 
the Soviet Union really the downtrodden slaves of a savage Jewish- 
Bolshevik regime they were said to be in the portrayals of Nazi 
propaganda? Attitude to the official propaganda image would 
naturally play a crucial role when drawing conclusions as to the 
fate of "missing" German soldiers in the East and the likely treat- 
ment of the inhabitants of a defeated Germany. Here, almost 
everybody was in a position to form some judgement of other, either 
on the basis of accounts given by soldiers on leave or in letters 
from the front and from the impression gained from the many Russian 
. and 
Ukrainian workers brought to Germany as forced-labour. 
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According to an SD report of August 1942p German soldiers were 
frequently amazed at the intelligence of the ordinary Russian, 
especially by his ability in many cases to speak German. This 
opinion was said to be particularly typical of the simple German 
soldier who had only been to a Volkschule (elementary school) and 
had never learnt a foreign language. On the basis of this 
experience he would then probably conclude that Bolshevism was 
not so primitive or lacking in culture as depicted by official 
propaganda. 
45 
These impressions would then be passed on to friends 
and relatives and would be valued much more highly than those 
impressions emanating from Nazi mass media. German propagandists 
were forced on to the defensive when combatting the strong 
impressions left behind by direct person-to-person contact. 
Party propaganda did endeavour, for instance, to explain the 
apparent success of the Soviet education system - albeit in a 
very typical way. 
"For the-Soviets the teaching of a language is 
to be seen in exactly the same way as instruction 
in how to operate a tractor or a plane. It is all 
part of the plan to bolshevise the world. German 
is taught to enable the Bolsheviks to communicate 
with the German people in the event they should 
ever enter the Reich as victors. They would then 
be able to shower us with their Jewish-Bolshevik 
agitation and would then have the chance to 
register every hostile remark immediately. In 
short, for the Soviets, learning the German 
language is just one of the prerequisites for 
implementing their reign of terror and the 
enslavement of the entire German people. " 
46 
Since June 1941 Nazi propaganda had never ceased stressing the 
racial inferiority of the people of Eastern Europe, in particular 
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of the Soviet Union. German soldiers were thus astounded on 
meeting the blond and blue-eyed Muschiks, who seemed to correspond 
to the "Arian" norm to a greater extent than the German people 
did. They also found the population of the Ukraine healthy, hard- 
working and good-natured. Furthermore, they were often greatly 
impressed by the great modern industrial works they came across 
in the course of their military advance into the heart of Russia. 
Animal instinct and fear of the commissar also appeared inad- 
quate to explain the bravery of the Soviet soldier. Many older 
German soldiers noticed a considerable difference between the 
tenacity ofthe Russian enemy of 1941-1943 and of 1914-7. Could 
this really mean that many Russians, especially the younger 
generation, really believed Stalin to be a great leader? Was 
there perhaps a genuine patriotic feeling for the new Soviet 
state? 
47 
Within the frontiers of the Reich many German civilians met 
the ordinary Russian worker face-to-face. 
"It is precisely the working-class people who 
notice that the Russians are often intelligent, 
skilful and quick in grasping complicated machine 
procedures. Many have learnt German very quickly 
and have apparently been educated at school not 
at all badly. This impression has blurred the 
former picture people had of the people of the 
East. , 
48 
Moreover, the family ties of the Russians working in Germany were 
very strong and the impression was gained that they had, in fact, 
been quite content with their lot at home in the USSR. The 
indisputable accomplishments of Soviet industry also showed that 
the Russians were not so stupid as was once thought. The view 
was also being expressed that Nazi propaganda's attack on the 
Soviet persecution of the Church was very hypocritical, for the 
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National Socialist state had hardly turned out to be a champion 
49 
of religious liberty. Some Germans even showed a certain, albeit 
reluctant, admiration of Stalin and held him responsible for the 
Soviet military successes. 
50 
Therefore, the Russian worker, 
firstly on the basis of personal observation and secondly of 
Soviet military achievement, came to be regarded with a certain 
respect. 
In the country, the Osta, rbeiter engaged in farm work appears 
to have played an even greater role in determining attitudes to 
the Soviet state and population for, as already pointed out, the 
influbnee of the official news media was here much more limited 
than in the towns. Regular reading of the newspaper seems to 
have been the exception rather than the rule among a great part 
of the German rural inhabitants. Thus opinions were formed almosi 
exclusively on the basis of personal observation and person-to- 
person contact. The good nature of the Russian farm worker 
provided the much needed confirmation that the Soviets were "not 
51 
so bad as they are made out to be" . In the more eastern parts 
of the Reich this was the only source of comfort when con- 
templating the possible consequences of a future defeat. 
When pointing out this very marked contrast between 
propaganda image of the Russian and the impression given by the 
industrious Ostarbeiter, one Party report referred to the 
unfortunate German propensity of going from one extreme to the 
other: 
"It is just those people who originally wanted 
a brutal extermination through hunger and disease 
who are now full of praise of their /-the Soviets'-/ 
accomplishments. , 
52 
This really amounted to an admission that unofficial information 
sources had already replaced official propaganda as the most 
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important factors determining, image of the Soviet enemy. 
The significance of this must be stressed, for in a theme basic 
to the entire Durchhaltepropaganda (literally translated: a 
propaganda of 'holding out') and to Nazi ideology as a whole the 
influence being exerted by the most determined efforts of the 
state propaganda machine was proving to be much weaker than that 
exerted by information sources outside official control. Fear of 
the enemy and the belief that there was truly no alternative but 
to hold out was the very basis of the campaign. The campaignq 
however, was accompanied by a growing belief that there was an 
alternative. Almost four months after the close of the anti- 
Bolshevik propaganda campaign, an SD report admitted: 
"..., the propaganda is finding it more and more 
difficult to get through to its listeners with 
sound and convincing arguments - especially to 
the working class and to show that Bolshevism 
really is the danger it has always been depicted 
.... Above all, the idea is beginning to spread, a 
result also of enemy propaganda, that Bolshevism 
has nothing against the ordinary Volksgenossen 
who has nothing to lose, but that only those at 
the top are threatened. 
. , 53 
Far from instilling fear into the populationp the slogans of anti- 
Bolshevik propaganda had only managed to urge it to find 
consolation elsewhere and to find a chance for itself in the case 
of defeat, a defeat which seemed to be becoming more and more 
likely. Particularly in east Germanyt the Soviet forced-labourer 
provided the urgently needed proof that Nazi propaganda was wrong. 
An essential argument of the anti-Bolshevik theme was that 
Germany was championing the European idea and the values of 
western civilisation against the barbaric "Asiatic" foe. The 
assumption was that the German Reich was not standing alone in 
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this struggle but was supported voluntarily by the lands it had- 
overrun shortly before. The fascist parties in the occupied 
territories1were portrayed as popular, phoenix-like movements 
of revival. German soldiers stationed in Western Europe soon 
corrected this propaganda picture in their accounts to their 
families and friends at home. Their reports left no doubt that 
the attitude of the population of the occupied areas towards 
the Reich was, in fact, becoming more and more hostile. In 
addition, the large number of foreign workers in Germany could 
in no way be interpreted as evidence of European cooperation, 
54 
since it was a well-known fact that they had come under pressure. 
Much of the information received from these unofficial 
sources was passed on in the form of rumours. It would be wrong, 
however, to ascribe all rumours to this source. Many were 
merely the expression of a hope; the hope, for example, that 
it missing" relatives and friends were still alive. According to 
one rumour, the Turkish Red Crescent organisation was compiling 
I 
lists of German prisoners-of-war in the Soviet Union and on a 
single day in one German city 350 letters were posted to Ankara. 
Another widespread rumour claimed to know: 
"Under pressure from the Vaticang moscow has 
promised to publish lists of prisoners in the 
near future. " 
55 
Dr6ge has clearly illustrated the role of the rumour in 
relieving fear of the Soviet enemy, a function that became 
particularly significant as Germanyls military position was seen 
to deteriorate. The contradiction between positive views of the 
enemy and official propaganda conceptions could be removed by 
believing the information passed on by the rumour. Similarlyp 
the great gap between the fact of having heard nothing from one's 
relatives and the belief they were still alive was bridged by 
the rumour. No contradiction now existed because the official 
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propaganda portrayal was simply ignored. As the months went by 
and defeat seemed more and more likely, despite the fact that 
the Red Army had not yet crossed the Reich's frontiers, the need 
to survive became the uppermost consideration and with it the 
necessity of coming to terms with the idea of an enemy 
occupation. In those parts of the Reich not able to place 
future hopes on the Anglo-Americans, a removal of fears could 
only be achieved, as DrUge, has showng by a mellowing of the 
stereotyped image of the enemy. In this process a substantial 
role was performed by the rumour and impressions gained from 
person-to-person contact were strengthened. 
56 
Combatting rumours was none too easy task for the Nazi 
propagandist. By contradicting them he only ran the risk of 
arousing even greater interest in their contentp the idea being 
that there is no smoke without fire. Instead of giving them 
unwanted publicity in the press, each Gauleitunr, was instructed 
to counter all rumours by using the strong-arm methods of the 
Kampfzeit (the "time of struggle" before 1933). All Party 
members were reminded of their duty to report all rumour- 
mongerýs-,, -. even if they should be friendsp relatives or Party 
comrades. The population was to be admonished: 
"all those Volksgenossen, who in wartime listen 
to the voice of the enemy, weaken our power of 
defence and resistance and must be prosecuted 
and punished mercilessly .... The principle must 
be that no exemptions will be made. If everywhere 
an example is made of such people, this will very 
soon have a deterrent effect. The Party has all 
the experience necessary from the Kampfzeit how 
to make such an example and how to use it with 
the right propaganda effect. " 
57 
Party members were to pay particular attention to what were 
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regarded as the most dangerous rumours. Rumours, for example, 
that the Anglo-Americans would occupy western Germany were to be 
countered by the argument that the Western Powers could never 
hope to check a Soviet advance, and talk of a possible compromise 
peace settlement by arguing that there was only one alternative - 
victory or Bolshevism. 
58 
These were basically the very same 
arguments about Germany being the sole bulwark against the 
Soviet attempt at world domination that had been heard 
incessantly for almost two years, and they were predestined to 
meet the same fate. 
Katyn 
In spring 1943 the discovery of the mass-graves of several 
thousand Polish officers, probably murdered by the Russians in 
the summer of 1940, provided Nazi propagandists with a solid 
basis for a theme which had always run the risk of appearing 
too abstract and theoretical. This was the much-needed and very 
welcome visible confirmation of Soviet brutality and intentions. 
For Goebbels it was a unique opportunity to achieve those goals 
he had failed to achieve during the anti-Bolshevik campaign of 
February and March. No time was wasted in reviving the 
apparently exhaustedanti-Bolshevik theme. Katyn was an example 
of what would happen to the whole German people should it prove 
too weak. Here was a chance to enlighten all those who still 
stubbornly believed in the enemy's humanity. On 18th April the 
Propaganda Minister wrote in his diary: 
"Here and there certain groups of Germans, 
especially the intellectuals, express the idea 
that Bolshevism isný, t as bad as the Nazis 
represent it to be. That is owing to the fact 
that our consideration for the families of the 
men missing in action in the East has been such 
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that we have not described the atrocities of 
Bolshevism as they actually'happened. The 
Katyn case now offers a welcome opportunity to 
catch up on this. The families of our missing 
men in the East must simply accept this sacrifice 
so that the German people won't some day have to 
face a greater one, perhaps even that of their 
national existence. " 
59 
After first consulting the Fiffirerp Goebbels gave orders that the 
greatest possible use was to be made of the Katyn material. He 
believed: 
"It will keep us going for a couple of weeks. , 
60 
Semmler, however, describes Goebbels' disappointment and dismay 
at the rather matter-of-fact treatment in the press following 
the first announcement of the discovery of the graves. He 
demanded greater political understanding and intuition from his 
journalists. They simply could not be allowed to get away with 
such a superficial and factual treatment of such a highly 
explosive theme: 
"Goebbels is furious at what he calls the lack 
of news sense of our editors, who cannot see 
what tremendous opportunities the material gave 
them. Their writers, he says, ought to be thank- 
ful that they had been given such hard facts. It 
should have been presented from every possible angle; 
to publish the official communique was not nearly 
enough. It was now up to the writing staffs to 
show that they were not only good journalists 
but also good propagandists. The present slack 
and uneventful period could not be better used than 
in rousing a whirlwind of interest and indignation 
about Katyn. Finally, Goebbels ordered every 
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German newspaper to cover the Katyn story at 
least two or three times a week, in news, commentp 
leading articles and pictures .... The story must 
be so hammered into the public mind that the 
mention of the word Katyn sends a cold shudder 
down the back of the stupidest man. , 
61 
The question that has now to be answered is whether this 
apparent substantiation of all the arguments used during the 
February-March campaign did actually manage to persuade the 
German people to place their faith unconditionally in the national 
leadership and its portrayal of the situation. Were all the 
hopes in the mercy and humanity of the foe now relinquished or 
did the factors described above continue to intervene between 
propaganda message and effect? 
The first accounts given by the SD seemed quite promising. 
On 19 April it reported: 
"The feelings of hate and fear of Bolshevismv 
which had become weaker among quite a few 
Volksgenossen recently as a result of such 
ideas as 'the Soviets'are-not so bad as they 
are made out to, bel, have been given new life. 
The fate of 12; 000 Poles is regarded as an 
example of what would happen to large sections 
of the German people should the Russians be 
victorious .... The discovery of the corpses has 
certainly made all. parts of the population think 
once again about the actions of Bolshevism and 
jewry and many Volksgenossen showed their disgust 
at these terror methods which, at the same time, 
give our struggle a convincing meaning and 
justification. " 
However, the fear evoked by this propaganda did not have a 
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particularly great morale-boosting effect on the families of 
the missing who now had to fear that their sons and fathers 
would undergo the same terrible fate as the Polish officers. 
The propaganda treatment itself was also not without its critics 
even at this early stage of the campaign. Many were astonished 
at the sudden sympathy expressed for the Poles and described it 
as "hypocritical". Had not these very same people been guilty 
of massacring "60,000 Volksgenossen" back in 1939? A much more 
serious criticism, being levelled primarily in intellectual and 
church-going circles, was: 
"We have no right to get excited over this Soviet 
measure, for the Germans have liquidated Poles 
and Jews in far greater numbers. " 
Opponents of the regime dismissed it as "a diversionary 
manoeuvre for the reverse in North Africa". The capitulation'of 
Rommel's Afrika Korps. had already become imminent in April 1943. 
Moreover, these "hostile elements" were of the opinion: 
"The discovery of the bodies has certainly been 
known for a long time. Its utilisation has 
been saved up for a time when the German people 
had to be served with something in order to hide 
an unfavourable development elsewhere. " 
62 
Another SD report from Frankfurt-on-Main referred to the 
comparisons being drawn between Katyn and the National Socialist 
elimination of Polish intellectuals and Jews by certain members 
of the German "intellegentsia". 
63 
The morale reports leave little doubt that the Katyn 
propaganda did at first lead to an intensification in fear of 
the Russian enemy. But this arousing of fear did not 
necessarily mean that the desired conclusions were drawn or the 
desired behaviour followed. Four weeks after the launching of 
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the campaign, the Regierungsprdsident of Augsburg reported: 
"It has been reporýed that since the announcement 
of the Katyn atrocities many farmers have begun 
treating the Russian and Polish workers better 
than their own countrymen. , 
64 
Thus, fear alone could not be relied upon to evoke the 
determination to hold out at all costs which was being demanded. 
In fact, fear could lead to clearly defeatist behaviour - protect- 
ing one's individual interests should the worst come to the 
worst. It might even lead. many to conclude that defeat was 
probable and it was now up to everyone to save what he could. 
Fear alone could never manage to convince the German-people of 
the certainty of final victory and might result in the very 
opposite of the intended effect. It was naturally very difficult 
for the propagandist to estimate the right dose of fear and 
pessimism necessary for his purpose, and the amount required 
varied from person to person. 
Reports describing the reaction to the Yatyn propaganda 
show quite clearly that all those intervening factors listed in 
the analysis of the late winter campaign continued to operate. 
In particular, the Ostarbeiter continued to be a valuable reminder 
that'not every Russian was a Bolshevik or a mass-murderer. That 
they were hard-working and "good fellows" provided the'desired 
proof that not all Russians were bad. 
65 
The Katyn propaganda is remarkable for its intensive 
repetition of the very same detail and conclusions. It is, of 
course, true that repetition is a characteristic of all Nazi - 
indeed almost all totalitarian - propaganda. However, in most 
cases the propagandist uses an assortment of stories and a 
variation in argumentation as a vehicle for reaching the same 
conclusion. But in the case of Katyn, there was absolutely 
no variation and, of course, only one story. Goebbels agreed 
-7 
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with Hitler that simple repetition enforces the propaganda 
effect. The various rmcrale reports dealing with the response 
to this campaign, however, -give the impression that the opposite 
was true. Instead of an intensification of the fear initially 
aroused, the effect was blunted rather than strengthened 
through constant repetition, because the propaganda purpose 
became clear to everyone. The population soon became weary of 
the theme. Although few doubted the truthfulness of the news 
of the atrocities, it was now thought that "enough has already 
been written and said about t,,. 
66 
This growing lack of interest 
in the subject is demonstrated in the reaction to a midday talk 
on Katyn by Fritzsche on 6th May: 
"The fact that Fritzsche spoke for the first time 
after the 12.30 news aroused a certain amount of 
interest as something special was expectedt but 
the mere mention of the word 'Katyn' was sufficient 
to make all interest fade. " 
67 
One Nazi Gauleiter, Brandt, recognised the inherent danger in 
this type of intensive propaganda campaign: 
"Why do our leading organisations deal with every 
issue so long on the radio and saturate the press 
with it until no one can bear to hear anything 
more said about it? " 
68 
According to the SD Linz: 
"The continued reporting of Katyn has only been 
followed by a small minority of politically 
interested readers, whilst the majority of readers 
doesn't want to hear -anything more about anything 
that has to do with Katyn and with boredom skip 
over any article dealing with it.,, 
69 
It would, nevertheless, be wrong to link all this indifference 
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to Katyn propaganda alone, for the months following Stalingrad 
were characterised by declining interest in all official 
propaganda. People were no longer prepared to waste their 
precious time-reading or listening to these reports which were 
"becoming more and more boring" . 
70 
This would help to explain 
the continued lack of interest in all sorts of political 
diatribe and the outright rejection of the rhetoric of such 
political commentators as Hans Fritzsche: 
"Because of the long duration of the war and the 
effects this has had, an indifference regarding 
all events of political life is to be observed. 
This is, above all, expressed in a general lack 
of interest and even rejection of every kind of 
propaganda. At present, more than ever beforev 
Fritzsche's talks are being regarded by the 
population as just propaganda. " 
On the other hand, the more factual talks by such military 
"experts" as Lutzow, Quade and Dittmar continued to enjoy 
considerable popularity. 
71 
It therefore comes as no surprise 
that virtually no interest was shown in the discovery of another 
mass grave at Winniza a few weeks later. Its portrayal as "the 
Poor man's Katyn" fell on deaf ears. 
72 
It must be pointed out that Katyn came at an unfavourable 
time of year for the propagandists. In the countryside, the 
farmers made the most of the long evenings and had almost no 
time to spare for things which seemed to be of no immediate 
concern to them. SD Linz reported at the beginning of May, 
that is two weeks after the first news of the Katyn discoveriest 
that it was surprising how many people had still heard nothing 
of Katyn! 
73 
Even in the towns and cities much less radio was 
being heard during the light early summer evenings, as a report 
74 from Stuttgart shows. 
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Conclus ion 
It has often been claimed that Goebbels successfully offset 
the negative effects of Stalingrad on morale. Tremendous 
significance, for instance, has been ascribed to his speech in 
the Berlin Sportpalast on 18 February 1943.75 It may be true that 
this address gave some encouragement of a temporary nature, but 
the sources examined in this study of the anti-Bolshevik and Katyn 
campaigns give us little reason to believe in a general halting of 
the downward trend in morale, let alone in a convincing propaganda 
success. Undoubtably, the German people continued to work hard 
and German war production was able to reach a new record in 1943. 
But how far was this really due to propaganda? The winter 
military crisis had led to a new crisis of confidence in the 
official news media and had enhanced the prestige of enemy 
propaganda for accuracy and veracity. The morale reports in the 
early months of 1943, as the anti-Bolshevik campaign was in full 
swing, point to a further decline in popular confidence and trust 
in the official information sources. On the other hand, it might 
be misleading to assume a complete rejection of this source. A 
very subjective distinction was drawn between "factual" 
information and propaganda. It was hardly realised that the very 
same propaganda purpose also lay behind the still popular 
situation reports by such military "experts" as General Dittmar. 
It was the blatant propaganda techniques which accelerated these 
doubts, a development which reached a peak in the propaganda 
exploitation of the Katyn massacre. Even the most gullible 
Volksgenosse was capable of spotting this attempt at 
manipulation. 
Other factorsp of course, also contributed to the failure 
of the campaign. It depicted the dangers only too well withoutp 
at the same time, pointing to a convincing solutioný What was 
needed was a sign of German strength. The intensification in the 
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bombing of German cities in the spring of 1943 pointed to enemy 
strength. Finally, with the stabilisation of the Eastern Front 
in March, the propaganda theme lost its factual basis even if 
the improvement of the military situation in Russia did not seem 
to bring peace or victory any nearer. The defeat in North Africa 
showed, in fact, that little had changed. It cannot be denied 
that the news of Katyn initially achieved the desired result. 
The subsequent constant repetition, however, not only led to 
boredom and apathy, but more important to a closer consideration 
of its importance for Germany - that isp it forced attention on 
to a possible defeat situation. Here, the neutralising effect of 
the unofficial sources mentioned abovep with their humanizing 
effect on the image of the Soviet foe, immediately came into 
operation. These provided the much needed conf irmation that 
survival was possible, even if the survival of Nazism was not. 
Hence, the rather matter-of-fact treatment initially given to the 
Katyn news, and on account of which Goebbels scolded the German 
pressp would appear to have been more effective than all the 
subsequent "propaganda" on which the Minister placed such high 
hopes. 
But this does not necessarily mean that defeat was now being 
regarded as desirable, but it does mean the beginning of a 
process in which war events came to be interpreted more in terms 
of the personal fate and survival chances of the individual -a 
development in stark contradiction to the Fascist idea of 
Volksgemeinschaft. The survival of National Socialism as a 
political system played virtually no role at all in these 
considerations. It is thus, quite clear that the growing 
harshness of the war and the recognition of future dangers led 
to a declining interest in purely political and theoretical 
aspects of the conflict. " National Socialist teachings and 
policies became less important when appraising the National 
Socialist inovement and the National Socialist government than 
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the success such a leadership had in mastering the crisis and 
securing peace. Even the Party's most fundamental theories no 
longer appeared relevant - even basic anti-Communist teachings. 
For the average German citizen in 1943 the war was primarily a 
struggle between nations and only secondly between political 
systems. 
Although there was still no general wish to accept peace 
at the cost of total defeat, there was, nevertheless, a growing 
preoccupation with the possibility of future defeat, as well as 
a growing tendency not to regard it as the end to all hopes for 
the continuation of an acceptable way of life in the post-war 
world. It was here, perhaps, that many German workers recalled 
the teachings of the old KPD. The Communist Party had fought 
to improve the lot of the German proletariat during the crisis- 
ridden years of the Weimar Republic and had upheld the Soviet 
Union as the model of its aspirations. The myth of the new 
society in the "first workers' state" had gained many adherers 
in the twenties. Such recollections possibly provided the much- 
needed confirmation that the ordinary man had little to fear 
should the worst come to the worst. Contact with Russian 
soldiers and forced-labourers would then serve to back up such 
hopes. Only the Nazis would have to bear the consequences of the 
lost war. This would help to explain the typically "class" 
views of the workers mentioned in morale reports cited in this 
chapter. It is difficult to know how far these feelings of- 
affinity with the political aims of the KPD and SPD had actually 
remained alive since 1933 or whether the recalling of these old 
class ideas merely represented the personal solution to the 
pressing problem of finding one's way into an unclear future and 
thereby a convenient way of knowing that survival was certain, 
even after a defeat. It would be very wrong to equate this 
automatically with even passive resistance to the regime by the 
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working class. The German workers continued to work hard for 
a victory they believed in lessand less. Not only did the vast 
majority wish to keep out of trouble with the police and the 
Party, but they wanted to keep their jobs and somehow continue 
to live. In short, ideas of survival after a defeat took on the 
form of a personal assurance in an eventuality. 
Repetition led in no way to the desired intensification of 
effect. In fact, the morale reports give the impression that the 
opposite was true - that it led to a decrease in response. The 
propaganda intention was all too clear with such a theme as 
Katyn. Increasing lack of interest had characterised response 
to propaganda for many months, but there can be little doubt 
that the Katyn propaganda only accelerated this trend. But was 
the repetitive propaganda rejected on account of a negative 
evaluation of the message? It-would seem that downright boredom 
with the theme and growing apathy in regard to propaganda as a 
whole were here the dominant factors. Of course, the increasing 
dependency on other sources of information played an important 
part-in determining this virtual indifference to the official 
media, since it made them, in part, superfluous in the forming 
of opinion. 
C. ANTI-SEMITISM 
As if it had learnt nothing from the failure of the two anti- 
Communist campaigns, the Ministry of Propaganda embarked on yet 
another doctrinal offensive in the early summer of 1943. At a 
critical phase of the war following the loss of North Africa, 
Goebbels found it necessary to concentrate the entire propaganda 
effort and direct the hate and aggression of the German people 
on just one target - the Jews. In the ideological world of Nazi 
propaganda the Jews were the essential link between Soviet 
Communism and Anglo-American Capitalism. Perhaps there was a very 
practical reason for launching such a campaign in the wake of 
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the Katyn propaganda offensive. Intensive anti-Bolshevik 
propaganda had only added to the tendency of differentiating 
between the western and eastern enemies of the Reich. The new 
anti-Jewish-campaign would help to enlighten those naive 
Volksgenossen who professed to have no fear of a future Anglo- 
American occupation regime. 
76 
, 
(i) TheCourseoftheCampai& 
In May Hitler agreed with Goebbels that it was time for an 
all-out anti-Semitic propaganda offensive: 
"We ought, so the FUhrer believes, in no way be 
deterred by intellectual objections to the 
treatment of the Jewish question. The Jewish 
criminals must be denounced ruthlessly for other- 
wise people will not understand what we mean and 
intend. , 77 
In his diary Goebbels drew a direct comparison between the 
debacles in Tunisia and in Stalingrad. The latter had been the 
occasion for launching the anti-Bolshevik campaign and now the 
end in North Africa would be followed by a full-scale attack on 
78 
the Jews. There thus seems little doubt that the new campaign 
was designed as an integral part of the Durchhaltepropaganda 
intended to offset any signs of defeatism in the wake of military 
setback. 
Anti-Semitism was now to 
press and to form the core of 
day the press would receive a 
question" which should act as 
attacks. Editors and journal: 
to be depicted as bearing the 
become the constant theme of the 
all comments and articles. Each 
theme pertaining to the "Jewish 
a stimulant for its anti-Jewish 
ists were reminded that Jewry was 
entire guilt for the world war. 
'That is more, even those news reports, which do 
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not at first appear to fit into-the anti-Semitic 
propaganda, must be presented in such a way as 
to serve its purpose. The following is an example. 
When after a raid on a German town in which 20 
planes were lost, the Jewish papers write in a 
truly Jewish way that the defences of this town 
were weak, it can be stated that it is the Jews 
who are writing this and that they themselves are 
not sitting in the cockpits of the bombers .... There 
is really no column in a newspaper where such an 
approach is not possible. , 
79 
Even specialist periodicals and trade journals were called upon 
to participate in the campaign. 
"This does not mean that periodicals ought to 
contain articles irrelevant to their information 
sphere, but that they should denounce all that is 
Jewish. Example: if a trade journal deals with a 
research committee's examination of the 'Rise in 
Production of Synthetic Caoutchouc in the USA' 
and says 'The committee consists of the financier, 
Bernhard Baruch..., ' then this is the wrong way to 
go about it. It must be stressed and made clear 
from the very start that he is a Jew. " 
80 
The campaign, however, should in no way divulge to the German 
people what the goverment really had in store for the European 
Jews : 
"When handling the Jewish question in public, no 
mention must be made of a future total solution. 
It may, however, be said that the Jews are being 
recruited for appropriate work. , 
81 
Goebbels set the ball rolling in his weekly article in Das 
Reich, broadcast on 7 May: 
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"This war is a racial war. It was started by the 
Jewish people and pursued in their interest and 
their plan has no other aim than the destruction 
and liquidation of our people. " 
He warned that the Jews "will be overtaken by that punishment 
82 
which they are already suffering in Germany" .A few weeks later 
in the Sportspalast he was claiming: 
"The complete elimination of the Jews from Europe 
is not a moral question, but one of the security 
of states. The Jew will always act in accordance 
with his character and racial instincts. He 
cannot help himself. Just as the potato blight 
, destroys potato crops and cannot but destroy them, 
so the Jew destroys^states and all nations. There 
is only one remedy for this: radical elimination 
of the danger... , 
83 
In the same way as anti-Bolshevik propaganda had endeavoured to 
urge those who hoped for fair treatment from the Soviets to give 
up their dangerous illusions, anti-Semitic propaganda emphasized 
the fact. that no German, even the "few" non-Nazis, would be 
spared by the Jews. 
"No German is in a position to escape by saying: 
'In my heart I always was a democrat and I always 
hated the Nazis; I was only prevented from 
demonstrating my true feelings'. In the eyes of 
84 international Jewry, every German will be guilty. " 
This crucial point was underlined even more emphatically in the 
special anti-Jewish May edition of Deutscher Wochendienst, an 
official publication consisting of propaganda material for use 
in periodicals. 
-". Emphasize: If we should lose this war, we should 
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not fall into the hands of some other nation; 
but all nations will be destroyed by world Jewry. 
TheJews are resolved to eradicate all Germans. 
International law and national custom will give 
no protection from the Jews' desire to destroy 
everything. Thus we must under all circumstances 
by victorious and weather our reverses.... 
Emphasize: Every single Jew, wherever he is and 
whatever he is doing, shares the guilt. There is 
no such thing as a 'good Jew', but only degrees of 
skill and camouflage. The Jew is a notorious 
criminal, , 
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(ii) TheRessetotheCam 
At first sight the reaction of the German population to this, 
new large-scale propaganda drive seems very similar to that at 
the time of the Katyn campaign. The continual repetition of the 
same arguments led to a decreasing interest in propaganda content, 
According to an SD report from Stuttgart of the 5 June, even 
those people who accepted the truth of everything told them about 
the Jews could no longer bear to hear the stereotyped argument 
that the Jews were to blame for everything. 
86 SD Frankfurt also 
referred to the unpleasant feeling of over-saturation caused by 
a too intensive bombardment with anti-Jewish propaganda. 
87 The 
radio commentator, Scharping, even admitted on the air that the 
campaign was not always having the desired effect and alluded to 
the boredom felt by the listener in the typically Nazi propaganda 
understatement: 
"Our listeners may have occasionally inclined to 
the view that the German radio was speaking too 
frequently about Jews. " 
88 
Many were shocked and alienated by the very vehemence and violence 
- 124 - 
of the anti-Semitic attacks. Primitive racialist diatribes in 
a speech by Robert Ley marking the tenth anniversary of the 
setting up of the DAF met with a particularly negative response. 
First, the same old arguments were used as had been appearing 
in Der StUrmer for years 
89 
and, secondly, the "uneducated 
language in a raucous voice" angered not only "intellectuals" 
but also blue and white-collar workers. 
90 
According to SD Linz, 
the nonsensical, incoherent and repetitive anti-Jewish venom 
had even shocked the most radical anti-Semite. 
91 
Nor does the 
attempt to give an anti-Semitic slant to those items of news 
having little or nothing to do with "the Jewish question" seem 
to have borne fruit. Nazi propaganda, for instancet had tried 
to construe the RAF raid on the Mdhne and Edertal dams on the 
night of 16-17 May as a Jewish-inspired operation. A Party 
report from Gau Halle-Merseburg noted: 
"This kind of propaganda interpretation is generally 
rejected. People say that these dams are certainly 
very important for the war economy and that this 
is the reason why they were destroyed. , 
92 
Considerably more dangerous than indifference to anti- 
Semitic propaganda was a certain boomerang effect it was having, 
not unlike that observed during the anti-Bolshevik crusade a 
short time before. Some people were of the opinion thatp if 
what the Nazis said about Jewish plans to destroy Germany was 
correct, the violence of the present anti-Semitic propaganda 
would only manage to strengthen the hate and desire for revenge 
inthe hearts of the Jewish people. Once again, the simple 
German would be the one to suffer in the long run. Mixed with 
this fear of future retaliation was a vague sense of guilt. A 
report of the Oberlandesgerichtsprdsident of Brunswick shows this 
quite clearly: 
"There are, of course, also people who blame the 
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Party for the bombing terror on the grounds 
that it had provoked it by its treatment of 
the Jews, e. g. the destruction of their temples. , 
93 
This impression is confirmed in letters written to the Propaganda 
Ministry in the summer of 1943 which "emphasise that what we 
/the German people7 are suffering now is the price for our 
extremist attitude towards the Jews, which has made the whole 
world our enemy". Semmler concluded from this evidence reaching 
him: - 
"Anti-Semitism is as unpopular as ever among the 
mass of the people and causes distrust or definite 
opposition. " 
94 
For an understanding of the factors which determined this 
thoroughly negative reaction to the campaign it is necessary to 
examine the general attitude to the Nazis' anti-Jewish policies. 
In doing so, it is naturally impossible to avoid the oft-asked 
question how far the German people really knew about the fate 
of the "resettled" Jews in the East. Although the SD recorded 
a generally positive reaction to the decree of 1 September 1941 
obliging every Jew to wear the Star of Davidq 
95 lack of 
opposition and indifference seemed to characterise the attitude 
of the average German at this time. In towns like Frankfurt-on- 
Main, where there was a comparatively large Jewish community, 
a marked anti-Semitic feeling did exist, especially among the 
lower-middle class. In country areas with a Catholic population, 
however, there was practically no contact with Jews and anti- 
Semitism appears to have been regarded as little more than just 
one of many propaganda slogans. 
96 Steinert is probably right in 
thinking: 
"Anti-Semitism hardly played the same central role 
in the response of the German people to Hitler and 
his ideology as it undoubtedly played in Hitler's 
- 126 
ideology itself. , 97 
What was more, theoretical anti-Semitic propaganda seemed less 
important for the German population as the burden of war grew 
heavier and heavier, Indeed, it might prove very irritating and 
give the impression that the government was trying to turn 
public attention away from the alarming military reality of the 
summer of 1943. In a summary of opinions expressed in letters 
sent to the Ministry of Propaganda, drawn up for his master, 
Goebbels, Semmier makes it quite clear that quite a few Germans 
were very much conscious of the political function of anti- 
Semitism: 
"Here and there the suggestion is made that when- 
ever things go wrong with us there is a search 
for a scapegoat and the Jews come in handy. A 
few writers say that the present hate campaign 
against the Jews proves once again that the leaders 
are trying to distract people's attention from 
difficulties they cannot master. " 
98 
Another intervening factor which presented a formidable 
obstacle, for the propagandist was the sympathy which some Germans 
had for the savage fate that had befallen the Jews. This was 
often the. case in the towns where the neighbour or the owner of 
the corner shop might have been Jewish. Once again personal 
experience impeded propaganda success. One preferred to believe 
what one saw with one's own eyes. Nor could it be forgotten so 
easily that many Jews had died defending the Reich only 25 
years before. Needless to say, such individual impressions and 
observations scarcely corresponded to the propaganda picture of 
the barbaric JewishBolshevik or the wealthy and unscrupulous 
Jewish plutocrat. Although it would be extremely difficult to 
estimate the extent of such sympathy, it would seem that it was 
widespread enough to worry. the apologists of the regime, who 
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frequently found it necessary to warn against any foolhardy 
compassion for the persecuted minority. But Nazi propagandists 
were hampered in their work yet again by the neutralising effect 
of the rumour. One such rumour is mentioned in an article in a 
Party publication intended for internal use: 
I 
"A German soldier from the Rhineland, after having 
been taken prisoner, is brought to Canada. The 
doctor who treats him there is a Jew from his own 
home town. He recognises himý treats him well 
and secures him a privileged position. " 
99 
Here, the rumour was playing a similar role as in the case of 
anti-Bolshevik propaganda. The need to reconcile oneself with 
the growing likelihood of enemy victory meant thatv if one was 
to believe in survival, one had also to believe in the humanity 
of Germany's enemies. 
The SD reports appear to contradict the widely held view 
that while the war was on only a handful of Germans knew about 
the true fate awaiting the Jews in the East. It is obvious that 
mass shootings and executions carried out on such a great scale 
could not have escaped the notice of all Wehrmacht soldiers and 
that not all kept their thoughts to themselves. As SD report 
from Frankfurt-on-Main of 17 April 1943 illustrates that 
information was being passed on among the German civilians at 
this time and how astonishingly accurate it was. 
"Occasionally, reference is made to the fate of 
the Jews in the East, who, so it is said, have 
been shot in their thousands by the SS. 
" 100 
Widespread knowledge of the extermination policy as well as the 
crucial role played by the soldier as information source, 
become evident in a further SD report of 26 July, which dealt 
with popular response to the discovery of a mass grave of 
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peasants, presumably murdered by the Communists in the 
Ukrainian village of Winniza: 
"The opinion is frequently heard that we also 
have ruthlessly wiped out all hostile elements 
in the East, particularly the Jews. Here, the 
accounts of soldiers and other people working in 
the East play a big role, " 
101 
This view is striking for the direct parallel it draws between 
an example of, enemy barbarity and the gruesome treatment of the 
Jews at the hands of the Nazis. Such awesome information 
acquired about the terrible deeds perpetrated by representatives 
of the Third Reich was often interpretated in terms of its likely 
personal effect on the individual German, his family, etc. 
"There exists a fear in many parts of the population 
that the soldiers taken prisoner /at Stalingrad 7 
could be killed in retaliation for the alleged mass 
shooting of Jews in the East by the Germans. , 
102 
If, as Marlis Steinert maintainsv only a few Germans really knew 
the full truth about the Nazis' liquidation programme, 
103 
these 
reports nevertheless show that the fate of the Jews was more 
widely known than has often been assumed in post-war Germany. 
The following qualification, however, has to be made. Rumours 
might have been heard about the extermination oi Jews in the 
East, but for many Germans they must have sounded incredible. 
Who could r'eally believe that his father, son or friend was a 
mass-murderer? Such an idea lay far beyond people's imaginative 
faculties. Many must have thought that such rumours had been 
started by the enemy, remembering how the British had turned 
atrocity propaganda into such a fine art during the First World 
War that it had been believed by half the world. 
(iii) Cone lus ion 
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The anti-Semitic propaganda campaign in the summer of 1943 
may therefore be seen as another attempt to pull the nation 
together after a military shock. The Nazis had hoped thereby 
to arouse the required determination to fight on by returning 
to the basics of their political creed. They hoped to offset 
any tendency to seek salvation in the West, and the anti-Jewish 
theme enabled them to attack all enemies of the Reich at one 
stroke. There can be no doubt, however, that the campaign proved 
no more successful than the two previous anti-Bolshevik ones and 
that the results fell far short of Nazi expectations-.. That it 
had had no overwhelming effect was to be indirectly admitted 
early the following year when the press found it expedient to 
warn its readers against the "fools who regard reports concerning 
the Jewish plans for revenge as mere propaganda and our warnings 
as a means of incitement". 
104 
The Rheinische Zeitung'was still 
complaining on 8 February 1944 about the fact that there were 
still people-about who thought "the Jews are human-beings too,, 6105 
The same factors had intervened between propaganda message 
and effect as at the time of the anti-Bolshevik propaganda drive. 
Once again, the very repetition designed to heighten the effect 
led to indifference and madeýthe recipients even more conscious 
of being manipulated in a most deliberate fashion. Personal 
experience, the reports of soldiers and rumours all contributed 
to a neutralisation of the propaganda message. It would seem) 
too, that quite a few people had'an excellent understanding of 
the workings of the propaganda machinery and fully recognised 
the intention that lay concealed behind the racialist tirades. 
The attempt to divert feelings of resentment, frustration and 
aggression on to, the enemy certainly failed here. Nor does the 
primitive appeal to the fear of the consequences of defeat seem 
to have worked. The tendency to place one's hopes on those most 
"infested" with "Jewish ideas". the Anglo-Americans, cI ontinued 
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and became more and more pronounced as Germany's military 
position deteriorated. In fact, this sort of propaganda only 
invited the question why the Jews so hated Germany. The answer 
was not hard to find. The use of ostensible Jewish plans of 
revenge by Nazi propagandists proved to be double-edged, as many 
believed that mounting such fierce tirades was just the right way 
to incite the Jews to step up their plans and exact an even more 
radical and fearful retribution. This demonstrates how 
subjectively the whole issue was considered. Eventual effects 
on oneself remained at the centre of all reflection. Mixed with 
this was a certain guilt feeling, illustrated in the parallels 
being drawn between German and enemy atrocities. It is 
interesting to note that the most negative reaction recorded was 
to the most primitive and brutal form of propaganda attack. The 
almost total rejection of Ley's speech would suggest that 
propaganda could not overcome indifference to a particular theme 
by relying on irrational arguments and emotional and violent 
language. The masses were not so primitive as Hitler and his 
entourage assumed. 
It is very important to remember that the anti-Semitic 
campaign cannot be seen in isolation - the reaction to this 
propaganda would be determined by the overall position in which 
the average German found himself. What was the actual relation- 
ship between theoretical anti-Semitism and the disquieting facts 
of Germany's position in the summer of 19437 At a time of crisis 
on the Eastern Front and in Italy and of constant threat from 
the sky, at a time when defeat was staring people in the face, 
the very irrelevance of this kind of propaganda could only 
irritate the hard-tried civilian population. There were far 
more important things to worry about. As with the two anti- 
Communist campaigns shortly before the main reason why this 
campaign failed was that it was unable to answer those questions 
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most plaguing people's minds. As far as the propaganda was 
considered at all, it was seen in terms of individual existence 
and survival. How did it affect one's own chances of surviving 
the war and its aftermath. This would explain the anxiety lest 
the campaign incite the enemy to mount even heavier bombing 
raids. By the summer of 1943, the air raids had, in fact, 
assumed such a dominant role in the thinking of every German 
that they had become the criterion for judging everything else. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE BOMBING OF THE GERMAN CIVILIAN POPULATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The "total'war" proclaimed so ostentatiously by Goebbels in the 
Berlin Sportpalast on 18 February, 1943 was soon to become 
reality for every German citizen. But it was not to be the 
"total war" envisaged by the Minister of Propaganda, but instead 
something quite different - the all-out campaign of the Anglo- 
American air forces to break the morale of the German civilian 
population by the systematic destruction of its cities. The 
city street now became the battlefield on which the German 
citizen fought a nightly struggle for survival. No other chapter 
of the Second World War has, perhapsp led to such different 
conclusions regarding effects and results. There is one thing, 
however, that cannot be denied: by no stretch of the imagination 
can the high hopes placed on it by the Commander in Chief of 
Bomber Command, Harrisp be said to have been fulfilled. He is 
credited, for instance, with having told Churchill: 
"We can wreck Berlin from end to end if the U. S. A. F. 
will come in on it. It will cost us between 400- 
500 aircraft. It will cost Germany the war. " 
1 
An indiscriminate bombing offensive against German cities might 
even render an armed invasion of mainland Europe unnecessary 
for "he was convinced that it could be the prelude not to an 
invasion but to an occupation". 
2 
The United States Strategic Bombing Survey', which was drawn 
up after the war and dealt with the effect of bombing on morale, 
gives the impression that bombing was an essential factor in 
- 133 - 
ensuring victory. 
"War weariness, willingness to surrender, loss 
of hope for German victory, distrust of leaders, 
feelings of disunity and demoralizing defeat 
were all more common among bombed than unbombed 
people. By the beginning of 1944 three-fourths 
of all Germans regarded the war as lost. " 
Although the conclusion was drawn that bombing "was less 
important than other military developments in producing 
defeatists", the compilers of these reports asserted that it 
"aided greatly in convincing civilians of Allied superiority both 
through the severity of the raids and through the unchecked 
passage overhead of fleets of Allied aircraft". On the other 
hand, "the apathy resulting from the heaviest bombing made people 
more susceptible to the controls of the regime". 
3 An interesting 
conclusion drawn in this mammoth work is that: 
"The popular notion that bombing stiffens the 
resistance of a people finds little confirmation 
in the facts of German experience. " 
4 
What is more, it is claimed that the feelings of anger and hate 
aroused by heavy bombing were not directed against the enemy 
but against the Nazi regime itself. 
5 
Janis explains these results of American research by 
referring to the simple fact that these reports were compiled 
during the military occupation of Germany, that is at a time 
when the German population would be, little inclined to express 
any animosity - even when relating to an earlier period - 
towards their conquerers. 
6 
He believes it wrong to come to a 
hurried conclusion that the target of anger was either the enemy 
or the German leadership, for it would be wrong to apply 
rational reasoning to the irrational behaviour and attitudes 
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arising from the emotions of hate and anger. It would seem 
that these aggressive feelings were directed at all authority - 
their own and the foe's. 
7 The populace felt the need to give 
vent to their pent-up-feelings and did not spend much time 
considering whether their attacks were fully justified or their 
targets really deserved to be the object of their rage. 
Rumpf comes to quite the opposite conclusion to that drawn 
in the American bombing survey and views the increasingly ruth- 
less bombing as "a factor which welded the people together to 
the end. The suffering caused by the devastati n of Germany's 
r_'Ip 
towns was the cement which not only held them together but held 
them to a state for which they no longer felt any enthusiasm. " 
8 
What is more, he not only agrees that war-time Nazi propaganda was 
"the most effective and successful ever", but that "it contribuiced 
very considerably to the steadfastness of the German civilian 
population under the blows of the bombing campaign". This effect 
was enhanced by the growing intensity of the enemy air attack, 
for it provided tangible evidence of the Allied aims of 
destruction. 9 Rumpf admits, however, that towards the end of the 
war the population was no longer taken in by the propaganda, but 
"they had no alternative so they closed their mindsit. 
10 
In her account of German civilian morale during the Second 
World War Steinert has. attempted to draw more specific and less 
generalised conclusions as to the effect of bombing. She believes 
that the intensification in Allied botpbing in 1943 "stimulated 
and strengthened the will to fight off the population which had 
hitherto been rather half-hearted and deepened the weakly 
developed hate of the British". 
" Moreover, she maintains that 
the Allied bombing campaign had serious re-percussions on 
political developments that were occurring inside the Reich. 
The Stalingrad debacle had led to a serious crisis of morale and 
an increase in criticism of the Party and the state leadershipt 
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for 
"former opponents, both left-wing and right-wing, 
joined up with the disappointed at the middle of 
the political spectrum to form a potentially 
broad opposition to the regime. This front of 
dissatisfaction, however, broke up once again as 
a result of the growing air-terror and the lack 
of any alternative to the path dictated by the 
government - the struggle for the survival of the 
nation, Apathy and resignation were the result. " 
12 
Nevertheless, in her appraisal of the effects of bombing on 
German morale, Steinert makes a very important distinction 
between two phases of the war: 
"Whereas during 1943 and the first half of 1944 
the increasing bombing terror contributed to. a 
strengthening of war morale by activating the 
hatred of the external enemy, thereby providing 
the fermenting discontent at home with an outlet, 
the continuous and uninterrupted wearing down of 
morale gradually made itself felt. The air war 
dominated life on the Home Front more and more 
and came to be Topic No. l. Nervousness and fear 
increased from day to day and in most towns it was 
no longer possible to get a normal night's sleep. 
Life became makeshift. People lived for the 
moment and closed their eyes to the future. " 
The government's inability to put a stop to the deadly attacks 
meant that by the autumn of 1944 the government had also fallen 
into discredit, 13 
These rather contradictory conclusions as to the effects 
. of bombing should be borne in mind in the following examination 
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which is principally concerned with the attempt of German 
propagandists to offset the negative effects of Allied raiding 
on morale and with the popular response to that attempt and to 
the bombing itself. In an assessment of the success or failure 
of this bombing propaganda, particular attention will be paid 
to the relationship between bombing experience and attitude to. 
official propaganda as well as dependency on unofficial 
information sources. In addition, an attempt will be undertaken 
to answer the apparently unresolved question whether the 
aggression arising from bombing was directed at the foe or at the 
Nazi leadership. Did the regime, as Rumpf maintainso 
successfully exploit the raids as irrefutable proof of enemy 
ruthlessness and barbarity and thereby become the sole 
beneficiary? The answer to this difficult question would 
determineto-a very large extent the success or failure of the 
entire anti-raid propaganda effort. The air war on the domestic 
front cannot, of course, be treated in isolation from the war 
situation as a whole when appraising the phenomenon of civilian 
morale. It will therefore be necessary to attempt a comparison 
of the relative significance of firstlyt bombing, and secondly, 
other military developments, as factors determining the overall 
morale picture. In the last two years of the war, the picture 
coming from the fighting front was a very bleak one indeed. 
After the loss of Tunis and the fall of Mussolini in the summer 
of 1943, the military situation was characterised by an almost 
uninterrupted retreat on the Eastern Front, as well as by the 
preparations to meet the expected Anglo-American invasion in 
the West. 
This chapter spans the period from January 1943 until the 
end of the war. 
_ 
Bombing, howeverv, was nothing new for the 
German civilian. The RAF had been raiding German towns ever 
since the early summer of 1940, but it was only in 1943 that 
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the Allied bombing really began to trouble the Nazi leadership. 
Whereas early in the war, the propagandist could console the 
stricken population with a cheerful account of events at the 
front, this was no longer possible. All indications that 
victory would soon be won and the raids consequently cease now 
vanished. At the beginning of 1943, the attention of the RAF 
was mainly directed at the cities of the industrial Ruhr. This 
was followed by a series of murderous blows against Hamburg in 
late July and early August 1943. The year 1943 also saw the 
beginning of "round the clock" bombing with the RAF attacking 
at night and the USAF by day. Although the Battle of Berlin 
was in the foreground in the'winter of 1943-4v a number of 
savage attacks were carried out against provincial cities as 
well. After a brief respite in the summer of 1944 when all 
available aircraft were needed on the Invasion front, the air 
war returned to Germany in an even more intense form, reaching 
its dreadful climax in the massacre of Dresden in February 1945. 
During these last months of the war, no town, no villagep no 
farm was safe. The Allies' complete domination of German air 
space was now demonstrated in the hour-long day-time attacks of 
low flying aircraft on the German countryside. 
B. PROPAGANDA TREATMENT OF ALLIED BOMBING AND MORALE9 1940-5 
(i) P E2p aLa ad aReticence: The 
Treatmený-oý- *ý a_-3- js- 'E 0 -ýf -2ýy 1943 
Allied air raids on Berlin and other German cities had been 
a source of constant irritation to German propagandists ever 
since the summer of 1940. Even in 1940-1, at a time when RAF 
raids were mere pin pricks, bombing had become a significant 
factor in influencing civilian morale. 
13a 
Propaganda policyp at 
first, proved to be a very vacillating one. Confronted with 
these first light, but nevertheless embarrassing raids, the 
ý---p-ropagandists chose almost to ignore them. Extreme caution 
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was exercised. Nothing should be allowed to disturb the 
picture of German invincibility and imminent victory. In October 
1940, for instance, the press was warned against publishing any 
material describing the effects of British raids, and three 
weeks later it was instructed to restrict itself to printing 
reports passed by OKW. 
14 But, at this early stage of the British 
bombing offensive, Goebbels was already quite aware of the danger 
of remaining silent over incidents of such immediate concern to 
all German citizens, for it simply meant forcing them onto 
another and very hazardous information source - the rumour. In 
September 1941, the Propaganda Minister ordered a more -realistic 
treatment of enemy raids, 
15 but with the devastating attacks 
on LUbeck and Rostock in April 1942, which marked a sudden 
intensification in the weight and accuracy of attack, he again 
opted for a policy of silence. 
16 As it became clear that 
Allied bombing had, in fact, entered a new and more dangerous 
phasep Goebbels realised the necessity of soothing the pain of 
the afflicted by giving them an honourable mention in his 
propaganda. In August 1942, the press was informed: 
"In future, the heroic bearing, of the population 
of our bombed towns, in particular, will be given 
a worthy mention. It would be completely wrong 
to describe the extent of the destruction or to 
publish reports fit only to cause tears. The 
population ought not to be pitied but its heroism 
ought to be marvelled at. , 
17* 
Party speakerst toop were told to refrain from underlining the 
damage inflicted by the enemy and instead to stress "the 
courageous and heroic bearing" of the population. 
18 
In his praise of the morale of the inhabitants of the west 
German towns Goebbels found it increasingly necessary to draw 
a somewhat artificial division between ýeari ja (Haltung) and 
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mood (Stimmung): 
"He no longer wishes the word mood, to be used for 
it is impossible to speak of mood when our houses 
are being burnt down and towns devastated. He 
wishes that only good bearing be still mentioned. "19 
Such a distinction suited propaganda purposes very well, for 
all unfavourable effects of bombing on morale could simply be 
put down to the less important phenomenon, "mood", whilst the 
rather intangible concept, "bearing", could be depicted as 
positive, without going into details. It was obviously very 
convenient for the propagandists to forget there was any link 
between the one and the other. In fact, bad mood could only have 
a deleterious effect on behaviour as time went by and the raids 
did not stop. But, as was so often the case, the Nazi 
propagandists became slave to their own propaganda concepts. 
In the next two years it became an unwritten law of the Party 
and its propagandists that however bad "mood" might be, the 
"bearing" of the population was impeccable and unassailable. 
The actual purpose of the air-raid propaganda is sumed up 
in a press directive of March 1943: 
"The systematic terror raids on German townsp 
which are aimed at wearing down the morale of 
the German people must be countered by the /-German77 
press with the aim to strengthen the feeling of 
solMarity, of the German people and to double their 
hatred of their enemies .... The community of mutual 
aid all for one and one for all - is the answer 
of the German population. " 
20 
The pr*ess-was. instructed to-,, stress--the enemy's savagery: 
"The press is to pay great attention to the 
barbarity of the British terror raids which, 
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unique in world history, are clearly aimed at 
the most densely populated residential areas 
of German towns, as well the most valuable 
cultural centres of Europe. " 
2 
Otherwise, the propagandist limited 
=h 
o publishing a 
communique in which the size of the attacking force was never 
mentioned and no details of damage, except to churches, hospitals 
and cultural monuments, was given. 
22 
A more generous treatment, 
however, was awarded to air raid news in the papers of the 
vicinity hit. It was thus possible "to satisfy the demand for 
attention on the part of those who have suffered without 
worrying those who have lived hitherto in safer areas. '. 
23 The 
provincial press, for example, was requested not to take over 
reports appearing in the local Berlin papers which dealt with 
an attack on the capital in the night of 16-17 January 1943.24 
In its handling of the Allies' bombing raids the Nazi 
propagand a was being forced to perform a balancing act similar 
to that observed during the anti-Bolshevik campaign. Satisfying 
the thirst for news by a policy of frankness might only 
encourage the enemy to continue his attacks and would only 
depress the morale of the population of "safe" areas 
unnecessarily, while a policy of restraint would only antagonize 
the population of the raided ýqest, who would see in it undeniable 
proof of governmental indifference. This explains the 
vicissitudes in propaganda policy. This was demonstrated yet 
again in March 1943 when Goebbels criticised press reports of 
raids for being "too frank and honest". They were still giving 
too many unnecessary and undesirable details and exercising 
insufficient restraint. 
25 
As if to underline the fortitude of the civilian population 
under the rain of bombs, a direct parallel was drawn between 
the inhabitants of the bombarded towns and the soldiers at the 
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front. A vocabulary hitherto reserved for the latter now came 
to characterise descriptions of the "Battle of the Home Front". 
In doing so, it was hoped to exploit that sense of purpose 
engendered when a population is compelled by circumstances to 
fight its own struggle for survival. Victims of the enemy blitz 
were to be handled in the same way as soldiers killed in action. 
In recognition of the valour of the inhabitants of the raided 
towns, Hitler personally ordered: 
"Decorations for wounds and injuries resulting 
from enemy air raids can be awarded to all 
German men, women and children along the same 
lines as to soldiers employed in the actual zone 
of combat. 126 
Not only were bombed cities compared to divisions on the battle- 
field, 27 but the raid victims themselves were described as 
"fallen', 28 and obituaries appeared in the press decorated with 
the Iron Cross. 
29 
The initial helplessness of the propagandists is further 
shown in the sphere of radio entertainment. The German wireless 
was in the awkward position of having to address an unbombed 
and a bombed population at the very same time. Frivolous 
entertainment was likely only to antagonise and exasperate the 
citizens of a town which had been visited by the RAF only a 
couple of hours before. The population of the Ruhr and Rhineland 
was in a veritable rage when, after having gone through yet 
another fearful attack, they turned on their radio sets to hear 
about what had just happened but were unexpectedly presented with 
the cheerful melodies of such popular contemporary hits as "For 
' Goebbels A Night of Bliss" and "Dancing With You Into Heaven". 
was at rather a loss as to what to do to prevent this unfortunate 
state of affairs. 
30 
The somewhat half-hearted counter-measures 
-taken--do, however, demonstrate Nazi propaganda's sensitivity to 
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the response of its audience: 
"Fewer texts should be broadcast between 22.00 
and 24.00, so that there is no opportunity for 
a comparison to be drawn between words broadcast 
and the respective situation prevailing during 
these hours. " 
31 
The generally sensitive and cautious approach of the propagandist 
to his audience is further echoed in a ban on any mention of a 
visit the Italian King and Queen paid to the bombed districts 
of Rome in July 1943, "lest our own people ask why no leading 
representative of the state has been to Cologne. " 
32 
This is 
most certainly a veiled reference to Hitler's repeated refusal 
to visit raided towns. DesDite all Goebbels' prompting, the 
German FUhrer chose to shut his eyes to this unnerving aspect of 
his war, fearing perhaps that his habitual optimism and 
confidence would be shaken. 
(ii) Th-. e Resp_. 211je t0 Ra id Pr o j2 a- 
£a 11 jl ainSp2: inZ L2 43 
The sudden intensification of the enemy air onslaught in 
the first few months of 1943 certainly seems to have unnerved 
the German leaders. This nervousness is echoed in the 
vacillating propaganda policy described above. Goebbels himself 
feared serious repercussions for morale after the first heavy 
raid on Essen: 
"If the English continue the air war on this 
scale, then we will be confronted with 
extraordinarily great, difficulties. " 
33 
As early as March 1943, it was feared that the fatalism arising 
from the enemy blitz might eventually prove a considerable 
threat to the bearing (Haltung) of the west Germans. 
34 Goebbels, 
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thinking that they were beginning to lose heart, lamented: 
"They know that we are weaker than the enemy, 
that our retaliatory blows against England 
hardly merit a mention. What is more, they are 
being forced to see how the U-boat campaign, 
which is strategically our weapon for hitting 
back, has been a failure this month. , 
35 
SD reports confirm that very little importance was attached to 
these Luftwaffe raids on England, which appeared very meagre 
indeed when compared with RAF raids on the Reich. 
36 
The spirit of discontent, now so widespread in the Ruhr and 
Rhineland, was expressed in a craving for official recognition of 
the ordeal they were having to undergo. With the renewal of the 
enemy blitz in January 1943 there was great bitterness when the 
raids were officially described as mere "nuisance raids on-the 
west German mgion". The annoyance abatedv howeverp as soon as 
Essen was mentioned in the OKW-Report. 
37 
This understandable need 
for an appreciation of their plight by both the government and 
the more fortunate citizens dwelling in "safer" parts was to 
become a constant factor of morale. , 
Exactly one year later there 
was considerable resentment in Gau Dasseldorf as it was believed 
that raids on DUsseldorf, Wuppertal, Remscheid and Krefeld were 
not being given the same attention as those on other towns. The 
inhabitants demanded that "the damage caused and the suffering 
endured" should be acknowledged and that "the extent and 
concentration of the destruction" should be given adequate 
treatment by press and radio. 
38 When, in July 1944, a heavy 
attack on SaarbrUcken was not even mentioned in the OKW-Reportv 
its citizens were said to be in a real rage. 
39 
That the rest of the Reich remained almost untouched by the 
RAF in the early months of 1943 made the bombing particularly 
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difficult to bear for the population of west Germany. Nothing 
aroused more ill-feeling than the realization that other regions 
were continuing to enjoy what was almost a peace-time way of 
life, preferring to ignore the regrettable happenings further 
west. The US Bombing Survey stresses quite rightly the 
significance of group unity - the feeling that all parts of the 
community are bearing their share of the burden - as an essential 
factor in wartime civilian morale. 
40 
It remarks that the Germans 
living in the heavily bombed areas "resented the--good fortune 
of their countrymen who had not been bombed. Many people in the 
Rhineland, for example, were pleased when the bombs began to fall 
on Berlin. " 
41 
The morale reports confirm that this was very often 
the case. After a raid on the German capital in January 1943, 
there was satisfaction in the west "that the loud-mouthed 
Berliners have at last got it again". 
"The satisfaction derives from the feeling that 
the Berliners are said to have shown little 
understanding thus far for the suffering of the 
population in the Rhineland .... Frequently, it 
could be heard that it would be fine if the 
British flew more frequently to Berlin so that 
the inhabitants there would get a taste of how 
42 
we in the west are feeling-" 
In the sametýay, an NSDAP report refers to the "undisguised 
joy" felt in the west on hearing of the raids on the German 
capital. 
43 
There was also a general dislike of the prominence 
given to the few raids on Berlin at this time in radio and 
newspaper coverage. Party speakers were told to explain that 
this was due to Berlin being the decision centre of Europe. 
44 
Even the light retaliatory attacks launched at London were not 
always greeted but were themselves regarded as additional proof 
that the government was indifferent to the suffering of the west 
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German population. According to one report: 
"There was veritable indignation that after one 
light attack on Berlin, retaliation raids were 
immediately launched against England, while after 
raids that destroyed at least parts of such cities 
as Cologne, Duisburg, DUsseldorf and Mainz, 
allegedly not one plane was made free from the 
Eastern Front for such a retaliatory attack. , 
45 
The idea was gaining ground in the west that "the whole 
Rhineland has already been written off" by the government in 
Berlin. 46 In southern Germany "a growing anti-Prussian mood" 
was detected. 
47 
The popular interpretation of the air offensive 
as the enemy answer to the proclamation of "total war" only 
added to the animosity towards the faraway capital whose 
inhabitants had, so it was thought, all shouted "Ja" to Goebbels' 
hysterical questions in the Sportpalast. 
48* 
The propaganda did its very best to remove these dangerous 
signs of internal discord within the Volksgemeinschaft. At the 
beginning of March 1943, the press was instructed not to pay any 
more attention to raids on Berlin than to those on other towns, 
since this "would have a pyschologically unfavourable effect on 
the towns of the west which have hitherto been forced to bear 
49 
the brunt of the attack" . Indeed, the propagandists were very 
conscious of the danger of the Reich splitting into two parts - 
the bombed and the unbombed areas - and attempted to check this 
development before it was too late. Goebbels assured his 
listeners and readers in the raid-stricken west that the entire 
country was sharing its anguish and pain: 
"The war which inflicts on them special suffering 
is not their waronly; but that of our whole nation. 
We are trying to distribute its burdens as justly 
and as fairly as possible. " 
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He had, however, to admit that parts of the Reich 
it still-maintain an incomparably higher living 
standard than the air-war zones. Nobody is 
envious of that; no one, however, will seriously 
object if it has to be partially cut to help the 
raided areas. The community spirit alone 
demands this. " 
After upholding the population of the west as a model for all 
Germans to follow, he pleaded for an appreciation of the trial 
it was having to undergo: 
"The sufferings of the air war are easier to 
bear if the stricken population feels that the 
rest of the Reich are aware of them. " 
50 
American analysts of wartime German propaganda were quick to see 
in this propaganda response an attempt "to satisfy the craving 
for recognition peculiar to those who feel that their sacrifices 
should not go unnoticed by their fellow humans. " 
51 
Yet again, 
an excellent illustration is given here of the two-way process, 
propaganda - morale - propaganda response. 
A N, e wP01icY2fýFrankneSs, 
June-Au& 11 
.2t1943 
On 30 May 1943 the RAF stepped up the intensity of attack 
once again with a devastating fire-raid on Wuppdrtal-Barmen. 
Goebbels now decided that, faced with raids on such a scale, a 
fundamental change in propaganda tactics was necessary. The 
official blessing was consequently given to a new campaign of 
frankness. Goebbels hoped that, by vividly depicting the effects 
of enemy bombing, the population of the affected areas would 
appreciate the government's concern for their plight. Secondly, 
a policy of unmitigated candour was designed to arouse a bitter 
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hatred of the common foe, thus forcing the aggressive feelings 
stirred up by bombing in a direction beneficial to the 
National Socialist government. Goebbels realised that 
Churchill's policy of "blood, sweat and tears" had done much to 
raise the morale of the British in the dark days of 1940-1. 
Perhaps he could accomplish the same in Germany. There was, 
of course, one great difference. The scale as well as the 
period of the RAF attack on Germany was much greater than that 
of the earlier Luftwaffe offensive which had taken place in the 
nine months from September 1940 to May 1941. 
Goebbels opened his new frankness campaign on 18 June in 
Wuppertal with a fiery speech to commemorate the victims of the 
enemy raid on the city. He assured the survivors that they had 
not been forgotten: 
".... the people of these provinces are carrying on 
their hard struggle neither alone nor in vain. The 
whole German nation stands by their side and 
embraces them with love and loyalty. " 
52 
One day later in a radio broadcast Fritzsche implied that 
the propaganda had created so much ill-feeling by its reticence 
and had permitted so much indifference elsewhere in the Reich 
that it had now been compelled by popular demand to change its 
policy quite radically: 
"The public honouring of the, fallen of Wuppertal, 
which took place before the ears of the nation, 
nay, the ears of the world, has lifted a ban which 
heretofore has applied to the suffering of the men, 
women and children who are exposed to the constant 
enemy attacks from the air on the civilian populat- 
ion .... Thus it happened that one part of the German 
people had only a very limited notion of what the 
I, 
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other part, in the areas most heavily threatened 
from the air, had to endure. Thus it also happened 
that Germans in the most heavily bombed cities 
felt that they had been deserted or that they had 
been forgotten and had in any case not been under- 
stood. They had seen too few proofs of understanding 
and active help in the areas not yet affected. , 
53 
The press was to stress the help that was being given to the 
bombed regions by the rest of the Reich. 
54 
But in the 
educational task of teaching the hitherto unaffected to 
appreciate the phenomenon of saturation bombingp the press was 
only of secondary importance. Radio was an instrument better 
suited to the propaganda task of portraying the full horror of 
what was happening nightly in the west. In the weeks that 
followed Goebbels' Wuppertal speech, radio reporters were 
dispatched to the stricken areas, because "it was no longer 
tolerable-to conceal from the public the frightening results of 
55 
the bombing terror" . Most of the reports 
broadcast contained 
two basic themes: firstly, the suffering and devastation 
inflicted by the enemy "air gangsters" and, secondly, the 
barbarism of the foe in destroying cultural monuments. In the 
week 20-26 June, for instance, 15% of the time given to news 
and commentary on the German Home Service was devoted to these 
two topics. 
56 
The full horror. of a bombed city was painted in 
unmitigated detail. Even the daily broadcast, "Front Reports", 
hitherto the reserve of reports from the front, gave considerable 
attention to enemy air raids. The German listener was presented 
with a horrific picture of roads full of craters, uprooted 
trees and treks of exhausted people leaving the burning towns. 
"At noon on the day after the raid, volunteers and 
ARP organisations and soldiers from all units of 
the Forces are still fighting against the violently 
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raging fires. it is a picture of horror and 
destruction. Whole quarters of the town are 
only smouldering ruins. , 
57 
This realistic reporting reached a crescendo at the end of JulY 
with on-the-spot accounts from burning Hamburg. 
"It is 8 a. m., five hours after the all-clear 
has sounded; it is still impossible to 
comprehendthe scale of destruction. Every- 
where in Hamburg fires are burning, flames 
crackle and the house-fronts crumble with a 
roar and fall across the streets, and there 
is the sound of time-bomb detonations. The 
rain has stopped. Smoke lies over the town 
like an enormous thunder cloud through which 
the sun is like a red disc. It is nearly dark, 
as in the middle of the night. , 
58 
In upholding the bombed, cities as an example for the whole 
Reich, Goebbels used their martyrdom to condemn and ridicule 
the pettiness of grumblers and grousers: 
"He whoelsewhere, thinks he must complain of 
one or another by-product of war should look 
to, Essenv Dortmund, Bochumt Wuppertal, or other 
towns of the air war areas and blush with shame 
that he dares to compare his worries and dis- 
comforts caused by the war with the suffering 
of the population there. If anyone had the 
right to complain', it is our population in the 
west and north-west. But it does not complain. 
It is fighting with admirable spiritual strength 
and fanatical stubbornness against fire and 
,, 59 desolation. .. 
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German propagandists did not object to employing class 
animosity as a lever for bringing across the message more 
forcefully - just as they had done during the "total war" 
campaign a few months earlier. A correspondent of the daily 
topical radio magazine, Zeitspiegell remarked: 
"Often one thinks it would be good to bring every 
German to this district for a day or for an hour. 
I think that a large number would then not look 
with such a carefree mind on five or six-roomed 
flats with their precious furniture which they 
want to preserve by keeping these flats 
exclusively for themselves; they would realize 
that elsewhere first childhood impressions are 
connected with ruins instead of beautiful 
pictures. , 
60 Zj 
A rather contradictory picture arises from a study of the 
effect of this new propaganda policy. The SD Schwerin detected 
general satisfaction that "the hinterland finally sees how bad 
it really is in the west" and noted that, as a result, there 
was greater trust in the political leadership. 
61 Semmler 
explained the-cordial reception accorded to Goebbels in Cologne 
in the aftermath of a heavy raid by remarking: 
"These suffering men and women feel that at 
62 least one of them is interested in their fate. " 
This is certainly an allusion to Hitler's repeated refusal 
to visit blitzed towns. It would appear, however, that the 
propagandists were not always very successful in removing the 
lurking suspicion that the government in Berlin had written 
off the Rhineland. After heavy attacks on Cologneand Aachen 
in July 1943, the old complaint reappeared, namely that the 
radio and press "were leaving the population in the rest of 
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the Reich in the dark about the real situation in west 
, 63 Germany' . This may be seen as an important warning not to 
overestimate propaganda success when a population is fighting 
a long struggle for survival. Even when morale reports point 
to a positive response to the propagandists' message, it would 
be wrong to conclude that the desired response proved to be 
of lasting effect. As soon as the enemy bombers returneds 
old doubts would return, too. Words against bombs would 
always be a very uneven contest. 
Goebbels' newly discovered candour only confronted his 
propaganda team with new problems. By stressing the full 
horror of enemy attack, he was in truth admitting the inabil- 
ity of the German leadership to prevent what was happening. 
Although the new tone in propaganda treatment of the air war 
was generally greeted, there was, neverthelessl some criticism. 
In Stuttgart, for instance, many found it terribly depressing 
"that these reports manifest our defencelessness more and more 
openly". 
64 
Even Goebbels' aggressive tones at Wuppertal were 
not always received so kindly. -for many considered it "cheap 
consolation" and found a hate tirade at a funeral profoundly 
repugnant. 
65 
What is more, by the early summer of 1943 many 
had become surprisingly adroit in spotting the purpose under- 
lying the changes in propaganda policy. Nor did the sudden 
resort to shock methods always me6t with the expected success. 
Some reports even lead to the conclusion that Goebbels had, 
in fact, overstepped the mark. After a vivid radio account on 
the destruction wrought by British bombers on defenceless 
civilians by Dr. Karl Holzamer, SD Stuttgart reported: 
"It is probable that those directly affected 
were depressed quite unnecessarily. To some 
extent it is also to be feared that such de- 
scriptions only increase the fear of raids which 
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are to be expected in the future, particularly 
when so many things, both true and untrue, 
about the damage in the west German towns are 
being discussed, , 66 
Some four weeks later, the same representatives of the 
Sicherheitsdienst pointed to the shattering effect a report from 
a fire-brigade truck rushing through the burning streets of 
Aachen had on listeners in their area. One woman was reported 
as saying: 
"I can no longer bear to listen to these reports 
from the air war areas. They make me terribly 
nervous. When you have to face the prospect 
every night that exactly the same will happen 
to you, then such reports are regarded quite 
differently from how they are regarded in those 
areas which are not at all endangered by air 
raids. It may be very good for the Ostmarker 
/-Austrian-s7 to learn something about the terrible 
fate of the west German population but for us 
, 67 here in Wdrttemberg the effect is hair-raising. 
This is an excellent demonstration of the dilemma confronting 
every propagandist when compelled to address simultaneously 
two parts of the German people whose attitude was determined by 
the degree to which they considered themselves endangered or had 
already actually been affected by enemy raiding. Too little 
realism was interpreted as evidence that Berlin was taking too 
little interest in the plight of the stricken, too much as an 
unbearable additional strain on the already hard-strained 
listener. The German propaganda 6'rganisation had long ceased 
to be absolute master of its own decision making. It was now 
no longer a question of interpreting and exploiting events to 
the full but of making them as palatable as possible to 
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consumers with very different tastes. 
T h-e ShockoftheRaidson 
HambUr 11 YuY, !!. a 43 
In the week 24 July -3 August 1943 Hamburg was the target 
of four devastating RAF raids, the first ever to produce the 
fire-storm. Not only was the greater part of Germany's second 
68 
city destroyed but over 40., 000 of its citizens lost their lives, 
This holocaust could not have come at a worse moment for the 
Nazi leadership. After the loss of North Africa in May and the 
fall of the Italian Duce on July 25, civilian morale had reached 
an all-time low. The destruction of Hamburg was simply the 
visual confirmation that the course of the war had irreparably 
changed to Germany's disadvantage. Many regarded the overall 
situation as "catastrophic" and as the "beginning of the end". 
Only a few citizens could now be found who were still able to 
persuade themselves that "final victory" was a certainty. 
69 The 
very idea that the war might soon be over was said, however, to 
gladden the hearts of some Germans, particularly the women in 
the severely bombed areas. 
70 
The attack on Hamburg came as a terrible shock for the 
whole nation. What is more, the 900,000 evacuees from the 
ravaged city passed on news of the catastrophe all over the 
Reich to all who were prepared to listen. The result was that 
a mood of panic spread like a forest fire. Every German city 
and town was now faced with the grave prospect of having to 
endure a similar avalanche of fire in the near future. There 
could, indeed, have been no better propagandists for the Allied 
cause than these refugees from the Hansa city. 
71 
Rumours wildly 
exaggerated the effects of these raids, putting the number of 
dead at over 100, '000 and comparing the mood of the Hamburg 
population with that of the Germany of November 1918.72 These 
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rumours proved so convincing that they failed to succumb to 
even the most determined efforts of the propagandists at curbing 
them. Even those regions hitherto untouched by raiding now 
came to learn the meaning of fear, and belief in the possibility 
of an effective defence against the enemy bomber vanished over- 
night. Few doubted that the Allied air flotillas could now 
pick on any German town at will. 
73 
The morale reports speak of 
an "air raid pychosis" which was getting hold of the population. 
74 
SD Mecklenburg registered the lowest level of morale hitherto 
and compared it to the mood prevailing at a time of defeat 
(untergangsstimmung). 75 What was more dangerous, some began to 
think of possible future alternatives: 
"The number of those, who, although outwardly 
doing everything demanded of them, are quietly 
seeking a back-door out of a general catastrophe, 
, 76 is at the moment increasing. 
"Well-meaning Volksgenossen" complained they had no factual 
arguments to counter these defeatists withýand were consequently 
compelled to rely on their simple but firm faith in the FUhrer 
77 
and "final victory" . 
Nowhere was the fear greater than in the capital itselfv 
whose population was convinced that it was now to be their turn. 
"Rumour has it that the attack will take place 
on Migust 8., the second anniversary of the 
beginning of our raids on London (sic). People 
go to bed early, sleep uneasilyq glance at the 
clock every time they wake up and are relieved 
when dawn at last comes and the danger, for the 
time being at least, is past. " 
78* 
Some citizens interpreted the evacuation of some public offices 
from Berlin as clear evidence that the government itself was 
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79 
contemplating abandoning the capital. The "panic" mood 
reached its peak when women and children were advised to leave 
the threatened city forthwith. A veritable chaos was the result. 
Immediately the railway stations were stormed by thousands of 
desperate and. bewildered citizens. 
80 But once the initial shock 
had subsided and the expected attack did not materialise, the 
Berliners soon calmed down once again 
81 
and within a very short 
time the flood of evacuees returning to the capital was to 
become a big headache for the city authorities. 
82 When the RAF 
finally did turn its main attention to Berlin in the last week 
of November 1943, the inhabitants found their courage again and 
11took" the raids just as bravely and stoically as the Londoners 
had done three years before. In fact, the experience of German 
towns during the Second World War would seem to confirm Speer's 
testimony at Nuremberg. Although the overall tendency was for 
the weight of attack to increase gradually which enabled the 
Germans to get accustomed to the raids, 
"In every case in which the RAF suddenly increased 
the weight of attacks, as for example the first 
attack on Cologne and Hamburg and the attacks on 
Dresden, the effect not only upon the population 
of the town attacked but upon the rest of the 
Reich was terrifying, even if only temporarily so. " 
83 
Now that the air war had entered this new and more perilous 
stage, there was a feeling at the top that the propaganda had 
gone too far in portraying the nightly orgies of destruction. 
Goebbels may have embarked on his adventure in the 
conviction that all-out retaliation was imminent. But thanks to 
a successful attack on the experimental sites in PeenemUnde on 
17 August 1943, this was not to be the case. Painting too vivid 
a picture of enemy ravages would certainly do no good if not 
followed up by a heavy and prolonged attack on the British 
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motherland. As this was not possible, all that propaganda 
would succeed in doing would be to underline German military 
weakness and the leadership's inability to prevent the raids, if 
the policy of the previous weeks were not dropped immediately. 
Everyday reality had now become so horrible that it would now be 
preferable to play it down, even if this meant risking an even 
greater lack of confidence in the leadership, than to depict 
what was actually happening in all its savage detaill thereby 
only deepening-pessimism and defeatism. A much more cautious 
line was therefore struck by German propaganda in August. The 
press was instructed to restrict itself to "the most necessary 
points". Although it would still be necessary to tackle the 
air war theme, 
"It is, in generals nevertheless desired that, in 
the future, press treatment of this matter fades 
away. 
J4 
The time had come to give up the defensive position adopted 
during the frankness campaign and to concentrate more on "the 
positive aspects. of our general war position in Europe". 
"The papers ought now to express once again the 
fighting spirit, as well as the will to win both 
at. the front and at home, which is based on the 
consciousness of our strength and military position. " 
85 
In as far as air war topics were still dealt with, the stress 
was now placed on the high losses sustained by the enemy air 
force, as well as on its growing inability to reach the target 
of its choice. A more offensive tone now characterised 
propaganda output. The propagandists attempted to give their 
audience tangible evidence that something was really being done 
to break the enemy onslaught. It was not so much the defence 
will of the population that was now emphasised but the actual 
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defence successes claimed. 
86 
TheEffectofBombin&oRMora 
intheLastMonthsoftheWar 
After-the attacks on Hamburg in the summer of 1943 the 
catastrophe expected by almost everyone did not materialise. 
Although German cities continued to be blasted and the Reich's 
capital itself became the focus of Allied interest, morale held 
and even recovered from the "low" of July and August 1943. But 
after the Allied landings in France in June 1944 and the 
subsequent retreat of German troops to the Reich frontiers which, 
in addition, meant the loss of the air defence's "early warning 
system", the strain on the civilian population began to show. 
Military developments themselves now constituted an additional 
threat to the very existence of every German, and this fatal 
combination of military defeat and continued heavy bombing 
became a burden too heavy to bear for long. Apathy and a 
longing for peace, whatever the political consequences, were the 
87* 
result. In the last three months of 1944, a total of 163,000 
tons of bombs was dropped, a greater amount than was recorded 
for the whole of 1943.88 The indiscriminate raid on Dresden on 
13-14 February 1945 with its terrible toll in human life (put 
at 60-13,000) had a shattering effect on morale. 
89 The very 
limit of endurance had now been reached. Belief that the tide 
would turn once more vanished for ever. Nowhere did the 
civilian population feel secure from the bombs - even in the 
strongly fortified bunkers which became death-traps in the event 
of a fire-storm. 
90 
After a heavy raid on Mannheim on 1 March 
1945, one SD reporter spoke of a "mood of catastrophe" among the 
entire population". 
"The belief in victory has,, as a result, suffered 
yet further damage. " 
91 
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The increase, too, in low-level attacks of single planes 
now meant that even the rural population was gripped by the 
awesome feeling that they were safe nowhere nor at any time* 
92 
The psychological effect of these low-flying air-craft was said 
in one report to be worse than that of concentrated "terror 
raids. because, whereas the latter meant having to seek shelter 
for a definite period".. 
"The hour-long circling of the fighter-bomber 
at low altitude makes whole districts nervous 
and rebellious. ' 
93 
The sight of hundreds of enemy fighters cruising 
undisturbed across the skies of Germany had a devastating effect 
on home morale and played a decisive part in determining attitude 
to the war as a whole. It was viewed as indisputable evidence 
of enemy might and superiority. The result was disillusionment 
and resignation among soldiers and civilians alike. There were 
now very few people indeed who still believed in the possibility 
of breaking Allied domination of German air space, of which 
"every Volksgenosse is able to convince himself with his own 
,, 94 eyes . The result was complete demoralisation or what the 
compilers'of the morale reports so aptly described as 
"Unterganggstimmung', 
9 
95 
There was, nevertheless, a widespread willingness to cling 
onto any hope the leadership might still be able to provide. 
Thus the brief reappearance of the Luftwaffe in force in the 
West at the turn of the year 1944-5 was a fillip to morale and 
at once led-to hopes that the Allied air offensive would now be 
finally and decisively checked. 
96 The reported destruction of 
600 enemy planes in an attack on enemy air bases on New Year's 
Day came as a welcome tonic to morale 
97 but, when the "success" 
was not followed up and the raids continued as if mthing had 
happened, hopes faded completely. 
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Nor was the civilian population ignorant of the grave 
effect Allied precision attacks on German transport and 
industry were having. Few could see how the war could be 
carried on without an industry or a communications system 
to rely on. 
"The very reality shatters time and time again 
any hope that may arise that we will ever again 
seize the initiative in air warfare. " 
98 
. 
During the final months of this war, many nurtured a 
heart-felt longing for an end to hostilities, for this would 
constitutev above all, an end to the ceaseless air attacks and 
air raid alarms. The writing was clearly on the wall and the 
quicker the war was over the better. 
99 
The political and military 
terms the enemy could be expected to impose on a defeated Reich 
were considered to be of secondary importance in the west and 
north of Germany. Thoughts hardly stretched beyond the day the 
sirens would at last be silent. This was recognised by no one 
less than the Propaganda Minister himself. He blamed the 
constant air bombardment for the poorer show of morale in the 
west than in the east. 
100 After having been reproached that 
there had not been a single symbol of resistance in the west 
like Breslau or YZnigsberg in the east, one of Goebbels' aides 
responsible for propaganda work in the so-called Westmark 
explained to the minister that "the western population has been 
worn down by months and years of enemy air raids to such an 
101 
extent that they would prefer a horrific end to endless horror". 
This would very much seem to corroborate the claims made 
in the US Bombing Survey. But, on closer examination, the 
conclusions drawn by the American researchers appear too general 
and not specific enough. Although it is most certainly true 
that heavy bombing did finally make many Germans ready to 
accept defeat as the only escape from the fear created by 
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bombing, this became a typical characteristic of civilian 
morale only in the autumn of 1944. In spite of the over- 
pessimistic conclusions drawn on all sides following the all-out 
attack on Hamburg in the summer of 1943, German morale did not 
crack and work discipline hardly suffered. It was the 
combination of unrelieved military disasters culminating in the 
enemy crossing the Reich frontiers, with the threat posed by 
the ubiquitous USAF and RAF after September 1944 that provided 
the death blow to German morale and created widespread 
willingness to surrender. Here, once again, the image of the 
enemy proved equally decisive. Whereas in the west it was 
generally favourable, in the east an end to the war was 
popularly interpreted as meaning an even worse fate than that 
associated with a prolongation of the fighting. 
C. COMPENSATION THEMES 
If morale were not to crack under the weight of enemy bombs, 
Nazi propaganda could not afford just to divert public 
attention away from the air war; it would also have to show 
that, however great the burden of bombing was and the suffering 
it involved, it was of absolutely no importance as far as the 
final outcome of the war was concerned. The civilian population 
would be reconciled to the inescapability of wounds inflicted 
by enemy raids only if they were helped to maintain their 
belief in victory. In the highly personalised view of the war 
which arose among the victims of bombing the most effective 
compensation theme would, of course, be retaliatory attacks on 
the British Isles which had now become one gigantic aircraft- 
carrier. But, in 1943, the Luftwaffe forces were tied up 
elsewhere and were hardly able to deliver more than the 
occasional "tip and run" raid against England. What would most 
certainly have been the most powerful compensatory propaganda 
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was therefore not possible. The next best thing would be to 
promise an awful knock-, out blow sometime in the future, and in 
the period under study this was to be done time and time again. 
Retaliation promises, as well as the later "secret weapon" 
attack on England, will be the subject of the next chapter. 
But between January 1943 and June 1944 promises as to events in 
the uncertain future were insufficient. Raids were taking 
place nightly over the Reich and immediately convincing 
compensatory arguments were required. 
oatSuccesses 
In the spring of 1943 it was very easy for Goebbels to 
point to the disastrous effects German submarine successes were 
having on the British armaments potentials as well as on the 
entire island economy: 
"The results of air warfare are immediately 
obvious to everyone, whereas the results of our 
U-boat warfare against the British Empire are only 
noticed by the broad masses of the British 
population after a certainjapse of time. 
However, by then they havet to a considerable 
extent, already become irremediable .... With 
air warfare Britain has grasped our wrist, but 
with U-boat warfare we have seized Britain by 
the throat. " 102 
Goebbels seems to have hit on the right key, for, at a time 
when morale was otherwise bad, great hopes continued to be 
attached to Doenitz' submarines. 
103 But the final turn in the 
Battle of the Atlantic in April-May 1943 robbed him of one of 
the best arguments in his propaganda armoury. He had developed 
his U-boat propaganda on the presumption that submarine successes 
would continue indefinitely. The result was intense 
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disappointment among the German civilian population. One can 
imagine that this disappointment was nowhere greater than in the 
cities of the Ruhr. It certainly did not take people long to 
grasp the significance of the sudden absence of Sondermeldungen 
announcing U-boat successes on the wireless. It was now to be 
recalled bitterly that only shortly before Goebbels had proudly 
observed that., whilst the enemy could do abso lutely nothing 
against the German submarines, there were effective means of 
dealing with British raiders. 
"Now it has turned out that the enemy has been 
much quicker in developing his means of defence 
against U-boats than we have been in developing 
weapons to combat enemy air raids. " 
104 
For the rest of the war Goebbels remained deprived of what had 
been, if only for a short time, a very powerful and promising 
propaganda argument. 
efenceSuccessesns 
EnemyBombers 
As explained above, a more aggressive note came to 
characterise Nazi air-war propaganda in the late summer of 
1943. The argument that the raids were exacting a prohibitive 
toll on enemy planes and crews now gained prominence. According 
to Goebbels: 
"The air war is, in many respects, a race between 
the state of technical development on both sides 
and at the moment ours is notably quickening its 
pace. In future ever-increasing enormous losses 
in personnel and material will be inflicted on 
the enemy. The moment will then eventually arrive 
when the success no longer corresponds to the 
resources in men and material employed. The 
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so-called Flying Fortresses will then become 
Flying Coffins. " 
105 
As late as October 1944, Goebbels prophesied "that in the not 
too distant future we will catchý up with the enemy air 
superiority bit for bit". 
106 Actual defence successes were 
naturally welcomed by everyone and the German fighter pilots 
enjoyed the same heroic reputation as W pilots had done in 
Britain in 1940. There was, however, a nagging suspicion that 
the new stress on defence successes was somehow an attempt to 
distract attention away from the catastrophic effects the raids 
were believed to be having. In fact, most Germans regarded 
the RAF raids as being more effective than was normally the 
case. Even publication of the large number of British and 
American planes shot down did not always secure the effect 
intended. Instead, it was not only seen as proof of the failure 
of the German submarine fleet but as evidence that the enemy, 
supply in aircraft was inexhaustible. This made the German 
people even more aware of the fact that, whereas the enemy 
could go on producing without any disturbances German armaments 
potential, and with it the hope for a change of fortune., was 
'being constantly weakened by heavy bombardment. 
107 Moreover, 
an alleged increase in the number of enemy aircraft shot down 
was simply interpreted as further proof that the raids were 
108 becoming heavier. There was dissatisfaction that, whil: st 
the press was constantly stressing losses sustained by the 
enemy air-force, not the slightest clue was given as to the 
ratio-between planes engaged and actual losses. 
109 An even more 
central danger to Nazi propaganda claims was that many doubted 
the veracity of the official figures of enemy planes destroyed. 
Working-class people, in particular, were said to be harbouring 
110 
such doubts. . What the average German saw and experienced 
himself made it impossible to swallow Goebbels' claim the enemy 
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was being worn down in fatal fashion by his own attacks: 
"One cannot believe in the truth of this view 
when very often one is oneself witness to the 
mighty armadas and afterwards compares them to 
the number shot down, ""' 
Finally, it was no good talking of defence successes when 
during the enemy "debacle" one had lost property and perhaps 
relatives and friends. 
(iii) German Industry n2t in Dany,, EZ: 
Throughout the period under study Goebbels assured the 
German people repeatedly that, however grievous the raids 
might be, they were having no effect whatsoever on arms prod- 
uction and therefore on Germany's chances in the future. 
112 
Although the same assurance was given by the armaments experts 
Speer., 113 many found this impossible to believe and preferred 
to base their'opinion on personal knowledge of destroyed 
factories. 114 In Frankfurt-on-Main, for instance, the citizens 
saw with their own eyes, that many factories and works were not 
functioning for a considerable time after the raids on the city 
115 
The claim that armament production in the industrial Ruhr had 
risen, although indeed true, also, met with scepticism. 
116 
Here 
is'a good example of a negative mood leading to an over- 
pessimistic evaluation of the situation. Goebbels' emphasis 
on the failure of Anglo-American bombing was further disliked, 
for it was viewed as an open invitation'to the enemy to launch 
117 
new and more devastating blows. In short, propaganda claims 
were judged and evaluated solely on the ground-of personal 
experience. 
A, Si&a2fEnemyWaakness 
Reports purporting to show that the enemy air raids were$ 
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in fact, a sign of weakness and proof that the enemy lacked 
both the courage and the ability to launch a successful land 
attack on German occupied areas were rejected by the vast 
118 
majority. In the same way, articles stressing the 
difficulties of American industry and the low level of 
education of US soldiers and airmen were greeted sceptically, 
for "the success of-American arms is demonstrated in such a 
terrible way in the air war". 
119 After the Allied landing in 
Normandy, the argument was discarded, as the enemy now proved 
that it was possible to win victory after victory on land and, 
at the same time, step up the scale of bombing. 
rominencetoRadsonGerman 
ccupiedEurop1 
In order to show the Germans that they were not the only 
ones suffering from Allied bombingl great prominence was 
frequently given to attacks on targets in German occupied 
countries. In the first months of 1943, for examplej raids on 
such cities as Paris, Antwerp and Rotterdam were-described in 
considerably greater deta'il than those which were being carried 
out at the same time on Reich territory. 
120 This was to become 
the focus of considerable criticism. According to an SD report 
of 12 April 1943, it was particularly regretted that, whereas 
the press never published casualty figures following raids on 
German cities, this was almost always done after attacks outside 
the Reich. This led to the unwelcome habit of using the latter 
to deduce probable casualty figures for raided German towns. 
121 
ebui1dinaP2: omises 
By the early summer of 1943, it seemed increasingly likely 
that by the time the war ended most of Germany's towns would 
be razed to the ground by enemy bombers. The prýocess of 
destruction was occurring at a really frightening tempo. 
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Hardly'a day passed without the OKW-Bericht announcing the 
latest devastating attack of the RAF on a civilian target 
inside the Reich. The countless victims of these raids must 
have considered "final victory" very poor consolation indeed 
for loss of relatives, friends and, of course, property. By 
June a new propaganda theme had emerged the promise once the 
war was over to rebuild German towns so that they would be more 
attractive than ever before. 
122 Goebbels painted a very 
optimistic picture of this post-war Germany: 
"And after the war it will be a duty and honour 
for the whole people, in gratitude for the hero- 
ism displayed today, to rebuild their towns more 
beautifully than ever. New life will then 
blossom out of the ruins and in the most remote 
future our children and children's children will 
talk about the courageous endurance of their 
fathers and mothers who through their heroism 
have bound a wreath of immortal glory round the 
armour of their proud cities. " 
123 
Goebbels repeated this promise to the bombed-out on the occasion 
of the remembrance ceremony for the victims of the raid on 
Wuppertal: 
"If the enemy is transforming their houses and 
flats into ruins, they can rest assured that 
after victory has been attained the entire 
German people will put its huge material 
strength together so that the destroyed villages 
and towns of these provinces can arise again 
more beautiful than ever before, " 
124 
In a speech held in November, Hitler even set a time limit to 
the work of reconstruction. 
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"In a bare three years, all the dwellings 
will without exception be restored, however 
many they ft-he enemY7 may destroy. " 
The bombed-out were reminded by their FUhrer that they, above 
all, had a vested interest in a German victory: 
"The man, in particular, who has lost his own 
property, can have but one desire - that the 
war should never-'be lost - because only a 
victorious war will be able to give him back 
what he has lost 0 
, 125 
As early as September 1943, Party speakers had been called 
on to stress the fact that German victory was the prerequisite 
for the realisation of the government's reconstruction plans, 
126 
In the meantime, however, the authorities were not inactive, 
Goebbels assured hi's listeners. 
"There is hardly a town in the Reich stricken 
by the enemy air terror, whose authorities 
are not even now making the most comprehensive 
preparations to solve the housing problem dfter 
the war. " 
When the time came to begin the enormous task, "our great 
wartime experience in rationalising production"would prove 
to be of great benefit, 
127 
This new emphasis on rebuilding plans seems to have 
irritated rather than to have comforted the population, for 
it was thought that first priority should be given to the job 
1,128 of defeating the "air gangsters . The claims repeatedly made 
that the work of reconstructiom would not take more than 3-5 
years were met with sceptism and were "so obviously a plaster 
, 129 on-the wounds of the bombed-out . The inhabitants of 
- Frankfurt-on-Main had very grave doubts as to whether such an 
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ambitious rebuilding scheme could be carried out so rapidly. 
130 
Most annoying for those citizens who had seen their town and 
all they possessed go up in smoke in one single night was the 
argument that there was a positive side to the raids, since they 
provided the unique opportunity for constructing new, larger, 
healthier and more splendid buildings. 
131 
This was most 
certainly an architect's dream but not a particularly welcome 
prospect to the average citizen, who would have preferred there 
to have been no war and his familiar surroundings to have 
remained as they were. 
(vii) The Stre. n, &jhanin. & 2LtheGe rman 
P. a2ple's Gommunity 
Just as the British Information Ministry had earlier 
portrayed the Luftwaffe raids*on Great Britain as an almost 
welcome morale-booster, Goebbels now attempted to show that 
Allied raids were only succeeding in forging the German people 
together in their bitter determination to resist the enemy at 
all costs. Far from weakening morale as they were intended to 
do, they were strengthening'it. Indeed, the Germans did show 
that they were no less strong in taking blows than the British 
had been in 1940-1. Goebbels even used the moral strength of 
the British at that critical time as an example to steel the 
rugged will of his own people and called on all Berliners to 
take the brave Londoners as their model: 
"What the English stuck out in the autumn of 
1940 and for which a few of us admired them, 
that we have to stick out now. I reject 
indignantly the enemy allegation that the 
Berliners have weaker nerves than the Londoners. 
This is out of the question. Just as for the 
British a turn for. the better has come in the 
field of air warfare since 1940, so things will 
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also turn round for us. The English needed 
two years for this; our waiting period will 
be a much shorter one than the English one. , 
132 
Yet again it was necessary to distinguish between "mood" and 
"bearing". Frau Scholtz-Klin-ck, the leader of the Party's 
women's organisation, maintained: 
"the harder this terror becomes, all the firmer, 
more energetic and more determined the bearing 
becomes with every raid, even if for a few 
minutes and hours the 'mood' might be bad here 
and there. " 
133 
Any negative feature in morale was now repeatedly dismissed as 
belonging to "mood" and no danger at all for the unity of 
purpose of the German people. 
Goebbels even claimed in December 1943 that the enemy 
raids were actually achieving what the Nazi regime had not 
quite managed to achieve: 
"In the copflagrations which after the severe 
terror raids flare up in the residential 
quarters of the attacked towns, a strength 
wells up in our nation which is unconquerable. 
Out of the ruins and gutted remnants of our 
housest hospitals, schools, theatres and churches, 
there emerges majestically like a phoenix from 
the cinders, marked by suffering but steeled by 
pain, the socialist community of our people, 
that which we have searched for in anxious 
quest for more than 1,000 years and which we 
could never quite achieve, the unity of. all 
Germans which will outlast time and generations 
.... We shall come out of this conflict as a 
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nation united for ever, the political steadfast- 
ness of which, tried in war, will form the 
basis of its historical future. " 
134 
Goebbels developed his theory still further in his Christmas 
Eve address two weeks later: 
"Today we march with a light pack, There are 
many of us who no longer have much to lose. 
They feel the loss of their personal possessions 
to be a kind of advance payment on the great 
national profit which we want to gain by this 
war. The loss of their possessions has mainly 
served to make them harder and more determined 
for war. " 
135 
The morale reports themselves tell quite another story. 
Far from "welcoming" the raids as "constructive", 
"The conviction of being without any defence 
and at the mercy of the Anglo-American bombing 
terror and the feeling of helplessness coupled 
with the fear of a possible future gas attack 
all make the, present situation seemo in the 
long run, unbearable. " 
136 
The stress on the steadfastnessness of the west German population 
was so obviously propagandistic in nature that many were led to 
conclude that the morale of the people there was "fairly worn- 
137 down" and had to be "pepped up . Particularly disliked were 
the many articles claiming that the raids were, in fact, having 
a beneficial effect by intensifying and deepening the defence 
will of the population. 
138 
Although the need to hold out was 
generally accepted, such cliches as "every blow only makes us 
harder" were rejected outright. 
139 The propaganda emphasis on 
of the strength of the heart" against the destructive will of 
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the foe was met with the sarcastic comment: 
"If we have nothing else than our courageous 
heart to set against the bombing terror, then 
140 
we can start burying all our hopes. " 
Similarly, the hard-tried citizens of Frankfurt-on-Main pointed 
out that "pitting hearts against bombs was a very unprofitable 
,, 141 way indeed of fighting a war . Some were even led to drawing 
the sarcastic conclusion that the much promised retaliation 
against England was being postponed on purpose to let more 
people have a chance to be bombed out and consequently to 
improve their morale! 
142 The propagandists were not blind and 
knew all too well that this kind of reaction would negate all 
their efforts if allowed to go unchecked. In May 1944, the 
German press was warned against using too bombastic language 
in its descriptions of bombed towns, because this could only 
have a negative effect on "mood". 
143 Nevertheless, the 
occasional propaganda excess in the treatment of bombing was 
still to be observed. At the very end of the war, Robert Ley 
claimed that "the destruction of Dresden has been greeted with 
a sigh of relief, for we have lost our last cultural town". 
It must be added that Ley had acted without the knowledge of 
the Propaganda Ministry. In fact, Goebbels was in a rage at 
t1iis ridiculous remark and pertinently noted in his diary 
that, if it were really, as Ley asserted, beneficial to march 
with a "lighter pack".. then one could take this argument to 
its logical conclusion and maintain "it would be better to 
abandon the Reich completely to the enemy because then we 
wouldn't have even the lightest pack to drag along".. Perhaps 
Goebbels had forgotten that he had himself used a very similar 
argument fifteen months before. 
144 
Some morale reportst however, seem to have echoed the 
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official propaganda line, observing what they thought their 
superiors would desire to see rather than the real state of 
affa irs. This is to be traced back to the wish to curry 
favour or the attempt to demonstrate the success of their own 
political work in their local area. The following excerpt 
from the report of the'Generalstaatsanwalt of Darmstadt, 
although purporting to be a factual observation of morale, 
sounds more like a rally speech worthy of one of the lesser known 
Party stalwarts. It is particularly worth quoting as a warning 
to examine all so-called morale reports with an extremely 
critical eye. 
"The people have undergone an important development 
asta result of the bombing raids and the heroic 
surmounting of the terror. One may say that the 
bourgeoise is dead or at least in its death-throes. 
Pettiness, shabbiness, the clinging on to property, 
the mental horizon which stretches no further 
than the rim of a soup plate, the selfishness of 
the nest, the forcing back of one's own 
spiritual strength, the mixture of constant fear 
and dim hope, the total wretchedness that 
characterises the bourgeois and the philistine - 
it is as if all these things have been swept 
away. Both in inward and outward bearing most 
people are now showing themselves in a light 
that would have been considered impossible only 
a short time ago. The German people is about to 
become a true national community (Volksgemein- 
schaft. ) In the same way as this national 
community stands together after every bombing 
raid in a clear feeling of unity, it is equally 
determined to carry on the struggle until victory. 
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This new state of mind will not be the 
smallest fruit of this war and it constitutes, 
at the same time, a guarantee for the rapid 
and successful task of reconstruction. " 
145 
Although the picture painted here surely belongs to the realms 
of pure fantasy, there are many indications that bombing did, 
in fact, play an important part in bringing German citizens 
closer together. This, however, should not be interpreted 
as proof of the success of Nazi propaganda or the existence 
of a Volks-gemeinschaft. Much more important than propaganda was 
the very force of the situation itself and the common threat 
to all. According to one witness of the bombing terror who was 
later to become the President of the Bundestag in post-war 
Germany: 
"It was just this kind of destructive bombing that 
made it easier for an unscrupulous state-leadership 
to persuade the German people that it only had one 
alternative - to stick it out with the leaders of 
the Third Reich or to perish. , 
146 
But this assertion must also be qualified. This may well have 
been true up to about the autumn of 1944. Afterwards, however, 
an increasing number of people, especially in the west, were 
very aware of there being a second alternative - surrender and 
survival, What is trtleis that Goebbels was all too ready to 
seize upon the raids as irrefutable proof of the enemy's 
destructive will. For those not taken in by this there remained 
the argument that if thousands were now being killed by enemy 
bombs, under Jewish domination it would be millions! 
147 The 
diary entry of an anti-Nazi living in Berlin during the heavy 
raids on the city in the winter of 1943-4 appears to provide 
further evidence that Allied bombing was having quite the 
opposite to the desired effect: 
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"The catastrophe which hits Nazis and anti- 
Nazis alike is welding the people together 
.... if the English believe they can thus 
undermine morale, then they are deceiving 
themselves. " 
148 
This coming together, particularly in the bombed citiesv 
should naturally not be confused with the official Nazi picture 
of a new-found national unity. Later, the community spirit 
would, especially in west-German towns and villages, be 
directed against the Nazis themselves and manifest itself in 
a common effort to shorten the war by refusing to offer 
resistance and, in some cases, by sabotaging the defence plans 
of one's own army. The German Volksgemeinschaft remained theory 
and was only a reality in the heads of some of the Party's 
ideologists. 
But to add credence to his own pet theoryt Goebbels 
attempted to prove that class-struggle was a thing of the past. 
It was, he asserted, no longer class-consciousness but the fact 
of being German that determined people's thinking. Apparently 
to underline this "new" classless community Goebbels paid a 
visit to the blitzed working-class districts of Berlin, 
accompanied, of course, by the microphones of the Reichsrundfunk. 
He thereby used his own person as an instrument of propaganda 
to demonstrate the bond existing between the simple worker and 
the government at an individual level. His own steadfastness 
was meant to be the symbol of Berlin's determination to hold 
out at all costs. In the first weeks of the Berlin blitz, the 
ideas of the common man were conveyed by means of the radio 
microphoneýto the listener at home, thereby portraying the 
identity of interest between the leaders and the led. The worker, 
suitably trimmed by Nazi propaganda, became the ideal German - 
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the very same worker who had shown so little sympathy for the 
ideas of National Socialism in the years before 1933. One such 
workman, for instance, explained to a radio interviewer how he 
had turned up for work in spite of having lost his home in the 
raid the night before. 
149 
The propagandists now coined the 
phrase "socialism of the deed" which was enabling German city 
dwellers to overcome the horror of the raids. 
150 
At the end of 
the first terrible fortnight for Berliners, Goebbels described 
to his readers and listeners his visit to Wedding, a working- 
class district with a strongly "Red" tradition. He had had 
the opportunity of chatting to some typical Berlin workers. 
Although they had once belonged to the "Red. Frontl", 
"Now they were only Germans .... It has never 
happened before that a country's workers, after 
such heavy blows, have met representatives of 
their political leaders without suspicion and 
embarrassment, slapped them on the back, spoken 
to them in a familiar way /duzen7/ and called 
them by their christian names; that they have 
encouraged you when you have come to encourage 
them, that they have cursed the enemy with 
contempt and burning hatred, confining him 
to hell and have only one question: when shall 
we go for him? , 
151 
There is no doubt that Goebbels was, in fact, given a 
resounding reception on the morrow of the raids. 
152 He himself 
appears to have been a§tounded by the popular acclaim in the 
working-class districts of Berlin. 
"I should never have thought it possible that 
such a transformation of spirit and viewpoint 
153 could take place. "L 
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All this can be explained by the feeling shared by Berliners 
that there was someone in the government who was genuinely 
interested in their welfare. It should, however, be added 
that there was hardly any other Gauleiter in the Reich who 
went to such pains to gain the goodwill of the masses. Indeed, 
no one recognised the significance of popular support - even 
in a dictatorship like the Third Reich - more than the 
Gauleiter of Berlin did. It would certainly be difficult to 
deny that, by keeping Berliners in the propaganda limelight 
and by appearing to remain in constant touch with their every- 
day problems and anxieties during the Allied blitz, Goebbels 
contributed greatly to the high morale of the capital's 
inhabitants. Naturally, the extra rations - 50 grams of meat 
and ten cigarettes a week - also played their part. 
154 
But in 
Berlin, too, there was no lack of criticism. The stress on 
life carrying on as normal, as if the raids were not all that 
bad, was found to be particularly annoying. The press, radio 
and newsreels were making much of the fact that the cinemas 
and theatres were still open and cultural exhibitions still 
being held. Here the Berliners sensed a determined attempt by 
the political leadership to conceal the real effects of the 
raids from the rest of the nation. 
155 
Observations made in a number of morale reports appear to 
contradict Goebbels' assertions concerning class unity quite- 
drastically. Although he might have temporarily impressed the 
proletarian population of his own Gau, the general attitude and 
outlook of the German working class continued to be "taintieýd" 
by traditional class thinking-, After the heavy attack on 
Frankfurt on 29 January 1944, for instance, ordinary working 
people felt bitter that the radio and press should show so 
little concern for the working-class districts of the city 
which had borne the brunt of the raid and sustained the heaviest 
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casualties and the severest damage. The view was being 
expressed: 
"If the West End - the district in which the 
former upper class lives - had been bombed, 
this would most certainly have been given 
more attention. " 
156 
Although the FUhrer's promise of "final victory" was doubted 
by working and middle-class people alike in Frankfurt, the 
former, in particular, were said to regard the entire German 
press, as a result of the heavy bombing, as "falsehood and 
deceit". 157 A similar phenomenon was to be observed between 
the rural "upper" and "lower" classes in the question of ' 
providing, lodgings for town evacuees. The small peasant farmers 
thought that they "were making great sacrifices whilst the 
large landowners (Herrschaften)were attempting to dodge doing 
their duty". 
158 
Without doubt the greatest contradiction to the propaganda 
image of one united "German People's Community" were the 
misunderstandings, tension and outright hostility arising 
between the evacuees from the towns and their country hosts. 
In fact, thi's town/country division split the nation right 
down the middle and proved even more threatening than the 
traditional class animosities described above. The Allied 
bombing brought two contrasting "worlds" into contact for the 
very first time. Difficulties were inevitable. The city 
inhabitants billeted on unwilling farmers found it impossible 
to adjust to a form of life they were not acquainted with. 
This was no purely German problem and similar difficulties arose 
in Great Britain too. In wartime Germany, friction seems to 
have been strongest between female evacuees and farmerst wives. 
The Regierungsprasident of Vdrzburg described the annoyance 
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and bitterness of the farming families in his area at the 
laziness and idleness of evacuees from the Rhineland: 
"Only a few feel obliged to help the hard-tried 
farmers# wives at this time when there is so 
much to be done. The following is a typical 
day in the life of the evacuees - getting up 
late, spending the day doing nothing, going to 
the cinema, spending the evenings in the 
restaurants, turning the night into day and 
leading a loose life. , 
159 
This tension, if unchecked, would do much to undo the Nazi 
propagandists' carefully constructed picture of national 
harmony and unity. Evacuees were repeatedly requested'not to 
harp on about what they had gone through and to give a helping 
hand with housework. They should try to appreciate the 
predicament of their -rural hosts: 
"The day's work of many of these peasant women 
has been long and hard, and now unexpected guests 
are sent to them. It is not surprising that, in 
spite of all their sympathy, they look on this 
with misgiving. , 
160 
At the same time, the radio pleaded with the hosts to understand 
their "guests" who had had to put up with nightly alerts for 
months on end. They should try to avoid this topic in their 
161 
evening "sit-togethers". 
A great many of these town women seem to have found 
evacuee life so unbearable that they contemplated returning to 
their bomb shattered and raid threatened cities as a more 
agreeable prospect to living on the land. 
162 In fact, returning 
evacuees were soon to become a nuisance to town authorities. 
They were often refused ration-cards as a means of persuading 
- 179 - 
them to return to their country billets. In Witten, a small 
town near Dortmund, this resulted in what were for Nazi Germany 
almost unbelievable scenes. On 11 October 1943,300 women 
demonstrated in front of the Town Hall. 
"There were such-shameful scenes that the town 
administration of Witten was forced to call in 
the police to restore order. They refused, 
however, to intervene, claiming that the women's 
demands were justified and that the order for- 
bidding the issue of ration cards to returning 
Volksgenossen had no basis in law. " 
163 
D. THE EFFECT OF BOMBING ON THE GERMAN POPULATION'S ATTITUDE 
TO THE ENEMY AND TO ITS OWN LEADERSHIP 
If Goebbels' propaganda were to be successful, it was vital 
to direct the aggressive response of the German population to 
Allied bombing at the enemy himself. In no case, should bombing 
be allowed to damage the prestige of the political leadership. 
All bombing propaganda was therefore designed to arouse and 
deepen hatred of the foe by pointing to Anglo-American barbarity 
and depravity. The significance of the aggressive feelings 
unleashed by bombing has been stressed by Janis: 
"If aggressive responses are directed toward 
community leaders or toward fellow citizens, 
there is likely to be a serious impairment in 
group morale. However, such aggression directed 
toward outsiders, notably the enemy, may improve 
group morale. " 
164 
Before dealing with the impact of Goebbel's propaganda 
efforts in this respect, it is first necessary to mention yet 
again the rather vexing discussion on the effects of bombing 
--on civilian morale. The US Bombing Survey found belief in the 
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leadership's interest in the plight of the civilian population 
less prevalent in lightly bombed than unbombed towns, but, on 
the other hand, greater in heavily bombed than more lightly 
bombed towns. Although resentment of the leadership was 
stimulated by light bombing, research seemed to show that 
apathy, preoccupation with personal matters, as well as a 
reduced interest in political questions, resulted as the raids 
were stepped up. 
165 This appeared to suggest that "heavy 
bombing may raise morale, not by making people active and 
enthusiastic in their support of the war, but by making them 
apathetic and hence less active in their criticism of and 
opposition to the war effort". All thoughts now revolved around 
the immediate problem of survival. 
166* 
The Bombing Survey makes 
much of the fact that the lower classes showed a "consistently 
lower morale", 
167 
whilst the true Nazis - i. e. those with a 
vested interest in German victory - had the best morale. 
168 
Good morale in 1943-5 naturally meant not only support of the 
National Socialist cause but also hatred of the nation's 
enemies, hate being the cement uniting the German people in its 
common purpose. According to the majority of French prisoners 
interviewed by American researchers after the war, Goebbels' 
"hate" propaganda was a great success, particularly when the 
raids grew heavier. They also thought that following severe 
bombing the population was more hostile to enemy fliers than 
to its own government. 
169 
Steinert, on the other hand, believes 
that, although it would be hazardous to exaggerate the 
significance of heated remarks uttered in the aftermath of 
enemy attack, there was, nevertheless, a link between bombing 
and the popularity of slogans ascribing Hitler and the NSDAP 
the guilt for all the unpleasant things that were happening* 
170 
Drdge, too, is of the opinion that the Allied raids led to a 
more critical appraisal of the leadership, as well as to an 
increase in resignation and war-weariness. He maintainst however, 
- 181 - 
that the raids could not completely break morale and that a 
mood of "desperate rage" arose which would explain the success 
of the retaliation propaganda, 
171 
The fundamental wickedness and viciousness of the western 
enemies provided the pillars on which the entire bombing 
propaganda rested. Everything depended on trust in the strength 
of these pillars. The German people must learn to hate! The 
devastation of its dwellings and the desecration of its shrines 
was the visible proof of the enemy's destructive will and should 
serve as a warning to those souls faintly contemplating future 
collaboration with the foe in a defeated Germany. Nothing was 
allowed to disturb or even distract from this unified picture 
of enemy savagery. The press was expressly instructed not to 
print any criticism of'the bombing campaign by such leading 
and respected British dignitaries as the Bishop of Chichester, 
172 
The object of Goebbels' propaganda was immediately recognised 
by the staff of American propaganda content analysts: 
"Once more Goebbels utilizes an unfavourable 
situation to direct feelings undesirable from 
the point of morale into channels useful for 
the war effort. Fear, dismay and despair are 
converted into hatred, spite and urge for action. " 
173 
To infuse the right feeling of justified outrage and hatred 
into German hearts, it was essential to demonstrate that it was 
the British who had invented this dastardly and, moreoverv 
cowardly form of warfare against defenceless women and children. 
According to Fritzsche: 
"It is historic truth that the British, by 
their air-raids against the children of Hamburg 
and Freiburg in 1940, started methodsv the 
consequences of which were for some months the 
subject of grave warnings by the Fiffirer. When 
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six months had passed, England and her towns 
received the answer. " 
174 
Listeners were also told that, whereas the Luftwaffe , 
accurately 
bombed exclusively military targetsq the enemy bombers raided 
indiscriminately and mainly hit residential areas. 
175 
The response was far from being satisfactory. As with the 
anti-Bolshevik compaign shortly before, there was very little 
interest indeed for such theoretical themes. Even those who 
were convinced of the veracity of propaganda claims believed 
that an attempt to unravel the guilt question could do absolutely 
nothing to stop the raids and was most certainly no replacement 
for the necessity of hitting back in force. 
176 Many remained 
altogether deaf to the arguments of the propagandists. In May 
1944, the enemy was reported to be having "a certain success" 
in persuading the German people that it was they who had begun 
the "terror bombing" and that the attacks on German cities were 
it an answer to our raids on London". 
177 In fact, the conviction 
that the German leadership was responsible not only for starting 
bombing of civilian targets but for starting the war as a whole 
grew greater and greater the more intense the raids became. 
According to one report, the view was being expressed in many 
air-raid bunkers that "Germany was to a certain degree to blame 
for the outbreak of the war in 1939 and that the Reich itself 
was therefore to a large extent responsible for the trials and 
tribulations the war brought". 
178 This view seems to have been 
sufficiently widespread to have merited a veiled mention in the 
Nazi press, thereby admitting the limitations of the propaganda. 
On 4 June 1944, for instance, Frankfurt's Rhein-Mainische Zeitung 
criticised those who "think they must preserve a dignified, noble, 
super-impartial reserve which may even go as far as to agree 
that, if the Germans had not replied to the first British attacksy 
the p resent state of affairs could have been avoided". 
179 
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Finally, in Brunswick and Halle 
the Nazi leadership'that was to 
befalling Germany, as the raids 
Party's persecution of the Jews 
temples". 
180 
it was being said that it was 
blame for the whole tragedy 
were the enemy's answer to the 
and "the destruction of their 
, 
Goebbels attempted to demonstrate the fundamentally 
barbaric and philistine nature of the enemy by giving 
considerable coverage to the destruction of German cultural 
monuments. This reached a peak in the high summer of. 1943 when 
the entire raid propaganda output was dominated for days by 
accounts of the damage inflicted by the-enemy air-force to 
Cologne Cathedral. Radio reporters were sent at short notice 
to the Dom to describe in pitiful and tearful accounts the 
ravaging of one of Christendom's most magnificent edifices. 
Germany once again became the bastion of western and Christian 
values in a world otherwise characterised by brutal and 
ignorant materialism. The reaction to this propaganda 
spectacular was a very interesting one. The vast majority 
evidently rejected this propaganda excess, which was interpreted 
as a not so clever attempt to cover-up the military leadership's 
inability to hit the enemy back in kind. 
181 Many saw in it a 
deliberate move to distract attention away from the "loss of 
thousands of innocent civilians".. as well as "the destruction 
of entire towns". 
182 In Cologrnitself the citizens demanded 
that the rest of the Reich be informed of the actual suffering 
of the west both in word and picture". It was not enough just 
to show pictures of the damaged cathedral in the newsreel. The 
streets ought to, be-shown, too. 
183 Here and there sheer 
amazement was expressed that "in spite of the negative attitude 
of National Socialism to the Catholic Church, such great 
attention was now being given to the damage to a cathedral". 
More pious citizens considered it to be "God's punishment for 
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the war 11 . 
184 
The repetitious nature of these radio reports 
reminded many listeners of the excesses of the Katyn propaganda 
only shortly before. One Rhineland farm-labourer was heard to 
say: 
"Now for the last fourteen days we have been 
hearing nothing except Cologne Cathedral on 
the radio. It's the same record as Katyn- , 
185 
Propaganda stress on cultural losses continued to be a subject 
of annoyance in the months that followed. After a heavy raid 
on Frankfurt-on-Main early in 1944, for instance, the bombed-out 
felt indignant at being. considered less important than the 
186 historical buildings of the city's Altstadt. 
It should be stressed once again that the whole bombing 
propaganda had the main purpose of stirring up feelings which 
could be utilised in a controlled way as a unifying factor in 
improving group morale. Hate should forge an identity of 
purpose between government and governed. Success would naturally 
be determined by the extent the German leadership managed to 
deflect the aggressive response to bombing away from itself and 
onto the enemy. This question deserves close examination. 
Unfortunately, the observations of witnesses and official 
reports provide a rather confusing and, at times, rather 
contradictory picture. 
From a study of citizens' letters written after a series 
of heavy attacks on Stuttgart in July 1944, Heinz Bardua 
concludes "that the resistance-will of the population was rather 
strengthened through fear of the ruthlessness and harshness of 
the enemy". 
187 
He even asserts that Nazi propaganda was able to 
assist in this "stiffening of the resistance-will". 
188 
A 
correspondent of a Swiss newspaper travelling through southern 
Germany in spring 1944 reported: 
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"Whereas previously the phantom of Bolshevism 
directed attention to Russia to a great extent, 
the intensified air offensive of the English and 
Americans has unleashed a wave of hate against 
these states such as is also being expressed in 
the German press. Sympathies for Englandt which 
still survived here and there, are disappearing 
rapidly. " 
189 
1 
But what was the exact meaning of hatred of the enemy? Did it 
mean hatred of the RAF, hatred of the British political 
leadership or hatred of the British people in its entirety? 
An SD report drawn up in February 1944 attempted to unravel 
this difficult question. After'noting"that there was still a 
tendency for some German citizens to be "objective" and fair to 
the opponent, it stated that it was only comparatively recently 
that a true feeling of hatred had arisen as a result of the air 
terror. This, moreover, varied according to class and area and 
was said to be strongest among those most directly affected. 
But, this hatred, which was being uttered so articulately, was 
to be viewed more as an expression of the belief and hope that 
the destruction of Great Britain was the only way of rescuing 
the Reich. The same report then tried to determine who exactly 
the target of this hatred was. It concluded that the very real 
emotional hate was principally directed at the "air gangsters" 
themselves and at the enemy leaders, although there were still 
some who held Churchill in esteem. Then came the telling remark: 
"It is not possible to speak of a hatred of the 
British people as a whole. " 
The so-called "intelligentsia" was reported as harbouring hardly 
any rancour whatsoever. In addition, those who belonged to the 
older generation of German men and who had been British 
prisoneng. -of-waro in the Great War sp6ke of British humanity 
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which automatically upset the propaganda image of a cruel and 
brutal foe. They were supported in their views by German 
soldiers just returning from enemy imprisonment as a result 
of the exchange scheme. 11nally, the very important 
observation was made that the sense of outrage and abhorrence 
created by individual raids quickly faded and was "overlapped 
by a feeling of the inescapable and fateful necessity of this 
war which is causing unspeakable misery everywhere in the 
world". 
190 
In Berlin, too, few outbursts of heart-felt hatred 
of the British were recorded. 
191 
This would seem to confirm 
the theory that heavy bombing leads to increasing apathy which 
rules out any lasting strongly-felt feelings. The war itself 
was simply to blame for all misfortune. The observations made 
here are supported by a correspondent of the Swiss St. Galler 
Tagblatt who had had the opportunity of speaking to several 
Germans. Although there was little hatred felt for the British 
people as a whole, there was a general desire for retaliation, 
not as a means of pure revenge and punishment, but as it was 
the only means remaining of knocking out England as an enemy 
air base for launching raids on the Reich. 
192 
Naturally, this 
was also tied to hopes for a speedy end to the war. It is thus 
clear that the German population would measure the success of 
retaliation in terms of how far the immediate threat to their 
own lives was removed. 
There would seem little doubt that in wartime emotions 
become blunted. The population is incapable of real hate. 
Initial fiery outbursts of wrath soon give way to apathys to the 
feeling of being subject to the vagaries of fate. It should also 
be added that any explosion of hate was more often than not the 
product of the moment. Although many German citizens may have 
given vent to their feelings in primitive utterances of hate for 
the foe both during and immediately after the raids, it is 
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possible that they behaved quite differently twenty-four hours 
later when faced with the job of clearing up or seeking a new 
home. They would then find little time for detailed and 
considered thought. 
Many reports indicate quite clearly that the Allied 
bombing had an overall deleterious effect on the population's 
attitude to the Party. As early as July 1943, American 
analysts detected a growing animosity towards the lower Nazi 
functionaries who were held responsible for inadequate provision 
of shelter and emergency accommodation. 
193 The SD reported that 
the widespread apathy was often accompanied by a hostile 
attitude to the NSDAP in Ddsseldorf and. Wuppertal-Barmen which 
were both the target of heavy attack in the early summer of 
1943. Although Haltung was said to be generally good, remarks 
against State, Party and leadership were recorded. 
"Negative utterances are often made by Volks- 
genossen who, as a result of the catastrophes 
have lost their nerve and let themselves be 
drawn into making subversive remarks .... Very 
striking is also the fact that the German 
Greeting /-Heil Hitler7 is only seldom used in 
the towns hit whilst the greeting Guten Morgen 
is used quite ostenstatiously. -Of the 51 people 
a Party member greeted with Heil Hitler, for 
instance, on the day after the heavy attack on 
Barmen, only two replied with Heil Hitler. ' 
194 
Many of the bombed out in Cologne and Aachen were reported as 
having lost hope in a good end to the war. Although outright 
hostile statements against State and Party were said to be 
comparatively rare, they were,. nevertheless, being made "in 
1,95 public without the least fear'%ý, ý An open refusal of the Party 
leadership was reported in several districts of devastated 
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Hamburg. The population was enraged and embittered by the 
local Party organisation publishing pamphlets declaring that 
heavy retaliation raids against London were in progress. The 
inhabitants knew that not one word of this was true and detested 
being treated as gullible. fools. 
196 In, Hamm hostile and 
defeatist remarks were so plentiful "that policemen on duty in 
public air-raid bunkers had to pretend not to hear what was being 
said if they wished to avoid'having to make mass arrests". 
197 
Very often, however, such utterances seem to have been little 
more than spontaneous outbursts of anger, echoing the necessity 
for finding a target for pent-up aggression. For example, 
immediately after the raid on Berlin on 15 February 1944, 
complaints were made that "leading persons" were responsible 
for starting the war. By the morning, however, the SD reported 
that the population had become more "sensible". 
198 
Nevertheless, 
there remains little doubt that there was a very real connection 
between heavy bombing and hostility to the Nazi Party, 
particularly at a local level. A report from Halle written at 
the end of 1944 admitted:. 
"With every new air-raid, criticism of the 
leadership takes on a sharper form. " 
199 
According to a report written by a Party official, von 
Kielpinski, towards the end of the war, the German people had 
felt watched since 1933 and had ventured to complain only to 
those they trusted. 
"It was first the heavy air-raids which caused 
the anger that had been gathering up inside them 
to burst out in a rough and sometimes venemous 
form. " 200 
Rumours were also in circulation in the raided towns which 
put the local Party leadership in a very unfavourable light. 
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For instance, as a security precaution an air-raid warning was 
supposed to have sounded when Goebbels visited the cities of 
the Rhineland. Such imaginative accounts were further 
exaggerated as they were passed on. The Gestapo was virtually 
powerless to prevent this happening "for these accounts are 
swallowed most readily in all groups of the population and 
are very rarely reported at once to the authorities ". 
201 
Local political leaders were a favourite target and were said 
to seek--! §afety from the endangered towns immediately dusk fell. 
"Two special trains are at the ready on the 
Starnberger See every evening to bring the 
senior Munich Party bosses to safety should 
there be an alarm. " 
202 
Indeed, anti-Party remarks took on a very personal form in the 
last two years of the war. Gauleiter Sprenger of Frankfurt-on- 
Main was the object of repeated sarcastic criticism. 
203 After 
a devastating raid on Nuremberg at the beginning of 1945, the 
whole bitterness of the city's inhabitants was directed at its 
Gauleiter, Holz. 204 
Repeated attempts by the propaganda to counter this trend 
by showing how the representatives of the Party Were making 
every sacrifice possible to alleviate hardship did not enjoy 
much success. 
205 An article in the Frankfurt press, entitled 
"In the Control Room of the Resistance-Will - the Emergency 
Measures of the Party to Relieve the Most Urgent Cases of 
206 Distress" was dismissed as "typically Party" . The title 
alone was probably sufficient to evoke a highly critical 
appraisal of the content! Another article written by Gauleiter 
Sprenger himself a few weeks later with the flaunting title 
"Front-Line City Frankfurt Will Be Held" was the object of 
savage scorn. Not only was it seen as an open challenge to the 
-enemy-to launch new attacks on the city, but as an unparallelled 
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example of hypocrisy. 
"The Gauleiter has already evacuated his wife 
to the country some time ago, his daughter is 
in Sweden and now he, too, has moved his 
residence outside the city, so it would be nice 
to know what he really wants to hold in Frankfurt.,, 
207 
It thus comes as no surprise that another feature appearing 
in the Frankfurt press entitled "The Gauleiter, the First and 
Best Comrade of the Population" was rejected outright* 
208 
E. BOMBING AND THE ATTITUDE TO THE OFFICIAL PROPAGANDA MEDIA 
The enemy raids were themselves an information source. They 
provided direct evidence of enemy power and became the criterion 
for judging the authenticity of official propaganda claims. 
The people affected by these attacks were witnesses of what they 
considered to be important war developments and regarded them- 
selves as "experts" when judging the course of the war as a 
whole. Their general attitude to the official news media was 
naturally determined to a very great extent by what they had 
experienced and seen with their very own eyes. There can be 
little doubt that the prestige of the Nazi press and radio 
suffered irreparable harm as a consequence of these nightly 
displays of Allied strength in the skies of Germany. A report 
of the Frankfurt SD written after the heavy raid of 29 January 
1944, for instance, summarised the attitude of broad sections 
of the community to official propaganda in the words "falsehood 
and deceit" . 
20 9 
By giving such formidablep if unbeckoned, clues 
to enemy might, the raids made the task of the German 
propagandists doubly difficult. As a report of May 1944 
emphasized: 
"The actual effects of the air raids, with which 
the people of Berlin and other cities become 
- 191 - 
acquainted time and time again, have a much 
greater influence than all the comments of 
press and radio. " 
210 
The raids also altered listening habits quite drastically. 
Although there was a growing tendency to keep the set on, there 
was a dimihished interest in what was being broadcast. For 
many people the radio had become principally a "warning device". 
In Frankfurt, for example, the citizens kept their radio 
-receivers tuned in "in order to make at once the necessary 
preparations for a possible air-raid alarm once the 
Reichssender Frankfurt had gone off the air". 
211 
F. BOMBING AND THE ATTITUDE TO UNOFFICIAL INFORMATION SOURCES 
For the bombed as well as those threatened by bombing there 
was a great thirst for information about anything that was even 
vaguely connected with the question that interested them most. 
News about the air-raids was regarded as touching on the matter 
of everyday survival. From observations described above it is 
clear that the official German mass-media, despite at times 
extensive treatment of the air war theme, were unable to 
satisfy, let alone saturate, this news hunger. So once again 
countless Germans turned elsewhere. 
1ackListeni_ of 
All over the Reich the Allied bombing offensive appears 
to have accelerated the trend of tuning in to forbidden foreign 
radio stations. The SD in Linz, for instance, squarely put 
the blame for the increase in "black listening" on the 
propagandists' insufficient treatment of the raids: 
"People want to hear more than they are told 
in the Wehrmachtbericht, especially about the 
areas attacked. They cannot wait to hear details 
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about where the planes were, particularly 
in the case of attacks in their immediate 
vicinity. The insufficient reports are one 
of the prime reasons for the steady increase 
in listening to enemy stations. " 
212 
SD Halle also pointed to this danger after the "dam-buster" raid 
of May 1943. The population found it incomprehensible why the 
press published no details when it was no problem to find out 
from the telephone or traffic stoppages which dams were affected. 
The report expressed the anxiety that 
"Owing to the failure to publish information 
many Volksgenossen will be easily misled into 
,, 213 listening into foreign stations . 
(ii) umours 
The mood of uncertainty accompanying the Anglo-American 
raids certainly increased the number of rumours in circulation 
as well as the disposition to believe in their content. Drdge 
refers to the insecurity resulting from raids, expressed in 
exaggerated accounts of destruction and casualtiesp as early as 
1940.214 He traces these wartime rumours back to "the 
discrepancy between the need for news caused by the threat to 
215 
vital interests and the news supplied" . He maintains that 
their significance and credibility rose as the enemy air 
offensive was intensified. 
"Whereas, at the beginning, apparently extensive 
air-raid reporting was still able to reduce 
the number of rumours with a few substantial 
pieces of news - even when they were untrue 
this was no longer possible from 1942 on. Now, 
the rumour regularly got the better of the press 
in the struggle for the reputation for 
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trustworthiness. There. can be no doubt 
that the discovery of the latter's 
dishonesty influenced the recipient's 
attitude to other sectors of reporting. , 
216 
The power of the rumour and its ability to affect 
behaviour is documented in the panic which gripped Berlin in 
the fortnight following the Hamburg catastrophe. Throughout 
this period rumours were constantly circulating that a certain 
town would be bombed on a certain day. 
217 This, of course, made 
the population even more nervous. The sparse information over 
casualty figures resulted in wild exaggerations. The raid on 
the Ruhr dams in May 1943, for examplet was said to have killed 
between ten and thirty thousand people. When official figures 
were finally released, these were more often than not mis- 
trusted. 
218 
In fact, in April 1943, the SD drew attention to 
this regrettable tendency of preferring to trust the casualty 
figures contained in the rumours than the official ones. 
219 
Such rumours spread quickly and even unnerved south-west 
Germany which was still comparatively untouched by bombing in 
the summer of 1943.220 According to another report appearing at 
about the same time, inflated rumours on the effects of raids 
and the casualties sustained were carrying fear of the enemy 
bomber to the remotest village. 
221 
For the German press it-was a-question of prime urgency 
to warn against rumours which were often blowing up casualty 
totals into five figures. 222 The Strassburger Neueste 
Nachrichten, for example, warned that the figures given in 
rumours were "exaggerated manifold and, indeed, appear to rise 
223 
rapidly with distance from the scene of the calamity. " 
(iii)Evacuees 
The evacuees from the raided towns were a very important 
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source of information. In questions of bombing they were 
considered "experts" and as such they were sure to find a ready 
ear. Their individual accounts were generalised by the country 
hosts and passed on as being typical of the behaviour of entire 
towns under enemy bombardment. 
224 
All sorts of depressing 
stories were passed on in this way causing alarm and despondency. 
Consequently, many lost heart and became convinced that the war 
could not be won. The fear that arose in the summer of 1943 
that, once the west had been dealt with, it would be the turn 
of the rest of the Reich to be systematically destroyed, can in 
great measure be traced back to these bringers of bad tidings. 
225 
Of course, the reputation of this information source was only 
enhanced by what was almost universally considered propaganda 
reticence in regard to the air war. A report from the small 
Rhineland country town, Simmern, lamented: 
"These people often think themselves entitled 
to give a judgement on the political'situation 
of the war and talk about matters which other 
Volkgenossen would never venture to talk about. 
Only a very few of them use or reply to the 
greeting Heil Hitler. " 
226 
The tales of these bomb-evacuees were said to be having a 
catastrophic effect on morale. 
227 
Refugees from Hamburg billeted 
on the south German town of WUrzburg spoke of a half a million 
dead in the Hansa city. 
228 
In the Schwerin area of Mecklenburg 
evacuees were reported to be seriously worsening the morale of 
the rural population, whose belief in victory had up to then 
been unshakable. Now, as a result of what they heard, they, 
too, were beginning to harbour their first doubts as to the 
feasibility of a satisfactory end to the war. 
229 
Nevertheless, 
it should be remembered that it would have been very easy for 
a local Party official to blame these outsiders for the bad 
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show of morale in his district. 
, These evacuees seem to have been instrumental in changing 
the attitude of the country population to the official mass 
media. In Franconia a contradiction was noted between the 
accounts of evacuees billeted in the region and those of the 
official propaganda. 
230 
Similarly, it was reported from Bamberg: 
"The often despairing mood of those immediately 
affected by bombing has little in common with 
the press accounts of the bearing of the 
population in the areas attacked. " 
231 
In Swabia, too, the descriptions of the evacuees led to doubts 
being cast on the veracity of official reporting. 
"It cannot be prevented that, once the idea 
gains ground that 'if one thing is not truey 
then the other can't be true either'p even the 
objectivity of the Wehrmachtsbericht is doubted. " 
232 
In other words, attitude to official bombing propaganda was a 
vital factor in determining attitude to the official propaganda 
media as a whole. 
The press and radio did their very best to check this 
menacing undermining of their authority. The population was 
warned not to accept "eye-witness" accounts of the bombing raids 
at face value, for the evacuees had themselves been victims of 
exaggerated rumours. 
"Anyone who understands the psychological 
effect of great mental strain will understand 
that many people are inclined to believe things 
which they would consider absurd at any other 
time. " 
233 
Farmers' wives were requested to avoid the topic of bombing 
at all times: 
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"My dear farmer's wife, when you spend a cosy 
hour with your evacuee in the evening, don't 
let her tell you about her hardships before 
she left for the country. It is natural that 
she should tell them to get rid of them. But 
the more you talk about these things, the worse 
they seem to be and the less we can get away 
from them. " 
234 
G. THE COMPARATIVE IMPORTANCE OF BOMBING AND MILITARY 
DEVELOPMENTS AS FACTORS DETERMINING MORALE 
In the two years 1943-5 the street itself became the principal 
battlefield for many German civilians. Faced with the task of 
survival, there was naturally little time to pay any great 
attention to the course of the war in general. Steinert, for 
example, claims that there was only minimal interest in events 
not directly relevant to theweryday life of the individual. 
"The broad mass of the population, weighed 
down by the misery of everyday life and the 
growing fear for their own lives, was hardly 
conscious of anything that was happening outside 
the sphere of their immediate professional and 
family life. The target of their criticism was, 
above all, what they could observe with their 
own eyes and what they felt to be unjust or 
scandalous. " /e. g. the life of the Party bigwig. ý7/ 
This would once again help to explain why so few Germans gave 
any thought to the fate of the Jews, who had always beený 
regarded as "outsiders". 
235 
The observations made here regarding 
the thoughts and concerns of civilians under enemy bombardment 
are confirmed by the U. S. Bombing Survey: 
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"Under conditions of severe raids their 
thoughts centred on the immediate personal 
problems of fox-hole existence. They did not 
think about or concern themselves with the 
larger political problems of war aims, of the 
conduct of the war by their leaders or whether 
surrender should be conditional or un- 
conditional. " 
236 
It was even noted that there was very little concern shown for 
raids on other towns or even, as in Berlin, on other parts of 
the same city 
? 37 ', Nevertheless, according to evidence given the 
compilers of these reports by French P. O. W. s: 
"As a demoralizing factor Allied strategic 
bombing appears to rank second to the 
dismal spectacle of retreats and losses on 
the Russian front since Stalingrad .... The fear, 
then, of eventual Russian reprisal was also 
238 
greater than the fear of continued bombing. " 
This, at first sight, would appear to contradict the 
observations made above. It would therefore be worth examining 
in detail the comparative importance of Allied bombing and 
military setbacks as factors determining civilian morale in 
Germany from the beginning of 1943 up to the end of the war. 
As early as March 1943, such favourable news as the 
recaptureof Kharkov and the success of German U-boats in the 
Battle of the Atlantic was being impaired by the constant fear 
239 
of air attack. , Shortly after, a Swiss newspaper correspondent 
observed how the sudden surge in enemy air attack was over- 
240 1 shadowing the German defeat in Rmisia. Even when Germany s 
military crisis reached a new height in the summer of 1943 with 
I the complete loss of North Africal the Allied landing in 
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southern Italy and the fall of the Duce, the "greater part" of 
the population tried to forget the frightening reality with a 
"flight into work". 
241 
Since the press and radio were unable to 
answer the question uppermost in people's minds - the future 
development of the war - official accounts of the military 
situation were as good as ignored. It was sufficient to inform 
oneself briefly of the day's events. There was, however, one 
significant exception: 
"Only news reporting on the air war is able to 
arouse any really great interest. The question 
whether the raids have taken place at night or 
by day, which towns have been hitv whether the 
raids have been heavy or light and how many air- 
craft have been shot down, also occupies the 
minds of the women who otherwise, as a consequence 
of their everyday worries, show hardly any 
interest in the newspapers, radio talks and 242 
other accounts of political and military events. " 
Even from Saxony, hitherto untouched by enemy raiding, it was 
reported in July 1943 that the OKW-Bericht was heard only for 
news of the latest bombing attacks. There was very little 
interest in events on the Eastern Front and, indeed, in 
military developments as a whole. 
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In the Schwerin area, the 
terrible raids of July-August 1943 on Hamburg put into the 
background all the decisive military and political events 
244 - occurring at the time. And in Hamburg itself, even news of 
Italy's "treason", which had such a devastating effect on 
morale elsewhere, was received with indifference. According to 
the Generalstaatsanwalt of the city: 
"For the time being, the readiness, indeed the 
elan, necessary for an open interest and 
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criticism of the events of the day is still 
11245 lacking. 
In Koblenz, not only were the raids said to overshadow everything 
else, but many people were heard to say: 
"That is the beginning of a lost war. 11246 
The following December, the SD reported that Berliners were 
showing little interest for anything not concerned with enemy 247 
bombing. 
This all-consuming preoccupation with air-raids was 
expressed in the irritation which accompanied any attempt to 
give prominence to events of clearly marginal importance for 
the outcome of the war. After making a great fuss about an 
exchange of telegrams between the Fiffirer and the Duce in May 
1944, the press was reprimanded for having made a blunder "which 
should have been avoided at all costs, because it demonstrates 
a kind of ivory-towered approach by the press to the real 
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anxieties of the people" . 
There was even a tendency to find a connection between 
enemy raids and purely local events. In Frankfurt-in-Main, 
for instance, the heavy bombing attack of 29 January 1944 was 
interpreted as being the British reply to the Gauleiter's much 
publicised announcement of a mass rally to be held on 30 249 
January. 
It seems to have been less the tragic loss in human life and 
, the damage caused that was responsible for depressing morale to 
such an extent "than the widespread belief that it was 
impossible to check the bombing terror effectively". 
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Attitude 
to the air war was itself of prime importance in determining 
the view of the overall war situation. This is exemplified in 
an SD report written in October 1943 which dealt with popular 
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attitudes to the position on the Eastern Front: 
"As far as the question whether the Dnieper 
Line can be held is concerned, the population 
of the areas hit by the latest air-raids is 
much more inclined to doubt than the 
Volksgenossen living in areas not endangered. " 
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Similarly, in Siegen the launching of the Rundstedt offensive 
in December 1944 was welcomed much less enthusiastically than 
elsewhere, a direct consequence of the savage raids the city 
had had to-bear a few days before. News of the German attack 
in the West was even viewed there as a cheap form of propaganda 
"with the purpose of raising morale" 
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further proof of the 
highly subjective interpretation of war events so typical of 
the time. The evidence provided by these reports certainly 
seems to confirm the following conclusion drawn by American 
propaganda analysts: 
"The widespread feeling 9f hopelessness 
/caused by bombina/ seems accompanied by 
a tendency towards diffusing it to war 
prospects in general. " 
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At the time, this was deduced from German propaganda's stress 
on the fact that there was absolutely no connection between the 
air war and the rest of the war, which amounted, in fact, to 
a confession of the Reich's weakness as well as its obvious 
inability to reach a military decision on the field of battle. 
An SD report of August 1943 illustrates how the intensification 
of enemy raiding in the spring and summer of 1943 marked a 
watershed in the history of wartime German civilian morale: 
"After Stalingrad it was still possible to move 
the stirred masses into accepting decisions 
for averting the disaster visible on the horizon 
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by making more energetic efforts. Their hearts 
were suddenly again made accessible to 
propaganda influence. However, since the air 
war began to threaten the urban population with 
immediate destruction, since every citizen and 
worker began to see himself faced with apparently 
insurmountable anxiety as to his livelihood as 
well as with the struggle for his property and 
for his bare life, a hitherto unknown need has 
been roused in everyone to think for himself 
about what is happening. This is expressed in 
the insistent asking of the question 'why' and, 
above all, in a thirst for political answers 
which are more than stirring words and slogans 
and which are fit to safeguard the threatened or 
already destroyed way of life anew and to assuage 
the spreading fear of life itself. " 
254 
Only when military events themselves appeared to constitute 
a direct threat to the individual's existence did they become 
as important or even more important than bombing as factors 
determining the state of civilian morale. The degree to which 
they affected the immediate life of the individual German and 
his family was the criterion which was used to measure the 
subjective significance of external events. The German people 
appears to have become more conscious of the importance of 
military developments in the spring of 1944. The SD office 
in Koblenz reported in April: 
"The population views militar'y events on the 
southern sector of the Eastern Front spell- 
bound and with considerable alarm. As a 
consequence of developments in this fighting 
zone, even the air terror has become less 
important in influencing mood. " 
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Above all, it was feared that the loss of the Rumanian oil 
255 
fields might prove fatal to the nation's war effort. As 
Germany's foes crossed the frontiers of the Reich, the danger 
posed by the military situation, of course, came to be felt 
much more acutely. In November, it was reported that the noise 
of battle in neighbouring Lorraine was unnerving the inhabitants 
of Mannheim even more than "the fear of enemy aircraft". 
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The 
raids on Regensburg and Nuremberg at the beginning of 1945 were 
also said to be overshadowed by the inhabitants' anxieties 
regarding the speedy advance of the Red Army in the East and 
the crossing of the German frontiers. 
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It would, however, be 
wrong to draw the conclusion that the raids were now of much less 
importance as a factor governing morale. The opposite was the 
case, as has been explained earlier in this chapter. Military 
developments and enemy air-raids were now seen as two sides of 
the same coin. A report from Berlin at the beginning of March 
stating that the capital's inhabitants were more concerned 
about the nightly mosquito attacks than the danger lurking only 
fifty miles away on the Oder 
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need not be viewed as a 
contradiction to the observations described above. Both bombing 
and events at the front were integral parts of the very same 
picture of unmitigated defeat. The latter, although feared in 
eastern Germany, promised a quick end to the ubiquitous danger 
from the skies above;, Goebbels certainly blamed bombing for the 
bad-show of morale in the West. After having received an account 
on the crumbling of the morale of both soldiers and civilians 
from Gauleiter Wagner of Karlsruhe, the minister remarked in 
his diary on I April 1945: 
"The people living left of the Rhine have shown 
a very poor political bearing indeed. They 
have been demoralized by the incessant enemy 
bombing raids and are now throwing themselves 
into the arms of the Americans, partly with 
enthusiasm but partly even without having a 
troubled conscience thereby.,, 
259 
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It would be a fair assessment of morale in Germany in 1945 
to say that in those areas that had or thought they had to 
reckon with Russian conquest, German retreat in the East was 
often viewed as posing a greater threat than that of Anglo- 
American bombing, whereas in the West enemy advances normally 
depressed morale much less than the continual air bombardment, 
The advance of the American and British forces was even 
welcomed by many as it meant a speedy end to the sleepless 
nights. Hence, the image of the enemy largely determined the 
relative, importance of bombing and military retreat as factors 
determining morale. Finally, the claim of the US Bombing Survey 
already described that bombing was of secondary significance 
compared with developments on the Eastern Front since 
Stalingrad must be viewed as insufficiently precise and too 
general. It was certainly true-in large parts of eastern and 
central Germany after the summer of 1944. Bombing, however, was 
of prime importance in these areas in the year that preceded 
that fateful summer and in the western parts of Germany until 
the'very end of the 'uur. 
H. CONCLUSION 
The bombing of Germany demonstrates the complexities involved 
Ck. 
in any analysis of such/subjective emotional phenomenon as 
hatred. Both the Nazi leadership and many post-war scholars 
made the mistake of trying to explain something inherently 
irrational in rational terms. They also became slave to the 
fixed idea that hatred is directed against only one target at 
any one time, i. e. the enemy or the German leadership. The 
very concept, hatred of the foe, remained vague and few 
attempts were made to explain what was really meant. Savage 
and biting remarks, even rage, were often little more than an 
expression of the German people's bitterness sparked off by 
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the frightening awareness of being at the mercy of a foe bent 
on destroying them. This would, perhapst account for the 
isolated cases of the lynching of captured Allied airmen. 
Research suggests, however, that the British and American 
peoples as a whole remained somehow distant despite the under- 
standable wish to pay the enemy back in kind. The petit local 
bureaucrats, unable to cope with such a catastrophe, soon 
became the target of constant irritation, annoyance and even 
outright hostility. They provided, in contrast to the British 
people, a tangible object for the aggressive emotions sparked 
off by bombing. The stricken population had considerably less 
interest in the matter of guilt or blame than the question of 
securing its own survival, livelihood and existence. The 
objects of its aggression and animosity were not clearly defined 
ano it was certainly not the either-or situation that Goebbels 
and many Allied morale experts presumed it to be. Nevertheless, 
there can be little doubt that bombing did irreparable harm to 
the image of the Nazi Party. The negative attitude was 
expressed in the general indifference, even schadenfreude, at 
the fate of Parteigenossen in the last days of the Third Reich. 
Although bombing led to an increasingly defeatist and 
pessimistic view of the war as a whole, it did not succeed in 
cracking morale by itself. The resistance will Of the west 
German population was broken by the fateful combination of 
military setback - the war crossing the German frontiers - and 
intensified, and virtually uninterrupted Allied bombing. 
Military events themselves were now viewed as promising a quick 
end to the nightmare struggle for survival. The writing was 
on the wall for Germany and the quicker it was all over the 
better. It would seem that the favourable image of the western 
enemies, as well as the hopes attached to Anglo-American 
occupation, were just as important as the bombing itself in 
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determining the morale of the west Germans at the end of the 
war. Naturally, for the vast majority of the region's 
population, an end to the war was primarily associated with an 
end to the air-raids. In, east Germany the situation was very 
different. Bombing had become a really serious probýem only 
in the last twelve months of the war, and, although it was 
characterised by some of the most savage, blows of the entire 
war (e. g. Dresden, -Chenmitz), the population had not been worn 
down to the same extent as in the west. In the Rhineland 
and'Ruhr, as well as in north-western Germany, bombing had been 
a feature of everyday life ever since the early days of 1940, 
and in those last frightful months of the war the inhabitants 
of these areas had no peace at all, day or night. Whereas in 
the west the prospect of Anglo-American occupation was not 
unattractive, in the east peace and surrender meant less an 
end to the raids but more the uncertainties of occupation by 
an enemy that had shown its thirst for revenge in East Prussia., 
Silesia, and Pomerania. This danger overshadowed the threat 
posed-by British or American bombs. The accounts of the 
refugees only served to strengthen the desire and will to hold 
out at all costs. 
Bombing certainly welded the population of a raided town 
together. Everyone was in the same boat. But the community 
spirit that arose had little in common with Goebbels' 
Volksgemeinschaft and, indeed, manifested itself in a clearly 
anti-Nazi form at the end of the war when the west German 
population opposed and even sabotaged any attempt by the 
Party or the Wehrmacht to defend its towns and villages. There 
were countless examples of the inhabitants acting en masse 
and removing tank barriers, for example. This upsurge in 
community spirit was evident at a local, not at a national 
level, as the animosity of many Rhinelanders for Berlin and the 
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tension between the evacuees and the country population 
show. It would even appear that town or village patriotism 
increased as nationalism decreased. With bombing drawing 
attention to immediate local problems, people's vision hardly 
stretched beyond the immediate locality. This would explain 
the relative indifference to raids on other towns. They were 
worrying only in as far as they demonstrated an imminent threat 
to their own community. People were conscious of the menace 
to the surroundings they knew so well and felt united in the 
wish to preserve them from destruction. In "more normal" times 
they might have been fascinated by ideas of a Greater Germany 
or even Lebens raum but now their very own and dearly loved 
streets and town were in danger. At the same time, however, 
the raids seem to have sharpened class consciousness yet 
further. Increasingly, workers viewed the "socialism" in 
National Socialism as a swindle and became convinced that the 
regime was primarily interested in furthering and protecting 
, the interests of the upper classes. 
It would really seem that within this overall framework 
Nazi propaganda was confronted with insurmountable difficulties 
and was hardly in the position to influence, let alone, to 
maintain morale. Its effect was a largely neutral one. Even 
the most energetic attempts to check the effects of the raids 
were generally met with indifference and, at times, with 
hostility. The propagandists were faced with developments they 
could not control. It was a running battle against a danger 
which was visibly growing from day to day until it finally came 
to dominate the lives of almost all German urban and rural 
citizens. The clearly understandableappetite for news was 
accompanied by an intense dislike of anything looking like 
official evasion of the issue uppermost in people's minds. 
The bombs spoke a-much louder message than all the microphones 
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of the Reichsrundfunk. Every attempt of the propagandists to 
overcome or at least neutralise the negative effects the bombs 
were having was doomed from the very beginning. The thirst for 
news was indeed unquenchable as experience showed. The 
propaganda "air terror" spectacular of summer 1943, for instance, 
was regarded as inadequate and, more seriously, as an official 
admission of German military weakness. The bombed towns and 
cities demanded attention, but when a good deal of attention 
was given, this was frequently interpreted as a pathetic 
confirmation of the crisis Germany was undergoing, as well as 
an insufferable additional strain on people's nerves! Goebbels 
moreover failed in his attempt to isolate the bombing raids 
from the rest of the war. The German civilian population was 
very quick to find a link between the raids and the course of 
the war as a whole. It was thought that the bombing attacks 
ý,! ere having a decisive effect on Germany's vital war industries 
and communications system, a more decisive effect than the 
facts warranted. The visible impression of bombing proved so 
strong that it was often extended to other sectors of the war 
and became the essential factor when judging German victory 
chances. 
Not only did the population become much more sensitive 
in its appraisal of the propaganda message but the propaganda 
itself, forced increasingly into a defensive position, became 
highly sensitive to popular mood and propaganda response. The 
smallest things were able'to upset the listening publics even 
the wrong choice in broadcast music. German people were quick 
to see the purpose behind the entire compensatory propaganda. 
This was often regarded as a very poor attempt to. distract 
their attention away from the daily horrors confronting them. 
Of course, the intense interest bombing aroused in any 
information concerning the air war made the population very 
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adept in spotting the purpose behind the propaganda message. 
Any assurance regarding such questions as rebuilding - at 
first appearance a subject that might be expected to interest 
them - was dismissed as irrelevant compared to the prime 
task of putting a stop to the enemy air offensive. The* 
German people did not want to hear assurances that the raids 
were of no importance whatsoever in deciding the outcome of the 
war but clear indications that the raids could be checked. 
Again, it is interesting to note that bombing propaganda, 
particularly the day-long emphasis on the damage to Cologne 
Cathedral, demonstrates the invalidity of Hitler's and 
Goebbels' belief in the effectiveness of repetition of a 
propaganda message. In fact, it only made the propaganda 
audience more conscious of the manipulative practices of Nazi 
propaganda. As a result, readers and listeners were put on 
their guard and shielded themselves against the propagandists' 
handiwork. Attitude to the air-war propaganda appears to have 
been an - in 1943-4 the - essential factor in determining 
at titude to the whole propaganda output and to have further 
undermined the reputation of the official German mass media. 
This, in turn, was connected with the growing propensity to 
rely on unofficial information sources to satisfy the appetite 
for news. 
The only really successful propaganda would have been a 
decisive military success in the air - the defeat of the RAF or, 
even better, an all-out retaliation which would destroy Britain 
or at least its capability to function as an aircraft-carrier 
for attacks on the European continent. The attempt to 
persuade the Germans that the latter was, indeed, possible 
is the subject of the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER 6 
RETALIATION 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In the last chapter it was pointed out that the German people 
wanted concrete proof that their leaders possessed the means 
to halt the enemy air onslaught and, what was more, to hit the 
enemy back in kind. The compensatory arguments described in 
detail there were inadequate to convince the Germans of the 
"insignificance" of enemy raiding in determining the outcome of 
the war. They knew all too well the terrible effects it was 
having and demanded tangible evidence that the leadership was 
still capable of turning the scales in the air war. The German 
leaders themselves realised that there was no way around this 
problem. If they were unable to conceal their inability to , 
strike an immediate blow at the heart of the foe, then all they 
could do was to promise all-out retaliation for some time in the 
future. They were encouraged by the development of new and 
revolutionary long-distance weapons at Peenemunde and supposed 
that these would be ready for employment by the end of 1943. 
Predictions of retaliation (Vergeltung), were nothing new. 
They had been made in 1942 and although care was taken not to 
give any clues as to the date operations would beginp Goebbels 
informed his listeners in a speech in October that the defeat of 
the Soviet Union was the necessary precondition! This was to 
be repeated by Wring on 30 January 1943.2 Retaliation, 
however, was at this time to-be understood as the resumption 
of'conventional raiding in the style of the 1940-1 blitz. In the 
spring of 1943, the word, Vergeltun&, took on a clearly 
different meaning,. It now came to stand for something vague 
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and indeterminate, but nevertheless terrible and decisive in 
its effect. -Soon its very mention sufficed to conjure up 
mystical and even apocalyptic visions of the future. These very 
hazy qualities were to enable the building up of such fantastic 
hopes in the months to come, that the point was soon reached 
when it was regarded as the very guarantee of final victory. 
B. THE LONG MONTHS OF WAITING 
TheFirstPromisesinth 
.E 
fj: inaof1943 
As the British stepped up their blitz on Germany in the 
spring and early summer of 19439 retaliation was increasingly 
viewed by the German masses as a question of utmost urgency. 
Even if the Nazi propagandists wouldp at times, have preferred 
to have remained quiet, they were forced by circumstances they 
could not control to take up the theme time and time again. 
The promise of Vergeltung now became an essentialp if not the 
essential component of Goebbels' propaganda repertoire. At times 
it must have appeared the only theme left fit to still the 
growing anxieties of the German people. German propagandists 
must certainly at first have found it the easiest theme to use, 
since, by directing popular attention to a future time, it did 
not require any immediate basis of fact. As early as April 1943 
Goebbels assured his readers in Das Reich: 
"By day and night we are working at the possibility 
of repaying the British terrorists in kind. We 
are certainly not looking on at the British air 
war with folded arms. " 
3 
In a speech in the Berlin Sportpalast two months later, the 
Minister assured his audience: 
"One day the hour of retribution will come. 
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The earlier condition concerning the prior defeat of the Soviet 
Union was quietly abandoned, presumably because the prospects 
of its fulfilment would not seem good enough to the population 
dispirited by Stalingrad and the general news from the Eastern 
Front. 
It would certainly seem that during the spring of 1943 
promises of retaliation did much to assuage the widespread 
anxiety and bitterness of the inhabitants of raided towns. 
Above all, they considered an all-out counter blow to be the 
most effective way of putting a stop to the enemy attacks. 
5 
They were encouraged in their hopes by the many rumours 
circulating, according to which new revolutionary weapons, 
including rockets, were being tested at Peenemunde. 
6 But many 
drew the wrong conclusions from these official forecasts and 
thought that the blow was imminent. When it turned out that 
this was far from being the case, disappointment set in. All 
further promises made by the leadership managed only to irritate 
rather than encourage the downcast population. 
At the end of May, the SD was already reporting the first 
doubts. 7 Although most people continued to believe the blow 
would fall later that year, 
8 
the constant repetition of a 
promise that had not as yet borne fruit became a source of 
great annoyance. 
"All the talk about the coming retaliation 
is slowly becoming superfluous. The time 
has now come for action. This opinion is 
to be found among all parts of the population. "9 
I 
At the end of June the Weimar SD reported: 
"One no longer wishes to hear anything 
concerning Vergeltung from Dr. Goebbels. "10 
Sarcastic comments were heard in South-west Germany to the 
effect: 
- 212 - 
"We cannot prevent the enemy from continuing 
his destructive attacks with fair words and 
empty threats. " 
11 
Nevertheless, despite growing impatience and nagging doubts, 
by the early summer of 1943 the promise of retaliation had 
become the most important favourable factor determining morale, 
Its'rising significance was, without doubt, tied to the negative 
turn in Germany's military fortune. 
"In regard to this question, the conviction is 
very often being expressed thatv whereas there 
is no chance of developments in eastern and 
southern Europe ending successfully, only the 
destruction of the aircraft-carrier England 
12 
can bring about a final decision in our favour, 
The German people was said to be divided in its opinion of 
VergeltunE. Whilst a smaller part of the population was 
reported as doubting whether the Reich was at all capable of 
launching a massive attack, the majority were apparently 
convinced that it would come by the beginning of autumn at 
the latest. The constant repetition of the same promisep 
although irritating and tiresomep led many to draw the 
conclusion that the leadership could in no case afford to run 
the risk of destroying its own credibility by making false 
predictions. All sorts of fantastic rumours were spreading 
across the land at lightning speed. There was talk of large 
guns capable of bombarding the British Isles, of missilest 
rockets and even atom bombs. Many people allowed their 
fantasies to run wild and even thought that the blow could 
easily be folbwed up by a military invasion which, in turn, 
would mean "the early defeat of England". 
13 
Such high hopes, accompanied by burning emotion, would 
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inevitably prove a great problem once it was realised that 
the attack was not imminent. This was indeed to be the case. 
The emotional cry for revenge increased with the surge in the 
intensity of Allied bombing. Vergeltung was rapidly becoming 
a question of individual survival. More and more it was 
regarded as the one effective way of putting a stop to the 
enemy raids. 
14 
As German towns continued to be pounded without 
the announcement so many Germans were yearning for, doubt and 
I 
scepticism grew still further. The fear was uttered that, by 
the time the blow fell, all the most important German towns 
would be razed to the ground. 
15 SD Schwerin reported the 
growing belief that, if retaliation did not start before 
August or September, it would be quite superfluous for by that 
time "the English will have decisively paralysed our armaments 
industry". 
16 
After the heavy attacks on Hamburg at the end of 
July the fact that Vergeltung 
, 
'had not been mounted was reported 
to be "making many despondent despite all good will, as well as 
shaking their faith in final victory U. 
17 
The utmost importance 
that had come to be attached to retaliation by the summer of 
1943 was expressed in the extremely dangerous view that an 
immediate blow was now the only means left of winning the war. 
Without it the war was utterly lost. 
18 Even the frank reporting 
of enemy bombing at this time only served to support this 
attitude by making the heart-felt cry for retribution even 
more voluble. 
19 
TheP0cyCautionSummer 
1943 
By July the propaganda leadership had come to realise that 
they would have to go cautiously. Vergeltung had become such 
a burning issue that a serious "boomerang effect" was to be 
expected if policy did not radically change. A Party report 
had already warned at the beginning of the month that, unless 
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retaliation came that year,. "trust in the'leadership, will reach 
zero point" . 
20 This view was underlined in an SD report from 
Schwerin at about the same time. The leaders would lose all 
credibility if operations did not begin soon. 
21 
As the 
propagandists themselves had learned that operations could not 
begin for some considerable time, they now opted for a policy 
of cautious reserve. Although not wishing to relinquish the 
theme entirely, they certainly wished to avoid giving the 
impression that the blow was imminent and that Vergeltun& itself 
was the only means left of winning the war. Retaliation 
propaganda proved to be just as delicate a plant to handle as 
the anti-Bolshevik theme. Far from improving morale, constant 
repetition would, in the long run, succeed only in doing 
irreparable harm by arousing hopes that could never be fulfilled, 
thereby undermining the bond between the lead6irs'and the 
governed. On 6 July the retaliation theme became the 
prerogative of members of the government. The press was 
forbidden to discuss it unless it were mentioned in speeches 
of ministers. 
22 
Of course, it was too much to expect that such 
- 
great hopes 
could be simply damped by a change in propaganda policy. The 
seed once sown would continue to grow. This was recognised in 
a Party directive of 1 July. It was admitted that people were 
becoming "impatient" and that they wished to know when 
retaliation would begin. Party speakers were instructed to give 
the following answer: 
"Do y6u want a big or a small retaliation? 
If you think a revenge blow, which would 
merely aim now at paying, back the enemy for 
what he has done to us, is enough, then the 
weapons at present available would be sufficient 
for this purpose. If you want a revenge which 
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overshadows all that we are now having to 
go through and which would really constitute 
the punishment the enemy has rightly deserved 
for his vile attacks and if you want a revenge 
that is truly fantastic, then you will still 
have to wait. " 
23 
This cautious line was to continue throughout the weeks that 
followed. Although the policy of almost complete silence had 
in the meantime been somewhat relaxedt Party representatives 
were reminded in September: 
"It is wrong to name a date for the Vergeltung. 
There must be no unnecessary talk about details, 
extent and form of retaliation. It must be 
clearly pointed out to the population that it 
should avoid any unnecessary gossip about this 
or that retaliation measure, as well as any 
unnecessary gossip about new weapons etc-p so 
that the-enemy is not wantonly provided with 
valuable clues. The Volksgenosse must be content 
with the knowledge that retaliation will come. , 
24 
(iii) TheRaidsonBritain in 1943 
As if in urgent need of an ersatz theme, the Nazi 
propagandists returned to an old stand-byp the Luftwaffe raids 
on Great Britain. The German newspapers were told to pay more 
attention to these "conventional" attacks on 18 August, "since 
the impression ought not be created that absolutely nothing was 
25 happening against England" . This was none too easy a task 
because, in fact, very little indeed was happening in the skies 
of England at this time. Throughout the whole of 1943 the 
German Luftwaffe dropped a mere 2,240 tons of bombs on the 
British Isles, whtlst the RAF and USAF dropped over 2009000 
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tons on the Reich. 
26 
Nazi propagandists were careful, however, 
not to portray these pinprick raids as "retaliation", as 
directives issued to the press at the beginning of the year 
show. 
27 
They did not wish to arouse new hopes which would 
inevitably backfire on them once the German population realised 
that the attacks were of no more than nuisance value. But this 
did not rule out the fullest possible exploitation of Luftwaffe 
exploits. The British authorities were even accused of trying 
to disguise the damage and losses inflicted. 
"They would very much like to depict the 
situation as if the sky'were merely reserved 
for the British and Americans and as if both 
had only to drop sufficient bombs at random 
in order to overwhelm Europe.. The drone of 
German engines over British ports and factories 
, 28 does not harmonise with this tune at all. 
Although such reports had appeared intermittently since the 
beginning of. 1943, they were to become more frequent that 
summer when the retaliation theme was being played down. The 
essentially manipulative purpose of these accounts had been 
detected by American analysts during a short lull in the RAF 
bombing offensive at the beginning of June: 
"An empty sky over Germany delivers German 
propagandists from their irksome efforts to 
blow up feeble counter-raids against Great 
Britain. The immediate drop in attention to 
retaliatory raids proves better than anything 
else the propagandistic nature of previous raids 
and raid accounts. " 
29 - 
As Allied planes returned in force and as the Vergeltung 
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theme became inopportune, the hard-tried German civilians 
were once again reminded of this "forgotten" theatre of war. 
The response to these blown-up reports was not always a 
very positive one. Most Germans appear to have recognized them 
30 for what they were and to have reacted with impatient irritation. 
The cautious wording, in particular, was a source of aggravation, 
as a report from Schwerin shows: 
"Many speak of the frequent accounts of attacks 
on selected targets in the Greater. London area 
1131 in the OKW-Report only with bitterne 
It was thus clear that this type of propaganda would always 
remain a very poor second best and would n-ever succeed in 
diverting attention from that which had come to be the very 
embodiment of such deeply felt hopes and emotions - the 
retaliation. 
Uv) The Resur. &. anae of the Retaliat- 
ionThemeintheAutumnof 
1943. 
Throughout the dark summer of 1943 doubts about Vergeltung 
grew. The propaganda reticence did not go unnoticed. But the 
morale picture, and with it the attitude to retaliation, seemed 
to undergo a radical change with Hitler's radio address at the 
beginning of September. At one stroke lurking doubts gave way 
to a new-found confidence. It should, however, be added that 
the new trust in Vergeltung cannot be seen apart from the overall 
more positive view of developments that accompanied news of 
successful German counter-measures in Italy. In exploiting 
this "proof" of Germany's might, Hitler managed to create a 
mood of virtual exhilaration which, however, soon abated and 
gave way to a more realistic appraisal of the situation. Many 
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ascribed great importance to, the fact that it was Hitler 
himself who promised retribution, 
"People believe these words of the FUhrer 
unconditionally because they consider it quite 
impossible that in this darkest hour of the war 
the FUhrer would feed them with cheap hopes. " 
32 
Many let their imaginations run wild and conjured up visions 
of England being destroyed within a space of a few hours. 
33 
It is interesting to note the persuasive power Hitler still 
possessed at this later stage of the war. The effect, however, 
proved to be only temporary and after a few days a decline in 
belief in Vergeltung was once again registered. 
34 
This 
phenomenon was to be observed again after the FUhrer's next 
address in November. Not only were all doubts reported as having 
suddenly disappeared, but many people were said to be believing - 
35 
naturally quite wrongly - that the attack was imminent. According 
to the SD: 
"One promise from the mouth of the FUhrer weighs 
heavier than all the declarations made in the 
press, radio and party rallies. " 
36 
Hitler's speech in September gave Goebbels and his 
propagandists the cue to take up the retaliation theme yet 
again. Perhaps they had fallen victim to the illusion that the 
day they'longed for so much was not far off. On Harvest 
Thanksgiving-Day (3 October), the Minister remarked: 
"the English are under an exceedingly fatal 
delusion if they imagine they are faced with 
only a rhetorical or propagandist slogan with 
no reality behind it. England will one day 
make acquaintance with this reality. The 
British may then thank their government. I do 
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not wish to say more about this subject than 
is absolutely necessary, but nobody should 
believe my' reserve to be a sign of weakness. 
English and American trees will not grow into 
the sky. Our German technicians, inventors, 
engineers and workmen will see to that. " 
37 
Although not as effective as his master, Goebbels also seems to 
have been able to throw the doubters onto the defensive, if 
only temporarily so. 
38 
At the end of Octoberq his rhetoric took 
on an even more confident tone: 
"the day of radical retribution against Britain 
is drawing slowly but surely nearer". 
39 
The promise of Vergeltung had become a drug for so many 
Germans. Their attitude to it might be a very negative one 
but they were unable to dispense with it. This would help to 
explain the fact that, although repetitious promises were so 
often the source of intense irritation and exasperation, the 
German_, people somehow needed those words they so violently 
criticised. All speeches of Party dignitaries were scrutinised 
word for word in order to detect some direct or veiled 
reference, and there was great disappointment when little or 
40 
nothing of relevance was found. 
In the autumn of 1943 the attitude. to retaliation swayed 
to and fro between outright pessimism and over-enthusiastic 
optimism. The reaction to Hitler's promises in September and 
November indicates quite clearly the willingness to believe. 
But the higher the hopes were raised, all the greater was the 
disappointment and-deep feeling of depression that followed on 
realizing that Vergeltung was not imminent. Neverthelessp 
despite all outward pessimism which expressed itself in bitter 
attacks on the leadership, belief in the secret weapons was 
never given up completely. To have done so would have meant 
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for many giving up all hope ofa favourable end to the war. 
Retaliation had become the very key to victory. Again and 
again the Nazi leaders succeeded in rekindling the flame of 
faith which had seemed to have been extinguished for ever. 
What was really nothing more than wishful thinking 
constituted the sole source of comfort in these dark days of 
wartime Germany. As the weeks and months drew on, visions of 
the coming blow became more and more fantastic until Vergeltung 
came to represent the panacea to all Germany's difficulties. 
An SD report of October 1943 commented on this dangerous trend 
and described the change in attitude that had taken place since 
the early months of that year: 
"Initially, Vergeltung had been ascribed greatt 
but not decisive, importance for the course of 
the war as a whole. But thoughts about Vergeltung 
have undergone an important change during the 
past few months. The entire development of the 
war since Stalingrad has meant that the feeling 
has got hold of the Volksgenossen that the 
enemy encirclement of Germany and the occupied 
areas is becoming tighter and tighter and that 
this development will inevitably lead to a 
crisis. A 'miracle' seems the only way out of 
this crisis. And this miracle, which constitutes 
the decisive turn of the tide, is expected from 
Vergeltung today by the majority of Volksgenossen - 
in the areas affected by, the air war by almost the 
entire population. Especially in the case of those 
Volksgenossen, whose confidence in victory has a 
positive effect on others and fortifies the hearts 
Of many who are faint-hearted and fickle, belief 
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in victo 
- 
ry is principally based'on the hopes 
attached to the future employment of new weapons 
and war instruments. These hopes extend far 
beyond the mere halting of the terror raids. 
This is the least people expect of Vergeltung. 
It is supposed that the counter blow will rather 
result in England being 'knocked out', of the war 
-within the space of a few days or weeks. People 
Imagine that the tremendous damage wrought on 
the larger English towns will secure the conditions 
necessary for the occupation of the island which 
will, in turn, lead to an armistice with England. 
It is then argued that America would then have 
no particular interest in carrying on the war. 
Our entire force could then at last be directed 
at Russia, the result being the early collapse 
of Soviet offensive power. " 
The same report went on to remark that the longer the delay the 
greater the expectations. It concluded by explaining that 
Vergeltun& had come to stand for something much more than the 
bare word at first seems to imply. It was "the decisive chance 
to gain victory, without which one can no longer believe in a 
,, 4 good end to the war .1 Talk of retaliation reached a new height 
during 
, 
the first week of heavy bombing of Berlin at the end of 
November. The often very simple and credulous hope was 
described at the time as "an important element for the good 
, 42 bearing of the people . This was not without its inherent 
dangers and once again the SD pointed out that retaliation was 
a question of confidence in the government. Should the oft- 
repeated forecasts not materialise, suchýbitterness and 
disillusionment would result that all efforts of the leadership 
to remedy the situation would be bound to fail 
ý3 
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Although not as cautious as it had been the previous 
summer, German propaganda did try to damp any over-enthusiastic 
optimism. Newspaper readers were informed in October that, 
though their impatience was quite understandable, they had to 
appreciate the supreme importance of the need to prepare the 
44 
blow thoroughly so that its effect would be decisive. But, at 
the end of the year, the propagandists themselves seem to have 
been convinced that the time of Vergeltung was rapidly 
approaching. Their utterances were marked by a somewhat more 
confident tone. In the last days of November, Goebbels 
delivered a particularly fiery speech in bomb-shattered Berlin: 
"In Germany there is no demand more passionate 
than to pay back the criminals on the Thames 
in full measure for what they have been doing 
and are still doing to us. The German people 
can rest assured. Day and night this retaliation 
is being prepared with feverish energy... 0', 
45 
Perhaps the best evidence that German propagandists were 
allowing this false illusion to guide them in their choice of 
words is a remarkable article by Schwarz van Berk published on 
5 December. Although professing to mute fantastic conceptions 
of Vergeltung, he presented such a glowing picture of its 
effects that many concluded that the start could only be a few 
days off. At the same time as endeavouring to soothe the 
widespread impatience, he made some very hazardous statements: 
"The question of the date of Vergeltung is no 
longer dependent on its technical completion 
but on the purpose it is intended to have. 
VerSeltung will be employed in an energetic 
ýform at the mome'nt-whi-ch is pychologically 
suitable so that it can influence the course 
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of this war. It-would be a useless start 
merely to repay ruins with ruins. The purpose 
of the undertaking will be expressed in-'quite 
different and surprising effects - both pyscholog- 
ical and political ....... The Vergeltung is not to 
be stopped or hindered by any manoeuvre of the 
enemy or by any operation he might venture. The 
ball is rolling. For us Vergeltung is not just 
a question of a triumph of arms or merely of a 
chastisement which is being demanded by our 
people, but a question of putting a stop to the 
unrestrained mass-murder with'one extremely 
drastic blow. For a peaceful observer it might 
seem that the time is not far off when mankind 
can blow up half of the world. , 
46 
In the days preceding the Christmas holiday, the German press 
appears to have thrown all caution to the wind. The reader was 
informed that retaliation was not simply a matter of bringing 
about "only a breathing space but a turning-point". The aim 
was not merely to destroy a few British cities but to 
eliminat e the "island" as "a jumping off point for all kinds 
of terror operations". No doubts were left as to its vital 
strategic significance: 
"When considered together with other plans the 
Anglo-American General Staffs apparently intend 
carrying out from the island base, this view 
then appears of paramount importance for the 
course of the war. " 
47 
Up to then the propagandists had never ventured to make 
such confident predictions. They certainly convinced many that 
the long-awaited blow would come in the form of a very welcome 
Christmas present 
ý8 Schwarz van Berk's articleý in particular, 
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was reported to have created lively interest and to have 
increased speculation on the form and the effects of the new 
weapon. Above, all, news of its launching was expected any day. 
49 
This conviction was demonstrated in the precautions many people 
were rumoured to be taking to meet an expected Allied counter- 
blow: 
II 
"It is being said that in west Germany the 
population has been instructed to furnish itself 
with requisites for a 60 hour stay in the air-raid 
shelter - this, namely, is the time the Vergeltung 
will last. When they leave the shelter, the war 
will be over. " 
An increasing tendency to tie retaliation to the end of the war 
was also noted. More cautious people were said to be expecting 
the attack in the spring and to believe that it could prove 
decisive only if accompanied by a German landing in England. 
It would be wrong, however, to suppose that all Germans shared 
this optimism in the last days of 1943. 
"Quite a few Volksgenossen even doubt in 
Vergeltung completely. They regard it as 
nothing more than a splendid propaganda 
manoeuvre of the German leadership; the 
purpose of which is to frighten the population 
of England and to make the Anglo-American 
leadership carry out their incomplete invasion 
plans prematurely. " 
So-called "opponents" were reported as viewing the whole 
Vergeltung propaganda as a clever attempt by the leaders to 
maintain popular support and to secure the population's 50 
willingness to carry on a war that could no longer be wons 
Of course, retaliation was not imminent in December 1943. 
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The high hopes that had been raised were dashed yet again. 
Already on Christmas Eve, many were very disappointed that 
Goebbels had not even mentioned it in his traditional radio 
address and interpreted it as a conscious attempt to damp any 
excessive optimism. 
51 
The old doubts rtemerged and, according 
to an SD report, it was just those people who shortly before 
had believed so ardently that the strike was imminent who were 
now being plagued with pessimism. 
52 
There was a growing 
tendency to regard it all as one gigantic bluff. Less radical 
minds feared that it would either come too late or rendered 
impossible by Allied landings in northern Europe. 
53 
(v) The "Baby R 
.1it 
z" onLondon- 
January-2jarch 1944 
The propagandists, as well as the German leadership as a 
whole, realised that it would not be enough to return to a 
policy of enforced silence. Something would have to be done 
to prevent a crisis of confidence in the German leadership. 
It would be necessary to give the German people immediate 
visible proof of the Reich's ability to strike back at the 
enemy. As a means of bridging the gap to the beginning of all- 
out Vergeltung, it was decided to resume conventional bombing 
of the United Kingdom, in particular London, in force. All 
planes that could be spared were brought to northern France 
until the Luftwaffe commanded a front-line force of 150-200 
bombers. In the months January-March London was once again the 
target of repeated attack which, however, never reached the 
intensity of the 1940-1 blitz. In these three months a total 
of 2,350 tons of bombs were dropped in 15 major attacksy 13 of 
which were aimed at the British capital 
?4 
Nazi propaganda portrayed the raids as by far the heaviest 
of the war and did not hesitate to exploit them to the full. 
Even the OKW-Bericht played its part in this propaganda drive. 
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On 2 February, for example, it claimed that on the nights of, 
21/22 and 29/30 January 900 Bombers had been dispatched against 
London, of which 750 had reached the target and dropped over 
1,000 tons of high explosive and incendiary bombs 
ý5 
According 
to British accounts, however, in the first raid only 27 enemy 
aircraft actually reached London and of the 161 planes sent in 
the second attack only 15 dropped their bombs within the 
56 
capital's boundaries. On the German radio on 21 February 
Semmler exulted in the "thousands of bombs" that were raining 
down -on London: 
"They are only a weak foretaste of what is to 
come. London and other cities will now pay 
for Cologne, Essen, Hamburg, Berlin and all 
the other towns delivered cynically to British 
terrorism. " 
57 
About two weeks later, Goebbels was making the over-confident 
forecast "that very soon every Anglo-American raid on a German 
58 
town will be paid back by a German raid on an English town". 
It was a promise that could not be kept. German radio listeners 
were encouraged in the belief that the attacks on London were 
at least as heavy as the Allied attacks on German cities. 
American analysts saw this propaganda quite correctly as an 
attempt to give the population new confidence in Germany's 
aggressive potentialities in the critical pre-invasion period 
?9 
Unrestrained exaggeration and downright dishonesty were to 
become increasingly the typical characteristics of propaganda 
treatment of these attacks. Of course, the German public would 
be dissatisfied with any accounts that did not allow the 
conclusion to be drawn that the British civilian population was 
suffering at least as much as they were. Often, the reality 
contradicted propaganda claims quite dramatically. On 22 March2 
for instance, an article appeared in the V61kischer Beobachter 
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entitled "Hull Harbour is Burning". In the attack of 19-20 
March, however, most of the German bombs had been dropped 
quite harmlessly on east Lincolnshire and north Norfolk and 
not a single bpmb had landed on HullP Similarly, heavy and 
destructive attacks were claimed on Bristol on the nights of 
27-28 March, 23-24 April and 14-15 May. In fact, the attacks 
were-scattered and Bristol remained virtually unscathedý' To 
make their assertions sound plaudible, Nazi propagandists 
accused the British authorities of endeavouring to cover up the 
effects of the Luftwaffe raids by enforcing an unusually harsh 
censorship. 
62 So as to disguise the minimal effects the raids 
were, in fact, having, the press was forbidden to publish 
Reuter figures of British air-raid casualties for the month 
63 February. In line with this policy, German papers were advised 
on 26 February: 
"Care is to be taken when publishing enemy 
press statements on the effect of German 
air raids on England that no information 
-is given that would allow the drawing of 
incorrect comparisons. " 
64 
The Germans were thus to be deprived of any opportunity of 
comparing the Luftwaffe raids with those of the Allied air- 
forces. The sensitivity of the German propaganda treatment of 
the "Baby Blitz" is further demonstrated in the ban on any 
mention of the lack of good air-raid shelters in London 
65 
and 
the visits of Churchill and the King and Queen to the areas 
worst hit by the attacks 
ý6 once again, it was feared, and quite 
rightly, that the civilian population would draw their own 
"inappropriate" parallels. 
Despite the propagandists' relief at hearing the news of 
the resumption of raids on Great Britain, they were nevertheless 
in a quandary when depicting the importance of the event. They 
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naturally wished to make the most of the raids but they did not 
wish to give the impression that this was the real thing or a 
replacement for the real thing. They knew all too well that 
this would have caused great despondency. The decision was 
therefore taken that the press, though giving prominence to the 
, 67 attacks, should refrain from using the loaded word "Vergeltung'. 
It'would suffice when the idea was conveyed that at last 
something was being done to answer the Allied pounding of 
German towns and that the air war had again become "a two-sided 
affair". 
68 
The reaction to this propaganda was a very mixed one. 
Although the renewed raiding of Britain was generally welcomedt 
there was a marked tendency to see it as the mere prelude to 
Vergeltung, as a kind of warming-up operationý9 At the same 
time, quite a few people, especially the inhabitants of Germany's 
bomb-battered towns, feared that the enemy would retaliate by 
stepping up his attacks on the Reich still further and that 
they, in the long run, would be the ones to suffer most? 
o 
The 
RAF raid on Berlin on 15 February wasp in fact, interpreted by 
many as the enemy's reply to the Luftwaffe bombing of London. 
Some people were of the opinion that it would be advisable to 
refrain from launching, such attacks until the Reich was in a 
position to deliver one devastating blow at the heart of the 
enemy which would destroy for ever his capability of mounting 
71 
raids on Germany. The direct effect on their own lives became 
the criterion for judging the wisdom or efficacy of bombing 
Britain. The raids do not seem to have had a very great 
influence on morale. Although they were naturally better than 
nothing, the Schwerin SD summed up the general disappointment 
in the words: 
"People want to see something more. 
.1 
From Koblenz it was reported that few positive results were 
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73 
expected from the raids. . As the Allied bombing offensive 
continued as if nothing had happened, the attitude to official 
treatment of the Luftwaffe raids became increasingly critical 
and by March it was becoming downright hostile. First 
suspicions that press and radio coverage was guilty of 
exaggeration were reported in an SD. report of 22 February from 
74 
Koblenz, but four weeks later criticism, ýwas taking on a much 
harsher tone. SD Linz reported: 
"The clumsy attempt by the press at playing 
up the frequent German raids on London, while 
dismissing the damage caused by enemy raids 
as insignificant, has a most provoking effect 
and is leading to a further diminution of trust 
in German news reporting. " 
75 
Many people even professed to have unearthed the propaganda 
intention and dismissed the raids on London as "appeasement" 
76 
tactics* 
0ntheEveofRetaIiation 
The renewal of the blitz on London was quite insufficient 
to distract people's attention from that theme that was 
uppermost in their minds and which for many had become the very 
incarnation of all their hopes. Despite a marked tendency by 
the more optimistically inclined to believe that Vergeltung 
would come with the launching of the Allied invasion, 
77 
the SD 
reports give a definite impression that the number of doubters 
was rapidly increasing in the first few months of 1944. 
According to a report from Frankfurt-on-Main in February: 
"large parts of the population no longer 
believe in Vergeltung but regard it as merely 
an invention of German propaganda. , 
78 
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In April SD Schwerin made the even more sweeping comment: 
"In general, it can be 'observed that, for 
the most-part, the population has lost its 
belief in Vergeltung which had once been so 
firmly anchored, 1,79 
In fact, the mood appears to have been very depressed indeed 
at this time. Belief in retaliation seems to have reached an 
all-time low and to have become the object of bitter reproach 
expressed in the form of political jokes! 
O As summer arrived, 
attention was once again focused on the enemy invasion thought 
to be impending. Very many Germans were of the opinion that 
an enemy landing provided the Reich with its last chance to 
deliver the western enemies a decisive blow. Indeed, many were 
afraid that the worst that could happen would be that the foe 
would not risk an invasion! 
81 But there were those who firmly 
believed that the attack would not come, since the enemy 
propaganda was proving so successful in tying down considerable 
German forces in France, thereby weakening the Russian front, 
that an actual landing would be superfluous 
ý2 
Never does doubt and pessimism regarding retaliation appear 
to have been greater than at that very moment when the launching 
sites in northern France were eagerly awaiting the order to 
commence operations. On 6 June the Frankfurt SD reported: 
"The absence of retaliatory measures in the 
face of the present air terror is seen by 
many Volksgenossen as a tacit admission of 
our own inability ever to launch a Ver&eltung. 
After all that the leadership has said, written, 
promised and failed to realize, it is possible, 
in view of the present course of the air-raids 
on the Reich, to speak of a crisis of confidence 
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among a broad section of the population. " 
83 
It therefore seems that the long predicted crisis of confidence 
had begun. But, exactly one week later, the first two VI 
missiles landed on the London area. For the propagandists it 
must have appeared that they had been saved at the very last 
moment. 
C. THE VI ATTACK, JUNE-SEPTEMBER 1944 
Although the first couple of VIs were launched on June 13t the 
real attack began two days later. In the three months that 
followed, of the 8,000 missiles launched, about 2,400 reached 
the British capital, killing over 6,000 people. By týe end of 
July, however, very few were getting through owing to a belt 
of anti-aircraft guns that had been built up along the south- 
east coast. In August the majority of the launching sites were 
capturedo although VIs continued to be launched at England 
right up to March from Heinkel. bombers based in north-west 
Germany and Denmark 
ý4 
Goebbels greeted news of the attack with marked reserve 
and a "wait and see" attitude. The start of operations was 
reported in the OKW-B. ericht in one terse sentence and the term 
Verge . Itung was scrupulously avoided. Moreover, press and radio 
85 
were expressly instructed not to use this worde But Goebbels, 
of course, did not enjoy complete control of the German press. 
This he had to share with Reichspressechef Dietrich whop so it 
happened, decided on a quite different presentation of the 
"great" event. It was he who was responsible for the 
distinctly confident tone of the Tagesparole of 16 June, which 
was clearly designed to impress upon the minds of the German 
people that it was the long awaited Vergeltung that had just 
begun !6 The newspapers were in an unenviable dilemma. To have 
obeyed one of their masters would automatically mean falling 
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foul of the other. The German newspaper reader himself became 
witness to the resulting confusion. Although Goebbels ordered: 
"Greatest reserve, no word of Vergeltungl no 
arousing of exaggerated hopes as if a positive 
end to the war were in imediate reach"p 
the Berliner Nachtausgabe, preferring to follow Dietrich's line, 
began its leading story on 16 June with the words: 
"The day, which 80 million Germans have been 
longing for, has come. 
-" 
87 
The Minister of Propaganda was in such a rage that he at once 
sent his right-hand man, Fritzsche to the studios of the 
Reichsrundfunk, of which Goebbels was undisputed boss, to undo 
the damage that had been done. But Fritzsche, although 
appealing to the reason of his listeners, left them in no 
doubt that it was, in fact, the Vergeltung that had just been 
announced and at a moment when so many had become sceptical: 
"Many a man may have been glum or impatient 
in these long months of trial, but the German 
High Command has never allowed itself to be 
guided in its decisions by considerations of 
such displeasure or prestige. " 
He then went onto strike a more cautious note: 
"Information about the further development I 
of the strictly military. operation is a 
matter for the High Command. Nor is it our 
task to make forecasts today about the effect 
of this or that kind of weapon. We who have 
waited for months will surely have time to 
wait and see the effect of the operation 
whose initial phase was reported today. " 
88 
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In a broadcast the following night Fritzsche was even more 
explicit: 
"Fools alone believed a new weapon was of 
value only if it wiped out the enemyp as well 
as his own country, from the face of the earth 
in five minutes .... What began the night before 
last was the first turn of the screw -a screw 
which will be tightened more and more. " 
89 
Goebbels held on to this cautious line during the following days 
and warned the press not to give exaggerated accounts of the 
90 
new weapon. 
But what was to be interpreted as caution or reserve? 
Reports, describing the destruction of whole districts of London 
would be interpreted as "cautious" by the optimists who believed 
that "final victory" was but a few days off. On the other hand, 
a portrayal of the bombardment along the lines of a conventional 
air-raid would be sure to sow a spirit of disappointment and 
despondency. Thus, in spite of the Minister's call for caution, 
it was almost impossible not to exaggerate, even if this meant 
risking a "boomerang" effect. Already on the very first day of 
VI reporting, the German Press Agency (DNB) was depicting the 
attack as "atonement for the death of the many innocent people 
murdered who are calling for revenge from their graves". The 
time had come at last when it was possible to exact "an eye for 
191 an eye and a tooth for a tooth'. At the very time when Nazi 
propaganda was officially subject to a policy of utmost reserve, 
extremely wild claims were, in fact, creeping into the 
propaganda content. Retaliation was given priority in both press 
and radio-, even over news from the Invasion front in Normandy, 
which in itself was anything but an encouragement to the 
population to keep a cool head. On 18 June, the 8 p. m. radio 
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news boasted in its opening item: 
"Our soldiers on the Channel coast constantly 
heard the organ-like fury of the explosive 
devices hurtling through the air and the thud 
of severe explosions. Yet these weapons 
represent only one of our new devices. That 
they were not used at the beginning of the 
invasion is a sign of our strength, which 
allowed us to await the most favourable moment 
for the opening fire on London. It appears 
from reports of German reconnaisance pilots that 
huge fires and severe damage have been observed 
in London and South England. The glare of fire 
is visible as far as the coast of North France. " 
Almost mystic tones were struck in the Front Report that 
followed this news bulletin: 
"With the fall of evening, one can see from 
the whole Channel coast and also from higher 
areas further inland the terrible effect of 
this weapon .... At first, there is a reddish 
-condens-ation which seems to skip across a veil 
of, -clouds, and then, with the falling of night, 
wide conflagrations are mirrored dark red and 
glowing against them. These are continuously 
-nourished by new fires in Southern England and 
, London .... During the last moments of the summer 
night, I thought the red light of dawn had 
already come, but from its direction it was 
still quite obviously the unextinguished fire 
at the heart of the island. 1,92,, 
Similarly, a few days later, pilots returning from a 
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reconnaisance mission over London asserted that "they had 
never experienced such large area conflagrationsv and that the 
,, 93 effect of the new weapons must be indescribable . 
The first news of the operation was received with 
unmitigated joy, although there were some "incurable" pessimists 
who at once expressed the fear that the enemy would reply with 
94 
gas. Trust in the leadership and victory was said to have 
been strengthened. The most fantastic rumours began to 
circulate describing the frightful effects of the new weapon. 
Much greater interest in radio news was now reported than even 
during the first days of the Allied Invasion, a good indicator 
95 
of the, high hopes that were being attached to VI. The news 
even removed the scepticism that had taken root as a result of 
military developments in Normandy 
?6 
One SD report made the 
interesting comment: 
"It is-characteristic that exactly the same 
people, who had previously derided Vergeltung, 
now talk big and already consider the war as 
over. , 
97 
The hopes were high and it was inevitable that it would not be 
long before they were bitterly dashed. In fact, it took but a 
very short time for the subsequent disappointment to set in. 
Even the glowing descriptions of the radio mentioned above had 
a frustrating effect, since it was generally supposed that the 
98 
effect would have been much more spectacular and decisive. 
Within two or three days, the "cautious" approach of the 
propaganda was being interpreted as proof that the effect of 
retaliation was considerably less than had at first been 
generally supposed? 
9 
Many Germans found it particularly hard 
to comprehend the fact that, despite VI, everyday life in London 
had apparently not broken down and that people were still going 
100 
about their daily business. Nazi propagandap quite 
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unwittingly, added to the, confusion when it quoted British 
politicians or the enemy press and-radiot and many people asked 
themselves how it was at all. possible that the Houses of 
Parliament continued to sit and the B'*-B. C. and Fleet Street to 
operate. From such quite incidental detail of Nazi propaganda 
content it was being concluded that "the effect is not 
particularly great". 
01 It was reported from south-west Germany: 
"Those who have suffered from air-raids tend 
to the view that a heavy air-raid is more 
effective. Otherwise, London would have most 
certainly been razed to the ground after a 
two-week long heavy bombardment with Vj.,, 
102 
By the end of July, criticism had become even more bitter, 
especially since no visible results had been noticed from 
retaliation. In Schwerin, for example, it was being said that, 
whereas Hamburg had been destroyed in a few days, life in 
London was still carrying on after five weeks of V-bombardment. 
- "As a result, quite a few Volksgenossen tend 
to the opinion that the V-weapons are just 
one great propaganda binge. " 
103 
Just as depressing was the fact that the new weapon had not 
put a stop to the Allied raiding of German towns. This was a 
particularly bitter pill to swallow for the inhabitants of the 
numerous battered cities, who naturally judged the success or 
failure of the new weapon in terms of its immediate effect on 
their own lives. 
"It had been expected that Vergeltung would 
bring immediate relief on the Home Front 
and these hopes are now seen to have been 
disappointed. " 
What is more, the raids on Berlinp Hamburg and Bremen in June 
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1944 were widely regarded as the enemy's answer to the VI 
104 
It was not long before the Vergeltungswaffe Nr. 1 was being 
nicknamed Versager Nr. l! 
105 
Goebbels had endeavoured to prevent just this happening. 
Of course, he had been forced to play a dangerous balancing 
act from the very beginning. To have played down the VI attack 
would have created bitterness and resentment, because it would 
have brutally contradicted the picture of retaliation that had 
been built up ever since the spring of 1943. To have indulged 
in wild exaggeration would only have meant adding fuel to the 
flames of an optimism hencefDrth impossible to satisfy, not to 
mention a far-reaching crisis of confidence in the nation's 
leadership. The inherent problem was echoed in the vacillating 
and, at times, rather nervous propaganda behaviour from June 
to August. At the same time as broadcasting truly fantastic 
accounts of big fires in London, the propagandists admonished 
the German people not to plac e their hopes too high. The 
press had itself been instructed as early as 17 June: 
"The reader must not be given the impression 
that the war will be finished in a very short 
time. " 
106 
But this was not to prevent it indulging in the very blown-up 
style of reporting described above. Two days later the 
population was warned against paying more attention to the VI 
attack than to the "other fronts", although this was precisely 
what the official media had been doing. 
"This war is a mighty struggle, in which 
individual events alone are not decisive. 
Only the total sum of bravery, preparedness 
and staying power of a people, only all our 
weapons together, will force the way to 
victory.... " 
107 
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In the weeks that followed, the emphasis came to be placed 
increasingly on the military and strategic nature of the new 
weapon. Its employment was an important element of German 
measures to counter the Allied invasion of Europe. In his 
lunchtime news commentary on 19 June Semmler clarified this 
point: 
"From London orders are transmittei 
bridgehead in Normandy. Supplies 
are directed from London. In the 
of the invasion nearly everything 
the Anglo-Americans on the smooth 
the hinterland. " 
I to the 
to the Front 
present stage 
depends for 
running of 
And, according to a Front Report that evening: 
"Defensive enemy*forces are tied down and 
from the point of morale are weighed down 
by the demoralizing prospect that this is 
only the beginning -'only one of several 
/Slows7 which strike at Britain and will 
continue to do so". 
This was then followed up by a news commentary by Scharping 
who warned: 
"even the best secret weapons cannot bring 
about the end of the war from one day to the 
other. Belief in miracles would be out of 
place in this context and might even become 
disastrous. " 108 
In the days that followed, the strategic argument was further 
developed: 
"The VI-Front in the back of the invaders not 
only holds back considerable numbers of soldiers, 
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armaments workers and war material of all 
three British-armed forces from other tasks, 
but, in addition, narrows down the strategic 
freedom of movement of the enemy leadership. " 
109 
This stress on the military importance of the VI became all the 
less convincing the deeper the Allied armies pushed into 
France. This is shown in an SD report written on 29 June: ' 
"Such newspaper headlines as 'VI Upsets Enemy 
Strategy' are received fairly sceptically by 
Volksgendssen as a result of enemy advances. "110 
At the beginning of July, as it was becoming clear that 
the VI was apparently having no serious effect on the enemy's 
war effort, German propagandists became much more cautious in 
their descriptions. On 8 July, for example, the press was told 
to avoid giving the impression that the situation was about to 
reach a dramatic point. Reports of large fires visible over a 
great distance, which had been a constant feature since the 
very first daywere no longer to be published! 
" A concerted 
attempt was made to call the German people back to "reason", 
although it was the official Nazi propaganda that had been 
mainly responsible for leading minds so astray during the 
preceding. fifteen months. On 4 July people were reminded: 
"The strongest of our secret weapons is and 
remains the German people's will of self- 
preservation.... " 
112 
The newspapers ridiculed those who had thought: 
I "three or four such things would completely 
wipe out Britain s capital and that with 
the help of some dozens of these miracle 
weapons the entire island could be destroyed. 
And because three days after the beginning of 
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the retribution attacks Mr. Churchill did 
not send peace negotiators to the FUhrer's 
headquarters, the matter is settled for them 
they therefore regard it as -a flop. " 
113 
Such propaganda seems to have impressed somep for, 
according to an SD report of 13 July, many people had overcome 
their initial disappointment that "the retaliation weapon did 
not have an immediately decisive effect" and "more and more 
people are adopting the view that the VI needs time to take 
t,, 
114 
effec . The RPA also reported that the popular view of the 
weapon had become more realistic: 
"The opinion which was frequently observed 
earlier, that the employment of retaliation 
weapons would alone suffice to end the war, 
is hardly heard at the moment. Consequentlyl 
the cautious treatment of the retaliation 
weapon is, practically without exception, 
thought to be the-right policy fby the RPA7/"l 
15 
Great interest in technical art3. cles on the construction of the 
flying bomb was recorded. On the other hand, the accounts of the 
damage being wrought in London were found wanting. 
"In general, people are dissatisfied at being 
informed only by way of quotes from the enemy 
and neutral press. They do not want to believe 
that the OKW is unable to give its own comment 
on the effect of the VI. Above all, there is a 
very strong'wish for publication of aerial 
photographs by our air reconnaissance. " 
116 
This appears, at first sight, to contradict the evidence of a 
general spirit of bitter disappointment given above. Buty 
perhapst the contradiction is to be found in the minds of the 
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German people themselves. At the same time as being 
disappointed in their initial expectationsp they wanted to believe 
the propagandists' arguments and were fascinated by any 
information concerning the weapon. The wish to cling on to 
those hopes which, at the same time, were being dashed, is 
described in a report of 24 July: 
"To a great extent the Volk sways between hope 
and fear. The population wants to hope and 
seizes upon any semi-official or unofficial 
utterance in order to take heart and to receive 
new courage. All explanations that weapons are 
always only a means to an end and that no miracle 
can be expected of them are accepted but with 
reluctance. " 
117 
In August., the German press and radio abandoned some of 
their caution. 'Perhaps they had been compelled to do so by 
force of circumstances. With the Allied breakthrough following 
the bloody battle of the Falaise "gap", there must have seemed 
little chance at all of pushing the enemy forces back in the 
foreseeable future. Moreover, the new Soviet offensive had 
brought the Red, Army dangerously near the eastern frontiers of 
the Reich. -Vergeltung was virtually the only theme left 
offering "positive" aspects. The essentially propagandistic 
nature of the VI now became evident. At a time when the VI 
had been defeated and-very few of these missiles were getting 
through to London, the German mass media stepped up their 
coverage and even published the, first pictures 
118 There 
, 
was an 
increasing tendency to quote or misquote enemy sources. Radio 
speakerst for instance, claimed to have "learned" that Croydon 
"has lost 75% of its houses through VI fire"1*19 Latert in 
October, Reuter would be "quoted" as evidence that "22,000 
houses in Plymouth have been destroyed by VI or so heavily damaged 
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that they cannot be repaired". 
120 Not a single V weapon had, 
in fact, landed on this city. As time went on, the discrepancy 
between facts and propaganda claims grew greater. In a Front 
Report broadcast of 22 August, for example, it was asserted 
that the damage caused by the VIs was four to five times greater 
than that caused by the Luftwaffe blitz of 1940. At the same 
time as the Allies were sweeping across the heart of France and 
Paris itself was about to be liberated, it was stated in this 
same radio programme: 
"Nobody can conceal that this'German long- 
range weapon is a military instrument which 
paralyses production, interferes with transport, 
dislocates supplies to the front in France and 
seeks and finds; its military objectives because 
behind it are a live mind and will, not the 
blind chance that governs the terror raids. " 
121 
Naturally, the decisive events that were taking place in 
France proved to have a stronger effect on the German public 
than all the assurances of Nazi propagandists. That the new 
weapon had been totally incapable of holding up the Allied 
advance was-considered the best proof of its strategic 
ineffectivness. After having been encouraged to view the VI 
in the context of military developments in western Europep the 
German people were now being forced to draw conclusions that had 
little in common with propaganda expectations. It was very 
difficult to imagine what, if any, visible results the weapon 
122 had really had. Many were duakfounded when the VI ceased to 
be portrayed as decisive and detected a contradiction to the 
claims of the previous winter: 
"First of all, we were told that we do not 
simply wish to pay back ruins with ruins, but 
to employ a weapon decisive for the outcome of 
the war. " 
123 
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Now, of course, -it was being recognised that the much lauded 
Vergeltung had, in fact, only managed to answer ruins with 
ruins and absolutely nothing else. What is more, the marked 
inclination of German propagandists to link the VI with 
developments on the Invasion front had a quite unintended 
effect. People accepted the argument that there was, indeed, 
a link between the two but interpreted it in a negative way; 
the Allied advance, if continued, would prove fatal to all 
hopes of future Vergeltung. They asked: 
"What will happen to the VI and future V-weapons 
when we are pushed further and further away 
from the English coast? , 
124 
Although the re 
* 
turn to a more dramatic style of reporting 
in August, along with the publication of the first official 
pictures of the VI, was able to rekindle the faded hopes of 
125 
some, the general mo6d of late July and August can be described 
as one of tremendous disappointment. Few still believed in the 
decisive importance of the "doodle-bug" and many began to doubt 
the veracity of the reports being published. The entire 
propaganda effort was being dismissed by some Germans as "a 
126 
sedative for the people". Finally, many deduced quite 
correctly from the fact that the OKW-, Bericht had failed to 
mention "VI fire on London" on two successive days in early 
September that the Allies had captured the launching sites 
127 
Looking back on the whole Vergeltung propaganda of the 
preceding months, the Generalstaatsanwalt of Naumberg commented 
in his September report: 
"The retaliation propaganda inevitably led to 
exaggerated expectations, which, in the long 
run, the VI itself was bound to disappoint. , 
128 
Few Nazi state or Party officials would have ventured such a 
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true and damning general judgement of Goebbels' propaganda. 
Many criticised but restricted their criticism to details or 
individual occurrences. 
D. THE V2""ATTACK, SEPTEMBER 1944 - MARCH 1945 
By the end of July the VI had for most Germans come to 
represent a vanished hope. But, there were still many who 
earnestly hoped that new and more powerful weapons would 
accomplish what the VI had failed to accomplish. In fact, very 
soon after the beginning of VI operations hopes were beginning 
to centre on the V2, the employment of which was commonly thought 
to be imminent 
129 
Quite fantastic rumours about its nature and 
capabilities were in circulation 
130 
According to a report of 24= 
July, expectations about the coming V2 weapon were high: 
"The greatest part of the population explains 
I 
that a decisive turn in the war can really come 
only with the employment of new and splendid 
secret weapons and only if we are able to employ 
these weapons very soon. " 
131 
I 
The very same division in public opinion was said to have emerged 
as in the months preceding the launching of the first VI. Once 
again, the German people was split right down the middle between 
the optimists who believed in the imminent appearance of new 
and awesome-secret weapons and the pessimists who mockingly 
uttered that it would certainly take a year for preparations 
for the V2 to be completed 
132 
Propagandists did not wish to burn their fingers a second 
time. Nevertheless, at the very same time as they were 
exalting the virtues of the VI back in late June, they had made 
triumphant forecasts as to the capabilities of further weapons 
that were to follow. Goebbels, in particular, who otherwise 
claimed to be pursuing a path of discrete caution, boasted in 
Das Reich on 23 June: 
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"We shall again employ new weapons of still more 
powerful affect at that moment we shall consider 
most suitable'. " 
133 
It was as if the "failure" of the VI, the advance of the Anglo- 
Americans in northern France and the start of a new Red Army 
offensive had all conspired to persuade Nazi propagandists that 
they would have to make the most of the V2 which as yet was not 
in operation. At the-'end of July Goebbels was gloating: 
"A short time ago, I saw modern German weapons 
which did not make my heart beat more quickly, 
but rather made it stand still for a moment. " 
His readers were assured that only a "minority" were still in 
"the testing stage" and that "the majority are already in process 
134 
of production". Semmler displayed the same confidence: 
"The relation of VI to V2, however, is about that 
of a Mosquito raid to a mass bombardment by 1000 
four-engined bombers. , 135' 
With such predictions being made, it is perhaps understandable 
why so many Germans fell victim to "miracle weapon" propaganda 
a second time. I 
During August a new propaganda argument came to the fore. 
The swift Anglo-American and Soviet advances were now depicted 
as a last desperate-attempt by Germany's enemies to end the war 
before the Reich was ready to employ the dreaded new secret .. 
weapons. 
"The enemy knows what to expect from these new 
weapons. He knows that there is no other 
means of rescue than to get the production 
factories and launching bases under his control. 
Every day gained and every square kilometre held 
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thanks to German resistance power means that 
the enemy has moved one step nearer his doom. 
.... WetAll defend this time gap needed for the 
completion of our new weapons with our teeth 
and claws .... Never before were we so near victory 
as we are today. , 
136 
This argument does not seem to have convinced many and morale 
in Germany at this time was dominated by the depressing spectre 
,, 137 of "enemy superiority in all fields . 
In September Goebbels decided on a round-about turn in 
policy. It was now realized that the V2 would prove to be of 
little more than nuisance value and it would therefore be utterly 
foolish, if not suicidal, to nourish fantastic hopes that could 
never be fulfilled. German propagandists now followed a path 
of silence. Talk of future secret weapons became taboo for the 
138 
mass-media. This policy was so total that news of the V2 attack 
on London, which commenced on 8 September, was held back for 
almost two months. It was very ironic indeed that, after having 
built up hopes that a new and more revolutionary weapon was on 
the way, Nazi leaders now thought it inexpedient to inform the 
German people of the start, of operations. In their assessment 
of the state of morale at this time, they must have considered 
it preferable to put up with the pervading atmosphere of dou bt 
and gloom than to risk a repetition of what had happened in June. 
When the OKW finally informed the German public in November, the 
139 
newspapers were told not to give the matter too much prominence. 
The weeks before the announcement were marked by a growing 
impatience, as had been the case in the months that preceded the 
launching of the first VIs 
140 This time, however, there was the 
remarkable situation that, at the same time as V2 rockets were 
falling almost daily on the British capital, doubts of the 
existence of the V2 and other new weapons were increasing and 
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there was a growing tendency to adopt the view that the whole 
matter-was nothing more than propaganda bluff 
141 
A lowly 
Zellenleiter in Frankfurt reported on 30 September: I 
"The VI operation has now been shown to be 
useless. Consequently, the conclusion is 
already being drawn that future retaliation 
weapons will, in the same way, come too late. 
This realisation makes the population extremely 
anxious. " 
He then went on to draw a rather remarkable parallel between 
belief in eternal life and in retaliation. 
"It can be seen quite clearly that belief in 
the leadership and its assurances is not so 
firmly anchored as the belief in God - who 
has never been seen - or, more exactly, the 
belief in the promises and threats by the 
Church regarding life after death. 1,142 
The rather sudden change in official propaganda policy did not 
go unnoticed: 
"Whilst the population had previously been 
annoyed that too much was being written and 
said about the new weapons, the present official 
, 143 silence has created complete disappointment'* 
Hence, the population still wanted to hear about the things in 
which it increasingly doubted. 
The first news of the V2's employment naturally boosted 
hopes, "even if this is not so evident as at the. *beginning of 
VI operations. " But the joy almost at once turned sour when 
it was learned that the V2 had been in operation for several 
weeks. This led to the conclusion being drawn that, if it had 
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been in use for such a long time without anyone noticing it, 
then its impact could not have been very great, to say the 
least 144 As had been the case with the VI, the disappointment 
was partly attributable to the fact that the V2 had been 
expected to provide immediate relief to the hard-tried 
inhabitants of the blitzed German towns. 
"After hearing the various predictionsp people 
were convinced that the retaliation weapons, 
which are being used at present against London 
and other areas, would force the enemy to stop 
his attacks on German towns. As this hope has 
not been realised and, in fact, the bombardment 
of German towns and industrial plants has been 
stepped up, people are now also beginning to 
doubt the effectiveness of the new weapons 
promised for the future, , 
145 
Although in the following weeks news of V2's employment against 
enemy front-line prositions in Antwerp and Paris was generally 
welcomed, expectations never reached the height they had done 
146 in the case of VI. The subsequent disappointment was hence 
much less pronounced. It really seems that the decision to 
delay news of the launching of V2 operations had paid off and 
had acted as a kind of innoculation against excessive optimism. 
In fact, the V2 remained for most Germans essentially of 
incidental interest, all the more so as the war drew near their 
frontiers. 
But it is surprising how many people were prepared to make 
the same mistake a third time. Within a few days of the first 
official announcement of V2 operations, speculation of "U" and 
further "wonder weapons" was rife. A large part of the German 
people found it difficult to live without the "drug". The 
Oberlandesgerichtsprdsident of Bamberg reported: 
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"The launching of V2 aroused a certain feeling 
of satisfaction, but the Volk is waiting for 
more effective weapons which, above all, will 
roughly offset the enemy superiority in the 
air and in heavy ground weapons. Great hopes 
are also being placed on the employment of new 
kinds of fighter planes. , 
147 
How strongly hope and pessimism were intertwined is demonstrated 
in a report of the Regierungsprdsident of Regensburg, compiled 
on 11 December: 
"Although the employment of the V2 was awaited 
anxiously and welcomed, it has not hitherto 
had any great effect on morale, because its 
effects have pot been sufficiently evident. 
People have also become sceptical regarding 
the employment of further weapons but discuss 
the subject, however, in great detail. 
Rumours about their expected effect and 
construction are taken up eagerly and passed 
on. None the less, the fear is widespread 
that they could come toolate. 11 
148 
The rather sober response to the V2 was encouraged by the 
rather hesitant propaganda treatment during the first few days 
after the announcement. The press derided the utopians who 
believed that-death rays or a single bomb could destroy the 
whole of Britain at one blow 
149 Nevertheless, exagg 
. 
erated 
accounts of the effects ' of 
V29 mainly from alleged neutral 
sources, did creep increasingly into propaganda content. The 
same phenomenon was now to be observed, as in the case of 
treatment of VI. Once announced, it was virtually impossible 
to resist the temptation to publish accounts magnifying the 
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weapon's capabilities. There was sure to be a ready audience. 
Short-term effect was thus permitted to override long-term 
considerations yet again. As early as 11 November, Swedish 
it eye-witnesses" were quoted to the effect that about 600 houses 
were being damaged by each rocket150 In the weeks to come the 
claims were to become more and more fantastic. On Christmas 
Eve 1944, the newspaper reader was presented with the following 
description suppos. edly coming from the mouths of "eye-witnesses" 
who had left London for Lisbon: 
"the devastation caused by the V2 is much greater 
than the destruction caused by the VI. The 
Houses of Parliamenthave been badly damaged. 
No building is still standing within a 500 
metre radius of Leicester Square. Anot her 
even bigger square, Piccadilly Circusp is 
devastated. , 151 
The propensity shown to ascribe such reports to neutral or even 
enemy information sources, as if wishing to underline the 
credibility of the claims, was to become increasingly marked in 
the following months. Perhaps it was itself an unconscious 
official recognition of the sceptical attitude of so many 
Volksgenossen to their own mass media. The picture of unmitigated 
disaster coming from the fronts that autumn and early winter 
probably acted as an additional driving force, pushing Nazi 
propagandists still further away from their initial caut ion. 
These German rockets provided the only glimmer of hope on an 
otherwise very ýIeak horizon. Moreover, propaganda "touches" 
would be less easily detectable for the masses than in reports 
from other theatres of war, where German soldiers were themselves 
witnessing the fatal developments taking place all around the 
borders of the Reich and even within them. The amount of V2 
propaganda, however, never approached that of the VI propaganda 
t 
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the previous summer. But the claims made were somewhat wilder. 
In the first three months of the new year, Nazi 
propagandists inflated reports of 
such a degree that many must have 
British capital had really become 
4 the definite impression was given 
had been considerably stepped up. 
contradiction to the truth. On 2' 
the effects of V2 attack to 
concluded that life in the 
intolerable. What was more, 
that the bombardment of England 
This was in stark 
L January, for example, 
listeners to the breakfast-time news bulletin were treated to a 
report ostensibly describing the experiences of a diplomat who 
had just arrived in Spain: 
"During the last 80 days, the V bombardment of 
Southern England and London has been considerably 
intensified, and by the employment of the V2 its 
terrible effects have been increased. - Hundreds 
of V missiles descend on London daily .... When a 
V2 explodes, the whole of London quakes - the 
effects are similar to those caused by an earth- 
quake. , 
152 
In fact, in the winter of 1944-5, very few "doodlebugs" were 
getting through the defences and an average of only 1-2 V2s a 
day were falling on London. This was not to stop Goebbels 
promising a further strengthening of the V-bombardmento as well 
as its extension to other parts of the United Kingdom, as late 
as 28 February 
153 
The German radio was audacious enough to 
inform its listeners that V-missiles were reaching Scotland and 
to cite the "British Information Service" as its source 
154 In 
March, "moral" values were attributed to Vergeltung: 
"It is a question here of something more than 
retaliation - it is, at the same time, a 
European necessity. In the same way as someone 
with appendicitus can be helped most quickly 
and effectively by the correct surgical treatment 
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the removal of the appendix, Englandý will mean 
Europe's recovery to health. It can no longer 
be tolerated that our continent is thrown into 
crises time and time again by England. In this 
respect, Germany is thus the executor of the 
European will to live. It is the doctor who 
removes the root of the disease. " 
155 
I One interesting feature of the V-propaganda in the early 
days of 1945 was the fleeting attempt at exploiting the class- 
factor. Salvage workers, for instance, were said to be 
stationed in "the most elegant districts of London" and to have 
been allotted "the task of guarding the property of the upper 
class, in as far as it has not already been destroyed by V 
bombs". The-British police were also reported to be finding it 
impossible to contend with the mobs of criminals out looting in 
the devastated areas 
156 
It is also worth mentioning the increasing resort to 
Mundpropaganda, a subject to be treated in detail in the next 
chapter. It represented the intentional planting of "white" 
rumours. Realising the power the common rumour was enjoying, Nazi 
propagandists decided to utilise it fo ,r their own morale-boosting 
purposes. The following is an extract from a Mundpropaganda 
directive dealing with the subject of Vergeltungp which was 
drawn up in December 1944: 
"The strategic importance of the V2 has been 
underlined by itq successful use against the 
British bomb depot in Burton-on-Trent. This 
underground depot, in which several thousand 
'terror bombs were stored, was detonated by a 
V2. The German long-range weapon broke straight 
through its covering consisting of soil and 
concrete. The, depot is situated in the Midlands, 
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but even this distance did not protect it from 
the range and accuracy of the V2. , 
157 
The mention of "terror bombs" most probably represents a 
conscious attempt to demonstrate a connection between the V- 
bombardment and-the burden the German people was finding most 
difficult to bear - the enemy bombing offensive. This type of 
propaganda seems to have enjoyed a certain success as a report 
of 19 December shows 
158 
The official propaganda, howeverg met with growing pessimism, 
although there is reason to believe that the Ardennes offensive 
of December 1944 temporarily bolstered hopes in secret weapons, 
present and future. On 28 December, for instancep it was 
reported: 
"As giost people expect the employment of new 
revolutionary weapons, as well as a more marked 
military effect of the V-bombardmentg a completely 
new perspective seems to be entering into people's 
picture of the war. All this is usually equated 
with certain final victory for Germany. "159 
This probably, however, represented little more than an 
extension of the general eup4oria at the news of the German 
counter-offensive to other aspects of the war. It is interesting 
to note that in January, when it was already obvious that the 
German attack had failed,. talk of further secret weapons was 
160 being dismissed as "fairy tales". Once again, the population 
had become more realistic in its appraisal of the situation: 
"The bombardment of London is no longer so 
important with the Red menace standing on 
one's own doorstep - just in front of 
Germany's frontiers. " 
161 
As has been mentioned above, success was also judged in terms 
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of the effect the V2 had on the bombardment of German towns by 
the British and American air-forces. This had continued as if 
nothing had happened on the other side of the Channel and had 
even been stepped up quite viciouslyv as Dresden so painfully 
experienced. Interest in the V2 diminished and the weapon 
came, to represent yet another lost hope. Nor does the German 
people appear to have been taken in by propaganda claims. In 
fact, the popular view of the weapon was much nearer the facts 
than the picture painted by the official propaganda. It was 
being said, and quite rightly, that "the enemy raids carried 
out in one night are more effective than all what the V-weapons 
, 162 succeed in accomplishing in England in one month'. A report 
from Halle was even more scathing: 
"What the enemy air force has destroyed in 
Magdeburg, Dresden and Chemnitz in a period 
of ten days is out of all proportion to the 
damage caused in London and southern England 
by V-weapons. One has the impression that it 
is no more than a kind of superfluous game 
designed to cover up the failure of the German 
Luftwaffe. " 163 
The German propagandists did do their very best to counter 
these*doubts and criticism, but this was no easy task at a time 
when every German-- civilian and soldier - had been called 
upon to defend his very home and family. In a radio talk of 8 
January, Semmler expressed his understanding of the mood of 
great disappointment that had arisen: 
"It is true that the enemy air terror during 
the last few weeks has shown anything but a 
reduction of intensity and that Vl and V2 
have, therefore, not been-able to induce the 
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enemy to stop his barbaric acts. It is, 
however, easier to bear a slap in the face if 
one can give one's assailant a powerful punch 
in reply. " 
Listeners were then assured that the two V-weapons in operation 
were far from being obsolete and that they were, in fact, 
depriving the fighting fronts of entire divisions and valuable 
fighter pilots. he maintained that life-in London 
"is definitely exposed-to greater dangers than in our bombed 
towns. " 164 
Despite such assurances, the readiness to believe in 
"wonder weapons" decreased rapidly in the first months of 1945. 
According to a report from Bamberg, dated 23 February 1945: 
"Very little is now being said about the 
employment of new weapons, which had been 
the subject of numerous rumours and utterances 
over a long period in the recent past. 1,165 - 
In April it was reported that "people can no longer believe. in 
anything" the leadership said and were asking sarcastically: 
, 
"Where are the new weapons then, which, according 
to one of his articles in Das Reich, had made 
Dr. Goebbels' hair stand'on end? , 
166 
But the belief in further miraculous secret weapons did 
survive here and there and was to remain a factor in German 
morale to the very end. It had come to stand for something 
very vague indeed and something veryhard to describe - an 
irrational hope that something might come which would prevent 
the worst happening. Even many of those people, who were 
apparently resigned to the fateful course of developments, did 
not wish to give up this very last - inkling of a hope that was 
harboured at the back of their minds. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
The retaliation theme can naturally not be seen in1solation 
from war events as a whole. Military developments were not 
only important in determining the amount of attention Nazi 
propagandists gave to the subject but also in determining popular 
response both to the V-attack and the propaganda portrayal. It 
is often a difficult task to decide how far depression or 
optimism in regard to Vergeltung was influenced by the appraisal 
of the overall military situation or to what extent the 
appraisal of the military situation was influenced by attitude 
to Vergeltung'. The extraction of one particular propaganda 
theme and the examination of the popular response to it is 
therefore not without its inherent dangers. 
Above all, the question of retaliation propaganda cannot 
be isolated from the much wider question of the air war. 
Throughout the period under study in this chapter the vital 
link existing between Vergeltung and the Anglo-American bombing 
offensive against Germany as a factor determining response and 
attitude emerges to the surface. It was-shown in the last 
chapter that all compensatory argumentsp apart from retaliation, 
were virtually predestined to failure In the Germany of 1943-4, 
since it was in impossible task to convince--the inhabitants of 
a city, that had just witnessed the frightful effect of a 
thousand-bomber raid, that enemy bombing was of no importance 
whatsoever in deciding the final outcome of the war. Only a 
theme that contained an inborn guarantee of an end to enemy 
raiding had any chance of success. And it is exactly this that 
bestowed the Vergeltung theme at first with such persuasivev if 
at the same time highly explosive, qualities. The examination 
of the retaliation theme in this chapter shows once again how 
closely war events were judged in terms of the expected effect 
on the life of the individual. The factors determining 
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propaganda response were of a highly personal nature. Of 
course, * by the end of 1943 Vergeltung had come to represent 
for so many the very guarantee of victory or at least a 
favourable end to the war, but this at the same time was 
associated above all in people's minds with relief from the 
terrible burden of enemy bombing. The more intense the raiding 
became, all the more pronounced was the propensity to ascribe 
decisive importance to Vergeltung. It was the substitute for 
military success which in better days had been regarded as the 
fundamental guarantee of future victory. 
From the point of view of the leadershipq Vergeltung must 
have appeared a most promising theme, there being no need for 
an immediate confirmation of propaganda claims in facts. But 
this was to invite people to-think for themselves. What they 
were not told about the weapon - and they were told precious 
little - they tried to ascertain by a fervent employment of 
their imaginations. The'result-has'been described above. When 
the new weapon did not turn up within the short period expected, 
extreme optimism turned into outright dejection*and despondency 
almost overnight. The essentially emotional nature of this 
hope in retaliation was the main factor responsible for this 
ambivalence. Spasmodic bursts of enthusiasm could be aroused 
by one mere mention in the speech of a political leader-whilst 
the failure to repeat the-same promise in another speech was 
sufficient to cast the listeners into a mood of deep 
depression, the like of which-had never before been experienced. 
Such a theme in which something apparently incidental was 
enough to swing emotions from one extreme to the other could 
hardly be relied upon, by' the Nazi propagandists to retain its 
effect. Things would certainly not have been so bad if the 
German people had not been kep t waiting for so long. The 
apparent advantage of this form of propaganda - concentrating 
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and directing attention to an event in the future - could only 
prove successful for a short time. Whereas the leadership 
measured the future in terms of months and even years, for the 
civilians it was a question of weeks and even days. Every day 
that went by without the-fulfilment of the promise meant another 
night in which they had to fear for their lives. 
The crucial importance that came to be ascribed to 
Vergeltung-meant that the population became even more sensitive 
in its appraisal of propaganda content. - Every written or 
spoken word was scrutinised in order to detect the propaganda 
intention or to find some clue as to the date of the great event. 
The many changes in propaganda treatment of retaliation did not 
go unnoticed. By promising Vergeltung, the leadership was, in 
fact, inviting the civilian population to examine closely every 
move of the propaganda organisation. This, in the long run 
would only make them more aware of being the target of 
manipulation. Once the secret workings of Nazi propaganda were 
exposed to view, Nazi propagandists would find it extremely 
difficult to reach the goals they set themselves. The case of 
Vergeltung propaganda shows once again quite clearly that one 
of the basic maxims of Nazi propaganda theory - the more often 
you say the same thing, the more likely you are to produce the 
desired effect - no longer held water. Repetition of the. same 
old promise only served to exasperate the hard-tried populhtions 
to divulge the propaganda intention and to diminish trust in the 
leadership and its information apparatus. On the other hand, 
once'Vergeltung, had been promised, there was little the 
propagandists could do to prevent the issue getting out of 
hand. Silence was no alternative and had an even more 
devastating effect than a policy of repetition. Only 
retaliation in action and a retaliation that would fulfil all 
the high-flung hopes could provide the solution to the problem 
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and relieve the propagandists of their nightmare. Buts in 
1944 this was no-longer possible! 
The main strength of the Vergeltung propaganda was that 
it was concerned with something that lay in the realm of the 
unknown. This was quite the opposite to the case of 
conventionql'bombing. The German people's own bitter experience 
provided it with a measuring stick for judging the effectiveness 
of Luftwaffe raids. This became clear at the time of the "Baby 
Blitz" on London when the Germans refused to allow themselves 
to be electrified by the glowing and gloating accounts of their 
own mass media. It was not so much the realisation that the 
reporting was considerably exaggerated but more the simple fact 
"normal bombing" lay within the realm of the known. They knew 
all too well that the effects could be frightful but they were 
also aware that, 'however heavy the raids werep they were unable 
to change the course of the war. Only something quite new and 
different - the-harbinger of a future and unknown world - could 
do it. Vergeltung came to be endowed with almost mystic 
qualities. It alone would do the trick. 
The advent of the V1 was proof that Vergeltung, did really 
exist, but for the German people its spectacular and 
revolutionary nature was very soon much less important than the 
concrete results that were expected of it. In those first two 
or three days of V1 attack, the readiness to believe, which had 
enabled the leadership, in the preceding months to re-stimulate 
apparently lost hope time and-time again, now manifested itself 
in virtual euphoria. But the'. 1eadership could only manage to 
conceal the truth for a few days. As soon as it was realised 
that nothing had changed or was likely to change in the near 
future, a wave'of bitter disappointment swept the land which 
threatened to ruýture any remaining faith in the mass media and 
leadership. Nevertheless, there were still many people who were 
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willing to let-themselves be deceived a second time by promises 
of further V-weapons. But the fact that the V2 did not create 
the same bitter feeling of having been let down perhaps shows 
that many Germans- had been put on their guard and, by spotting 
propaganda intentions, were protecting themselves from falling 
victim to the same "foul trick" a second time. Of course, it 
must not be forgotten that the propagandists themselves soon 
recognised their initial folly in promising new'V-weapons and 
had drawn the right consequences by the beginning of September 
1944. By-decidinj to connect both VI and V2 to military 
developments on the Invasion front, they did much to take the 
"magic" out of the weapons. It was, at the same time, a great 
risk which did not pay off. Quite unwittingly, they provided 
the population with a new criterion for measuring the success 
of "retaliation". What was more, they were transfer-king V- 
weapons from an unknown to a known front. In London there were 
no "eyewitnesses" who could constitute an unofficial information 
source, but in France, on the other hand, German soldiers could 
provide their relatives at home with a first-hand account of 
events. The rout of the Wehrmacht was less easy to disguise than 
the declining bombardment of the British capital. From being 
the replacement for military fortune and the rectifier of 
military misfortune, Vergeltung was being debased and degraded 
into just another new-fangled military weapon for use at the 
front. 
It would naturally be very tempting to exaggerate the 
significance of retaliation propaganda as a factor in 
maintaining civilian morale at such a critical time. It 
indubitably contributed a lot by distracting troubled minds 
away from the terrible reality. -Butýother factors were just as 
important in preventing a collapse of morale - the fear of an 
uncertain future under Russian occupation (above all, in the 
east), the traditional respect for authority, the power of the 
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secret police, etc. But most of these other factors were of a 
purely negative nature. It was Vergeltung that, despite all 
changes of mood, -enabled so many Germans to retain their hope 
that something somehow might turn up to change the whole face 
of the war. The disastrous developments on the military fronts 
did not go unnoticed but thanks to Vergeltung propaganda the 
hope of - as opposed to the firm belief in - victory managed 
to survive them. -The main strength of this propaganda lay in 
its very vagueness which allowed people's fantasies to fill in 
the missing detail. In spite of all recurring doubts in the 
long period of waiting and the deep disappointment that was 
felt after the VI finally appeared, some of these vague thoughts, 
which really represented no more than a tiny hope that some- 
thing might turn up to prevent the worst happening, were to 
continue to influence German morale right up to April 1945. 
That extreme situations can cause a remarkable distortion of 
sound judgement is shown by the reaction of the German leaders 
and their entourage to the news of President-Roosevelt's-death. 
What can one expect of humbler folks who possessed only a 
fraction of the information at the disposal of the leadership 
and consequently had a much more fragmented picture of 
developments as a whole. This is not designed as an attempt to 
contradict the very real and widespread defeatism which was so 
characteristic of the German morale landscape at the end of the 
war, but an attempt to show how contradictory any two opinions 
of any one . person at any one time can be in such an extraordinary 
situation as that of 1944-5. It serves as a warning not to 
judge emotions in what must have appeared an irrational world 
rationally. Finally, it must be remembered that the 
traditional respect for authority meant that many Germans just 
could not accept the fact that their leaders would lie and 
deliberately lead them astray at a time of such grave national 
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crisis. The higher the speaker's position in the political 
hierarchy, all the more pronounced was the tendency to take 
his prophetic utterance at its face value. ' This would also 
help to explain Hitler's ability to reawaken the almost 
vanished belief in Vergeltung 
, 
with just a few words in 
September and November 1943.167 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE LAST MONTHS (OCTOBER 1944 - MAY 1945) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is concerned with Nazi propaganda during the last 
eight months of the war. On the evening of September 8,1944v 
the western frontier of the Reich was'crossed for the first 
time by a patrol of American troops. The entire western front 
had collapsed in August. The liberation of Paris in August had 
been followed by a retreat even more rapid than the German--, 
advance in the early summer of 1940. Brussel's fell on 3 
September and Antwerp one day later. It now seemed certain that 
the war would be over by Christmas. ' But the Allies were soon to 
meet with an unexpectedly strong resistance on the German 
frontier and it took the Americans to 24 October to capture 
their first German city, Aachen, which fell only after a bloody 
battle. 
The Nazis were now making an all-out attempt to rally 
Germany's strength. Goebbels announced a second "Total War" - 
more total than the first one of 1943. After having to wait 18 
monthsp Goebbels'had finally been appointed "Reich 
Plenipotentiary for,, Total War" on 25 July. He had promised 
Hitler an additional one million soldiers within three months 
and proceeded to free German industry and the state 
administration of all but'really indispensable workers 
'' 
for- 
the front. In a radio broadcast of 26-July he had pledged 
himself to carrying out a radical adaptation of the whole of 
public life to the needs of "total war"" The toughening in 
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German resistance three months later was a fruit of these 
measures, although more important perhaps was the fact that 
every soldier was now defending the soil of his fatherland. On 
16 October 1944 the formation of the Volkssturm- a type of Home 
Guard - was decreed. Boys between 15 and. 18 and men up to 60 
years old were now called upon to defend the fatherland. 
The Rtindstedt Offensive in the Ardonnes'which began on 16 
December showed that-the Reich was still capable of providing 
surprises although incapable I of inflicting grave wounds. Seven 
days later it was already clear that the offensive had failed 
in its aim of neutralising the military threat in the West. 
, 
Nor had the Soviets been inactive. The Russian offensive 
which had begun on 15 June 1944 had brought the Red Army to the 
borders of East Prussia. But after capturing the town of 
Goldap, it was pushed back by the 5th Panzer Division. The 
Soviets then thrust forward in the south. The occupation of 
Bulgaria in September was followed by a swift advance into 
Rumania and Hungary. Nor did the respite for East Prussia last 
long. On 12 January 1945 th6 Soviets launched an offensive of 
unparallelled severity. Not only was the land link between 
East Prussia and the Reich broken but the Red Amy proceeded to 
advance into Silesia, calling a halt to their advance only on 
the banks of the Oder, an hour's train ride from Berlin. The 
Red Army had advanced 220 miles in a fortnight. Meanwhile the 
Allies in the West had crossed the Rhine in March and, after 
encircling Model's Army Group in the Ruhr, pushed forward 
across the North German Plains, reaching the Elbe on 11 April. 
This period has been chosen for a study of propaganda 
effect because every German was now forced to face the whole 
might of the enemy onslaught. In the period October 1944 - 
May 1945 Germany became the battlefield and military events 
were of immediate concern to every individual German, whether 
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he lived in the raid-weary towns or the comparatively untouched 
countryside. The air war had already shown the difficulty the 
propagandists had in combatting the evidence the Allies gave of 
their strength by their nightly visits over the Reich. Now the 
existence of the homeland was at stake. If Nazi propaganda were 
now to be successful, it would not suffice to induce a spirit 
of fanatical resistance and to minimise enemy successes, but it 
would also have to show how victory or at least a favourable 
end to the war could be achieved. This strategy of inducing 
resistance through a propaganda of fear and the portrayal of 
Germany's chances in a propaganda of hope and consolation 
provides the basic theme of this chapter. The propagandists 
certainly now realised that in such a situation precious little 
could be done to improve the general mood of the population. 
They should try instead to procure the correct behaviour, 
characterised by the. fanatical resistance which arises from 
the recognition of the fundamental need to carry on the fight. 
Before the various propaganda themes are dealt with in 
detail, it' is necessary to sketch the general picture of morale 
during these final months. The considerably high hopes that 
had been attached to the German defences in France and to the 
beginning of the VI attacks were very soon dashed. The shock 
and astonishment at the speed of the Allied advance through 
northern France and Belgium led to a new low in morale. Steinert 
nevertheless maintains that morale was still higher than in the 
2 
spring and summer of 1943, but this contention would be very 
difficult to prove. There was certainly an improvement with 
the unexpected stiffening of German resistance on the Reich 
frontier, but moralt remained at a comparatively low ebb. The 
formation of the Volkssturmappears to have had a very depressing 
effect. Manv reý-Yarded it as "the last continzent', 
3 
and as 
proof that the war'was irretrievably lostý Despite the cautious 
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propaganda at the beginning of the Ardennes offensive, many 
Germans nurtured exaggerated hopes, believing a repetition of 
5 
the events of 1940 was possible. Party members were once again 
proud of displaying their Party badges - whereas only shortly 
6 before they had been ashamed to wear them. The greater the 
hopes attached to the western offensive, all the greater was the 
subsequent disappointment. German propaganda had prepared the 
population for a new Soviet offensive but its very momentum 
took both the propagandists and their audience by surprise and 
started a fall in morale which could no longer be checked. In 
the weeks that followed, the morale reports point to a growing 
feeling of apathy and powerlessness in the face of events. 
Whatever one might do and however hard one might work, the 
inevitable could not be staved off. This feeling naturally 
intensified the further the Allies advanced into the Reich. For 
the first time morale reports spoke of a break in Haltung. This 
is the unfavourable background to the last desperate struggle 
of the Nazi propagandists. 
B. PROPAGANDA THEMES 
As Allied troops reached German territoryl it was quite clear 
that Nazi propaganda would now have to concentrate on pointing 
out the terrible effects an enemy victory would have. The very 
survival of the nation-was at stake. A propaganda of fear was 
meant to arouse a spirit of determination, but if enemy 
strength was portrayed in too, vivid colours this could easily 
lead to a feeling of desperation and hopelessness. Nazi 
propaganda had therefore to point to the chances Germany still 
had. The efforts of state propagandists at this closing stage 
of the war are characterised by the attempt' to find the right 
balance between a propaganda of fear and a propaganda of hope 
and consolation. The latter was certainly more difficult to 
contrive, because the Allied advances across the Reich were a 
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constant reminder of growing enemy strength. 
The PropaZanda of Stren. &, Lh 
Throu, &h Fear 
Since Stalingrad Nazi propaganda had never ceased depicting 
the dire consequences of a German defeat. The very repetition 
of these warnings would seem to demonstrate their limited 
effectiveness. As the war situation deteriorated, the tendency 
to preoccupy oneself with a possible defeat situation and one's 
own survival chances - already recorded in the early months of 
1943 - became more and more pronounced. At the time of the fall 
of the Duce in July 194i more people than ever before were 
beginning to contemplate a future Anglo-American occupation. 
Some regarded such a prospect as not at all bad and even as an 
improvement on the situation then existing? In Austria and 
Bavaria some people were speculating about a future south German 
monarchy under "Otto 1"ý As early as the fall of 1943, the 
thought that an end of the war would mean an end to the air-raids 
and the constant anxiety about one's family and friends was 
9 becoming uppermost in people's minds* Goebbels never tired of 
warning against harbouring such fantasies. Defeat, so he 
maintained, would not mean the end of the fighting but instead 
a new major conflict between the enemy powers in which Germany 
would have to provide the necessary cannon-fodderio This 
awesome possibility does not appear to have worried all 
Volksgenossen. In April 1944 the Reichsregierungsprdsident in 
Munich reported a widespread opinion that defeat would not be 
so bad and would certainly not mean the destruction of the 
German people, for the Americans and British would protect it 
from the Russians and prevent the Soviet flood, from inundating 
11 
western Europe. Indeed, according to a report written a few 
months later, many even believed that the Western Powers would 
join Germany in a common struggle against the Bolsheviks, once 
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the Nazis had been defeated. Although Germany would have to 
bear the main burden in this conflict, it would, in return, be 
12 
reward6d',, with favourable peace terms. 
With the first capture of German territory such 
speculations of course grew and also the need to combat them. 
Russian atrocities in East Prussia provided Nazi propagandists 
with ideal material for demonstrating the enemy's lust for 
revenge. It was stressed that all Germans were threatened and 
could expect a like fate should they prove too weak. In its 
treatment of Soviet outrages the German press was to underline 
the fact that it "was simple German workers and farmers who 
were being butchered". Should the Russians advance into the 
Reich, it would not be just the rich landlords and industrialists 
who would be massacred but the very "substance of the people". 
"A systematic and cruel massacre of every single 
German would occur and turn Germany into one 
huge graveyard. , 
13 
But, by exploiting these Russian atrocities in his propaganda, 
Goebbels ran the risk that the population would begin to see 
in the Western Powers the only effective protector against the 
Bolsheviks. Such a favourable disposition towards the West was 
widespread enough for the radio commentator, Semmlerp to warn 
against those weaklings who believe a US occupation would be 
easier to endure, nay, would be even worth striving for, 
compared with a Bolshevik occupation". He went on to attack 
the stupidity of those who had no fear of being occupied 
"because they have always treated their maid-servant from the 
East courteously and have made a present of three frocks and 
three pairs of shoes, or because their brother-in-law was a 
car-washer at the Ford Motor Company or a liftboy in a New York 
, 14 skyscraper'. 
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'Such "illusions" could be prevented only by stressing 
that all Germany's enemies had the same diabolical plans of 
destruction. Here Morgenthau would come to Goebbels' aid. To 
make this propaganda message more credibleý the press was 
1 15 
instructed topLay down the divisions inside the enemy camp. 
Newspaper editors were supplied with "archive material" to 
illustrate what the Allies had in store for a vanquished Reich. 
This propaganda of'fear should become "a sort of continuous 
feature which will remind the reader daily of the dangers that 
threaten him unless he exerts all his energy against his 
16 
enemies". 
There was a great danger that this kind of propaganda might 
lead to panic and a feeling of, hopelessness. In its portrayal 
of the suffering of the east German population the press was 
told to avoid creating such a mood by emphasizing the heroism 
of the inhabitants rather than the gruesome fate of individuals 
17 
The anti-Bolshevik atrocity propaganda was not merely intended 
to arouse horror and outrage but also "a barbaric will to 
resist"'. 
8 
So the German-listeners and readers were now exposed to a 
prolonged propaganda campaign not unlike that at the time of the 
Katyn discoveries. - That the western foes were not forgotten is 
shown by the followingýremark made in a radio broadcast dealing 
with alleged American "atrocities" in occupied areas: 
"A wide gulf separates us from the Americans 
who make paper-knives out of the bones of 
killed Japan`ýse and use their skulls as 
ashtrays. " 
19 
Reports of "Katyns" on German soil were used to back up the 
same arguments that had been used in anti-Bolshevik propaganda 
for years and which have been dealt with in Chapter 4. Great 
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attention was now paid to the visual aspect. Not only did the 
Wochenschau (cinema newsreel) present a vivid picture of Soviet 
barbarity but eye-witnesses - including raped women - were 
brought before the microphone of the Reichsrundfunk. In the 
West, the propagandists' task was naturally much more difficult. 
Evidence of enemy cruelty was not easy to find. Here, stories 
had to be invented in the interest of what Goebbels called 
It poetic truth". This was explained by Semmler: 
"Wherever we only know a little about some event 
or plan or operation of the enemy then - so 
Goebbels says - we shall not be violating the 
truth if we add something to the story to fill 
the gaps. We should describe things as they 
might well have happened or as they probably 
did happen. To put it in Goebbels' own words: 
'We are only helping the public when we call 
imagination to our aid in certain cases where 
the record of the facts is for some reason 
incomplete! 11,20 
In west Germany the first priority of this "fear" 
propaganda was to counter any friendly disposition towards the 
Anglo-Americans. Despite the most intensive efforts of Nazi 
propagandists to inspire fear of the "plutocratic" powers, 
almost all morale reports at the time clearly point to a failure. 
The same remarks were still to be heard regarding an eventual 
enemy occupation. The reply, for instance, to the propaganda 
claim that the Germans would be enslaved was: 
"And what have we got at present? It certainly 
couldn't be any worse. We wouldn't need to work 
any more than we do at present. , 
21 
Workers and tradesmen were heard to say that an Anglo-American 
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occupation would be quite bearable and certainly no worse than 
after the First World War. 
"Americans are said to be interested in not 
destroying anything, for they want to do 
business. " 22 
In September 1944 it was reported that "bourgeois circles" 
were hoping that Germany would be occupied by the Western 
Powers because they "feared the arrival of the Americans less 
, 23 than the possible rule of the mob in the interim period', an 
interesting allusion to class fears of a repetition of the 
attempted revolution of 1918-9. Some were heard to say that 
the Americans and the British "were also human beings". A 
typical-remark was reported by the SD in Mannheim: 
"I am not afraid of the enemy tanks. They have 
better things to do than to shoot an old woman. " 
24 
The propaganda was therefore unable to influence the positive 
image of the western enemies. This failure to arouse fear of 
the British and Americans would account for the considerable 
difficulty the authorities had in persuading the population of 
the areas threatened by the Allied advance to leave their homes. 
They preferred to let the thunder of war "roll over them" than 
be evacuated to a "safe" area. A report of November 1944 
summarised the factors determining this behaviour: 
the great hopes the western population attached to 
the arrival of the British and Americans, 
2. the influence of the clergy, andp 
3. the unfavourable impression given by the German 
troops retreating from the west, often accompanied 
25 by French "camp followers"* 
The attitude of a great part of the west German population may 
thus be summed up in the words: "Peace, the sooner the better". 
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The work of the propagandists was further hampered by the return 
of exchanged prisoners-of-war early in 1945. Those returning 
were "full of praise of the treatment they had experienced in 
, 26 England'. 
This wish of the west Germans to stay at home and stick it 
out was accentuated by the circulation of certain rumours. 
According to, rumours making the rounds in Westphalia, 
Rhinelanders'had had nothing to fear after hoisting the white 
flag on the arrival of enemy troops. In March 1945, SD 
Mnster reported the belief widely held among the population 
of the Ruhr: 
"Submission without resistance seems here to be 
the only possibility of a way out of the dread- 
ful strain of the present air war. " 
27 
In the Rhineland itself the inhabitants of many towns and 
villages not only hoisted white flags but also removed anti- 
tank obstacles to-prevent their streets becoming the scene of 
battle. In the Mayen area the local population sabotaged all 
orders given by the military and proceeded to burn "all 
articles which might point to their having belonged to the 
28 Party". In Siegburg a large group of women marched on the 
army headquarters to demand the soldiers lay down their arms 
and capitulate? 
9 In Frankfurt the American troops were 
received by friendly crowds? 
o Those evacuated from the west 
further inland would appear to have had a very low morale 
indeed. That they made no effort to conceal the fact that they 
were unwilling evacuees is shown by the intentionally - 
ambiguous inscriptions on the trains arriving in Schwerte 
from the west in September 1944: 
"We come from Cologne, Aachen and Trier 
For that we thank yout Fi1hrer! 131 
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Fortification work proved equally unpopular among those who 
32 
stayed behind. Why should the Allied advance be hindered in 
any way? Thus the people of the German Rhineland neither 
defended their homes like a fortress nor did they set "a 
shining example, of courage and resolution", as Goebbels said 
33 
they would. , The Minister put a large part of the blame on 
Wehrmacht troops fleeing from the West: 
"It is hardly surprising if the population 
losesits nerve-when it repeatedly sees- 
retreating bands of soldiers who throw away 
their arms and no longer put up any resistance. " 
34 
The attitude of the north Germans was not much different 
to that of the Rhinelanders. Although the situation in the 
north did not become acute until well into 1945, the inhabitants 
of Hamburg were reported as not fearing occupation by the 
British and Americans. In fact, many people quite welcomed 
the prospect as it would bring an end to the air-raids and, so 
35 
they wrongfully thought, to the miserable food shortages. it 
was being said: 
"the continuation of the war is only a senseless 
slaughter of the-civilian population" and 
"Rather an end with horror than a horror 
, 36 without end'. 
This almost friendly disposition towards the future occupiers 
may also be partly explained by the phenomenon observed in the 
examination of the anti-Bolshevik propaganda campaign of 1943 - 
the need to humanise the enemy if one was to maintain the belief 
in one's own chances of survival after a lost war. This seems 
to be confirmed in the description of the attitude of Berliners 
made by a Swiss reporter in April 1945 when there still seemed 
a chance that the Americans would reach the German capital 
before the Soviets. 
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"A severe regime is expectedt but not inhumanity 
and people prefer to hear hopeful promises, 
rather than read the papers' propaganda on US 
barbarity. , 37 
There is some evidence, however, of a latent fear of 
enemy revenge for Nazi atrocities, knowledge of which appears 
to have been more widespread than is often claimed. According 
to SD Stuttgart, the publicity being given to the atrocities 
perpetrated by the Red Army in the East Prussian village of 
Nemmersdorf was having far from the desired effect. 
"Haven't we killed Jews in their thousands? 
Aren't soldiers always saying that the Jews 
had to dig their own graves? .... But the Jews 
are also human beings. Thus we have shown to all 
our enemies what they should do to us if they 
win. " 
38 
Similarly, a Swiss newspaper article claimed that most Germans 
believed the anti-Soviet atrocity propagandal since these 
outrages were regarded as "retaliation for the horrid crimes of 
the Waffen-SS in Russia", news of which had reached them 
through soldiers coming home on leave? 
9 This apparently 
extensive knowledge of what had happened in Eastern Europe 
would help to explain the remark made in a Party report from 
Detmold that the population was less afraid of the Anglo- 
Americans as such than "the revenge and the hate of the 
40 
returning Jews". A young German arriving in Switzerland early 
in 1945 mentioned the clever exploitation of this apprehension 
by Nazi propaganda. The Germans, so she maintained, were being 
whipped up into a spirit of resistance and perseverence 
through fear of punishment for the crimes of their own 
41 
oppressors. Although this is clearly an exaggerationp it is 
interesting how German propagandists at this time invariably 
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stressed that the Jews would be the "slave-drivers" in a 
42 
vanquished Germany. 
Hence, seen as a whole, anti-western atrocity propaganda 
was largely without effect and enthusiasm for the advancing 
western. Allies was only impaired by vague fears of Jewish 
revenge. This was not true of anti-Bolshevik atrocity 
propaganda. Although this was usually believed, the effect it 
had was often the contrary to the one the propagandists desired 
a strengthening of the determination to fight on to "final 
victory". Reports reaching Goebbels had warned that the anti- 
Soviet propaganda should in no case be allowed to lead to a 
general mood of panic which would only facilitate the Red Army's 
advance 
ý3 
But this is just what happened. In February the 
Gaupropagandaltiter of Halle complained to the Ministry of 
Propaganda that the refugees were hampering military operations, 
thereby aiding the Soviet advance. In short, he disliked the 
44 
atrocity campaign since it created the desire to flee, Even 
local Party offic ials did not remain immune to this panic fear. 
The consequence was that "many villages and towns were being 
abandoned by their able-bodied population without a struggle 
45 
and they fell undefended into the hands of the enemy". 
Furthermore, the claim that Goebbels' anti-Bolshevik 
propaganda was a factor in making the west German population 
welcome the western armies 
46 is substantiated by-several morale 
reports. A report from Vdrzburg of March 1945, for example, 
stated that the citizens were pondering the question "whether 
it would not be better if the Anglo-Americans came; they should 
even be let in before the Bolsheviks, who were to be feared more, 
,, 47. arrived An opinion prevalent in Ndnsterland at the same time 
was "that the Americans should be let in as far as possible 
before the Soviets brought yet further parts of the Reich under 
their controlt, 48 0 Gauleiter Wagner of Karlruhe also reported 
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the popular belief the British and Americans would protect the 
local population from the Russiansý9 In Berlin at the end of 
March there was even joy over news of American advances and 
there was talk of Germany laying down her arms and then marching 
side by side with the Anglo-American armies against the USSR 
?0 
By their vivid portrayal of Soviet barbarity the Nazis had 
thereforeýmanaged only to raise hopes of western generosity. 
Where the population was certain that it would be occupied by 
the British or Americans and not by the dreaded Russians, anti- 
Russian atrocity propaganda was usually ignored or met with 
comparative indifference. 
A very dangerous "boomerang" effect of this atrocity 
campaign was reported by a Nazi functionary at the end of March: 
"Even the portrayal of the abominable Soviet 
behaviour in the German territory they occupy, 
besides invoking fear, has simply led to a 
muffled resentment that our war leadership has 
exposed German people to the Soviet terror. " 
51 
At about the same time, Goebbels noted with alarm a growing 
criticism of "the person of the FUhrer" in letters, sent to h' 
52 
lm* 
Thus, the Nazis rather than the enemy became the focus of 
bitterness -a phenomenon not unlike the reaction to Anglo- 
American bombing. 
Perhaps even more dangerous was the fact that the many 
atrocity stories were making the propaganda audience more aware 
of their powerlessness to do anything that might alter the 
situation they were in. It was for this reason that SD Konstanz 
warned against repeating these accounts too often. Women 
listeners were said to be particularly depressed by reports of 
Soviet cruel ty? 
3 
SD Villingen also pointed to the dangerous 
"mood of desperation" arising from this propaganda 
?4 This 
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unwanted side-effect is further demonstrated by the fact that 
in Berchtesgaden some farmers' wives were getting their Russian 
workers to issue them with certificates of good conduct which 
they could show to the Red Army! 
55 In fact, the "hard-working" 
Ostarbeiter was becoming less a source of hope - as at the time 
of the Katyn propaganda campaign - than a source of fear of 
enemy revenge. Those "cowardly Volksgenossen, who for the sake 
of their future safety, try to become, friendly with their 
foreign 'guests"' were the target of attack in the local German 
press. A particularly bitter attackv for example, was made 
against those "crying women" (Tranenweiber) "who feed their 
Polish harvest helpers with special ham sandwiches just to get 
1156* a seat in the German Soviet paradise . 
No better evidence could be given that this fear propaganda 
was not having the desired effect than that supplied by the 
propaganda content itself. An article appearing early in 1945 
in the SS newspaper, Das Schwarze Korpst shows quite clearly how, 
in anticipation of what was coming, more and more Germans were 
drawing away from the Party and National Socialism. 
"Death awaits all survivors of a lost war - the 
men, the women and the unborn, the workers, the 
farmers, the town dwellerso the soldiers, the 
Nazis and those who would pretend never to have 
been Nazis, Prussians and Austriansv the population 
of Bavaria and Westphalia, Protestants and Catholics 
in the same way as the simple believers in God. , 
57 
Belief in the possibility of living in a defeated Reich 
inevitably implied a very subjective distinction being made 
between Nazi and non-Nazi. This was what the leadership had 
always feared. Hence this warning that all Germans would suffer 
without exception. 
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At the end of March, Goebbels was to admit the failure of 
all his efforts hitherto to instil a hate of the British and 
Americans. He claimed that these western enemies were more 
dangerous than the Soviets "because the naive and the credulous 
easily indulge in foolish illusions regarding them and their 
intentions from which they mostly only awake when it is too 
58 
late". He even thought that the lack of a truly radical anti- 
West propaganda had played its part in the catastrophic 
deterioration in the morale of the west German population? 
9 
But 
this demonstrates one of Goebbels' fundamental faults - to 
interpret all developments in morale as the result of the action 
or inaction of his own propaganda machinery, thereby playing 
down the importance of factors outside his control sphere. 
It was perhaps vanity which created this overestimation of his 
own capabilities. Rather too late, he decided to repeat the 
of success" of atrocity propaganda in the East with intensive 
atrocity propaganda in the West. In the first days of April 
1945, the Minister was busy preparing a directive prescribing 
an invigorated anti-western propaganda campaign. 
"It is the main task of press and radio to make 
it clear to the German people that the western 
. 
enemy powers have the same infamous goals and 
the very same devilish plans of destruction up 
their sleeve as the eastern foe, and that they 
only employ what seem to be more civilised methods 
in order to deceive the German people and to 
lure fools into taking the bait, , 
60 
Despite subsequent instructions to the press, the sudden, more 
aggressive note came too late to do any good. As late as 13 
April when Anglo-American troops had reached the very heart of 
the Reich, the newspapers still remaining under Nazi control 
were ordered to stress the outrages allegedly perpetrated by 
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61 Negro troops in the Franconian town of Iphoven. 
In these very last weeks 
content itself was to provide 
failure to rectify the morale 
stating that the slogan "they 
made out to be" was no longer 
commentator summed up the att: 
in a broadcast of 11 April in 
of the war, the propaganda 
the final evidence of Goebbels' 
situation in the West. After 
are not half so bad as they are 
to be heard in the East, a radio 
Ltude of many people in the West 
the words: 
"If it has to be, let's rather have the British 
and Americans than the Russians. " 
62 
By the end of April Nazi broadcasters had become even franker 
about the failure of their efforts. It was practically 
admitted that the following was a typical reaction to anti- 
Bolshevik atrocity propaganda: 
"To us will come the Americans, the British, 
the French, the peace-loving civilised powers! 
Surely, they will not allow the centre of 
Europe to be left to the Russians. " 
63 
How great the contradiction between this - albeit reluctant - 
realisation of reality and the ideal of a united and determined 
German nation that lay at the basis of all Nazi propaganda only 
shortly before! 
In the last months of the war the Nazis resorted to some 
interesting methods to secure acceptance of the propaganda line. 
One example was the increasing relidnee on well-known soldiers 
and respected military spokemen for delivering the propaganda 
message. The popular "hero". Rehmer, who had been largely 
responsible for putting down the putsch in Berlin on 20 July 
1944, broadcast on the Reichsrundfunk at the beginning of March 
a very gruesome eye-witness account of Bolshevik atrocities 
ý4 
The immediate response was so positive that within a couple of 
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days there were calls from Party leaders for a continued 
employment of soldiers in radio propaganda. According to a 
report of the SD office in Rastatt, many Volksgenossen were less 
aware of a National Socialist bias in talks by soldiers than in 
those given by Party representatives 
65_ 
an interesting admission 
of popular suspicion of both the Party and official propaganda. 
SD Konstanz also reported the greater success of atrocity 
propaganda coming from the mouths of military spokemen, but, 
at the same time, warned that such accounts would only prove 
effective in the long run ifthe Party refrained from repeating 
them too often 
ý6 
Dittmar, too, whose almost factual way of 
discussing military developments had been very much appreciated 
by listeners - including those otherwise highly critical of 
Nazi propaganda - was given an overtly propagandistic function 
in the final stage of the war. On 6 February, for instance, 
he warned his listeners that "the war is not prolonged by those 
people who call for resistance to the utmost" but by those. 
believing "the peace of the graveyard reigning over Germany is 
, 67 the peace they want'. In this resort to "experts" the 
propagandists were, in fact, tacitly admitting that the most 
conventional propaganda forms had proved insufficient and, at 
the same time, demonstrating the Party's faltering prestige. 
In the West even more drastic measures were used to back 
up the fear propaganda. Realising that a visual confirmation 
of the propaganda message would provide the best effectp the 
Reichspropagandaleiter (propaganda chiefs of the Party) decided 
to have the Wehrmacht march captured prisoners-of-war through 
the west German towns. in order to show' how uncivilised and 
barbaric the foe was, the prisoners were not to be allowed to 
wash and shave for days and they were to be forced-marched a 
great distance beforehand. If possible, coloured enemy troops 
were to be used. The exercise was also designed to demonstrate 
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68 the "high" losses sustained by the enemy. 
Such methods, however, were unable to prevent a growing 
preoccupation with the inevitability of defeat and the urgent 
need to believe in the possibility of an acceptable way of life 
in a defeated Reich. With the enemy armies advancing rapidly 
across German territory, fewer and fewer pe6ple wished to 
believe that there was no alternative to death, should Germany 
lose the war. Belief in anti-West propaganda would have meant 
depriving oneself of the one hope still left. As far as "final 
victory" was concerned, who still thought it possible? 
In an assessment of the effect of this propaganda of 
fear, it would be wrong to make any such generalised conclusions 
as Baird has done. He claims that the strengthening of the 
Wehrmacht's resistance both in the East and the West in 1945 
was "due in good measure to Goebbels' propaganda apparatus" 
and that "the combination of propaganda and terror succeeded 
in the darkest days of the Third Reich in tying /_plieý7 the 
69 German people voluntarily to Hitler". The longing of a great 
part of the west German people for the arrival of the British 
and Americans and with it an end to the war would certainly 
seem to contradict this assertion. The behaviour of many 
Volksgenossen at this time was characterised by a timely 
anticipation of a new post-war world. This would explain the 
relative indifference shown by many on hearing the news Of 
ilitler's death ?0 
The effect of this fear propaganda was largely determined 
by the relationship existing between reality and propaganda 
portrayal. Where the latter was based upon fact - as was 
undoubtably often the case with Russian excesses - the 
propaganda content was largely believed. Furthermore, 
susceptibility to anti-Bolshevik propaganda would depend on the 
degree one thought oneself threatened by the Soviets, i. e. where 
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one lived and the social and political position one held. If, 
on the other hand', propaganda was at variance with the recognised 
reality or in stark contradiction to the popular image of the 
enemy - as was the case with anti-American atrocity reports - 
then the effect would be minimal. It must, however, be 
emphasized that belief in anti-Bolshevik propaganda was not 
identical with acceptance of the need for the prescribed 
behaviour. In fact, as has been pointed out above, the 
propagandists often succeeded in inducing quite the opposite 
behaviour to the kind intended. To a certain point, fear might, 
aid the propagandists considerably but the same factor would 
also lie behind the wish to be occupied by the British or 
Americans. 
Finally, there was a difference between response to anti- 
Bolshevik propaganda in the last months of the war and the 
response to the intensive anti-Bolshevik propaganda campaign 
described in Chapter 4. To most Germans - even to those living 
in the East - Russian occupation was a very remote prospect 
indeed in 1943. Even the increasing pessimism as to the final 
outcome of the war does not appear to have led at once to a 
corresponding increase in fear. People clung to the positive 
reports they heard from soldiers on leave as a kind of re- 
assurance that, even if things should turn out for the worse, 
Russian rule would be tolerable. The rumour, as explained in 
Chapter 4, became the vehicle for humanising the enemy. The 
shock on hearing of Soviet barbarity in East Prussia and 
Pomerania, not only over the radio but also from eye-witnesses 
the refugees flocking into central Germany - formed a timely 
revision of these hopes. Also the "experts" - the soldiers - 
who had once spoken admiringly of Soviet achievements now told 
of the outrages they had seen. It was this which led to a 
concentration of all hopes on the western powers. The rumour 
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now served to remove the contradiction between the popular 
image of the Anglo-Americans and the negative propaganda 
portrayal. Hence, the mass flight to the west! 
TheProp ýa y, 2nda0fH0 
Conso1ation 
Goebbels realised that fear alone was not enough to ensure 
the success of his propaganda efforts. The German people would 
also have to be shown how the war could still be won. Concrete 
evidence would have to be given. Military successes, however, 
small, would have to be exploited to the full. It was here that 
the principal danger lay. Unless managed with the uttermost 
skill, such a propaganda would immediately arouse hopes which 
would only be dashed later, thereby causing a further 
deterioration in morale. On the other hand, it would be 
terribly difficult to resist the temptation to exploit any 
favourable piece of news. The almost insuperable problem was 
to find just the right balance between arousing reasonable 
optimism and inspiring exaggerated hopes impossible to fulfil. 
The population would want to be told how Germany's misfortune 
could be turned but any use of predictions, however implicit, 
could prove disastrous and destroy any remaining trust in the 
assertions of the propagandists. People were impatient and 
would expect an immediate realisation of any prediction. The 
propagandist was in an increasingly unenviable positiong for 
the war had now come to Germany and the German people would now 
judge the veracity of any reports of German "successes" in 
terms of their effect on the enemy's advance as well as on the 
Allied bombing assault. Indeed, more and more Germans were in 
a position to compare the propaganda picture with the reality 
of the situation witnessed. All this meant that the Nazi 
propagandist was in a terrible quandary. The population was 
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demanding positive news - something which he could provide 
only at the tremendous risk of a "boomerang" effect. The 
following section deals with the attempt to maintain belief in 
"final victory" in the first months of 1945. 
Goebbels himself did not underestimate the enormity of the 
task of holding out hope in such a bleak military situation. 
In March 1945 he informed his subordinates in the Propaganda 
Ministry that "the great hour of German propaganda had come". 
In good times it was easy enough to make propaganda but now 
the leadership had "the chance to prove the moral and political 
strength it possessed". Secondly, now that the fighting had 
reached the territory of the Reich, it would no longer be 
possible to separate the Fighting Front from the Home Front. 
Now there was only one German Volk fighting a battle of 
survival. It was the task of the propagandist to help the 
ordinary citizen recognize Germany's real chances of victory. 
He was not to forget that he was 11addressing people who were 
,, 71 war-weary, anxious and often doubtful, 
The Minister could naturally not afford to ignore the 
great military blows Germany was experiencing and he tried to 
portray them as unfortunate but not fatal setbacks. In the 
first days of 1945, as it was becoming clear that the Ardennes 
offensive would never attain its objective, it was presented 
as a successful mission which had prevented the launching of 
a simultaneous enemy attack in the East and West. This line 
was still being followed after the Soviet offensive had begun 
?2 
It was also claimed that the German army had forestalled an 
immediate threat to the Ruhrq Saar and Palatinate 
?3 As the 
full weight of the Russian onslaught became evident, Nazi 
propaganda maintained that Soviet Russia was making one last 
desperate effort to decide the outcome of the war by throwing 
in the very last reserves of the Red Army 
?4 
This rather 
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pitiful attempt to find a positive aspect in the unmitigated 
bad news coming from the Eastern Front was often accompanied by 
a vague kind of prediction which avoided giving any clue as to 
how or when there would be a change of fortune. 
"We have spoilt the enemy's plan in the West 
and we shall bleed him white in the East as 
well. , 
75 
When the full extent of the Soviet breakthrough could no longer 
be concealed from the German people, the press was instructed 
to place less emphasis on a factual account of events and instead 
to stress "the determined national spirit of resistance of both 
76 
the Home and Fighting Fronts against the Soviet storm"s The 
heroic spirit and unshaken confidence of the population was to 
become the leitmotiv in all reports from the East. At the same 
time, the press was absolutely forbidden to give any clues as 
to the date of any coming German counter-offensive 
?7 
Nevertheless, Goebbels realized that he could hardly avoid 
making promises if his propaganda was to sound plausible. The 
German people needed a straw to cling on to. In his guarded 
predictions of a coming German attack in the Eastj he went as 
far as he could to arouse a determination to carry on but, at 
the same time, refrained from giving any details. At the 
beginning of March, for example, after promising that the areas 
in east Germany occupied by the Russians would be regaineds he 
made the rather cautious statement: 
"The requisite preparations have already been initiated 
on a grand scale, but they need a certain time to 
take effect..,, 
78 
This very delay in launching the promised counter-attack was 
even interpreted by the propagandists as a positive factor, as 
it ensured that the attack was being so well prepared that it 
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179 would have an even better chance of success when it came. 
The propaganda treatment of submarine successes at the end 
of the war illustrates the precariousness of working with 
predictions and also the difficulty Nazi propagandists had to 
resist making the most of any'German success - however small - 
thereby arousing expectations that could not be met. The U- 
boat campaign did take a small turn for the better in January 
1945, but the press was immediately warned against making any 
hasty forecasts or even giving the impression that a new all- 
out submarine offensive was in the offingP As these isolated 
marine successes, however, became the only positive aspect in 
an otherwise unmitigated picture of disaster, the propagandists 
could scarcely afford not to use them. On the wireless Semmler 
was soon to claim that the U-boat feats had come at an extremely 
critical time for the enemy because "the tonnage situation of 
the Allies has never been so strained". They might prove "of 
dec isive importance for military developments on our west 
front". The old argument used in the early months of 1943 at 
the time of the bombing of the Ruhr reappeared: "every tanker 
sunk reduces terror flights over the Reich 
J1 In a speech at 
the end of February, Goebbels stated that the enemy's shipping 
resources were stretched and very vulnerable. He predicted: 
! 'The last vessels of the British Merchant Navy 
will by and by fall victim to our U-boats now 
putting to sea for new operations. " 
82 
There could be no better example of self-professed caution 
being thrown to the winds when the military situation becomes 
desperate. 
In dealing with this compensatory propaganda in 1945, 
further mention must be made of V2 propagandav described in 
detail in the last chapter. The "last shots" of German 
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retaliation were used by the propagandists to demonstrate 
that the Reich was still capable of paying back the British 
in kind. In February Goebbels admitted that the enemy raids 
were becoming unbearable for the German people but reminded 
his listeners that the British were also finding the V- 
bombardment unbearable 
ý3 
It is quite clear that the V-rocket 
had now become a propaganda weapon designed more to maintain 
morale in Germany than to break it in England. The Germans 
were led to believe that the employment of new V-weapons was 
impending. In his attack on the barbarism of the British in 
bombing Dresden in February, Semmler warned that such a crime 
could not go unpunished and that "the Reich still has means of 
84 
exacting retribution". 
'Another argument used by Nazi propagandists to console 
their German audience was that the food situation and the 
general state of morale in,, Britain was as bad as or even worse 
85 than in Germany. The downright misery of life in the United 
Kingdom was depicted in a broadcast by von Oven who claimed to 
be quoting the BBC - perhaps a "poetic truth". 
"There was no longer any regular family life; 
families are torn apart. Some. provinces were 
so overcrowded with evacuees that ten people 
were forced to live. in one room. Of a total 
of 13 million houses, 4ý2 million had been 
destroyed; the housing scarcity was serious. 
The people are wearing old clothes and torn 
shoes; substitute fats were given instead of 
butter, dehydrated meat instead of joints, it 
'was very rare to receive an egg, there-were no 
cars, no musical instruments and no radio sets. 
In short, everybody was tired of the war.... In 
some respects, their difficulties may not be 
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comparable with ours, but in many respects 
we should be glad to live in our country and 
not in the British Isles. " 
86 
- 
How did the German people respond,, to this propaganda 
attempt to persuade them that the situation was really not so 
bad as it first appeare 
, 
d? From a report written in February 
it would seem that the soothing words of the propagandists 
were insufficient to offset the negative effect of the Red 
Amy's advance. The assurances now being given reminded many 
of those that had been given after the Allied landings in 
Normandy. They were based "on a false diagnosis when judging 
the enemy". The same report went on to mention the apparent 
conýradiction between a general feeling of hopelessness and 
the desperate wish to believe "something might happen". 
"The Volksgenossen indeed continue to do and 
endure everything demanded of them. The real 
conviction is, however, lacking that any further 
effort and sacrifice can still have a point and 
lead to a final success in our favour. " 
At the same time, vague hopes were being harboured that 
revolutionary new weapons might somehow bring about a change 
of fortune 
ý7 Despite this, there can be no doubt whatsoever 
that morale had now reached an unprecedented low. Only military 
success, not propaganda promises of military success, would 
lead to any improvement. According to the Gaupropagandaleiter 
of Halle, morale had already reached "zero point" in February 
and he placed the blame squarely on the failure of Wring's 
Luftwaffe and the non-appearance of the long-promised new 
- 88 weapons, - Many-people saw in the accounts of V2 attacks a 89 
cheap cover-up operation for the debacle of the German air-force. 
Even the Nazi press was forced to admit that people were 
becoming sceptical and asking when German skies would be cleared 
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of the enemy air-force and when the decisive weapons would be 
ready. A typical answer was given by one journalist: the 
German people need not fear for the future because its leaders 
had promised new weapons and these men had always spoken the 
truth! 
90 Such reasoning was hardly likely to allay the 
increasing fear and despondency. The military setbacks had 
become so grave and their significance so obvious that even the 
most skilful propagandist would not have been able to neutralize 
their effect. Goebbels' assurance that "Germany still has all 
the political and military chances" in her hands was "rejected 
without exception by all classes as pure propaganda lacking any 
factual basis". People were saying that events had proved the 
truth of the slogan once coined by Reichsmarschall Gdring: 
"Whoever possesses air-superiority has victory 
in his pocket"91 
As the enemy armies advanced further and further into the Reich, 
no one could imagine how the war could'be'continued without the 
92 industry of the Ruhr and Upper Silesia. 
A Nazi official, von Kielpinski, was certainly right in 
asserting that after December 1944 public opinion in Germany 
had very little in common with the wishes of the leadership and 
its propagandists 
?3 
Even the most respected source of official 
information, the Wehrmachtsbericht, had now fallen further 
into disrepute through its attempt to disguise the extent of 
the enemy advance. Such expressions as "the enemy could make 
only a negligible advance" or "the enemy gained territory only 
after the heaviest loss of blood" were received with great 
scepticism. The abandoning of such cities as Cologne was 
hardly mentioned. 
"This glossing over is destroying even the last 
remaining trust the Wehrmachtsbericht has until 
, 94 now enjoyed'. 
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At Goebbels' promptingt the OKW-Bericht made no mention of the 
loss of Kolberg in March. The Minister was afraid of under- 
mining the effect of the Durchhaltefilm of the same name running 
in German cinemas at the time. 
95 
1 
With the coming of spring few people were any longer 
prepared to believe the vague prophecies of Nazi propagandists. 
Berlin cinema audiences were reported to have burst into 
"derisive laughter" when the newsreel showed Goebbels on the 
Oder promising an offensive that would liberate all areas 
96 
occupied by the foe. The very last vestiges of optimism 
regarding a German counter-attack were probably to be traced 
back to the last desperate conviction of refugees from the 
eastern provinces-, not to the efforts of the propagandists. For 
them a German defeat meant permanent separation from the only 
home they had known and loss of all they owned. They had a 
vested interest in clinging on to even the vaguest hopes 
offered them. They were perhaps the most effective propagandists, 
stimulating others with their confidence that, in the end, 
everything would turn out'for the best. Somehow, they would 
see their homes and farms again. Whereas these refugees from 
the East often strengthened morale, those from the West, who 
had little fear of defeat, had the opposite effect. 
97 
Finally, few Germans were taken in by descriptions of the 
miserable living conditions said to be prevailing in enemy 
lands., Most realised the situation was much worse in the Reich 
?8 
As the military situation worsenedv Goebbels took refuge 
more and more in the portrayal of a contrived metaphysical world 
governed by., the forces of good and evil. Here, the vagaries of 
battle were of little importance. Good always triumphed over 
bad and Germany with its FUhrer ; represented the forces of good. 
In this theoretical world moral strength and unflinching 
determination were more powerful than the sword. There were few 
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risks involved in this type of propaganda. Goebbels spoke 
of "the enigmatic quality of war which grants every opportunity 
to every people in everysituation". Purely geographical 
aspects were of secondary importance: 
"The place where one stands and fights is not 
the only decisive factor in this issue. Once 
we stood on the Atlantic coast, outside Moscow 
and Leningrad, on the Volga, but the enemy did 
not surrender. Today he stands on the Rhine and 
and the Oder. Why, then, should we do what the 
others refused to do .... A people resolved to 
defend its life and to-use every, even the most 
daring means, cannot be beaten. "99 
These assuran I ces became emptier and emptier. Whereas in 
February Goebbels claimed: 
"So long as the war continues nothing is 
100 irreplacable", 
in his last Das Reich article broadcast on 20 April he 
maintained: 
"Not to be beaten means for us to be victorious"1001 
There could be no better example of the bankruptcy of German 
propaganda than the answer given by a radio commentator at the 
beginning of April to the question: "How shall we achieve 
victory? " 
"How is it possible, when in March and April 
storms I and snow are still ragingg that spring 
should come and the sun shine again? After ally 
there is no visible sign. , 
102 
A peaceful and idyllic life"ýas promised in the remote future: 
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"In a'few years' time after this war Germany 
will flourish as she did before. In her 
destroyed regions and provinces will arise 
new and finer towns and villages where happy 
people will live. All Europe will take part 
in this progress. We shall again be friends 
with all nations of goodwill and shall to- 
gether with them heal the serious wounds 
disfiguring the noble features of our 
continent. , 
103 
This was perhaps the most accurate of all Goebbels' predictions 
made at the time! The better world of the future was described 
as if it were a certainty but factual explanations as to how 
it might be achieved were discreetly left out. The Propaganda 
Minister developed his own theory of "historical justice": 
"History offers no instance in which the 
unbroken courage of a people could in the 
end be overcome by brute force. Always, at 
the decisive moment, there comes the timely 
intervention of the arm of Providence, 
inexplicable to man, which will not allow 
any tampering with the eternal laws of history. " 
104 
A mystical, almost religious note characterised 
propaganda. Providence was the ultimate weapon 
propaganda armoury. It was Providence that was 
struck down Roosevelt and to have spared Hitler 
This pseudo-mystical. propaganda took on an almo 
in Goebbels' radio address on 19 April, the eve 
56th birthday: 
this 
in the Nazi 
said to have 
on 20 July 1944. 
st biblical note 
of Hitler's 
"Now as often before when Beelzebub stood within 
reach of having power over all peoples, God will 
cast him into the abyss, whence he came... " 
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Hitler would be his instrument 
105 
In this preoccupation with 
the mystical, Hitler's person became an instrument of 
propaganda. He was the champion of Providence and hence the 
guarantee of "final victory". A nation with such a leader 
simply could not lose. The panegyric of Hitler's person 
culminated in an article of Goebbels in Das Reich in the very 
last days of 1944. The Minister told his readers that their 
Fiffirer was "the greatest among the living" and that "he 
transcends everything ordinary and human in a way which makes us 
,,, 
106 
appear very smal . 
The morale reports show that few people were taken in by 
Goebbels' rhetoric. SD Stuttgart believed that no other single 
article of the Minister had been criticised so much as this one. 
There was an intense dislike of the mystical language which had 
the effect of turning Hitler into a "German God" or a "second 
107 
Christ". Most Germans kept their feet firmly on the ground 
when confronted hourly with the sombre reality. Their reaction 
to this kind of propaganda was based on a realistic estimation 
of the military situation. Mystical appeal was met with factual 
questions. Goebbels' attempt to prove enemy war guilt and to 
wipe Hitler clean of any responsibility for having started the 
war fell on deaf ears. Few could now accept the propaganda 
portrayal of the FUhrer as a lover of peace. Memories were not 
so short. Many people still remembered Chamberlain's visits 
to Germany in September 1938 and his great reluctance to go to 
war with Germany 
108 
In fact, according to one report of 
January 1945, some citizens - especially "so-called intellectuale 
and "intelligent workers" - were turning to Mein Kampf to show 
that the Nazis had started the war in September 1939, 
"for one of the essential points in the Fiffirer's 
policy had certainly been the expansion of the 
Reich in the East and, in addition, the union of 
all Germans in one united Reich". 
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This would only have been possible by going to war and it was 
109* 
clear that "the FUhrer had aimed at war from the very start". 
The perverted interpretation of Germany fighting a just war 
against the forces of evil was thus neutralised by people's 
memories. What is more, many remained unconvinced that the war 
had been at all necessary. In the country areas around 
Stuttgart many people were heard to say that the war could 
very easily have been avoided, for everyone had enough 
Lebensraum -and it was completely unnecessary to seek more in 
110 
the East. Such a view was particularly dangerous for it not 
only meant a negation of all National Socialist propaganda 
theory and claims but also blaming one's own government for all 
the suffering borne in the sixth year of the war. The response 
to Goebbels' praise of Hitler's "sixth sense" was that, if the 
FUhrer was really the genius he was made out to be, then he 
would never have embarked on the war! Finally, on hearing the 
Minister's claim that Hitler could not be fooled, many pointed 
to the events of 20 July 1944 to prove the opposite was true 
ill 
Naturally, when examining the reaction to this praise of 
Hitler, an assessment of the German people's attitude to their 
leader at this time is of supreme importance. Did he still 
enjoy the respect of earlier and better days? There can be 
little doubt that at the very time propagandists were busy 
turning him into a German god and the guarantee of "final 
victory", the population was regarding him more and more as a 
mere mortal who had failed in his life's work. On the other 
hand, he continued to enjoy a certain respect and was not so 
unpopular as the Party itself. Many really believed it 
possible to distinguish between the organisation and the man 
who had brought it to power. This is not to deny the general 
feeling of bitter disillusionment in 1945. Unwittingly, 
propaganda laudations of the FUhrer only turned attention back 
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to promises made in the past. Many remembered the claim made 
by Hitler in October 1941 that the last battle-fit Soviet 
divisions had been destroyed. 
"Who can take it ill if we no longer believe the 
words of the Fiffirer. " 
Hitler's promise in his proclamation of 24 February that 
Germany would, despite all, still win was met with such ironic 
remarks as: 
"The FUhrer is prophesying yet again" 
"The Fiffirer has never stopped promising us 
victory" 
"Again and again it's the same old tune. " 
The FLihrer'savowed confidence was no longer enough to allay the 
general spirit of pessimism: 
"They shouldn't always tell us we will win the 
war because we must win it, but they should show 
us for once how the other qide can lose. " 
Sur-hanegative view was also being uttered by "thoroughly calm 
and decent Volksgenossen. " 
112 That Hitler should continue to 
enjoy any respect at all in such a catastrophic situation may 
be seen as a limited success of Nazi propaganda. But his 
popular image had, of course, little in common with the superman 
the propagandists were making him out to be. For many Germans 
he was less the champion of Providence than the cruel victim of 
Fate. He had wanted the best but his failure was to be traced 
back to one fault - his unquestioning faith and trust in his 
fellow men! The idea was current that he had been misled by 
his entourage who had given him bad advice and had deliberately 
withheld the truth from him. This last remaining esteem was 
often tied to one last faint hope that something might still 
11 
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happen. In spite of the general mood of hopelessness and 
dejection many managed somehow to hang on to the vague idea 
that Hitler "will still have something that will bring about 
113 
the turn". 
Another feature of the consolation propaganda in the last 
months of the conflict was the growing resort to historical 
parallels. The message was always the same. Many states and 
nations had faced worse crises than the one Germany now found 
herself in but had, nonetheless, pulled through in the end. One 
of Goebbels' favourite comparisons was the desperate position 
of Frederick the Great's Prussia during the Seven Years' Warj14 
Another parallel popular among Nazi propagandists was the time 
of trials and tribulations experienced by the NSDAP before 
coming to power. At the turn of the year 1932-3 it had really 
seemed that the Party had reached the nadir of its fortunes, yet 
only a few weeks later Hitler was Chancellor 
115 Goebbels even 
went back a couple of thousand years to prove his point. In an 
article appearing in Das Reich in November 1944 he wrote: 
"The decisive struggle between Rome and Carthage 
lasted more than 18 years and brought Hannibal 
to the gates, of Rome. Yet Rome won in the end 
and out of blood and tears there arose, as the 
proud result of this struggle, the Roman Empire - 
the most monumental achievement of the ancient 
world. , 
116 
Hitler found this comparison particularly appealing and in 
March 1945 instructed Goebbels to make even greater use of the 
117 Punic Wars in his propaganda, Parallels were even drawn with 
the American and Dutch Wars of Independence! 
18 Through all 
these comparisons runs a remarkable appeal to "the justice of 
history". This was a guarantee of final German victory. 
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"If this were not so, the Goddess of History 
would only be a money-whore, an ignominious 
priestess of the greater number, and History 
without higher morals. 11119 
The Nazis were also not averse to pointing to the predicament 
of the British in 1940 and of the Russians in the autumn of 
1941 in order to show their own people that no crisis, however 
120 
grave,, was insurmountable. 
Most Germans were, however, entirely immune to this attempt 
to distract their attention away from the situation then 
prevailing. The frequent comparisons witIl the Seven Years' War, 
for example, were rejected outright. Conditions had been very 
different in the-eigNto-entlizentury and there had been no such 9, 
thing as air warfare! 
f2l 
The Mnster SD office, now evacuated 
to Bielefeld, feared that. the continued use of these historical 
parallels was doing more harm than good, as it was leading to a 
fatal awareness of being manipulated by propaganda 
122 Goebbels 
himself confessed - if only in his diary - that this kind of 
propaganda was not meeting with the expected success. Rather 
&spairingly but nevertheless nearer the truth than he had been 
for a long time, he lamented: 
"One has the gloomy feeling that even the best 
arguments do not get through to a people that 
is tired and battle-weary. , 
123 
Far from relinquishing instructive historical parallelss rather 
typically he set about preparing an article in Das Reich which 
he hoped would convince his audience of their usefulness. He 
wrote at the end of-March: 
"The purpose of historical examples is to strengthen 
and raise our fighting morale and they are not 
cited because they agree in all their details with 
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the present fateful struggle of our people 
against a world of enemies. , 
124 
It would really seem that, at this stage of the war, Goebbels 
was unable to find a replacement for a propaganda theme which 
he knew was proving to be ineffective, and these parallels 
continued to be drawn right up to the very end of the war. 
Finding itself in a position it could do little to control, 
Nazi propaganda rapidly degenerated into a crude bombardment 
with slogans. Catchphrases like "Victory Will Be Ours" or 
"The Strength of the Believing Heart" appeared again and again 
in the headlines of the German press. The newspapers gave vori 
Oven "the creeps": 
"As they no longer have anything tangible to say 
to their, readers, they try to outdo one another 
in empty pathos. Every day one can read all over 
the front page, 'Courage, Faith, Steadfastness! ', 
'Now More Than Ever', 'With the Fiffirer to Final 
,, 125 Victory', 'Faith and Combat' . 
Such slogans were upheld as undoubtable truths which did not 
need to be proven. Secondly, the style of the propaganda 
articles and speeches, was increasingly marked by an almost 
uncontrollable use of superlatives -a sort of ersatz 
enthusiasm. The speeches of Goebbels and even less important 
Nazi leaders were received, if one is to believe newspaper 
accounts, with an enthusiasm no less intense than the reaction 
to the German military triumphs of 1940-2. This tendency 
would vindicate Lasswell's assumption: 
"In severe crises, whether revolutionary or 
interstate, anxiety may cumulate to the point 
of using all the available capacity of expression. 
The higher the level of utilised capacity, the less 
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margin is left, the more terse and repetitious 
the style. Hysterical speakers, for instance, 
may reach a plateau on which-they shout as loud 
as they can, reiterating a limited repertory 
of more or less unintelligible cries. 
Variations in style become impossible as the 
individual regresses to rather primitive forms 
,, 126 of 'repetitive compulsiveness' . 
This sounds like a very accurate account of the decline of 
Nazi propaganda. The phenomenon described above had been 
evident ever since Stalingrad. Despite the many warnings by 
the SD that repetition was having a negative rather than a 
positive effect, Nazi propaganda became increasingly dependent 
on the reiteration of a handful of arguments. This tendency 
became much more marked in the final months of the war when the 
propagandists often did not bother to provide a factual basis 
for the "truths" propagated. An air of resignation may perhaps 
be discerned in these empty slogans. Blind faith was demanded, 
a faith probably not held by many of the propagandists. The 
SD noted a widespread aversion to these hollow phrases and 
reported in March: 
"The 'steadfastness of the believing heart' is 
now being spoken of sarcastically. " 
127 
Instead of these hackneyed slogans, people demanded to hear a 
128 
more sober and soldierly language. The aptitude of Lasswell's 
assumptions on propaganda behaviour in a time of stress is 
borne out by the criticism made by an Austrian Party official 
in February: 
"Ideas such as-motherhoo. dy sacrifice, bravery, 
devotion to higher values, etc. are already being 
repeated again and again by our immoderate 
propaganda in such a way that, even when someone 
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uses these ideals with a pure and heart-felt 
conviction, he runs the risk of being regarded 
as a bombastic gasbag. The propagandists have 
trampled down the meadows which God has given 
the poets. " 
According to the same report, the unbridled use of superlatives 
was making it impossible to heighten the intensity of the 
propaganda message. The very essence of the propaganda was 
being debased. The writer went on to explain that the word 
"enthusiasm" could certainly be used to describe Hitler's 
reception in Austria in 1938 but not the response to a speech 
of Ley in some obscure factory in the sixth year of war 
129 
Goebbels was very aware of the perils involved in this 
degeneration of the propaganda content into a series of good- 
sounding but hollow slogans 
130 
At the end of February he 
instructed his propagandists to be calm and more realistic and 
to avoid using empty phrases. They were to give the German 
131 
people factual proof that the war could still be won. This 
was, of course, easier said than done. Bormann, too, warned 
Party officials 
"Nothing wouldýbe. more dangerous than to want 
to help the population endure these hard times 
through slogans, empty phrases and irresponsible 
predictions. " 
He. moreover, professed the belief that, if the German people 
were told the truth about the seriousness of Germany's position, 
it would be possible to arouse in them the most fanatical will 
to resist the enemy onslaught132 
Goebbels' radio address on 28 February is to be seen as 
a conscious attempt to get away from a catchphrase propaganda 
and to pave the way for a propaganda of "substance". According 
to von Oven, the Minister-worked extremely hard preparing the 
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speech which took an hour to deliver. The following day the 
German press was allotted an extra ration of paper so that 
it could print the speech in full. That the radio should 
repeat the speech twice demonstrates the importance attached 
to it. 
133 
Not only did GoebbelS promise victory; he set out to 
prove that Germany still had a good chance of winning. He 
claimed that the supply of arms and food was such that the war 
could be continued for an indefinite period. Although referring 
to the recent success of the b-boats and V-weaponst the stress 
continued to be put on the determination and the will of the 
German people. 
134 
Realising the great effort that went into the planning of 
this speech and the hopes that were attached to it, a detailed 
examination of the response would most certainly prove 
rewarding. Von Oven had few kind words to say about it: 
"This is the first speech /of Goebbels/ which I 
have to describe as decidedly bad and as a crude 
propaganda failure. " 
He went on, however, to qualify this criticism: 
4 
"Our position certainly seems to be in such a 
tangle and so hopeless that even the best 
propaganda is doomed to fail. , 
135 
This very negative impression is confirmed by several mood 
reports. SD Villingen described it as "a great disappointment". 
"People railed at it-in. a frightful way. The 
government, they say, has really no idea how 
. 
things really stand. They can no longer bear 
hearing the constantly reiterated statements about 
the moral strength of the heart. What's the use 
of bravery when no weapons-and munitions are 
available. " 
136 
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Goebbels' assurances had apparently fallen on deaf ears. His 
comforting words were contradicted by what every German could 
see for himself. The same. report went on to say that people 
were asking what had come of the "trump cards" the FUhrer had 
promised and the secret weapons that were supposed to come to 
Germany's rescue. Another report from SD Rastatt compiled a 
few days after the speech stated that "the minister is hated 
more than he is valued" and that "he is spurned as a teller 
of fairy-tales". A certain class animosity can be detected 
in the response to Goebbels' call: "Better to die than 
capitulate! " 
"He can talk - he sits in safety and in a good 
shelter. " 
Even'Party members were now heard to say that "it would have 
been better if we had not started the war, particularly with 
Russia and the United States", 
137 thus showing that they 
disbelieved the basic propaganda argument that the enemy alone 
bore the responsibility. In Mannheim Parteigenossen were 
reported as saying after the speech: 
"If the new weapons don't come, then this promise 
was the biggest swindle the nation has had to 
endure. " 
The heavy air-raid on the town on 1 March was interpreted by 
some of its citizens as the enemy's reply to Goebbels' 
138 defiance. If this were not the case, then it was surely a 
timely reminder of the enemy's strength and omnipresence. 
Thus Goebbels' "new-line" propaganda could do little or 
nothing to improve the mood already largely determined by 
factors outside the control of the propagandist. In factp the 
'hew line" soon fizzled out and it did not take. long for the 
former state of affairsp which Goebbels had endeavoured to 
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change., to reappear. Even the best will could no longer 
check this inevitable decline and decay of German propaganda. 
There were few people left in the German Reich who were 
still prepared to swallow promises. Nothing had come of the 
promises made before so how could one expect anything to come 
of those now being made at a time when Germany's military 
situation was visibly deteriorating from hour to hour.? This 
was the very core of the propagandists' dilemma. In her account 
of Goebbels' weekly articles in Das Reich, Kessemeier has shown 
this insuperable obstacle then confronting German propagandists. 
After pointing out the success of his articles until 1944, she 
goes on to show how at the end of the war "the discrepancy 
between the reality which everyone could recognise and the 
propaganda portrayal" made it impossible to believe what he 
said. Although after December 1944 his articles not only 
appeared in Das Reich but also in the entire Gau press, thus 
reaching a much larger number of readers, Goebbels was powerless 
when faced with the growing war-weariness and the paralysing 
feeling that absolutely nothing Germany could do would change 
the course of events 
139 
Nevertheless, one isolated SD report 
could claim as: late as March that "the German broadcasts still 
give a certain comfort and can still contribute to an 
, 140 improvement in the mood . This guarded optimism ought 
perhaps to be seen more as an attempt to comfort the hard- 
tried propagandists rather than as proof of propaganda success. 
Nearer the truth was certainly a report from SD bTdnster written 
a few days later: 
"It must be described as an established fact 
that the state-controlled media, press and 
radio, are now exerting as good as no influence. 
From the intelligentsia down to the working class 
the German propaganda is mistrusted and rejected. , 
141 
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In Halle a "reliable National Socialist" was reported to have 
remarked: 
"We have been lied to and cheated. If a fraction 
of what has been told us since Stalingrad were 
true, then the present situation could never have 
come aboýt. , 
142 
Some Berliners even compared the propaganda to "a band on a 143 
sinking ship which goes on playing with undiminished enthusiasm". 
There can be little doubt that defeatism had come to 
chdracterise the general mood of the German . people in the spring 
of 1945. In March morale in Munich had reached "zero point" and 
even those Volksgenossen who had always clung onto their heart- 
felt belief in "final victory" had now given up all hope. An 
occupation of the whole Reich was now anticipated. Most people 
were now longing for the end. 
144 Similarly, the ' 
Regierungsprdsident of Augsburg noted in his March report that 
"many would quite like to see a swi ft advance of the enemy 
145 
armies, that thereby the war would finally come to an end". 
Few Germans, even Party members, were now prepared to contradict 
146 
or scold those making distinctly defeatist remarks. At the 
same time, the pathetic clinging on-to a last vague hope, 
described above, persisted. In trying to grasp these 
apparently contradictory aspects in the morale of the same 
person - defeatism and faint-hope - we must remember the very 
irrationality and ambivalence of human thought in a situation 
of such extraordinary strain. But this--relative "optimism" 
was perhaps most typical of those who simply had to believe that 
the worst could somehow be averted. Many refugees from the East 
and those left behind in Mnigsberg, went on hoping. For the 
latter the reality had become so, incredible that many chose to 
ignore it. They just could not comprehendthe fact that the 
Russians were in the suburbs of their town! Many tried to 
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interpret this dreadful reality as part of an ingenious and 
predetermined plan of the FUhrer to lure the enemy into a trap147 
The sheer irrationality of human behaviour in such a situation 
in which accepting defeat is virtually synonymous with 
accepting onegs own destruction is illustrated by the 
considerable effect that a militarily insignificant event 
associated with normality could have on morale. In beleaguered 
Mnigsberg the temporary reopening of the banks after the 
initial Russian thrust was welcomed with a reassuring feeling: 
"The possibility of paying in money again and 
drawing it out again shows clearly enough that 
things can't be so bad after all. , 
148 
Most Germans, however, had by March come to terms with the 
reality of impending defeat and apathy greeted the most 
determined efforts of Nazi propagandists to buck them up. 
After six years of war the German people was exhausted and 
incapable of sharing any strong emotions - even against those 
who were bombing its homes 
149 The attitude of Berliners at the 
end'of March was summed up by an eye-witness: 
"One lets the government, press and radio calmly 
carry on with its propaganda without responding 
to it. No one takes even the remotest interest 
in what is preached. Warnings, appeals, threats 
only ricochet like bullets when confronted with 
this war-weariness. The Germans are without 
exception more apathetic than they have ever 
been. They don't believe in anything at all. , 
150 
This widespread apathy was accompanied by a growing pre- 
occupation with the immediate personal sphere of life and the 
question of survival in an uncertain future. 
"The inner anguish and the feeling of despair, 
7 
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the burden of everyday life, the work, the 
food situation and the anxiety regarding one's 
own existence and the well-being of relatives 
in other parts of Germany, at the front and at 
home, have turned the Volk into an apathetic 
human mass which has had enough and no longer 
has-the strength to express its feelings and 
wishes. " 
151 
Naturally, most afraid of this phenomenon were the propagandists 
themselves. They admitted the existence of this paralysing 
fatalism and the longing for peace but, at the same time, 
reassured their audience that there was absolutely no danger 
W, 11,, 
152 
of "a collapse of our resistance 0 But such 
reassurances were, of course, worthless and without effect, 
for by the end of March 1945 German propaganda had become 
irrelevant for most Volksgenossen. The thoughts of most Germans 
were already centred on a world without National Socialism. 
Although those still lucky enough to possess a radio set in 
working order might still tune into the Reichsrundfunkv few 
any longer paid much attention-to what was being said. 
C. THE FACTORS IMPAIRING THE DESIRED PROPAGANDA RESPONSE 
In order to explain further these very meagre results of Nazi 
propaganda in the last months of the war, consideration will 
now be given to the factors intervening between propaganda 
message and propaganda response. It was shown in earlier 
chapters how alternative - also "illegal" - information sources 
gained in prestige and importance as Germany's military position 
weakened and Allied air-raids intensified. At the same time 
Nazi propaganda's reputation for truth and-reliability took a 
severe pounding. The further development of these trends will 
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be traced in the following section of this chapter. The 
attitude of, the German people to the National Socialist Party 
and the importance of class and social group and membership of 
the churches as factors determining outlook and response to 
propaganda will also be examined. First, ofall, howeverp it 
is necessary to tackle the question of the availability of the 
-propaganda audience and the capability of Nazi propagandists 
of reaching this'audience. It would be the greatest folly to 
take both these things for granted. 
TheTechnicaProb1emsand 
GapsinPropandaDistribu 
The loss of territory and the heavy air-raids naturally did 
not remain. without effect on newspaper circulation and on radio 
transmission and reception. At the closing stage of the war, 
the fall in the potentialpropaganda audience was to become a 
particularly acute problem and the propagandists racked their 
brains to find the best way of ensuring propaganda distribution. 
In March 1945 Goebbels warned that technical difficulties in 
those areas threatened by air-raids or by the enemy advance 
should in no case be allowed to lead to a situation in which the 
inhabitants were left to their own devices. As a partial 
solution, he suggested greater use of pamphlets, officially 
inspired rumours (Mundpropaganda) and, above all, cable radio 
(Drahtfunk), which could not be heard by the enemy and "can 
therefore use a more candid language than is possible in the 
153 
political broadcasts of the wireless"o Relaying the normal 
radio stations$ Drahtfunk had already been installed in many 
German homes in pre-war days. Furthermoret it had been used 
for the public relay of speeches by Nazi leaders. The number 
of subscribers rose considerably during the war as it began to 
supply an additional service: warnings of enemy air activity 
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over the Reich. - Operated at Gau levell it was even possible 
to inform the citizens of a city which districts had to 
expect immediate attack. 
As early as September 1944, the press in areas endangered 
by the enemy advance had been instructed to go on publishing 
as long as it was technically possible - if necessary, 
independently of the Berlin Tagesparolen. In such an emergency 
the newspaperswould receive their instructions from local 
Party leaders. In the event of "temporary" enemy oýcupation 
editors were absolutely forbidden to carry on publishing. 
The local'population would then be supplied with official news 
by means of pamphlets 
154 
The problems facing the German press at the end of the 
war were twofold: a) shortage of paper b) supply and 
distribution difficulties. As early as the spring of 1944 
anxious voices had been raised regarding "gaps" in supply. 
Especially the evacuees from the bombed areas were without 
daily papers, because the paper shortage ruled out any increase 
155 in circulation in the reception areas. It is not difficult 
to imagine how acute the situation became a few months later 
with the sudden influx of refugees from the East. To make 
matters worse Allied bombing caused repeated disruption of both 
printing and distribution 
156 Finally, in early 1945, owing 
to paper shortage, newspapers had to be reduced not only in 
size but also'in circulation 
157 
By the end of 1944, of a total of sixteen million 
licensed radio sets in Germany, three million were out of 
operation. There were fears that this could undermine the 
effectiveness of the entire radio propaganda. The idea was 
even put forward of bringing to Germany radio sets which had 
been confiscated in Holland and Norway 
158 
It was a question 
not just of replacing sets smashed in raids but also of 
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procuring valves and other spare-parts 
159 
In some parts of 
the Reich clear radio reception had become virtually impossible. 
In Saxony, for instance, it was reported in March 1945 that 
the Reichssender Leipzig was completely out of operation whilst 
the national programme, the Deutschlandsenderwas not broad- 
casting in the mornings and was usually off the air for the 
rest of the day because of enemy air activity 
160 
Therefore, 
even if one were willing and able to listen to official 
propaganda, it was not always possible to do so. What is more, 
radio listening was being hampered by frequent power-cuts. The 
enemy air-raids had also drastically changed listening habits 
and had in some cases led to total radio abstinence. After a 
sudden air attack without prior warning, most of the citizens 
of Freiburg, for instance, no longer risked switching on their 
sets for fear of not hearing approaching enemy planes. Those 
161 
still listening did so with only "half an ear". Nor was 
the picture very different in other German towns. An eye- 
witness in Nuremburg wrote in March 1945: 
"The Deutschlandsender indeed broadcasts the 
OKW-Bericht daily. But who can still hear it? 
For a long time now, most radio sets have either 
been smashed by bombs, sent out of the city or 
kept in the cellar. It is impossible to leave 
them in the flat, for every day the alarm sounds 
eight to ten times. And who is able to drag 
the radio set eight to ten times daily into the 
cellar? " 
He went on to remark that 
listened and already knew 
162 
of military operations. 
Mannheim was left without 
or press for three days. 
as a result, only a few still 
that Franconia had become the scene 
After a severe raid the town of 
power and consequently without radio 
The result was a greater 
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susceptibility to reports emanating from another information 
channel., the rumourv which was not always so-flattering to 
government and Party 
163 
TheShortcom'of Ia 
.9S 
.aaanda 
0fficiaIPro j2 
Nazi propagandists had been unable to allay the feeling 
felt by so many peopleof being manipulated which has been 
described. in earlier chapters. Nor had they been able to make 
good the damage done to their prestige during the setbacks 
of 1943, in particular'Stalingrad and the embarrassingly long 
silence which followed the fall of the Duce. Even more than 
before, the press and radio had come to be regarded as "the 
willing tools of the 'propaganda"' and the'very word 
"propaganda" was now associated in the popular mind with 
"deceit" or at least a "one-sided presentation for a certain 
164 
purpose". The almost inevitable resorting to slogans the 
more the military situation deteriorated could only heighten 
this uncomEortable awareness of being the "victim" of 
propaganda. 
Credence in propaganda was dependent on the degree to 
which it could answer those questions uppermost in people's 
minds. And it was here that propagandists were presented with 
a terrible dilemma. The listener demanded honesty and 
objectivity but honesty andcbjectivity would have meant giving 
defeatism an official blessing. It must be kept in mind that 
propaganda was not only aimed at inducing belief in its 
message but also at securing certain behaviour. The two 
objectives were in no way 'compatible in 1944-5. 
The shortcomings of German propaganda as well as the 
attitude of the average German to it at the end of the war are 
perhaps best summed up in the observations made by an Austrian 
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Party member in February 1945. He first condemned the 
propaganda emanating from Berlin for being too deliberate and 
clumsy. Moreover, in Austria it often seemed "foreign" and 
remained without effect or, even worse, it had the opposite 
effect to the one desired. The Volksgenosselwas conscious 
of being deliberately manipulated: 
"He feels that he has become too much the 
object of the propaganda and quite rightly- 
feels angry about it. " 
After criticising the sledge-hammer methods of propaganda, 
he went on to point out the long memories of many people who, 
remembering what Goebbels had said two years before, did not 
hesitate to compare it with what he was saying in 1945. He 
believed the propagandists were underestimating the German 
people and made a devastating attack on the fantasy world the 
propagandists were living in: 
"The consequences of the mistakes and short- 
comings of our propaganda are that the Volk 
is living independently 
, 
of it and that they 
are by no means affected by it to the extent 
theýpropagandists believe they are. " 
He concluded his report with the pertinent comment that if 
German propaganda were really so successful, then the 
population would not be tuning in so much to foreign radio 
stations and there would not be so many rumours in 
circulation 
165 Thus lack of trust in official propaganda 
was almost synonymous with trust in those unofficial news 
sources to be described in the next part of this chapter. 
Unofficial Information 
Sources 
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The alternative sources of information described in 
earlier chapters - rumours, foreign radio stationsv accounts 
of soldiers and evacuees - continued to exert a crucial influence 
on the formation of opinion as the military situation became 
more and more desperate. 
a) Foreign Radio Stations 
Foreign radio was certainly the most dangerous of these 
unofficial sources for, even if only a minority of the German 
people were regular listeners, they would "infect" the rest by 
passing on what they heard. It is still unclear how many 
Germans actually did listen. According to the United States 
Strategic Bombing Survey, 51% of all adult Germans listened at 
166 
some time during the war. Although the reliability of this 
167 figure has been disputedy the growing severity of the 
punishments meted out to "radio criminals" would certainly 
point to an increase in audience as the war went on. In the 
years 1943-5 the German newspaper reader was repeatedly 
confronted with reports like the following: 
"Oskar Obel, aged 47, of Vienna was sentenced 
to ten years' penal servitude by a Vienna 
Sondergericht for a radio crime. On a motion 
of the Reich Supreme Prosecutor, this sentence 
was annulled and the case was again referred to 
the Sondergericht. Ubel had listened to foreign 
broadcasts in his flat on about forty occasions, 
together with several young men with whom he 
discussed anti-German news. He had, as it were., 
organised the listening and spreading of the 
news. The Sondergericht considered that this 
particularly serious case came under paragraph 
2 of the Radio Decree and consequently pronounced 
the death sentence, which has already been carried 
out.,, 
168 
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As Hagemann has pointed out, the artificial monopoly 
enjoyed by Nazi propaganda could only last as long as it was 
backed up by external military success but, as soon as it was 
faced with a setback and the myth of German invincibility was 
cracked, then the German listeners would begin playing around 
with the tuning-dials on their sets and seeking "a bridge with 
169 
the world outside". 
In the summer of 1943 American analysts concluded that 
"illegal" radio listening was on the increase from the simple 
fact that accounts of punishments inflicted on offenders were 
now being carried in the national press, whereas before they 
170 had been confined to local newspapers. Driven by a hunger 
for news, the nagging wish to find out what was really going 
on, even those otherwise loyal to the ideas of National 
171 Socialism were now joining the ranks of "black listeners". 
Party officials-seem to have had a hard time of it trying to 
dam the stream of "forbidden" news. SD Cologne even suggested 
that a rumour should be spread that a technical instrument, 
existed which, enabled the police to detect transgressors 
172 
Although some Party men claimed to have found the bulk of "black 
listeners" in upper and upper-middle class circles who felt 
"inhibited when forming their own free opinion by the one-sided 
173 German information". class as such would seem much less 
important than the reception capabilities of the set one 
possessed. Of course, those owning four or five-valve 
"superhets" were usually better-off than the owners of simple 
Volksempffinger. 
- During the winter of 1943-4 a station calling itself 
Soldatensender Calais was giving Nazi propagandists a big 
headache. Although purporting to be a German programme 
broadcasting to Wehrmacht troops in western Europe, it was, 
in fact, an Allied propaganda station. Many-people were 
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listening to it without realising that it was an enemy station. 
What is more, its attractive programmes - much lighter than 
those provided by either the Reichssender or Deutschlandsender - 
174 
were making it dangerously popular. Its transmitter was so 
powerful that it drowned the Reichssender Munich175 Its 
success proved so worryingýthat some local Party leaders decided 
to explain its true nature by means of Mundpropaganda 
176 
But not only enemy stations were popular. Neutral 
stations, although forbidden, also found many appreciative 
listeners. Although the BBC tended to dominate the aether in 
northern Germany, the Swiss station, Beromunster, enjoyed a high 
reputation for objectivity in the, south-ýwest 
177 
"Black-listening" increased dramatically in the late 
summer of 1944 as the failure to'halt the Invasion became 
evident. Here again, the prestige of the enemy radio was 
enhanced when the truth of its reporting was later confirmed by 
events. Soon, an additional factor was to encourage others to 
tune in - the fear lest one hear of developments on the Eastern 
Front too late! 
178 
That the German radio, for instance, should 
have announced the fall of Budapest three days after it had been 
made known over the enemy radio did not go unnoticed and 
destroyed any remaining vestiges of trust in German. news 
reporting 
179 
The threat posed by enemy stations grew the 
further the enemy armies advanced, because loss of territory 
also meant the loss of the valuable jamming stations in the 
areas previously occupied. Jamming could be continued only 
at the expense of domestic radio stations. Tjýe danger was so 
grave that in October the Propaganda Ministry asked the 
Reichspropagandaamter whether they thought the time for such a 
sacrifice had now come 
180 
The Berlin propagandists had to make 
a painful choice. Measures against the enemy radio would have 
meant depriving the German population of what was regarded as 
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the most efficient propaganda instrument. That would have 
been too great a sacrifice. Even if Nazi propaganda was having 
less and less influence on public opinion, the myth of its 
effectiveness had to be upheld! The proximity of the enemy 
lines meant that enemy stations could be received at ease. 
Especially at night-time these stations were interfering with 
the reception of German programmes. 
"Thus the Volksgenossen, even when they only want 
to hear a German station, go searching and with 
deadly certainty stumble on to an enemy station-" 
181 
The capture of the powerful long-wave Luxembourg transmitterp 
the wavelength of which lay next to the Drahtfunk, must have- 
constituted a terrible temptation for the German listener to 
turn the tuning-dial just a little! This meant that even 
those people who had continued to trust their own radio 
propaganda and had scrupulously avoided enemy wavelengths now, 
too, began to doubt 
182 To make the situation even worsep the 
Allies made increasing use of German wavelengths so that it 
became virtually impossible to know whether a station was 
German or not. The news heard would then be spread without it 
being realised that it had come from an enemy source. This was 
all the more likely as the German stations went off the air 
without notice with the approach of hostile aricraft 
183 
There is therefore no doubt that "black-listening" 
increased in the same measure that Germany's military 
situation worsened and the embarrassment of German 
propagandists became more evident. 
b) Gennan Soldiers 
The great influence of soldiers' reports on the mood 
at home has been mentioned in Chapter 4. They were seen as 
"experts" and opinion leaders on war matters although their 
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accounts naturallyýtended to be generalisations of individual 
experience. Propagandists realised their importance in the 
forming of opinion and. endeavoured to exploit the prestige of 
the front fighter in their propaganda, as at the time of the 
Katyn discoveries. A Party report of April 1944 was very 
realistic in its assessment of the German soldier's influence: 
"The front-line soldier from the Eastern Front 
enjoys more success in the village pub than a 
speaker in a meeting. What the simple soldier 
says is passed on, whereas, although people go 
to the Party meeting, they do not pass on what 
they have heard there. " 
184 
The consequent limitations in the effect of official 
propaganda w, ýs also recognised by the SD: 
"a single unfavourable letter from a soldier or 
the tale of a solitary soldier on leave can have 
more influence on the belief of many Volksgenossen 
in the stability of the Eastern Front than the 
press can make good in a whole week. , 
185 
It is not difficult to imagine how this influence could be 
both a source of strength and danger for the propagandists. As 
long as everything at the front was going to plan, the soldiers' 
enthusiasm would prove a valuable support for official 
propaganda. But, as early as the winter retreat of 1941-2, the 
accounts of events passed on by the troops were giving 
propagandists cause for anxiety 
186 It would nevertheless seem 
that they continued to constitute a strengthening rather than 
a weakening. factor as regards civilian morale until well into 
1 43, ' although their accounts might often be at variance with 
official reporting 
187 In fact, many soldiers were depressed by 
the pessimism and lack of enthusiasm they encountered among the 
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civilian population. 
188 
The persistent need to retreat in the 
East after summer 1943, as well as the growing unlikelihood of 
a new grand German offensive, had, however, a shattering effect 
on this confidence in the Reich's military strength. The 
accounts which soldiers now gave totally contradicted the 
propaganda picture of an orderly retreat "according to plan". 
They spoke of valuable equipment and huge stores being left 
189 behind, as well as the loss of entire German divisions. The 
consequence was that the front-line reports broadcast on the 
radio began to be criticised for concealing the real state of 
things 
190 
and that even the once respected OKW-Bericht was 
increasingly viewed as propaganda since it made no mention of 
those forced withdrawals described in letters from the front 
191 
The soldiers on duty in the rear lines were reported as 
having a more depressing effect on home morale than those in 
the front lines. And it was the former "who make up the larger 
group of soldiers on leave". Moreover, "they can influence the 
mood of the population all the more, because the latter 
believes everything the soldier says and makes no distinction 
between soldiers fighting at the front and those stationed 
192 behind the lines". Certainly, it was these rear-line 
soldiers who caused some of the most morale-shattering moments 
of the war in the autumn of 1944. During the retreat from the 
West, the sight of these undisciplined soldiers accompanied by 
French "camp followers" and booty was sufficient to evoke a 
spirit of unconcealed dejection and even defeatism 
193 A report 
of May 1944 claimed it was possible to distinguish between the 
younger soldiers who were still-relatively optimistic and the 
more, pessimistic older generation that had just been called 
194 
UP. 
In the final months of the war, nothing seems to have 
distressed the soldiers more than the terrible numbing feeling 
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of powerlessness when confronted with overiqhelming enemy 
superiority in men and material. Early in 1945 soldiers 
wounded on the Eastern Front were said to be infecting the 
inhabitants of Middle Franconia with this depressing feeling 
when they reported that "the Russians were much better equipped 
than we, the Russian tanks were rolling fortifications against 
which nothing could be done, and every second Russian soldier 
possesses a submachine-gun"1,95 
It was, of course, practically impossible to interfere 
with, let alone control,. this information channel. Attempts 
were made to appeal to the soldiers' and the civilians' sense 
of duty and to call on them to exercise self-discipline in 
their correspondence. In a forces broadcast the soldiers were 
warned that their petty grumbling will have "a far-reaching 
influence on our people". They should transform their letters 
into "a sharp weapon" by omitting their grievances. They were 
to "add in every letter a word of good cheer" in order to give 
"fresh courage" to the Home Front. Soldiers were also reminded 
that every letter wa's not only read by their families "ten 
, 196 times" but also "discussed at the place of work', In the 
same way, those at home were reminded that soldiers were eye- 
witnesses of events, -on just one small section of the front and 
that they consequently had no oversight over developments'as 
a whole 
197 
c) Enemy Pamphlets 
Alýhough the German population was instructed to hand in 
unread all leaflets dropped by enemy planes to the nearest 
198 
police station, the growing anxiety expressed by the Party 
and the-SD would-Indicate an increased interest in'their content 
as Germany's war fortunes receded. It was frankly admitted that 
those lucky enough to find them now; read themý99 These leafletst 
so it was-reported, were proving particularly effective for they 
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played on those doubts nagging the minds of their readers. 
They were becoming so worrying to-the authorities that Nazi 
propaganda found it necessary to take up the questions they 
raised, thereby running the risk of spreading knowledge of the 
arguments of enemy propaganda yet further. In a report of 
April 1944 SD Koblenz expressed the opinion that, whereas before 
this form of enemy agitation had had little permanent effect, 
it was now proving quite successful. Many people were 
venturing to utter the view that the statements made inýthe 
leaflets were probabýy correct for, whilst the predictions made 
by enemy statesmen had turned out to be right, this certainly 
could not be said of those made by their own leaders? 
00 
This 
view is an indication of the success of Allied propaganda 
tactics of printing the promises made to the German people in 
better days and then leaving their readers to draw the 
appropriate conclusions? 
01 
The growing success of this 
information source is further confirmed in a report compiled 
in March 1945, according to which the dangerous idea that Anglo- 
American occupation would be quite bearable was to be traced 
back in large measure to enemy pamphlets 
? 02 
Evacuees 
The negative effect of the evacuees from the bombed cities 
on the mood of their hosts has been described in detail in 
Chapter 5. In the final phase of the war their numbers were 
joined by the millions of east Germans fleeing in panic from 
the advancing Russians. None of the horrors they had suffered 
were left untold. Although many of them had not given up all 
hope of returning to their homes., their terrifying accounts 
certainly did much to depress the mood of the population in 
those areas less threatened by the Soviet advance and, 
indirectly, to arouse an even friendlier disposition towards 
203 the western foes. 
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The authorities could do prai 
these tales of gloom. They could 
population in the reception areas 
unreliable reporters as they live 
of judgment has been distorted by 
204 
they have undergone". 
atically nothing to control 
do little more than warn the 
that "fleeing civilians are 
from rumours and their power 
the deprivations and 'terrors 
e) The Churches 
Finally, the churches, especially the Catholic Church with 
its long and universal tradition, had a great influence on 
opinion - in many rural areas an even greater influence than 
that of the NSDAP. This had always caused considerable anxiety 
to the Party, which, despite repeated efforts, had not 
succeeded in diminishing the hold of the Church on its members. 
With annoyance and a sense of powerlessness Party functionaries 
witnessed an increase in churchgoing in the second half of the 
205 
war. As early as summer 1943, it was being reported that even 
Party members were finding their way back to the Church and 
attending Sunday service regularly 
? 06 Whereas the Party's 
propaganda depended on success in this world, all the promises 
and hopes held out by the Church were directed at a time in the 
undefined future. They were eternal truths which did not need 
to be backed up by evidence of the present day. On the FUhrer's 
birthday in 1944, a Sunday, Party officials in some Catholic 
communities were forced to make the unpleasant observation that 
207 
the churches were being-better frequented than Party meetings. 
A report of a Party representative in a small town in the Taunus 
spoke of the malevolent agitation of "the Catholic Action" 
, 208 which was seriously undermining "the will to win'* The 
Catholic Church, in particular,, was said to be having an 
extremely negative influence on young people. In Kreis 
Oberlahn-Usingen the clergy's anti-Nazi "agitation" was held 
responsible for an incident in which some Hitler Youth tore up 
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and destroyed pictures of the FiihrerP9 What is more, the 
clergy were said to be exerting an "anti-racialist" influence 
on the population, thereby undermining the very essence of 
National Socialism? 
'O 
According to one report, the attempt of 
the clerics to portray the misfortune that had befallen the 
Reich as a just punishment for having persecuted "God's chosen 
race" was falling on fertile ground. Moreovers these 
representatives of the spiritual power had managed to damage 
the public image of the Party and even the institutions of the 
stateýll The influence of the Church would appear to have been 
particularly strong in the summer months when, owing to the 
great burden of work, the country folk were hardly reached by 
Nazi propaganda. In short, the local church remained an 
essential part of everyday country life in wartime Germany and 
far more importance was attached to the words of the parish 
priest in the Sunday sermon than to the latest articles of the 
faraway Propaganda Minister. 
TheProb1emsofRumoursan 
theUse0f "M undp1: 2 j2 aRand a" 
The rumour, which was partly based on information supplied 
by the information sources described above2 became perhaps the 
most important news channel at the end of the war. The Nazi 
mass media were leaving the German people in the dark about 
what was really happening and, needless to say, every 
Volksgenosse felt obliged to find out the truth, especially 
now that he was being directly threatened by the enemy advance. 
The mood reports leave no doubt that the number of rumours 
in circulation had risen dramatically since the summer of 1943. 
During the closing stages of the combat, the rumour was even 
determining behaviour. Exaggerated reports of enemy break- 
throughs were leading to "a growing uneasiness among the 
population, the disruption of work, a fall in confidence and 
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212 even to an unjustifiable wish to flee". 
The propagandists, powerless to prevent rumours arising, 
ridiculed those spreading them. The rumour-monger was compared 
to the local gossip who believes every depressing tit-bit of 
news she hears and passes it on enthusiastically. 
"She thinks that Roosevelt is the successor 
of Al Capone and Stalin Archbishop of Moscow. 
She remembers only half of what she hears and 
skilfully fills in the gaps with her own flashes 
of genius. " 
213 
Another method of trying to make these rumour-mongers unpopular 
was to portray them as "a small minority" which was 
encouraging the enemy in his hopes "that German morale would 
crack one day" and that the Reich could be defeated from the 
air. If the air terror were stepped up, then the 
responsibility could be ascribed to this "small group". 
214 
Party 
members were reminded of their duty to root out these people 
who "encourage the enemy in his will to attack" because 
it every uneasiness and disorder'behind the front-lines only 
tempts the enemy to strengthen his attacks and exploit them to 
the fullit. 
215 
As early as July 1943, Goebbels suggested that it was up 
to every "decent" German to silence these "saboteurs" of the 
war effort: 
"The rumour-monger must be regarded like the 
man who starts a panic in the field. There 
he is regarded as a coward trying to infect 
with his fear the Fighting Frontp apt to 
disorganise a whole company and more if he is 
not stopped. At the front it is usual to make 
an end to this sort of thing at once, generally 
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through-self-help. It should be done 
equally at home. , 
216 
Such veiled threats were to become more and more explicit as 
the war went on. In March 1944, the Minister of Justice warned 
German radio listeners that the spreaders of rumours "are doing 
the work of the enemy and attack the fighting-front in the rear. 
There can be no mercy in such cases. , 
217 
Soon the admonitions 
were to become harsher. In September 1944 rumour-mongers were 
described as "traitors" who had to be removed "for good and all". 
Extenuating circumstances would not be considered by the judges: 
"The frivolous and irresponsible must also be 
reckoned among such traitors, because they 
paralyse will, belief and confidence. They 
_spread'doubt 
and endanger our spiritual powers 
of resistance. Whether they act out of stupidity 
or spite is immaterial. Since all warnings to 
these-nefarious people have hitherto been in vain, 
the entire severity of the war law will in the 
future be applied to them. He who fails to 
report gossips and rumour-mongers is equally 
guilty. This should be remembered by all kinds 
of retailers, dairy owners, publicans, hairdressers, 
etc. who have hitherto tolerated or even favoured 
such gossiping in their shops for selfish business 
reasons or out of weakness. " 
218 
The very violence of these threats underlines the powerlessness 
to check this'unbridled trading in rumours. But those 
spreading "optimistic" rumours also found themselves the target 
of, attack - the*so-called "150% National Socialists". 
"The boaster does not content himself with 
discussing probable hopes and the possibilities 
of victory. He does not say: we shall win this 
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war despite all adversities but he asserts 
with a serious and important face: you may rest 
assured, we shall be on the Volga again in 
October! Or he predicts with convincing 
certainty that all we have to do is to wait 
for V2 and then the war will soon be over, 
Britain will then capitulate in December at 
the latest. , 
219 
SD Udnster mentioned such dangerous creatures who give dates 
for the coming "wonder", only then to dash all hopes when their 
promises failed to materialise. The result was even greater 
doubt, resignation and fear 
? 20 
Newspaper warnings were, of course, not enough. Direct 
measures had to be taken. Not only was the whole Party 
membership exhorted to check this flow of rumours 
221 but 
Wehrmacht officers were also reminded that it was their duty to 
222 
report all recalcitrants when on leave. Even members of the 
press were called on to do their utmost to work at a personal 
level against malicious anti-Party rumours; for example, that 
Party officials were abandoning their posts with the approach 
of the enemy army 
? 23 
Finally, the idea dawned on the Nazis of 
using schoolchildren in their campaign. If the latter could be 
influenced in the right way, it might be possible to dam the 
flood of rumours and dangerous tales reaching the ears of their 
parents. The mutual trust on which the bond between parents 
and children was based could thus be exploited for "positive" 
propaganda purposes. 
"Fathers and mothers listen to what their children 
have to say and, 'as a result, a skilful propaganda 
can be carried out which, if the conditions are 
right, can have an excellent effect .... Children 
go home /-from school or a Hitler Youth meetinjý/- 
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and are sure to pass on what they have heard. 
In this way, it-is possible to act against all 
kinds of ridiculous rumours and exaggerations, 1224 
Such a measure was, in practice, rather difficult to implement. 
Not only did many teachers fear that dealing with rumours in 
class would serve to spread them rather than curb them, but 
they felt too overburdened to take on any additional time- 
consuming duty. There were, however, cases reported of 
schoolchildren eagerly watching out for any "enemy rumour" 
224a 
circulating in their "house community"o 
Despite such counter-measures, the Party and its 
propagandists were forced to face the unwelcome truth that they 
were fighting not merely a small and dangerous minority but a 
phenomenon that had come to influence the mood of the entire 
German population. Other means would have to be sought. If 
the "negative" rumour could not be extirpated by threats of 
draconian punishment, then it might perhaps be offset by the 
circulation of a "positive" rumour. The use of "propaganda 
by word of mouth" (Mundpropaganda) to spread morale-boosting 
propaganda, as well as to counter hostile rumours, was to 
become a constant feature of German propaganda in the closing 
stages of the war. It was naturally a means of overcoming 
the decreasing receivability of the media as paper became 
scarcer and radio stations became fewer and more liable to go 
off the air without warning during enemy raids. But the 
increasing resort to Mundpropaganda was also an admission that 
the old forms of propaganda were failing and, moreoverl proof 
that the German mass media had lost all credibility. The 
effectiveness of the rumour as an information channel had long 
been realised and it was now decided to exploit it to the full 
in the interests of the Nazi state. The reliance on 
Mundpropaganda grew the more the military situation worsened and 
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faith in the German mass media receded. As early as the summer 
of 1943, it was being used to contradict rumours-that the 
government was planning to confiscate all private bank savings 
225 
226 
or considering a further cut in meat and bread rations, 
subjects unfit for the press and radio. But, by the end of 1944, 
Mundpropaganda had developed into a veritable propaganda system. 
It ruled'out any danger of giving added publicity to "negative" 
rumours in circulation, as would be the, case if they were dealt 
with through the official channels of information. Furthermore, 
there would be no records and everyone would remain in the dark 
as to the provenance of the rumour, because it would be 
virtually impossible to distinguish an officially inspired 
rumour from one which had stemmed from "other" sources. Such 
thinking by the Party becomes clear in the recommendation of the 
Reichspropagandadmter for an intensification of Mundpropaganda 
in October 1944: 
"The population is at the moment very susceptible 
to all rumours and therefore also to the message 
of the Mundpropaganda. It is thus possible to 
spread positive items of information without 
running the risk involved in leaving behind any 
written record. , 
227 
Reacting to this 
intensification 
effectiveness he 
rumours they had 
without delay by 
proposal, Goebbels at once ordered an- 
Ln the Mundpropaganda effort. To ensure maximum 
instructed his subordinates to report all 
heard forthwith so that they could be countered 
a Mundpropagandaparole 
? 28 
Party officials were bound to secrecy. Not only was it 
absolutely forbidden to pass on Mundpropaganda "in an official 
form" i. e. at a formal meeting, but they were ordered to take 
care not to give any clue "which would enable the population 229 
to conclude: 'the news has come from the Party' of tfrom above". 
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The Mundpropagandaparolen (instructions) were to be spread as 
discreetly as possible and their main purpose was "to counter 
230 
the negative slogans of the enemy by positive arguments". 
The relation of the content of these "white" rumours to factual 
truth was explained by the Party's propaganda section: 
I'As is the case with doctors, we as propagandists 
have the task to see the Volk through a crisis. 
A doctor, who at the same time as handing a patient 
some medicine, tells him that it is no good and 
only coloured water, is perhaps an honest fellow 
but not a good doctor. Only the person who has the 
best overall view and the best appreciation of the 
situation as a whole can determine which medicines 
ý-hould be given to the Volk at one particular time. , 
231 
An excellent example of this propaganda "medicine" is given by 
a Mundpro2agandaparole dealing with the V2 attacks on London. 
It was to be said that this rocket caused the mightiest 
explosion ever witnessed and made a crater 100 metres in diameter. 
"During the experiments with this weapon a V2 
landed 500 metres from an evacuated village. 
After the explosion the greater part of the 
village was destroyed. " 
232 
According to another Mundpropagandaparole of February 1945, 
of the 12,000 tanks the Russians had had at the beginning of 
their offensive on 12 January)82000 had been destroyed in the 
space of three weeks! 
233 At the end of March Goebbels was even 
playing with the idea of circulating in "anonymous and 
disguised propaganda", i. e. Mundpropagandal the contents of 
horoscopes which prophesied "an alleviation in our military 
situation" in the second half of April and an end to the 
fighting in August? 34 
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,. There was, however, one snag with this type of 
propaganda. There was no guaranteeing the desired effect, 
since like all rumours even officially-inspired ones were 
impossible to control once planted. The content of these 
"white" rumours would most probably be altered as they were 
passed on from mouth to mouth and thus "boomerang" in the end. 
The reputation enjoyed by the soldiers as a reliable source 
of information was also exploited in the Mundpropaganda 
campaign towards the end of the war. To raise the morale of 
the raid-stricken city dwellers, small groups comprised of 
soldiers and Party men were formed to spread "positive" news 
among the population. They received their instructions from 
the propaganda offices of the Party and the Wehrmacht. The 
Mundpropagandaparolen issued-by the latter had, however, to be 
approved by the NSDAP Gaupropagandaleitungen. Furthermore, 
the Party checked the political reliability of the soldiers 
participating in this Mundpropagandaaktion. Organised in squads 
of four, they were sent to those places where citizens 
congregated - public transport, squares, markets, railway 
stationsp air-raid shelters, pubs, cinemas and shops. 
"Usually two soldiers work together, one of them 
clad in civilian clothing. They either join in 
other people's conversation or begin their own. 
Whilst they are on duty, they do not let it be 
seen that they know one another. " 
They were also to carry out "terror-raid duty": 
"After the sounding of the air-raid alarm, they 
have to leave the duty area they have been 
allocated that day and go to the parts of the 
town worst hit by the bombing terror. " 
Their reports were passed on to the Wehrmacht Propaganda office 
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and'then'to the Gaupropagandaleitung for evaluation' 
? 35 
The first 
such "special, group" had been formed in Vienna at the end of 
1943 and Berlin and Breslau followed in 1944. In the first 
months'of 1945 the "action" was extended to many other German 
towns including Dresden, Leipzig, Munich, Hamburg and Nuremburg 
236 
At first, the reports of these groups were confidently 
optimistic, claiming that the campaign-was proving very 
effective, but this was to change in the spring of 1945. By 
then even the propagandists had come to recognise the 
insufficiency of Mundpropaganda. in tackling the general defeatism 
and spirit of apathy. Certainly, in March 1945 officially 
inspired rumours about new "wonder-weapons" and military "trump 
cards" were no longer proving so effective as a few months 
237 
before. 
ttitudestothePaty 
The growing anticipation of defeat was accompanied by a 
conscious attempt to distance oneself from the National Socialist 
Party. The German propagandists found it more and more necessary 
to impress upon the minds of their audience that such a 
disassoc, iation- from the Party would be of no use whatsoever, for 
the. foe was bent on destroying the whole, German people. All 
Germans would be forced to bear the terrible suffering defeat 
would bring. There was no alternative but to fight on. But a 
similar drift was to be observed within the Party itself. The 
more lukewarm members or Mitldufer were beginning to separate 
themselves from the others. As early as summer 1943, when events 
were having a shattering effect on moralev some downhearted 
Parteigenossen were appearing in public without their membership 
badgeg or with'them 
. 
-skilfully tucked under',, their lapels 
? 38 
'In' 
his report of July 1943 the Regierungsprdsident of. Munich made 
a clear distinction between those remaining faithful to National 
Socialist principles and those who interpreted events in Italy 
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of as an encouraging sign for the reintroduction of the so-called 
, 239 democratic freedom'. It would seem that, spurred on by the 
military crisis, many were finding their way back to the 
political ideas they, had held before 1933. Nazi successes had 
helped to blur their sound political thinking. The same report 
went on to remark that the internal crisis in Italy had forced 
Party leaders tolaccept the facts "that a part of the population 
has turned away from National Socialism, that another part of 
the population can now only be described as fellow-travellers 
(Mitldufer), and that it has now become clear in which groups 
240 
of the population, there are still genuine National Socialists". 
Here, no details were given. In fact, the Party was being held 
responsible for all misfortune. The Oberlandesgerichtsprasident 
of Brunswick saw in the increasing use of the third person in 
remarks about the political leadership proof that "numerous 
241 
people" were disassociating themselves from the Nazi Party. 
The campaign to activate the-Party at the end of 1943 
would appear to have been designed to boost morale in its own 
ranks as well as in the population as a whole. Although a 
certain success could be claimed and morale was generally better 
in spring-1944 than nine months before, the Party was neverthe- 
less fighting ajosing battle. It was not long before the Reich 
was facing new and, more dangerous blows, and the degree of 
enthusiasm for the, Party was-linked irrevocably to the 
anticipation of victory or defeat. Most now realised that the 
latter was becoming more and more likely. This was true both 
outside and inside the Party. With the failure to stop the 
Allied invasion of Western Europe those tendencies recorded in 
the summer months of 1943 were to reappear in a more extreme form 
After the first enemy troops had crossed the Reich frontiersv a 
Party report maintained that "80% of our 7-8 million enrolled 
Party members" were mere "driftwood" and were making timely 
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preparations for the day when power in Germany lay in "other" 
242 
hands. Many were no longer bothering to use the customary 
243 
greeting, Heil Hitler. In DUren even Party leaders were now 
heard to say Guten Tag! 
244 It was the same picture in 
Villingen: 
"Many Parteigenossen no longer even take the 
trouble to make an outward acknowledgment of 
their creed. The greeting Heil Hitler is being 
used less and less frequently. On the telephone, 
for example, it is being replaced almost 
intentionally by AufwiederhUren. " 
245 
1jany Germans were now beginning to distinguish between the 
German Volk and the National Socialists 
? 46 
This was 
synonymous with accepting that defeat constituted no finality. 
They saw chances for themselves in a vanquished Germany. This 
was naturally a danger sign for Nazi propagandists who had never 
ceased stressing the absolute unity of the German people. In 
fact, their success depended on acceptance of this premise. 
This process of moving away from the Party became more marked 
the more threatening the military position became. Towards the 
end of the war, political functionaries were made very much 
aware of "the gulf separating them from the broad mass of the 
people". They could not appear on the street or travel on 
public transport without being made to sense the intense 
antagonism felt towards them 
ý47 
The attitude to the Nazi Party is of great significance in 
an examination of the response to official propaganda. There 
would naturally be little inclination on the part of many to 
accept the truth of those statements made by a propaganda 
service representing the interests of a group to which they no 
longer felt bound. The importance of the relationship between 
attitude to the Party and response to propaganda is illustrated 
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in an SD report of March 1945, describing the reaction to a 
speech of Goebbels in the front-line town Goerlitz as well as to 
Hitler's address on Heldengedenktag. Whereas "a handful of 
political believers" were said to have received new strength 
from these two speeches, "the majority dismissed them as 
, 248 trivial and devoid of substance'. The conclusion can therefore 
be drawn that the disposition to and acceptance of the 
propaganda message largely depended on loyalty to the Nazi 
cause. This is underlined in a report of SD Schwerin, which 
expressed the view that Goebbels' Das Reich articles were having 
a positive effect only on supporters of the regime, whilst little 
could be done to influence doubters and sceptics who were all 
too ready to pull to pieces every word the Minister used 
? 49 
The few people still responding to the propaganda message were 
those who wanted - nay had , '- to believe and be persuaded and 
consoled. It must be emphasized, however, that they were no 
longer typical of the Party membership and, in fact, consisted 
of a shrinking minority of those in the Party cadres. The 
extremely negative attitude of the majority of Parteigenossen 
was interpreted by non-Party members "as proof of the 
, 250 inevitability of German defeat'. 
Ever since the beginning of 1943 the Party had been on the 
defensive. Increasingly, it was being compelled to defend 
itself against the accusation that its officials were 
privileged and not being called up for military service. 
Instead, they were, so it was whispered, able to live a "safe" 
and comfortable life at home. The propagandists tried 
repeatedly but without much success to show that the opposite 
was true - that casualties in the ranks of the Party were much 
higher than among the rest of the population 
? 51 In'the'ýsummer 
of 1944 the Party was encountering the dangerous accusation 
that the NSDAP and its leadership were guilty of beginning the 
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252 
war. This was to prove so menacing that later that year the 
Party organisation in Wneberg made an urgent request that the 
matter be dealt with more intensively by the propaganda 
? 53 
There can be no doubt that the Party was now becoming the 
scapegoat for Germany's misfortunes. In the Catholic town of 
Paderborn, for instance, many people believed the continuation 
of the war to be "only the concern of madmen and irresponsible 
254 
criminals . It is quite obvious which people were meant here. 
The image of the Party was further eroded by the tales of 
refugees fleeing from the East. They spoke resentfully of the 
chaos of the "evacuation" and held the Party responsible for 
255 the lack of planning and the subsequent suffering of the trek. 
The punishment meted out to cowardly Party leaders in east 
Germany after the launching of the Soviet offensive in January 
1945 would appear to have had the opposite of the desired effect. 
Gauleiter Eggeling of Halle-Merseburg considered the publicity 
given to the shortcomings of Party officials and their 
subsequent court-martialling to be an extremely risky business 
likely to do more harm than good. 
"What is the population supposed to think when 
its trust in the leadership has already been 
badly shattered by military events and the 
failure of the prophecies and promises made 
by the propaganda to materialise. " 
Publication given to such isolated cases of dereliction of duty 
could in the long run only lead to a very negative 
generalisation regarding the Party's behaviour as a whole? 
56 
The Gaupropagandaleiter of the same Gau reported to the 
Propaganda ýinistry that the trials of Party officials for 
cowardice were not only undermining confidence in the political 
leaders but were being regarded as a confirmation of the 
rumours circulating at the time which pointed to a crisis in 
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257 the leadership. Many people were pointing to the statements 
of Nazi dignitaries to prove this assumption. Whereas Goebbels 
had stated in Das Reich that no one knew when and where the war 
would finish, Hitler had categorically promised "the historical 
turn" in 1945: 
"It is concluded from this contradiction that the 
German leadership is itself no longer united 
and that one leader disavows what the other has 
said. , 
258 
Such talk, of course, did irreparable harm to the image of 
both the Party and government. The mere suspicion of division 
above even if it were unfounded - would create the impression 
of a dissolution not only of political authority but also of 
the Nazi state. The most dangerous conclusion would then be 
that one no longer owed such a leadership any allegiance or 
loyalty. How could one respect a goverment that was itself 
in the process of falling apart.? Nazi propaganda did its 
utmost to counter this threat by stressing the determination 
and. unity of the leadership. 
Belief in propaganda was possible only when people 
accepted the basic idea that there was absolutely no alternative 
but to fight on and when people agreed that defeat would 
constitute the end of all Germans. As soon as personal 
identification with the Party was replaced by a subjective 
distinction between Nazis and "other" Germans, the inference 
being that the latter had nothing to fear, then all the efforts 
of the Nazi propagandists would be of no avail. Belief not 
only in the possibility but also desirability of a post-war 
National Socialist Germany was a prerequisite of, propaganda 
success. Vested interests were very important. Many of those 
remaining outwardly confident were those who saw no chance 
for themselves in a post-Nazi Germany. Respect for the Nazi 
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regime greatly depended on the "image" of the Party. As soon 
as it lost this respect and as soon as its raison d"etre was 
questioned, then every attempt by, Nazi propaganda to concentrate 
hope on a victorious post-war Nazi Germany was doomed to fail. 
(vi) CIassandSocia1Group 
Nazi propaganda portrayed the Germans as a united and 
contented people. If there were grumblers and defeatists, then 
they were only a tiny minority. They were said to belong to 
those classes and groups of society which were commonly the 
object of class animosity. It is interesting to see that, at 
the same time as Goebbels stressed the unity of the German 
nation and the absence of class-warfare, he attempted to use 
the very animosities arising out of the class-struggle for the 
purposes of propaganda. This was the case at the time of the 
"total war" mobilisation after Stalingrad, described in Chapter 
3. It was, nevertheless, a risky game and difficult to keep 
under control. In the two years that followedv the targets of 
attack were principally the intellectuals, "bourgeois", 
plutocrats and old-fashioned bureaucrats, whom it was said all 
took little interest in the course of the war and were 
interested only in ensuring their own personal comfort 
? 59 
These attacks were usually accompanied by praise of all working 
Germans. 
In a style more suited to a propaganda speech, the 
compiler of a Party morale report from Frankfurt wrote in April 
1944:. 
"Despite the great burden of work, the behaviour 
(Haltung) of the working population is still 
much better than that of a certain middle-class 
element which is so lacking in courage and 
principles that, it even sees a certain chance 
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for itself in the event of defeat. Rumours, 
defeatist views, etc. are being sown by this 
group. Whereas in the pub or in the third 
class /-compartments7 people grumble quite 
rightly about some supposed or even actual 
injustice, those in good hotels and in the 
second class demonstrate their opposition or, 
what is more often the case, behave as if 
nothing were of concern to them. " 
260 
But, according to an SD report drawn up some months earlier, 
those wanting peace at any price were to be found not only 
among "intellectuals" and "business circles" but also among 
"workers and farmers who are badly off or who have strong 
261 
religious ties". The Nazis, however, were unwilling to give 
up their idealistic view of the German worker - despite all 
the evidence negating this picture. The praise of the German 
proletariat reached a climax in the radio propaganda coverage 
of the life of Berliners during the blitz, described in Chapter 
5. Even the morale reports were full of compliments to the 
German worker, a fact which perhaps demonstrates less a 
realistic assessment of the facts than a reluctance to 
renounce the ideal of "German Socialism". There is, however, 
little reason-to believe that the German worker's attitude to 
society had been transformed by the Nazis. This is borne out 
by the reaction to the "total war" measures of 1943. Intense 
class-consciousness is surely indicated by the following 
remark of a German worker reported to the Propaganda Ministry: 
Ne only need to be accused of doing something 
wrong and we are punished severely and without 
delay. But if it's the wife of a doctor or of 
a captain, the matter is drawn out so long 
until it is completely forgotten. Exactly the 
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same class differences exist today as before. 
In this respect, nothing has changed. , 
262 
Steinert is certainly right in seeing here a criticism of the 
Nazis' failure to carry through any reform of the social system. 
Hitler's person was the only thing which still held many German 
workers to Hitler's state 
? 63 
As far as his party was 
concerned, very few felt any true sense of identity. The real 
attitude of a great number of German workers at the end of the 
war is implied in a report of October 1944 which warned of the 
strong activity of "hostile-elements" among Hamburg workers 
which, if left unchecked, could lead to "a dangerous 
j, 264 development .A report drawn up five months later was rather 
more "favourable"q although it is interesting to note that the 
stress was put on the workers' outward behaviour - the fulfil- 
ment of their duty and the fact they did not complain. No 
attempt was made to examine their true attitude, although 
reference was made to their strong trust in the Fi1hrer and 
265 
their "immunity" to all attempts at Communist sedition. 
Country people would appear to have been much less 
interested than townsfolk in the course of the war. This is 
easy to understand when it is remembered that they remained 
practically untouched by the war until the final months. It 
has already been pointed out that they were far from being the 
most ideal propaganda audience. Not only were they too busy 
266 
to read the paper or listen to the radio, but they had never 
been very engaged politically and viewed with suspicion any 
attempt at politicizing them. Above all, they remained faithful 
to the known and long-practised customs of the Church and knew 
which side they would back in the event of a conflict between 
267 
the temporal and spiritual power. Finally, many farmers 
and farm-labourers do not seem to have been particularly 
fearful of defeat for they regarded themselves as indispensable 
whoever was in power 
? 68 
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To conclude, by the end of the war disillusionment had 
spread to all classes and social groups. The Nazi ideal of the 
German worker was a myth. Twelve years of Nazi rule had been 
unable to remove class-consciousness and suspicion. The 
Volksgemeinschaft was really no more than a facade. For a short 
time, most Germans had been unable to resist the nationalist , 
enthusiasm and had, perhaps, even believed in the unity of the 
German nation, but, as soon as military success was replaced 
by military failure, their immediate interests became the 
paramount consideration, 
4 They felt less Volksgenossen and more 
workers with working-class interests and middle-class people 
with middle-class interests. The Party had ceased to represent 
the interests of any class or group - even-those of the lower- 
middle class that had voted for it in 1933. As explained in 
Chapter 5, the very real community spirit - not to be confused 
with Volksgemeinschaft - engendered by bombing was of a local 
nature and was little more than the expression of mutual 
dependency caused by common misfortune. Furthermore, it 
expressed itself in a clearly anti-Nazi form at the end of 
the war and still existed in the first, harsh post-war years. 
D. THE FINAL MONTH 
erewo1f Propa. &anda 
The first day of April 1945 was marked by the launching of 
"Operation Werewolf". "Freedom fighters" were said to be in 
operation in those parts of Germany under Allied occupation 
and until the coming "liberation" they would make life hell for 
the enemy forces. Even sabotage "tips" were given. German 
women and girls, for example, were called upon to pour boiling 
1269 water from their windows onto enemy troops. The campaign 
was essentially designed to give the occupied. population the 
impression that not all was lost and to counter any willingness 
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to accept the new status quo 
, 
by meting out savage punishment 
to collaborators. To secure the maximum propaganda effect the 
Werewolf "resistance" was said to be operating a radio station 
behind enemy lines. In fact, its transmitter was situated 
outside Berlin and broadcast on the former wavelength of 
the Deutschlandsender. The station received both its instructions 
and news items directly from the Propaganda Ministry. The 
broadcasts themselves "consisted of gay popular music 
interspersed with terse news of the exploits performed by the 
non-existent Werewolves. " 
270 
Goebbels attached great, hopes to the campaign: 
"Werewolf addresses itself quite consciously 
to a political minority of unflinching and 
unwavering supporters, who always form the 
unshakable elite of the people. " 
271 
He estimated that this "minority" made up 10% of the population 
but was sure that 
"These activists will, nonetheless, once they 
make their presence known, be able to enthuse 
the majority of the German Volk. , 
272 
This "Werewolf" propaganda may be interpreted as an attempt of 
the Nazis to fall back on the one tool they still had left 
threats of punishment and revenge. At first appearancep 
however, the "Werewolf" programmes seemed much franker than 
those of the official stations but its "news" was almost 
without exception invented. Every day examples of valiant 
deeds perpetrated by these resistance fighters and other 
courageous Germans were read out over the air. "There were 
stories of children who cut telephone wires, stole arms and 
equipment; there were stories of women who poured sugar into 
American gasoline tanks, thereby spoiling the fuel. , 
273 On 
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the other hand, it reprimanded the majority of the west German 
population for cowardice and lack of courage: 
"Where would our enemy stand today had our towns 
in the west been made into fortresses of deter- 
mined resistance. " 
274 
I 
It warned that all cowards would be dealt with once the foe had 
been thrown out of the Reich. Wild assertions and predictions 
were blended into the propaganda of heroism and threats: 
"we are near the turning point; even the presence 
of enemy tanks near Leipzig cannot hold it up. " 
275 
These promises became even more extravagent as the situation 
continued to deteriorate: 
"The endless war, which the German people is 
determined to fight out if forced to, will one 
day - and that day is not too far distant - 
lead to the collapse of the perverted enemy 
coalition .... There will be no peace in Europe 
until the German people is certain that it will 
keepits-freedom. tefore that the German people 
will' not lay down its arms even if we have to 
fight at the North Pole.,... Even if more towns 
fall and more territories are lost, developments 
will still turn out in our favour. 11276 
An 'interesting feature of these broadcasts was the 
"socialistic" tone of its pronouncements. Whereas the Soviets 
were scarcely mentioned, it concentrated on attacking the 
"gambling hyenas of the London and New York Stock Exchange". 
Moreover, the emphasis was placed more on "the German worker" 
1277 than on "the German people'. The Nazis may well have been 
trying here by means of pseudo-socialist appeal to utilise for 
their own ends those half-revolutionary sentiments and the 
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desire for social change which surface-after several years 
of war. 
But this primitive form of propaganda seems to have 
alienated the listener rather than to have instilled in him 
new hope. In Hamburg, for instance, it was condemned as an 
278 "act of. madness". Many doubted the authenticity of the 
reports broadcast on the "Werewolf" station and only a few 
people believed it was really a "secret" station transmitting 
from enemy'-controlled territory, as its signal was 
suspiciously strong 
ý7 9 
The population of west Germany had 
prepared itself for an Allied occupation long before it had 
become a fact, and it'is not difficult to imagine that these 
broadcasts, which were so out of touch with reality, were 
followed with little more than curiosity. Indeed, they stood 
in the way of the desired conciliation with the western powers. 
In short, "Werewolf" was the last trick of a propaganda serving 
a regime which represented the past, not the immediate future. 
And who, in April 1945, in occupied Cologne, Aachen and 
Frankfurt still believed or wished to believe in an imminent 
Nazi victory? 
(ii) nkina ah i j2 " _P 
ro j2 a y, anda 
The propaganda of April 1945 is characterised by an 
increasing disregard for caution when dealing with the theme of 
Allied disunity. The propagandists had been very much aware 
that this theme could only serve to awake unjustified and 
exaggerated hopes and contented themselves with underlining the 
common purpose of all enemies to destroy the German people. ' 
But now, with Anglo-wAmerican troops sweeping across the North 
German plains and Soviet troops preparing to strike at Berling 
all caution was thrown to the wind and the propaganda audience 
was encouraged to believe that the disintegration of the 
Allied coalition was only a matter of time and would rescue the 
Reich at the very last moment 
? 80 
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The inner struggle between the inevitability of having to 
exploit every, "positive" item of news to the full and the 
realisation of the perils involved in arousing exaggerated hopes 
is clearly demonstrated in the propaganda treatment of 
Roosevelt's death on 12 April 1945. At first, the press was 
forbidden to draw parallels with the death of Empress Elizabeth 
of Russia in-the Seven Years' War, but at the same time, it was 
instructed to impress upon the mind of the reader that such a 
loss would prove irreparable to the Allied cause and could mot 
281 be made good. When the war, neverthelessp continued as if 
nothing had. happened, a somewhat more cautious note was struck. 
The news was now to be presented in a form that would give the 
impression that the new President, Truman, was not so dangerous 
as Roosevelt had been. But Yet againt the inner contradiction 
and tangle in propaganda aims became evident in the instruction 
to the press not to destroy "the justified hopes of the German 
people" of a change in American policy by quoting the enemy 
press while, at the same time, not encouraging these hopes any 
further! 282 
The last extant Tagesparole of 19 April shows a growing 
nervousness and lacking farsightedness, as well as a going back 
on the principles of the entire Durchhaltepropaganda hitherto: 
"In addition to a clear presentation of enemy hate 
and plans of destruction for the German people and 
Reich, a strong emphasis on the recently growing 
tension inside the Allied camp is particularly 
suitable for increasing both the defence will 
and the staying power of the German people and 
for strengthening it in the conviction that in 
the present military crisis only grim 
perseverence can hasten the unleashing of the 
political conflict among our enemies$ thereby 
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bringing about a decisive turn in the entire 
war situation. " 
Moreover, the press was told to quote the Catholic Times - 
hardly a very representative newspaper of British public opinion - 
to show how many people in the West already feared a Third 'World 
War and the bolshevisation of the whole European continent 
? 83 
Living from hand to mouth, German propaganda was demonstrating 
a decreasing readiness to consider the long-term effect of its 
pronouncements. It almost seemed that, realising the Nazi ship 
was sinking, Nazi propagandists contented themselves with making 
sure that the band went on playing! 
A peculiarity of the last month of Nazi radio was a 
resumption of religious broadcasting. This was perhaps a last 
desperate effort to convince those circles that had been the 
victim of Nazi attack that National Socialists were now the 
defenders of Christian civilisation against the evil forces of 
atheistic materialism. For the first time in years a church 
service was broadcast on 8 April from the "front-line town", 
Goerlitz ? 84 Two weeks later, while, the Russians were fighting 
their way through the suburbs of Berlin, the Reichsrundfunk - 
broadcast a service of Christian worship from a rural parish 
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church outside Potsdam. 
During the last few weeks of the war, the clearest picture 
of the actual mood of the German people is provided by the 
utterances of the propagandists themselves. They could not 
afford to deny the current pessimism. To have done so would 
have been an invitation to criticise them for living in a dream 
world far away from reality. In an article in Das Reich 
broadcast on 6 April, Goebbels admitted that many hearts were 
beginning to falter. After assuring his readers and listeners 
that the enemy too was exhausted and could only sustain such a 
terrible strain "for a certain period", he went on to paint a 
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very sombre picture of morale in April 1945. 
"There is a kind of lethargy among the lax and 
weak, there is weariness and apathy among those 
most sorely afflicted by the war, and there is 
doubt and hopelessness in hearts without faith 
eaten out by the sternness of our time. But we 
will not reproach them as long as they continue 
to fulfil their wr duties and attempt to replace 
their lack of inner fortitude at least outwardly 
by a measure of daring. " 
Here, the strong and fanatical should come to the aid of the 
weak and ailing 
ý86 
There could be no better indication of the 
propagandists' plight than this virtual declaration of power- 
lessness. Realising that they could do absolutely nothing to 
alter the prevailing defeatist mood, they would now be 
satisfied if they ensured that the German population went on 
working, although few people might see the, point in doing so. 
So much for Nazi propaganda expectatiorsin April 1945! 
In fact, many of these broadcast observations of the state 
of morale were no less candid than the descriptions of the 
morale reports themselves. A radio broadcaster admitted on 11 
April that those people believing 
"If things go on like thist we shall soon be 
finished" 
were becoming a "ferment of disintegration". He attacked 
those "who have lost the FUhrer's picture in their heart and 
counsel others to take it down from the wall". The speaker, 
however, had only one remedy for halting this decay in morale: 
"To those who consciously or unconsciously want 
to become traitors, we mention the gallows as a 
warning, , 
287 
- 345 - 
The propagandist, unable to persuade his listeners that there 
was still ground for optimism, had to resort to the most 
primitive threats. 
(iii) Propayanda Farewell 
German propaganda finally admitted - if only implicitly - 
the loss of the war on 30 April, the day of Hitler's suicide. 
At the same time, an attempt was made to justify the war and to 
argue that not all sacrifices had been in vain. All Germans were 
now called upon to maintain belief in the meaning of this war 
that was now approaching its end: 
"To the distress of us all we have not succeeded 
as much as we hoped. Nevertheless, from our 
people's unparalleled feat of strengthq to 
which even now we must contribute our share, we 
must carry with us the firm certainty that in 
the future also each of us will speak German, 
even though he may have to live temporarily 
11288 under Bolshevik, US, or British occupation. 
This, of course, contradicted the basic assumption of the entire 
Durchhaltepropaganda since Stalingrad - namely, defeat 
constituted the destruction of the German Volk. The argument 
now underlying all Nazi propaganda was that National Socialism 
had bestowed upon the Germans the sense of belonging to the one 
united national community and that not even enemy domination 
could destroy "the nation". 
The catastrophic military position did not prevent the 
Reichsrundfunk from carrying on as if nothing had happened. 
It was, apparently a prisoner of its own routine... On 30 April 
it broadcast a programme on mathematics in ancient Babyloniap 
Egypt and China and a talk entitled "How can science ascertain 
paternity? , 
289 On the following day, until the announcement 
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of the FUhrer's death in the evening, the wireless broadcast 
a number of programmes celebrating May Day. One talk looked at 
"Strength*through Joy" cruises to Madeira in better days 
? 90 
The political propaganda of the first days of May can be 
characterised by the motto: "It cannot all have been meaningless. ' 
On May 1 listeners were told: 
"The German people must never let anyone deprive 
it of these aims which have secured for it the 
privileged position in the variguard of European 
social policy and national culture. Only a 
people that abandons its own character, and thus 
all essential features of its extensive 
contributions to the culture and welfare of 
mankind, can perish .... Ours is a faith in the 
future and the unshakable determination to make 
it as great and beautiful as possible by using 
all the forces at our disposal, , 
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The fairly sanguine tone of these broadcasts may indicate that 
the propagandists, too shared the popularly held view that the 
Americans and British would join Germany in the fight against 
the advancing Soviets and grant her generous peace terms. A 
report of 6 May, for instance, described the mood of the 
population of Flensburg, the seat of Doenitz' government, as 
follows: 
"People view the present situation as a clearly 
transitional period and believe that the final 
stage of the war will be reached when the 
struggle against the Soviet Union is decided in 
our favour with'or without foreign help. A 
great part of the population considers the 
backing of the Western Powers as fairly self- 
evident. , 
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This would help to explain the almost friendly welcome given to 
Anglo-American troops in Flensburg the following day. Rumours 
were even circulating that armed clashes had already occurred 
between the Russians and British 
? 93 Here, the rumour had 
become the vehicle for confirming, hopes that had hitherto 
remained unfulfilled. It must also be remembered when explaining 
this apparently optimistic political assessment of the position 
that the population was so preoccupied with its everyday 
problems that it had little or no time to realise the full 
extent of the disaster that had befallen it. This is 
corroborated in an official report of 7 May: 
"The outward calm and the composure displayed 
is to be seen more as a sign that the extent 
of the catastrophe - because of the swiftness 
of its coming - has not yet been realised or 
understood. " 
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In the first days of May, German propaganda continued to 
operate in the tiny area still unoccupied. On 6 May the 
Flensburg propagandists were recommended to work on the_ 
following lines: 
1) to provide a more extensive news service; 
2) to encourage "the will to rebuild" by arousing a spirit of 
self-confidence; 
3) to point to the "historical" significance of the war and 
to give the "fate" of both the individual and the Volk 
a meaning; and 
to impress upon the population "the inner strength of the 
German character by means of music, literature, etc. and to 
present them as indestructable and insuperable, thereby 
addressing the soul of the population in a positive 
, 295 direction'. 
But the declaration of acceptance of unconditional surrender 
- 348 - 
the next day came as a rude shock for both the inhabitants of 
Flensburg and their propagandists. The effect of the news was 
said to have been "shocking and crushing". Quite suddenly, 
after the people had been encouraged in their hopes that they 
might somehow avoid the consequences of a lost war, the awful 
realisation of being completely at the mercy of the victors 
finally dawned on them. The bitter feeling was echoed in a 
criticism of both FUhrer and Party for not having ended the war 
earlier and saving the lives of countless German soldiers and 
civilians 
? 96 
In this cruel confrontation with unrelieved defeat 
the propagandists were called upon to change their tactics: 
"According to observations made during the last 
few days, general formulations about maintaining 
the national substance no longer suffice. 
Propaganda must rather point out to people in a 
positive way the many possibilities they still 
have of seizing the initiative and of coming to 
one another's aid by means of various forms of 
self-help. " 
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In fact, this very last recorded recommendation to the 
propagandists of the Third Reich was the most honest and 
realistic one. 
The propagandists also had now to give up any hopes they 
might have been nurturing of contindmg to serve a German Reich 
government. The arrest of Doenitz and his ministers on 22 
May was the final demonstration that not only the Russians but 
also the "western friends" had no intention of treating the 
German people in any other way than as a vanquished foe. 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has clearly been a study in propaganda decline. 
A striking feature of Nazi propaganda in these last months of 
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hostilities was its almost schizophrenic behaviour. Victims 
of the prevailing bleak situation, the propagandists were being 
compelled to justify their raison detre by seizing upon every 
positive or apparently positive item of news they could lay 
their hands on. As the crisis thickened, consideration of 
long-term consequences gave way to a simple consideration of 
short-term propaganda advantage. In short, the task was simply 
to show that the future post-war Germany would be a National 
Socialist one. But, in doing this, the propagandists ran the 
risk of exposing themselves to the criticism that they were 
endeavouring to distract their audience away from a reality 
which all could see without the intervention of propaganda. 
This would only heighten the awareness of being manipulated in 
a way and for a purpose that lay in stark contradiction to the 
hopes, needs and wishes of the majority of the German people. 
In fact, Nazi propagandists found themselves in an extremely 
unenviable position. To vindicate their existence, they had to 
show how the war might be won but to do so meant demonstrating 
the fact they had lost touch with reality! If they were to 
stress the seriousness of the military situation and the perils 
facing the nation, people would draw what appeared to them the 
necessary consequences and for the sake of expediency do nothing 
that was likely to hold up the inevitable - defeat and the end 
of National Socialism. 
The reader can certainly appreciate the difficulty the 
propagandists had in trying to transform a deeply-rooted image 
of the enemy. This is borne out by the failure of anti- 
American atrocity propaganda. Nevertheless, the rather-positive 
image of the Russians recorded in 1943 unquestionably underwent 
a drastic revision in the late summer of 1944. Nazi propaganda 
was then to make full use of eye-witness reports of Soviet 
cruelty and crimes against the civilian population. But it 
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would be wrong todescribe this change in attitude as being 
principally the fruit of the propagandists' efforts. Much more 
important was the fact that the content of these reports was 
backed up in the accounts of friends and relatives on active 
duty in the East. In fact, it can be said that anti-Bolshevik 
propaganda was only'successful when it was confirmed by the 
"expert" - here, reprqsentatives of the Wehrmacht. 
It is also quite, clear that belief in the truth of propaganda 
content did not necessarily mean that the recipient drew those 
conclusions and followed that behaviour pattern the propagandist 
intended he should. Indeed, the atrocity reports might be 
believed but the resulting panic and the wish to be occupied by 
the British and Americans certainly did not correspond to Nazi 
propaganda aims and expectations. The atrocity campaign 
against the Western Powers fell on deaf ears because it was not 
backed up by that respected expert, the front-line soldier. To 
have believed in these accounts would also have meant depriving 
oneself of the one sure hope and refuge of an acceptable way of 
life in a vanquished Germany. As early as 1944 the Western 
Powers were being viewed as the friends and Allies of the future. 
It is interesting to note that the propagandists also became 
conscious of the increasing ineffectiveness of conventional 
propaganda forms and resorted more and more to utilising for 
their own ends the reputation of unofficial information 
channels - the soldier and the rumour. This must be construed 
as a very deliberate attempt to deceive the German civilian 
population. The preparation and organisation of the 
Mundpropagandaaktion gives abundant proof of this. It virtually 
amounted to a confession that manipulation alone - not 
information - was fit to secure loyalty to the National 
Socialist state. It was, moreover, a tacit admission of the 
"victory" of other information sources in the struggle for 
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German public opinion. 
The very best confirmation of the failure of Nazi 
propaganda in its principle task of upholding belief in "final 
victory" are the gradual preparations taken by many Germans in 
anticipation of a future non-Nazi Germany. As was explained in 
Chapters 2 and 4, many people were contemplating life in 
"another" Germany as early as the first few months of 1943. The 
attitude of many, directed at this future horizon, was to regard 
the war as an unnecessary struggle for a lost cause. German 
lives were being thrown away and the whole rancour and 
bitterness was now directed at those who were standing in the 
way of transition to "new times". Hence, the Party was 
increasingly seen as the hated guardian of those interests 
responsible for the dreadful calamity that had befallen all 
Germans - Nazi and non-Nazi -,, and which was still trying its 
utmost to block the path to the peace that was yearned for. The 
Americans and the British, on the other hand, were the guarantee 
that the peace would be acceptable. Of course, this was more 
typical of the attitude of the population in those areas of the 
Reich which appeared to lie out of the reach of the Red Army. 
Similarly, the increase in churchgoingp even among nominal 
Party members, in the last two years of the war, besides 
pointing to fear of enemy retribution, might be interpreted as 
further evidence of a widespread anticipation of a new post-war 
Germany. It was a safe demonstration of opposition to the 
principles of National Socialism. The Christian churches also 
provided the comfort of continuity in a world that was under- 
going radical change and in a land that was about to undergo 
political upheaval. ý The idea of a "Thousand Year Reich" had 
turned out to be a myth and many now found their way back to a 
world they knew to be secure and inpregnable. 
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The months October 1944 - May 1945 therefore witnessed a 
further and final decline in the effect of National Socialist 
propaganda. Faced with a task impossible to solve - the 
maintenance of belief in German victory -inspiring words and 
clever propaganda tricks proved insufficient to neutralise the 
penetrating message of enemy victory and advance. 
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CHAPTER 8 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
In the various subjects examined in this thesis - the effect of 
the Stalingrad debacle, the "total war" campaign, the 
ideological campaigns, enemy bombing, retaliation and the 
catastrophic developments in the last nine months of the war - 
the same factors determining propaganda policy, the popular 
response to this policy and the propagandists' reaction to this 
response have cropped up again and again. Thes7e very same 
factors, which are now to be discussed for the last time, cannot 
be separated or-seen in isolation from the'all-pervading 
numbing atmosphere of decline. Individual phenomena - or 
factors must be seen in this context if their significance is 
to be fully appreciated. For the sake of clarity, those points 
for discussion listed in the introductory chapter on pages 7-10 
will be. taken up and dealt-. with one by one in this final 
chapter. An attempt will be made to bring together those main 
strands of thought which became explicit in the conclusions to 
the individual chapters. 
1. The Comparative Importance of Fear and Consolation 
The complementary strategies of fear and consolation run like 
threads through the entire. propaganda output of the period 
under study. In a way it, was a sign of inherent weakness that 
Nazi propagandists had to rpsort increasingly to fear. The 
idea was, of coursethat by means of an intensive pounding 
with anti-Bolshevik and anti-Semitic propaganda the German 
people should learn of the consequences of defeat and, 
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furthermore,, be instilled with the exhilarating feeling of 
fighting a good cause against the powers of darkness. Hate 
itself should constitute the unifying force. In 1943 the 
danger perceived was still somehow too distant and remote to 
secure acceptance of the propaganda theses. Moreover, in as 
far as the Soviet Union was recognised as a growing threat and 
the possibility of defeat loomed on the horizon, the population 
preferred to believe in information that "humanised" the 
Bolshevik foe and made the prospect of possible future Russian 
rule more palatable. Here, as pointed out in Chapter 4, the 
rumour and other unofficial information sources were to come 
to the rescue. Very striking is the widespread willingness 
shown by the German people at the time to accept at face value 
the truth, of any information that they wanted to hear and which 
pointed to the basic humanity of the Russians. Any Nazi 
propaganda of fear threatening to disturb this picture was 
ignored or rejected. But this form of "flight" was no longer 
possible after the summer of 1944, when the Soviets failed to 
come up to people's high expectations of them. The apparent 
confirmation of propaganda atrocity stories by reality did not, 
however, lead to propaganda success. The truth of the terrible 
stories spouting out of the Nazi media was not doubted, but 
the propagandists found out to their chagrin that securing the 
right behaviour was something much more difficult than securing 
acceptance of the propaganda message. A strong dose of fear 
did not result in a strengthened determination to resist but in 
mass flight to the west and the transference of hopes to the 
western foe. Fear had thus encouraged the Germans to seek 
their own consolation, at first in both the east and the west, 
and then only in the west. 
This behaviour bore testimony to the failure of Nazi 
propagandists to supply adequate compensation. In factv as the 
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war went on, they were providing much too much fear and much 
too little compensation. Of coursep it became increasingly 
difficult to provide the latter. The answer of the propagandists 
to reverses was to stress the national unity and the invincible 
courage and determination of the German people. But such 
arguments were hopelessly inadequate when the enemies of the 
Reich, continued to advance despite the intensified effort of 
German soldiers and workers. Nothing at all was achieved by 
the employment of theoretical propaganda or the use of 
historical parallels, as was seen in the last chapter. Any- 
thing'smacking of distraction or escapism was rejected outright 
and one can appreciate the impatience and outright anger of 
many Germans when confronted with this kind of propaganda at 
the. end-of the war. The sheer gulf between the real danger 
perceived and propaganda exploits was simply too great. There 
was no longer any room in people's minds for philosophical 
perambulations and meanderings. What was more, the more 
contrived the compensatory arguments became - and the situation 
compelled the propagandists to resort to contrived arguments - 
the more vivid was the revelation of the purely manipulative 
elements in the German mass media. This also meant that, as 
the military situation worsened, the compensatory propaganda 
was less and less able to constitute the desired balance and 
complement to the propaganda of fear. The only themes that had 
any chance of success were those backed up by actual events or 
based on events thought to be imminent. This is demonstrated 
quite clearly by the favourable reaction to the propaganda 
dealing with U-boat successes and the Rundstedt offensive. But 
-after 
May 1943 there were few submarine successes to record and 
the German offensive of December 1944 only brought successes 
of an ephemeral nature. For the rest of the time German 
propagandists were seldom able'to resort to military reality in 
order to comfort their audience. But they could promise 
- 356 - 
something in, the foreseeable futurep something that would change 
the whole picture of the war - Vergeltung. 
Very soon the retaliation theme cast all other compensatory 
themes into the shadows and assumed-an importance, even greater 
than the propagandists desired. It was to become the hinge on 
which everything hung. In Germany in the latter half of the war 
the retaliation idea was something more than the wish for 
reprisals that had been widespread in Britain - especially in 
un bombed areas 
1* 
- in 1940-1. It stood for something more than 
the simple wish to pay back the enemy in kind; it was 
increasingly seen as the only way of Winning the war and 
destroying the enemy's capability of launching raids on the Reich. 
Retaliation was the only theme holding out a chance of lasting 
success, since it directed attention away from the present to the 
future. Nevertheless, as was clearly demonstrated in the evidence 
used in Chapter 6, Vergeltung propaganda, too, was ultimately 
dependent on substantiation in fact. The success of this 
propaganda depended on the assumption that the blow was imminent. 
and, as this was not the case, the general attitude to Vergeltung 
was subject to sudden ups and downs in the long period of 
waiting. Despite the recurring doubts and disappointment when 
the blow failed to. come, the very great impatience itself 
demonstrated the intensity of the feelings aroused by Nazi 
propaganda. It is striking how Nazi leaders managed time and 
time again to provide new hope, although the effect of their 
promises - even those of Hitler himself - only proved temporary. 
The fact was that the propagandists were saying those things the 
German people wanted them to say. Throughout the period 1943-5, 
the willingness to believe and the spirit of general disappoint- 
ment and pessimism somehow coexisted. People themselves were 
scarcely awaýeof the inherent contradiction. 
The retaliation theme shows the danger when a compensatory 
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theme is too "successful" at a time of national crisis. The 
message proved so effective that the propagandists themselves 
lost control over their own creation. quite unwittingly, they 
were concentrating the nation's hopes on one thing to the 
exclusion of everything else. As a result, Vergeltung alone 
was considered decisive for the final outcome of the war. But 
as-such, the "dream", too, in the long run needed 
corroboration in deeds. In fact, by the beginning of 1944 
the German leadership had lost such control over the Vergeltung 
issue that it was'allowing its decision making to be influenced 
by the response to the retaliation propaganda. The "baby blitz" 
on London in the first months of 1944 was more a propaganda 
than a military necessity. It was the only means left of 
quelling the tremendous impatience aroused by the predictions 
made in the preceding months. It must not be forgotten that 
the planes which bombed London were sorely needed elsewhere and 
could-certainly have been put to a more effective military use. 
As far as the post-war world was concernedg Nazi 
predictions and plans were vague. Apart from the promise to 
rebuild German towns within a few years of victory, 
surprisingly little was said about the social and economic 
policies of the future. There was no equivalent of the 
Beveridge Plan in wartime Germany. This probably in the long 
run worked out to the advantage of Nazi propagandistsp for it 
left them with more elbow room and greater opportunity for 
propaganda manoeuvre. In Britain Beveridge proved such a "hit" 
that it obtained the aura of holy writ. No British politician, 
whatever his leanings and innermost convictionsp could afford 
to oppose the plan and, instead, activists of all parties vied 
2 
each other in demonstrating their support of it. There is a 
certain similarity in the response to the Vergeltung, theme in 
Germany and the Beveridge Plan in Great Britain in as far as 
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the political leadership was forced to follow public opinion 
rather than lead it.. once the ideas had been propounded. 
2. The Effect of Repetition of the Propaganda Message 
There is no evidence to show that the growing resort to the 
staple idea of Nazi propaganda - the more often you say the 
same thing the more likely it is to stick - at the end of the 
war was very effective. In fact, the opposite appears to have 
been true. It is certainly no coincidence that the themes in 
which repetition played the dominant role and in which Goebbels, 
expectations as to its effectiveness were greatest (e. g. Katyn, 
anti-Semitism, the damage to Cologne Cathedral) w6re precisely 
those which were least effective. In the case of Katyn, a 
promising theme, apparently backed up by the factsp was 
undermined and soon forfeited any chance of success thanks to 
unbridled repetition of the very same arguments. The growing 
use of repetition in the last months of the war, which finally 
degenerated into the routine reiteration of a handful of 
propaganda slogans, not only created a spirit of boredom and 
indifference to propaganda utterances but made the audience much 
more conscious of the underlying propaganda purpose and the 
deliberate attempt at manipulation. And, once the workings of 
Nazi propaganda were revealed and recognised, the less was the 
likelihood that the propaganda recipients would respond in the 
desired manner. 
Repetition is, of course, a characteristic of all 
totalitarian propaganda and is an unavoidable consequence of 
the outlawing of all political competition and free exchange 
of opinion. It was and is still used in Soviet Russia just as 
intemperately as it was in Nazi Germany. Nazi propagandists 
werev however, at a distinct disadvantage compared to their 
Soviet counterparts. They were confronted with a propaganda 
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audience: much more sophisticated and media conscious than the 
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peoples of the USSR. Although repetition was always a 
fundamental operating principle of Nazi propaganda, up to 1943 
a number of ideas were repeated and in varied ways. Indeed, 
Goebbels devoted considerable thought and effort to providing 
an interesting framework for conveying a few basic ideas. This 
was to be much less the case towards the end of the war when 
the same, ideas-were hammered home quite indiscriminately and 
much less attention was paid to presentation and argumentation. 
It is necessary, however, to distinguish between the 
conscious and unconscious resort to repetition. Propaganda 
behaviour in the final months of the war strongly suggests 
that there was a connection between the deterioration in the 
military situation and the debasement in the quality of the 
propaganda message. By April 1945, the propaganda content 
consisted merely of a few constantly reiterated and abstract 
slogans and catch-phrases. The hectic situation which arose 
in 1945 overtaxed the capabilities of Nazi propagandists, who 
were so overwhelmed by the crisis they were facing that they 
knew no other answer than to turn to known and hackneyed 
formulas. They were living from hand to mouth and had no time 
to think about the consequences of their decisions. Try as 
hard as they might, they were practically powerless to halt 
the downward trend.. Being a propagandist in the Germany of 
1945 was -to put it mildly -a very unrewarding job. 
In his work, "Propagandes", Ellul has argued that 
minimal response to a propaganda theme could mean that the 
message has already been accepted and that its repetition is 
considered. unnecessary. Apparent disinterest is not the same 
as rejection of the propaganda argument. 
"In fact, he (the recipient) has now become 
insensitive to the objective and intellectual 
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content of the propaganda. He has now become 
indifferent to the propaganda theme, the idea, 
the argument and its development and illustration... 
He no longer needs to read the newspaper or to - 
listen to a talk, because he already knows their 
ideological content-beforehand, and they can do 
nothing at all to change his attitudes. It is 
thus true that after a certain time the individual 
becomes indifferent to the propaganda, but that- 
is not to say that he has become insensitive, that 
he has turned away from it and been rendered 
immune. It means quite the opposite; he has 
totally accustomed himself to it, he is completely 
dominated and moulded by it. He no longer needs 
to see and read the poster; the colour itself is 
enough to awake in him the desired reflexes. ,4 
The case of the, Third Reich would seem to contradict this 
assumption. This study has shown how prevalent independent 
thought and outright rejection of propaganda arguments were 
in wartime Germany. Outward docility is to be traced back as 
much to apathy as-it is to acceptance of the propaganda 
message. Popular response to totalitarian propaganda is not 
all. that different, in present day East Germany from what it 
was in the Germany of 1933-45. The slogans of the SED are 
omnipresent and constitute a familiar part of the street and 
factory scene, but they are hardly anchored in the hearts of 
the people themselves. In fact, the proliferation of political 
slogans, - designed to demonstrate the indisputable unity of 
the citizens of "German Workers' and Peasantst State" and their 
political leadership, play a, very minor part in the forming of 
public opinion. They remain something external, even esoteric. 
Even the East German youth, organised in the FDJ, maintains 
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an amazing degree of "independent" thought. More often than 
not their ideals and goals are "western" and "capitalistic". 
The same expressions and formulas are repeated in the same way 
as prayers are said in church by those who have never 
seriously considered the question of the existence of God. In 
the USSR, too, the stereotyped monotony of press editorials 
demonstrates how propaganda has degenerated into a set 
exercise, existing apart from reality. In all the lands of 
Eastern Europe the contrast between the way people really think 
and the world of "socialist reality", presented by their 
propagandists, is all too evident. 
It would be safe to conclude that repetition does not 
heighten the responsiveness of the propaganda audience to 
propaganda and that it does not increase interest in the 
message but rather decreases it. 
3. The Availability of the Propaganda Audience 
It must be stressed that, owing to both behavioural and 
situational factors, National Socialist propaganda was far 
less "total" and ubiquitous than is frequently assumed. This 
becomes particularly clear in this study of the years 1943-5 
when the free time at the disposal of both workers and farmers 
was severely limited. In the spare time left to them many 
Germans tried their best to forget the terrible tragedy that 
was befalling them. This would account for the continued 
popularity of-the cinema, which mainly showed frivolous 
entertainment films depicting a world of bygone days. Only 
the fifteen-minute Wochenschau provided an unwelcome link with 
reality. It is really astounding how many people did not 
bother to listen to the radio or to read the newspaper, or, if 
they did so, devoted exclusive attention to news of enemy air 
raids. This does not appear to have been a purely German 
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phenomenon. In Britain, too, there was a marked recession of 
interest in general war news during the blitz. In May-June 
1940, nine per-cent of the British were not following war news, 
but in February 1941 the number had increased to thirty-nine 
5 
per cent. Although no such statistical surveys were made in 
wartime Germany, the growing disinterest in war news in 1943-4 
can be traced back in good measure to the Allied air 
bombardment. In short, possession of a radio set or even 
subscription to a newspaper or magazine provided no guarantee 
that the citizen would acquaint himself with, let alone absorb, 
the propagandists' arguments. It must also be remembered that 
in many rural areas a wireless set was a rarity, so that a 
substantial part of the population was deprived of the most 
"effective" propaganda instrument. 
Secondly, war developments themselves impaired the 
availability of the propaganda media at the end of the war and 
tore open the gaps in propaganda distribution. It was shown 
in Chapter 7 how bombing dislocated the printing and 
distribution of newspapers, destroyed or damaged radio sets, 
interrupted a town's electricity supply and hindered both 
wireless transmission and reception. on top of all this came 
an increasingly serious shortage of paper and radio valves. 
Finally, the upheaval caused by the Allied invasion of the 
Reich in 1945 and the trek of millions of Germans to an 
unknown destination meant that the Nazi propagandists could no 
longer be sure of reaching even a part of their audience. 
Crucial to any study of the effect of German domestic 
propaganda at this time is_the awareness of the fact that the 
propaganda audience of 1945 was something quite different to" 
the one of 1942. 
The Attitude of the German People to Official Propaganda 
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The attitude of the German people to its propaganda was 
determined by the "image" of the latter and its reputation for 
trustworthiness, by the awareness of being the object of 
deliberate manipulation and by the military events themselves. 
All these three factors were closely interconnected. As early 
as the Battle of Stalingrad, millions of Germans were conscious 
of the fact that their mass media were not representing their 
interests and were therefore encouraged to consider the question 
of the purpose of propaganda. Many realised that the leadership 
would not hesitate to withhold information from them again in 
the future should it fear to lose face. The official silence 
and the propagandists' clumsy attempts at diverting people's 
attention elsewhere angered the-Germans, who found such 
handling insulting and saw their intelligence being underrated. 
A great part of the German population now became amateur 
content analysts, turning reading between the lines into a 
fine art. After the winter of 1942-3 the attitude to the media 
was characterised by the will to find out more about'propaganda 
intentions and the secret workings of the propaganda machinery. 
Goebbels knew all too well how much the power of his 
propaganda depended on its arcanaý* The revelation and 
recognition of the "secrets" would render it, in the long run, 
ineffective. 
Naturally, the crisis of Nazi propaganda was a crisis 
which all totalitarian propaganda*systems would have faced in 
such a situation. The success of all totalitarian propaganda 
depends on its image of infallibility. As has-already been 
explained in the introductory chapter, during the first two 
or three years of the war German invincibility was self- 
evident and propaganda success merely mirrored military success. 
But the sudden confrontation with military failure at the time 
of Stalingrad contradicted this former picture and the only 
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answer the Nazi leadership at first knew was silence. But 
this, in turn, could not stem people's appetite for news but 
only whet it. Nazi propagandists then tried rather cleverly 
to overcome the impasse by explaining that all the advantages 
gained in the first years of the war meant that the Reich 
possessed an invincible position with the beginning of real 
war. They endeavoured to show that up to then the war had been 
no "real war" at all. To prove their point they adopted a 
more sober tone. But the sudden resortto "frankness", so 
perfectly executed, only helped to underline the central 
organisation and regimentation of Nazi propaganda. This trick 
did not work, for apparent realism was frequently seen as 
official admission of the severity of the crisis and served to 
spread defeatism rather than to curb it. German leaders were 
at a distinct disadvantage compared to the British leadership 
back in 1940-1. In Germany military setback was much more 
difficult to bear after*a prolonged period of virtually 
uninterrupted victory, and at the beginning of 1943 there was 
a fatal combination of military setback and war-weariness. 
Churchill's promise . of "blood, sweat and tears" was 
exhilarating in the summer days of 1940 but Goebbels' similar 
promise in early 1943 met with a rather different reception 
from people who had been told repeatedly - and had believed - 
that victory was not far off. In Great Britain the hardest 
time had come at the beginning, although by 1942 there, too, 
the strain was beginning to show, - particularly after the loss 
of Singapore and Tobruk. Certainly Churchill's popularity was 
waning and there was even talk of a "new man", perhaps Stafford 
Cripps. It is quite'conceivable that, had the setbacks and 
retreats continued, a tricky political situation would have 
arisen which might even have led to the ousting of Churchill. 
Of course, in the Germany of 1943-5 there were no political 
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parties or a parliament to worry about, but the disappointment 
did manifest itself in growing criticism of the leadershipq 
the Party and, of course, the propaganda. 
In the subjects treated above it is striking to what 
degree events themselves constituted criteria in the judgement 
of propaganda "truth". The enemy victories were at the same 
time the best form of enemy propaganda and undermined the trust 
of the German people in their information media more than 
anything else. The propagandists could do no other than 
minimise the defeats inflicted on the German armed forces but, 
in doing so, they did more harm than good. The credibility 
gap between the real and the propaganda world became an 
unbridgeable chasm, obvious even to the most diehard supporters 
of the regime. The force of current events proved too strong 
and convincing to permit their being turned inside out by 
propaganda gloss. In short, the ersatz world of the 
propagandists could provide the German people with no 
satisfactory substitute for reality. The constant advance of 
the Red Army after the summer of 1943, for instance, 
contradicted the propaganda assertion that the Soviets were 
being bled to death by the Wehrmacht. But nowhere was the 
contradiction more apparent than in the case of Allied bombing. 
The air raids on the German civilian population have 
played a central role in this study, ' for they were the most 
immediate proof of enemy strength and superiority and as such 
constituted a crucial factor in determining the popular 
attitude to Nazi propaganda. The study made in Chapter 5 
into their effects, and consequences for morale showed quite 
clearly that they provided much more powerful propaganda than 
all the contortions of Nazi propagandists. Their effect was 
visible and could not be ignored or thrust aside. The 
destruction wrought by enemy bombers showed clearly that the 
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promises made by the propagandists were lies and deceit. The 
impression left behind determined not only the outlook on war 
developments as a-whole but also the-reliability of all 
utterances made by German propaganda, whatever the subject. 
Only when the military threat became really acute and the 
territory of the Reich was directly threatened did military 
events become equally or, at times, more decisive in determining 
this attitude. For over a year reports on raids and promises 
of retaliation were the only pyopaganda capable of arousing 
any great interest, but they-were also the themes that caused 
the greatest resentment. The thirst for news was insatiable 
and, try as hard as they might, the propagandists could not 
quench it. This situation gave rise to uncontrollable and 
exaggerated rumOurs, which only managed to make the rift 
between perceived truth and the propagandists' interpretative 
world still greater. The feeling felt by the inhabitants of a 
bombed town that the media were not giving enough attention to 
what they had endured further undermined the trust in the 
propaganda. They thought they were being left in the lurch by 
a leadership that. did not care. A similar phenomenon was 
observed in Britain during the Luftwaffe raids of 1940-1. 
In Bristol the BBC news bulletins were thought to be doing 
7 
insufficient credit to the town's sufferings. The 
Mancunians, too, were enraged by the wireless "underplaying" 
8 
their plight, while the inhabitants of Hull were angered at 
repeated references to the bombing of their city as attacks on 
to 9 a north-east-town". But there was an apparent contradiction. 
Any post-raid morale-boosting propaganda in either Germany or 
Britain was frequently regarded as an open invitation to the 
enemy to repeat its attack. This shows how the raids were 
assuming such a dominant role in people's lives that everything 
even local events - was seen in an international context. Just 
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as in January 1944 the citizens of Frankfurt believed a heavy 
raid on their city to be the enemy's answer to their 
Gauleiter's much publicised announcement of a Party rallylo 
the inhabitants of Plymouth had seen in the visit of the Royal 
Couple to their city in April 1941 the reason for the return of 
the dreaded bombersýl In as much as the air war affected people 
at a personal level, it was viewed in an extremely subjective 
way. 
Once the German population made its own contact with the 
real world of 1943-5, the efforts of propagandists at 
upholding belief in victory were doomed. The starts and fits 
in Nazi treatment of the raids only demonstrated the 
propagandists' helplessness. Anything that smacked of 
distraction (e. g. ideological themes or polemics) was rejected 
outright by the German people. Nazi propagandists were 
compelled to take up the subject which concerned the nation 
most, ýbut, by-doing so, they inevitably compromised themselves. 
In 1943-5 there could be no such thing as an adequate or 
"successful" raid propaganda. 
In an examination of popular attitude to Nazi propaganda. 
the tendency of the German people to generalise is quite 
striking. For example, the pessimism in regard to Stalingrad 
was echoed in premature fears of the loss of North Africa. 
The Rundstedt offensive at the end of 1944 led to unbounded 
optimism regarding events on both the East and West Fronts and 
a marked rise in confidence in the future effect of the V- 
weapons. Here the significance of the emotional subjective 
"image" of the war becomes clear. Similarly, a heavily bombed 
population was much more likely to view contemporary military 
developments pessimistically than a lightly bombed or unbombed 
population. 
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The deep-reaching apathy of a large part of the German 
people towards-the end of the war should not be underestimated. 
By the spring of 1945 the bad tidings were coming in at such 
terrifyingly short intervals that they could not be absorbed 
and they were hardly registered in the minds of the listener. 
This meant that both press and press were often ignored. Apathy 
was the outward sign of renunciation of "outside" events and of 
exclusive preoccupation with the immediate environment, i. e. the 
family and friends. It is practically impossible to unravel 
basic attitudes in such an extraordinary situation as that of 
1945. They defy rational explanation. 
The fundamental problem of totalitarian propaganda in a 
situation of acute crisis may be summed up as follows. The 
population demands objective informationg but to give it is 
tantamount to an official admission of defeatism when'the 
government possesses a monopoly of the media. Hence it is 
impossible to give the people what they want - realistic 
information as to how 'the-war can be won. But people go on 
demanding to hear the truth. The truth, however, has to be 
favourable if it is to be propagandistically effective. In the 
last two years of the Third Reich, the very force of the 
situation facing the propagandists must be appreciated. They 
were compelled - on the basis of popular demand - to tackle 
delicate subjects they would have preferred to have left alone, 
to-take risks and to follow dark and uncertain paths. But 
their reputation suffered still further as a result. By the 
end of the war, the Germans had,. to a great extent, freed 
themselves from their dependence on official propaganda, a 
dependence of which they had once been barely conscious. With 
the aid of alternative sources of information they were puttiU6 
together their own picture of the war. 
5. The Significance of Other Sources of Information 
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At the time of Stalingrad a surge in "black-listening" was 
recorded. As this first great defeat of the Wehrmacht turned 
out to be but the first in a long line of setbacks, the 
alternative sources of information, which lay outside the 
sphere of official control, increased in significance until 
they finally became a sort of propaganda substitute. This did 
not mean that Nazi propaganda was rendered*completely 
superfluous but it did mean that its reputation receded as that 
of alternative news-sources. was enhanced. In fact, many 
Germans showed an extraordinary knack in combining information 
from both official and unofficial sources of information in 
order to form their own independent picture of events. The 
value estimate of a news source was a vital factor here. The 
BBC, for example,. was commonly thought to broadcast more news 
and less "propaganda", a view which also contained a value 
estimate of Nazi propaganda. Not only the fact that events 
confirmed unofficial information but that the Nazi radio and 
press frequently reported the same news two or three days later 
than the enemy radio all worked out to the disadvantage of 
German propaganda. The growing rift between Ehe picture drawn 
by official propaganda and that based on unofficial sources only 
accelerated this trend. By thesummer of 1943 the enemy radio, 
the accounts of-soldiers and rumours had come together to form 
a primary information system. 
Person-to-person contact was clearly more effective than 
the words of faraway propagandists, even when the information 
spread in this way was wrong, as was the case with many 
casualty rumours and descriptions of Soviet "humanity". In 
fact, the situation was such that many Germans tended to 
believe any wrong news contained in the rumour rather than 
any right news in official propaganda. An extraordinary 
gullibility, for instan ce, was to be observed in the aftermath 
of air raids. Blown-up figures of damage and casualties were 
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spread by means of rLunours and a "raid pychosis" took hold of 
the population of areas hitherto untouched. Exaggerated rumours 
also circulated in Britain as a result of the German raids. 
After an attack on Liverpool in May 1941, for example, there was 
12 talk of 50,917 dead! In Germany, as in_Britainp there was 
a tendency to add a nought on hearing official casualty figures. 
The favourable disposition to any rumour was, of course, 
exploited by the Nazis in their Mundpropaganda campaign, 
particularly in the last months of the war. As explained in 
the preceding chapter, the role played by the soldier as expert 
and opinion leader also found official recognition in the growing 
use of members of the Wehrmacht as propaganda mouthpieces. 
Nor should the importance of the Christian churches in 
wartime Germany be underestimated. Church-going was and is much 
more prevalent than it is, for instance, in the United Kingdom. 
Both the Catholic and Protestant'Churches were the only official 
organisations that . never succumbed fully to Nazism. ' Theirs was 
another set of values which gave their active members an 
alternative. Especially in rural areas, Christianity was more 
deeply ingrained than National Socialism. As a result many 
people did not find it too difficult to come to terms with the 
idea of the transience of Nazism and even of German military 
greatness. Catholics, in particular, were conscious of 
belonging to a universal church and this, perhaps, created a 
sense of identity with the Western World. 
No study of the effect of Nazi propaganda in 1943-5 could 
therefore be complete without detailed consideration of these 
unofficial news sources, which were finally to play an equally 
or even more important role in the forming of German public 
opinion than Nazi propaganda itself. An interesting subject for 
further research would be the role played in wartime Britain by 
the very same unofficial sources which have been examined in 
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this thesis. The considerable 
points to the possible potenti, 
the blitz he became "the voice 
omniscient that he was reputed 
provincial town clocks! 
13 
popularity of "Lord Haw Haw" 
alities of such a theme. During 
of authority" and was so 
to be able to read the time from 
6. Class and Social Factors 
The military victories of 1940-1 undeniably gave the German 
people the feeling of belonging to one great national 
community'. In fact, however, this feeling represented only the 
spirit of nationalistic enthusiasm, which so few Germans found 
possible to resist in those "happy days". The second half of 
the war demonstrated how superficial this Volksgemeinschaft 
really was. In as far as the turn of fortune forced people to 
contemplate the prospect of eventual defeat, there was a marked 
increase in preoccupation with immediate interests and a decrease 
in nationalistic fervour. After the bitter blow of the winter 
of 1942-3, the German people began to divide up again into its 
traditional class and social'groups. This concentration on 
immediate interests meant an intensified sensitivity-towards any 
perceived social difference or injustice, and any suspicion 
that the common , 
burden was not being equally shared meant, in 
turn, growing inter-class antagonism. Even bombing did not, 
as Steinert is inclined to believe, restore a semblance of 
national unity and determination 
14 Therd. was undoubtedly a 
growth in the communal spirit at a local, not at a national, 
level. This neighbourliness was a consequence of the 
realisation of being in the same boat and is certainly not 
attributable to Nazi propaganda. Goebbels' claim that enemy 
raiding was forging a new national community was not only 
ridiculous but contradicted the assertion that Germany had been 
a Volksgemeinschaft since the first days of the Third Reich. 
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The resounding reception given to Goebbels in the working-class 
areas of Berlin, described in Chapter 5, should be seen less 
as evidence of identity with the Nazis and more as respect for 
the only leader who dared show himself in public and who was 
apparently concerned with the plight of the masses. Baird, too, 
overstates the role of nationalism at the very end of the war 
when he maintains that "the limited propaganda success" (sic) 
at this time is to be traced back to "the fact that traditional 
Nazi propaganda overlapped and merged with traditional German 
patriotism and the people's intuitive response to defend the 
15 Fatherland in danger". The disorderly retreat in the west, 
the hoisting of white flags in most west German towns and the 
flight of millions of east Germans to the west are not 
altogether compatible with this assertion. 
The-, "total war" measures of 1943, examined in Chapter 3, 
affected people according to class but, at the same time as 
creating outwardly greater social equality, theyincreased class 
consciousness. The simple fact that middle-class women were 
being brought into the war effort for the first time only made 
the working class aware that it alone had borne the brunt of 
war sacrifices heretofore whilst the better-off had enjoyed an 
almost parasitic peace-time living style. In short, the working 
man would not benefit from his toil-s'and only the rich would 
benefit from German victory. The middle class, on the othdr 
hand, saw in these war measures an attack on their class and a 
betrayal of National Socialist ideas. The readiness to 
. 
believe the worst. in regard to government intentions showed how 
sensitive German people were when official policy affected them 
financially, economically and socially. Goebbels seriously 
undermined the strength of these class feelings which were 
flaring up, when he thought he could use them propagandistically 
as a whip to secure acceptance of the mobilisation and closing- 
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down measures. In fact, if anythingg he only made the situation 
worse, for the better-off saw this as proof that Goebbels was 
inciting thd lower classes against them, whilst the working 
class remained unconvinced as to the honesty of the leadership's 
intentions, the fair implementation of the measures and the 
equality of sacrifice to the war effort. Thus, practically all 
classes. came to regard government policy and government interests 
as running contrary to their own interests. No longer was there 
an identifiable unity of national and personal purpose and 
interests. 
There is little evidence to suggest that the great majority 
of the German working class began to think ideologically in a 
clearly socialist, let alone Bolshevik, way. What was typical 
of these years was the loss of respect for political authority, 
which was echoed in a typically class form. There was certainly 
no marked upsurge in -revolutionary kervour, as had been the 
case in 1918. There was a tendency, however, for the German 
proletariat to see little danger for itself with the arrival of 
the Red Army and to care little about what the enemy had in 
store for the Nazi Bonzen. It is perhaps here that many German 
workers, without being or wishing to be Communists or fellow- 
travellers, recalled what was convenient and comforting to 
recall - the fact that the USSR claimed to be a "w6rkers' 
state". This is echoed in the slogan "the Reds are not so bad", 
which was falling on fertile soil as early as the spring of 
1943. But this was no 
ýhymn 
of praise to Communism and was 
certainly not the same as "how wonderful Bolshevism is". In 
fact, although difficult to define in detail, the attitude of 
the German working class to the Soviets was a fundamentally. 
passive one. Whilst not welcoming themv it did not necessarily 
regard them as the enemy of the working man. It must be 
remembered that the years of the Weimar republic were not far 
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off; still twelve years before, a considerable proportion of the 
German proletariat was faithful to the SPD and KPD. The common 
working-class attitude - at least, up to the summer of 1944 - 
can be summed up as follows: Bolshevik rule would be tolerable, 
no worse but no better than at present. 
In Germany, as in Great Britain, the war was accompanied 
by a radicalisation of political thought. The recognition of 
social equality meant that radical social reform was demanded 
after victory. The German government paid less attention to this 
than the British government with its far-reaching post-war plans 
did. Nevertheless, the recurring use of the expressions 
It socialist community" and "socialism of the deed" shows that 
Nazi propaganda was playing lip service to what it recognised 
as a social and political undercurrent in the thinking of the 
masses. 
This flaring up of class feeling was accompanied by a 
growing aggressiveness in the attitude to the Party which, in 
turn, provided further proof of the non-existience of the 
Volksgemeinschaft, of the rejection of central Nazi propaganda 
theses and of the recognition of the fact that the NSDAP no 
longer represented the interests of any one class - in 
particular, those of the "small, man". As the burdens of war 
became harder to bear, the Party took on increasingly the 
function of a much-needed scapegoat. It is rather ironic that 
the more the Nazi Party utilised world Jewry as its scapegoat, 
the more the German people utilised the NSDAP as theirs. This 
should not, in general, be seen as a phenomenon peculiar to 
Nazi Germany. In Great Britain there was a marked antagonism 
towards local bureaucrats in 1940-1, particularly in bombed 
provincial cities. Fury at the ineptitude of local government 
on Merseyside, for example, was mirrored in rumours of white- 
flagst martial law, food riots and even "peace-demonstrations" 
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16 
on the morrow of heavy bombing. In Frankfurt-on-Main heavy 
bombing'led to greater class sensitivity in response to Party 
propaganda, and particularly the working class spurned any 
attemp .t to put the work of the Party in a good light 
17 This 
readiness to think the worst of the Party or of local 
administrators was therefore accentuated by bombing. 
At the end of the Third Reich, a further split in the 
"national community" becaýne evident - between Party members 
and non-Party members of-all clastes. The more official 
propaganda reiterated the thesis of the inseparable bond between 
the German people and the National Socialist Party, the more 
pronounced did the tendency become for the German people to 
make precisely this distinction. For a great part of. the German 
population the Nazi Party was becoming something external, even 
oppressive, by-1944-5; it was certainly no longer regarded as 
the representative and guarantor of German interests but an 
organisation following its own selfish interests. This 
inevitably had a far-reaching effect on the popular attitude to 
a propaganda claiming to represent the unity of a National 
Socialist Germany. The few believers left were more often than 
not ýhose who had no alternativý but to believe. Also 
ascertainable was the drift of ýhe millions of lukewarm or 
opportunist members away from theNSDAP from the summer of 
1943. The'hard core left was a surprisingly small minority of 
the total membership. Both the Party leadership and Germany's 
enemies grossly overestimated the fanaticism of these 
representatives of the "New Order". 
The friction caused by the evacuation schemes showed that 
there were, in fact, two quite different Germanies - urban and 
rural Germany. There was a confrontation between two "worlds" 
which hitherto had never taken place, two "worlds" that the 
Nazi Volksgemeinschaft had not managed to bring together. The 
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same misunderstandings and adjustment difficulties were to be 
observed in wartime Britain. Thereq too, many preferred to put 
up with the bombs rather than remain unwelcome guests of people 
with such strange ways. 
Regional Differences 
In the same way as the German Volksgemeinschaft divided up into 
its constituent parts with the prospect and preoccupation with 
military defeat, there was a marked tendency to nurture hopes 
of local particularism and generous treatment. This comes out 
pArticularly clearly in the source material used in Chapters 
4 and 7. The Rhineland was quite confident that it would be 
occupied by. the Western Powers, by states possessing a similar 
culture and "civilisation". The Austrians and Bavarians paid 
increasing attention to those traditions and customs which made 
them different to "other" Germans. Because of them they 
expected special treatment; perhaps they might even be treated 
as the "victims" of Prussian nationalism and militarism. Such 
hopes would to a great extent be fulfilled in Austria. After 
the war, few - even in the Allied camp - were to recall that 
back in the "good days" of 1938-42 the enthusiasm of the 
Austrians for the ideas of National Socialism was no less 
pronounced (perhaps more so) than in the "Old Reich". In the 
west of Germany people feared the impending defeat less than in 
the east, and this would help to explain the indifference to 
what was considered irrelevant anti-Bolshevik propaganda. 
Up to about the summer of 1944 the enemy bombing offensive 
split the German Reich in two - the bombed areas of west and 
middle Germany and the unbombed east and rural areas. The latter, 
continued as if the war were far away, almost untouched by the 
dangers and annoyances of wartime life. The awareness of the 
inhabitants of the blitzed towns of this disparity further 
undermined the national unity and the trust in the leadership. 
I 
- 377 - 
Only f4ith the extension of bombing to east Germany and the 
increase in low-flying attacks in rural areas in 1944-5 did this 
division vanish. Allied bombing also brought latent provincial 
antagonism towards the Reichshauptstadt to the surface. The 
schadenfreude of the inhabitants of the bombed Ruhr and 
Rhineland on hearing of the raids on Berlin in early 1943, 
described in Chapter 5, was, in fact, a demonstration of hurt 
pride that their sufferings had not been recognised by outsiders. 
There was a marked tendency for each bombed town to allot 
itself a special position in the series of enemy raids and even 
to regard itself as the victim of the worst attack yetj8* Angus 
Calder has described a similar phenomenon during the blitz on 
London in September-October 1940: 
".... in most parts of the country, the tendency 
was to pooh-pooh the stories of what was happening 
in London. 
-If a 
town had. been attacked, however 
lightly, the locals wanted'to know why London had 
all the publicity. "19 
Bombing posed an insuperable problem for Nazi propagandists, 
who were compelled to address two quite different audiences at 
the same time; too little treatment of the raids would embitter 
the minority, the bombed urban population, too much would 
depress the country folks and the inhabitants of other towns 
who constituted the majority. 
At the end of the war, Germany can be divided into two 
parts, the east and west, when examining the question of morale. 
If morale is to be measured in terms of confidence inNictory 
and trust in-the leadership, then it was much higher in the 
east than in the west. Naturally, until the summer of 1944, 
east Germans had scarcely any war scars to show. With the 
sudden advent of the Soviet invader, the mass flight westwards 
and the loss of their homes in the subsequent months, their 
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morale and naive trust in the worldly powers that be do not seem 
to have been broken., But theirs had been a much different kind 
of life and much less sophisticated than that characteristic in 
the more urbanised and cosmopolitan west. Maybe their simple 
trust in theýpolitical leadership was essentially-an expression 
of the hope that-only German victory could restore them the life 
and the things they had just lost. In the west, on the other 
hand, behaviour-was often outwardly defeatist in 1945, even 
among those who had decided to stay put. Here, enemy victory 
was not associated with the loss'but the preservation of 
everything one had. The image of the Anglo-Americans made defeat 
and political change palatable, even agreeable. Moreover, the 
resistance will had been pulverised by 1945 by the fatal 
combination of five years of constant aerial bombardment and 
two and a half years of uninterrupted military defeat. The strain 
was no longer bearable and the advent of bombless nights was 
reason enough to welcome the end of the "Thousand Year Reich". 
8. Attitudes to a 
ýossible Defeat Situation 
Closely linked with a study of class and regional factors is an 
examination of German attitudes to possible German defeat and the 
post-war world. Nazi propagandists certainly underestimated the 
significance of immediately personal factors in determining the 
popular m ood and thoughts of the future. In 1943 the Eastern 
Front was much more important in the popular mind in as much as 
it posed a threat to the lives o'f relatives and friends and 
much less important were the hopes of Lebensraum or purely 
ideological and racial aspects. This essentially apolitical 
basic attitude would-explain why so many Germans found it not 
too difficult to come to terms with the idea of future defeat. 
Doubtlessq most Germans still wanted to win the war in 1943, but, 
as this hope was. dashed, the stress was increasingly placed on 
securing an acceptable way of life in a defeated Germany. 
- 379 - 
Already at the beginning-of 1943, vague thoughts of a non-Nazi 
Germany had become a danger signal for Goebbels. There was a 
fatal connection between military setback and individual 
reflection on the future. In spite of all such morale-boosting 
themes as anti-Bolshevism which were meant to demonstrate the 
inseparability of Germany and National Socialism, preoccupation 
with thoughts of future defeat grew after Stalingrad in ratio to 
the deterioration in the Reich's military position. The very 
fact that the war came to be viewed in terms of-its likely 
impact on the individual, his family and immediate circle of 
friends ran quite contrary to the spirit of the 
Volksgemeinschaft. 
It is amazing to what extent popular views concerning the 
end of the war in the years 1943-5 were coloured by a timely 
a4ticipation of the post-war world_and how great a role was 
being played in these views by those people who were, at the 
same time, bombing and killing their holders. By the winter 
of 1944-5, when all hopes in Soviet generosity had been thwarted, 
the Anglo-Americans constituted the consolatory factor par 
excellence. In Chapter 7 the evidence showed beyond doubt th at 
the favourable image of the western foes proved much stronger 
than the propaganda argument that enemy victory would mean the 
end of the German people. Official-atrocity propaganda which 
threatened to confuse the picture was simply ignored. There 
was a marked inclination to use one s own experience or rumours 
in order to find what one wished to find - proof of Anglo- 
American humanity.. Any tit-bit of information was seized upon 
if it confirmed the favourable pre-formed opinion. This moral 
preparation for defeat went. so far in the early months of 1945 
that the majority of West Germans expected better treatment and 
a higher living standard than they were in fact to get in the 
first th3ýee years of enemy occupation. This growing identity 
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with the Western Po, ý7ers -a total negation of all Nazi 
propaganda goals - was illustrated in the widespread illusions 
of a common struggle against the Bolsheviks, which even survived 
the death of the founder of the Nazi creed. This phenomenon 
at, first appears to have been a belated and startling acceptance 
of Goebbels' thesis of a European "crusade" against Bolshevism. 
But it was really no such thing, for in 1945 it was prevalent 
in a Germany where National Socialism was rapidly becoming 
defunct. -It might be seen rather as a sign of identity with the 
West and as an acceptance of the idea that Germany's future lay 
with the Western Powers. The Americans and the British became 
the very guarantee-of a return to "normality", and in 1945 
German military resistance was meeting with the active 
opposition of many west Germans, as it constituted an obstacle 
to that post-war world of popular fantasy. 
Finally, German experience in the years 1943-5 shows how 
unimportant political ideas and ideology - even nationalism - 
are, when the life and the interests ofthe individual are 
threatened. It would even appear that Many Germans were so 
convinced of future wes. tern generosity that they were prepared 
to accept as the price not only the end of National Socialism 
but also the end of the unity of the German state. 
' **** . '. * 
Some of. the factors determining German morale and response to 
propaganda in these last two years of the war seem to transcend 
national frontiers and political structures. It is tempting 
to see in the reaction of the German people at this time typical 
human behavioural patterns and response characteristics. The 
number of parallels between wartime Nazi Germany and wartime 
democratic Britain is quite astounding. They point the way for 
and show the potentialities of an examination of the very same 
- 381 - 
factorst which have been described in detail in this thesis, 
in wartime Britain or perhaps in other lands at other times. 
A. L. Unger has made a valuable contribution to "internationalising' 
basic political and social patterns in his examination of two 
totalitarian statest which are. often viewed as two extremes of 
20 
the political spectrum - Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany. But, 
as implied above, totalitarianism does not need to be a 
prerequisite for--a comparative study of two- leaderships and two 
peoples in wartime. 
It is certainly to be hoped 'that the factors touched on in 
this study of wartime Germany will also give students of the 
Third Reiýh ýood for thought and ideas for future research. 
Although the Nazi press and cinema have been the subject of a 
number of studies, it is remarkable how little has been written 
on wartime Nazi broadcasting. An authoritative account has yet 
to be written. The reports of the BBC Monitoring Service would 
provide here a wealth of information and a-virtually untapped 
documentary source. Used in conjunction with the numerous SD. 
reports on popular response to wireless programmes, they would 
most certainly supply a fascinating and rewarding basis for 
research into the content and effect of Nazi broadcasting. 
Attention might also be paid to the role of the apparently 
purely "entertainment" aspects in the. world of Nazi radio. 
It would be only right to end this account with a final 
word on the "mind" behind National Socialist propaganda, Joseph 
Goebbels, and the question of his overall "success". So much 
depended on the person, of-the Reich Minister of Propaganda, but 
it would, nevertheless, be wrong to hold him entirely 
responsible for the propaganda failures of 1943-45. As 
explained above, the external situation was such at this time 
that it posed an insurmountable problem. Even the ablest 
propagandist would have been at a loss to know what to do - and 
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21 
the "evil genius". Goebbels, wa's here no exception. The 
period between Stalingrad and the German surrender shows up 
the limits of propaganda very clearly indeed. At this time 
Goebbels rapidly became the victim of a situation he could do 
nothing to control. Many students of Nazi Germany, as well 
as many contemporaries of the Third Reich, have fallen victim to 
the temptation to exaggerate the effect of both propaganda in 
general and Nazi propaganda in particular, and have 
consequently grossly overestimated Goebbels' achievements. 
Hagemann believes, for example, that Goebbels enabled the 
German leadership to lengthen the war and that his propaganda 
rallied the German people to, the regime right up to the bitter 
22 
end, According to Werner Stephan, who served in the 
Propaganda Ministry for twelve years, Goebbels "kept the 
armament workers in the factories" and without him "the struggle 
23 
could-not have been continued" so long. Such sweeping 
generalisations are highly misleading. This study has shown 
, 
that the last two years of the war were marked by a losing 
struggle by Goebbels' propagandists to retain control of 
people's minds rather than by a series of propaganda "victories" 
and "successes". Boelcke is very near the truth when he points 
to the sheer impossibility of anyone - Goebbels included - of 
24 turning at will a "low" in mor , ale 
into a "high" . Other 
factors played, an equally or even more decisive part than 
propaganda in ensuring the continuation of German resistance 
until May 1945: apathy and the powerlessness to change "fate", 
political indifference, the respect for authority, the force 
of habit, the fear of punishment by the, Gestapo or by the enemy, 
the lack of an immediate alternative (as opposed to long-term 
hopes of ene mercy). Goebbels' work should thus be seen as MY 
one factor among many determining people's behaviour in the 
second half of the Second World War. 
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Nor should it be forgotten that during the war the 
Propaganda Minister was not the indisputable master of Nazi 
propaganda that he had been in the preceding years of peace. 
After September 1939, he had to share control with 
Reichspressechef Dietrich, Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, 
Rosenberg's Ostministerium, and, most important of all, the 
25 Propaganda Office of the Wehrmacht, In military matters 
Goebbels' freedom was very restricted indeed and he, too, could 
only move within the-limits laid down by the OKW. This meant, 
in turn, that he was quite unjustifiably blamed for all 
propaganda faux pas - also in matters he could do absolutely 
nothing to control. For Germans and foreigners alike, who 
were not versed in the intricacies of Nazi state and Party 
organisation, Goebbels' name was synonymous with Nazi 
propaganda. The over-optimistic and short-sighted military 
reporting from the. Salerno bridgehead in September 1943 is a 
case in point. The Mirýister was truly grieved at being held 
26* 
responsible abroad for this propaganda debacleý 
In the field of morale, however, Goebbels had a 
relatively free hand. The greater the need to look after 
civilian morale became, the more important did his position 
become. By 1943 he had, in the eyes of. the German masses, 
assumed a dominant place in the Nazi hierarchy, second only to 
the FUhrer. Few-Germans were aware of the power of the graue 
eminenz, Bormann. The importance Goebbels ascribed to the 
interaction between propaganda and morale has already been 
pointed out. Nevertheless, the Minister's extreme vanity 
prevented him from making an unprejudiced and realistic 
assessment of morale and propaganda effect. More often than 
not, he preferred to see what he wanted to see and, by the end 
of the war, he was putting much'more trust in his own 
intuitive interpretation of the real mood and feelings of the 
population than in the unanimous findings of the morale reports. 
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He ascribed more importance to one flattering letter arriving 
at his ministry than to ten 'I negative" SD intelligence reports. 
Such a man could not accept failure and the approaching 
confrontation with reality. For Goebbels suicide was the only 
possible flight from the recognition of failure. 
0 
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CHAPTER 8 
According, to H arrissonlopcit*, PP*314-5: "Champions of re- 
p4sal. were conspicuously more numerous in the unblitzed 
places in the countryside. as well as among elderly males who 
had fought in the First World War, But one, was repeatedly 
impreýssed by the paucitypsometimes the total absencesof such 
reactions among most blitz victims* The published versions 
greatly exaggerated the private mood, " One of the reasons 
he gives for this was "the strongly felt probability that 
the mord''wel bombed 'them' the more they would bomb or in 
some way retaliate on us (even unto gas) - so why make it 
worse for everyonepourselves included? " A similar attitude 
was observed in bombed German towns after the beginning of 
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the 'Little Blitz1 in January 1944 (see page 228) and after 
the launching of Vergeltung in June 1944 (see page 235); see 
- -also-Calder. The People's War. Britain 1939-1945 (Panther 
Edition), pp. 264-5. 
2, For an Account of the Beveridge Report9see Calder. op. cit., 
pp. 607-19. 
3. For a comparison of the use of repetition in Nazi Germany and 
in the Soviet Unionsee UngersThe Totalitarian Party. Party 
and People in Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. 
4. Ellul. Propagandes,, pp. 204-5- 
5. Harrisson, op. cit., pp. 281-2. 
6. Whensfor example. the illustrated magazinevDie Wochelcarried 
--a, Picture of the playing of the gramoLphone recording of the 
Sondermeldung fanfaressGoebbels threatened the editor respons- 
ible with imprisonment in a concentration camp. These victory 
announcements would lose their effect if the 'mystic' element 
were revealed, See Scheel, Krieg Uber Xtherwellen, p. 146, 
7. Harrisson. op. cit., p. 207* 
8. Ibidosp. 2459P, 247* 
. 
9, Ibid, sp. 263* 
10. HSta Wiesba4entAbt., 483/5741* SD Abo Frankfurt/M, gBetr: Presse- 
.. Propagandal 
Feb, 1944, 
11. Harrisson. op. cit., P. 217. 
12. Ibid., P, 242; Calder. op. cit., p, 246. 
13* Harrissonsop. cit. PPP*316-7; Caldersop. cit., P, 156; for a more 
detailed account of the effect of German broadcasts to wartime 
Britain, see Briggs, The War of Words (The History of Broad- 
casting in the United. KingdomoVol. III)*PP*140-59,232-7, *306-8. 
14. See SteinertoOP-cit*P. 434* 
15, Baird. The Mythical World of Nazi War Propaganda 1939-194519P*258. 
16, Harrissonsop, cit*ppp, 238924Q-1; Calder. op. cit,, P, 246. 
17. Same source as in footnote 10, 
18. In his account of the German blitz on the British provinces 
in 1940-1, Calder (OP, citolp, 250) writes of "the Jealousy with 
which the inhabitants of each blitzed town insisted on regard- 
ing it as the worst hit of all", 
190 Ibid*, P, 2349 
20. UngergThe Totalitarian Party, Party and People in Nazi Germany 
and Soviet Russia. 
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21, The title of a book on Goebbels by Eo Ebermayer and H. 0, 
Meissner. 
22. W. Hagemann. Publizistik im Dritten Reichjp*242sPP-479-r9O- 
23o Stephan, joseph Goebbels - Damon einer DiktaturqPP-271-2P310- 
24. Boelcke, Wollt Ihr den Totalen Krieglp. 19 (dtv paperback). 
25. The consequent friction and disputes about competence are 
described in Baird,, The Kystical World of Nazi War Propaganda 
1939-1945ppp. 28-37. 
26. On 18 September 1943 he wrote in his diary: "The military 
news sources under General Jodl have been writing about a 
Dunkirk and a Gallipolligand now the whole pack of enemy 
propagandists attacks me and holds me responsible for this 
totally false news policyl .... It won't do for my good name 
to be dragged in the dirt by the world and then, when things 
go wrong. for those who are really responsible to fade away 
into the background, leaving me to take. it on the chino... " 
, 
Ed. Lochner. The Goebbels Diaries#Po367. 
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